

Indonesian Islamic Culture

in Historical Perspectives

Indonesian Islamic Culture in Historical Perspectives

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Foreword
Minister of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

Assalamu'alaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh,

My sincere praise and gratitude to Allah the Almighty for the publication *Indonesian Islamic Culture in Historical Perspectives*. This book is translation of 12 articles from the Indonesian Language book, entitled *Sejarah Kebudayaan Islam Indonesia* (History of Indonesian Islamic Culture).

I warmly welcome the presence of this English edition because it delivers a message that presence of Islam in Indonesia is a result of a long historical dialogue between universal values with the reality of the local cultural diversity. This Cultural encounter has produced Indonesia Islamic culture which is characterized by its spirit of tolerance and peace. Since it was born from the encounter between the Nusantara cultural character and the Islamic doctrine.

With its tolerance and peace – loving orientation, Indonesian cultural has from the early period been part of Nusantara Islamic culture. This is one of primary contributions of Islam in the process of strengthening the nation and the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.

This precious experience should be shared by the whole member of the national community. On one hand, the characteristics would give the right understanding to the people that Indonesia Islam is a tolerant and peace –loving way of life. And, one the other hand, it can offer a worthy contribution to the endless effort to create a peaceful world, the world that has been a dream of every nation.

Wassalamu'alaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh,

Minister of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

Muhadjir Effendy

Preface

Director General of Culture Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

Assalamu'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh,

Islam, as one of the religious teachings practised in Nusantara, has a substantial contribution to Indonesian culture. Initially broadcasted through the peaceful medium of *dakwah* (sermon) which embraced local culture, Islam was soon accepted by society as a religion that advocates peace. Throughout its development, Islam has coloured and enriched the diverse cultural patterns of Nusantara.

Culturally, Islam in Indonesia has a distinctly Indonesian identity and characteristics distinguishing it from Islamic culture found elsewhere, including in Africa, Europe, and its place of origin in the Middle East. The practice of Islam in Indonesia consequently shaped the Indonesian Islamic culture. This is related to the initial entry of Islam which was peacefully accepted by locals as it was introduced in ways that accommodated local cultural elements. Local culture was included in practical applications of Islamic teachings, including weddings, celebrations, commemorations of life cycles from birth to death, and daily prayers, without abandoning the core teachings or *akidah* of Islam.

Islamic values subsequently entered the creative intellectual space of the traditional education system of society. The existence of *pesantren* or Islamic schools as a traditional educational institution is a process of assimilating and adopting the educational system that has grown and existed in the pre-Islamic age. The pre-existing education system established in the classical Hindu and Buddhist ages continued to be used upon the entry of Islam, albeit with some of the contents altered to align it with Islamic principles. There were significant differences between the teaching methods of Islamic *pesantren* in Nusantara and Islamic-based education of Islamic states in the Arab region, Africa, the Persian Gulf, and Western Asia which has a predominantly Muslim population.

In later developments, Islamic views that resulted from the learning process in *pesantren* also seemed to be more accommodative, fluid, and non-radical. These views shaped the paradigms of Islamic organisations formed and raised in Nusantara, such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Persis, and other Islamic organisations in Nusantara. These organisations were able to build a close and mutually beneficial relationship with each other without focusing on their differences. In modern day Indonesia, the presence of Islamic organisations formed in Nusantara can be considered as an important pillar that sustains the reality of lives in the nation-state of Indonesia.

Hence, we welcome the re-publication of this book, *The History of Indonesian Islamic Culture*. This book is important not only as a point of reference on Islamic culture in Indonesia, but also as an instrument of Indonesian diplomacy to show the *rahmatan lil 'alamin* lives of Indonesian muslim society and a view of Islam that is peaceful and aims to protect the lives of people amidst the prevalent radical interpretations of Islam that has distressed the rest of the world recently. It is our hope that the re-publication of this book will be a positive and useful endeavour.

Wassalamu'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh.

Jakarta, March 2017

Director General of Culture

Hilmar Farid

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
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Introduction

Taufik Abdullah

I

When you think about history, sometimes you may feel a bit funny. People say that history is about the real narrative or the true reconstruction of events or series of happenings a community experienced at a specific locality in the past. That past event usually has no longer any empirical reality in the present. Historical research tries to tell and, if possible, explain the causality of past events and happenings. However, in retrospect, it is common that efforts to construct a string of words that tell of events in the past depart from an awareness of present realities. Sometimes, or even often, attempts to reconstruct past events come with the hope that valuable lessons may be learned.

This may the case when someone is curious about historical events and past dynamics. But when dealing with contemporary events the problem is somewhat different. Since their start, series of events or happenings offer themselves to be noted and even remembered. When questions or new insights enter the consciousness system, this reconstruction of events can also be repeated. When only part of the entire process is captured, other scientific disciplines will fill in the gaps of information about the events in question. Frequently, contemporary events seem to provide the whole "self" that may be reconstructed at any time, though, of course, merely in series of words. It may be said that we reconstruct different stories about how events may have begun, continued, and ended. So, it is understandable that there are to frequent debates about the validity of the reconstruction of contemporary events.

Indeed, historical reconstruction can provoke debate. The more important the event is perceived, the more likely it provokes debates especially about what evidence should be deemed valid or what happenings should be reconstructed in series of words? Is the reconstruction of events a true reflection of these past events or occurrences? The more important the events are in the system of public awareness, the more poignant the view on the level of truth that can be expressed. The more fundamental the sense of responsibility given to the result of the reconstruction, the higher the possibility that debates will be provoked.

The scars and debris of past relics can also lead to curiosity. At first the answers to our questions may be mythological as if they originate from the days of "nowhere" and happened upon the aid of supernatural powers. But then, in accordance with scientific development, the answers became increasingly academic as well. Thus for example, when unoccupied remnants of temples are found scattered in isolated forests, they will be

increasingly recognized as witnesses of the level of civilization and of the cultural style of the past, even though they now have been long abandoned.

If these epoch-making temples are reconstructed in historical descriptions, who would not become interested or even fascinated when dealing with romantic and even heroic stories? The reconstruction effort becomes more exciting when old manuscripts are discovered to be deciphered, and especially when a myth is found that is still part of the present oral tradition. Anyone interested in the history of the ancient periods will be amazed to hear the story of Ken Arok and Ken Dedes. how Ken Arok had the audacity to kill King Tunggul Ametung because he was interested in Ken Dedes, the beautiful queen. Moreover, he was convinced that his success in seizing Ken Dedes would put him on the throne of Singosari (in the early 13th century Java). But, as it happened, his success came with Mpu Gandring's curse. Or let us take the historical narrative of the ingenuity of Raden Wijaya, who not only deceived and defeated the Mongols, but also managed to declare himself the first king of Majapahit (1293), the kingdom that in its culminated glory supposedly dominated almost the entire Indonesian archipelago. Moreover, anyone may gain knowledge from this kind of historical stories about the various dimensions and the nature of lost past cultures. Perhaps these stories reveal past political tendencies that may put the democratic values and behavioral patterns of modern nation-states in context. Is it so that the ideological ties with the past we learned at school about what may be called "national personality" or "identity of the nation" legitimized the validity of contemporary nation-state's socio-political life?

Attention for and curiosity about the historical narratives behind the temples, buildings and other ancient relics sometimes feels as if they are witnesses to changing cultural foundations. Everybody knows that culture is not only decoration and social relations. Culture is the foundation upon which social life functions. Even material objects like buildings are displays of material culture, which allows a good life. In all non-material manifestations, words of the spoken language, implied or written, culture is an inseparable part of social life. Within culture social ties and communications can be assembled. Culture provides the foundation and the historical awareness of both personal and social life. Regardless of the different shapes and forms in which they are embodied, in essence, culture is the embodiment of the system of meaning[1] that makes sense of and about everything. When we look at a monument, for example, we know very well that it conveys a message. Indeed, a culture is "a world of symbols" embodied in manifestations ranging from facial expressions and hand movements and the selection and use of words up to the shapes of utensils, buildings and shelters. Culture is not something that just exists and is useful in daily life; it is much more than that. Culture "says something about something" for every possible form and manifestation.

1. See Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture, New York: Basic Books, 1973.*

Through all its types, shapes, and symbols, culture not only just shapes contemporary social life and links it to its social foundations in the past, but it also offers a vision and hope for the supporting community's future. Therefore, culture is intimately related to transcendental consciousness that connects people to their beliefs and that transcends mundane reality. In general, cultural manifestations, whether material objects, strings of words, or even lifestyles, are closely related to a spiritual sense of the divine. This is so for historical relics, building and statues, and all else inherited from the past such as manuscripts and books, myths and oral traditions; they usually spark a sense of religiosity. So do reflecting on and understanding the meaning of life, and the ties and the purpose of social life. It is in an atmosphere of religiosity that the relationship between man and the universe as contained in old manuscripts and oral traditions is examined in detail. Man knows that history is the treasury of memories of past religious beliefs and the spiritual foundation of personal and communal life. Usually, religious beliefs underpin the quest for the secrets of the universe. Thus, religion is believed to offer the true answers to the fundamental questions about human dignity. Religious beliefs give the legitimate answers to all the unanswered secrets of the universe.

The way the meaning of religion is perceived shows people's desire to understand mankind's social nature and historical dynamics and, to a lesser degree, the nation and local communities. This is especially so if a religion is cosmopolitan in nature and ignores geographic and ethnic boundaries. In the Indonesian archipelago this desire can also mean an encouragement to learn about and to understand the origins of the arrival and the spread of Islam, a religion that denies regional human cultural boundaries. Understanding the teachings and the history of Islam is even more needed when one wants to understand the Muslim community's dynamics or when Islam is debated. What is it in the present reality of Islam that influences and even guides various aspects of private and social life? This question has increasingly attracted attention because the historical and structural context enables us to understand events that happen regularly.

The historical and cultural dynamics that are considered the spark of Islam, from the various debates about the essence of religion and political behavior to the architectural shapes of houses of worship, generally attract attention and even have become debated matters. This is understandable because Islam is a living religion and constantly exposes itself to or, perhaps, is faced with problems from the past, the present, and the future. Islam is also a religion that refutes the separation between private and social life because of the ties between His creatures and the Creator of the universe. More importantly, Islam is a living religion and its adherents commonly perceive it as existing in a dynamic situation. It is increasingly evident also that Islam is being placed into the socio-cultural context of its presence. When this

is done, everybody suddenly faces the sociological and anthropological reality of the way the same understanding of God's oneness and the doctrine of Muhammad as the last Prophet can also lead to diversity. So, when historical and sociological reviews are conducted, will they generate curiosity? How many are the true faces of singular Islam?

II

In the history of Indonesian culture the first academic debates on Islam concerned seemingly simple things. They revolved around the question of when and how Islam started to penetrate public life in the archipelago. The debates were increasingly "festive" if only because the process was perceived as reflecting meanings that implied mixtures of events that happened in the past. That is, the historical narrative of Indonesia, in which an event or, more precisely, series of occurrences shaped the archipelago's historical current of what is referred to as "the arrival of Islam". When this was seen to have occurred, people said that the region entered a "new period" of its history. Perhaps this needed no debates, but debates happened anyway. For example, in historical discourse, what is meant by "the arrival of Islam"? Does it mean that at some given time, adherents of Islam arrived in this country, should it be understood in the sense that Islam started to expand its influence, or does it mean that the development of this universal religion had already happened?

The problem is that historical reconstruction also requires certainty about the meaning of narrated events. A simple example is the tendency of those interested in the historical development of Islam in Indonesia to say that Islam has "come" to Indonesia in the first century of the Hijrah, thus, in the 7th century A.D. But what does the word "come" mean in this context? If they had used written sources rather than resorting to hypothetical conjectures, they should have said that in the mid-9th century A.D. Ibn Kurdhadhbih and Marwazi had talked a lot about the region. From then on, all sorts of information became known about the region, for example, the fact that Fansur (Barus), the region on the western coast of Sumatra produced camphor had already been known for a long time, but they were just facts and did not say anything about the spread of Islam. In other words, the first information about the introduction of Islam in the archipelago was just in the form of news. It is therefore no use to claim that since the time of Prophet Muhammad Islam has successfully been established in this religion.[2]

In the second stage, evidence was discovered of the existence of Muslims who lived in the archipelago. When this stage had been entered, it no longer only concerned knowledge of the Arab world, located between the Persian Gulf and China, an age-long trade route. At this stage inscribed tombstones

2. See G.R. Tibbets, *A Study of the Arabic texts containing material on South-east Asia, Leiden & London: E.J. Brill, 1979.*

were discovered telling of the presence of Muslims in the Indonesian archipelago. Having researched the tombstone in Leran (East Java) from the year 475 A.H. or 1082 A.D. , Guillot and Kalus concluded that it is an Islamic tomb. But, can the existence of this tomb be used as evidence that Islam had planted its influence in the region even before the Kingdom of Majapahit was established in 1293? This Islamic tombstone is just a coincidence. Having studied it in depth, Ravaisse concluded that "the Leran inscription only proves one thing, namely there had already existed in that area a significant number of Muslims consisting of descendants of the settlers, the natives or mixed, more than 450 years before the time of Malik Ibrahim. It turns out that Nusantara's experts are now arguably agreed to determine the Islamization of East Java in between the riots following the death of King Erlangga around the year 1045 and the heyday of the kingdom of Daha (Kediri) at the reign of the king Jayabaya, less than a century later."[3]

But isn't this statement also just a historical hypothesis? It is ascertained that a small community of Muslims existed and that they were buried in tombstones displaying their religion? Can this fact be used as evidence that Islam had begun to develop in Indonesia, especially in 11th century Java? In the *Nagarakertagama*, Mpu Prapanca, the poet of Majapahit, did not mention the presence of any followers of Islam in the palace of King Hayam Wuruk. But the tombstones of Traloyo and Trawulan (1290 Saka or 1368-69 A.D.), which are located in the capital of Majapahit, gives the clear impression that Muslims had been dwelling in Majapahit's palace. The tombs of the royal family are even located in the same cemetery. Moreover, when the development of Islam in Java is reassessed again, it would clearly show that historical evidence from just two centuries later, at the beginning of the 16th century, shows that the spread of Islam in almost all parts of Java had indeed begun.[4]

If this is true, the earliest spread of Islam occurred when it had already entered its third phase. In this phase, the "era of Islamization" did not start in a power center. It started in a village. If we listen to the story as told in the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* and, in a slightly different version, in the *Sejarah Melayu*, it seems that this process began when a village champion received spiritual insight from a cleric who purportedly came from the Holy Land. After having crossed the line of "infidelity" he also managed to set up a supra-village power center, which later grew into an empire. While expanding his power, the ruler enthroned himself as sultan spread Islam. At this time also the waters of the Indonesian archipelago were increasingly crowded with international traders.

3. Ludvik Kalus and Claude Guillot, "Nisan Leran (Jawa) berangka tahun 475 H/1082 dan nisan-nisan terkait" in Claude Guillot & Ludvik Kalus, *Inskripsi Islam tertua di Indonesia, Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, École francaise d'Extrême-Orient, Forum Jakarta-Paris, 2008: 30.*

4. M.C. Ricklefs, *Mystic synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth century to the Early Nineteenth Centuries, Norwalk: EastBridge, 2006, 13-15.*

So, enjoy the translation and the theological meaning of the inscription on the tombstone of Sultan Malikus-saleh (1297), the hero who had become the king of Samudera Pasai (Aceh), the first Islamic kingdom:

> "Indeed, the world is transitory. The world is not eternal. Indeed, the world is like a spider's nest. Verily for you this world is sufficient. Hi, people looking for strength. Life is short. Everyone in the world will certainly die."[5]

The tombstone seems to have come from Gujarat. Is it possible that Islam entered Nusantara via northern India? A debate was started and many scientists were in favor of the theory that Islam came to these islands from Gujarat. However, during the time of Sultan Malikus Saleh, Gujarat cannot be regarded as a region with many Muslims. Scholars who doubted that Islam came from Gujarat said that it was more likely that the spreaders of Islam came to these islands from the Coromandel coast and Malabar. Can this reconstruction of history be accepted? An Indian scientist, moreover, saw the possibility of Bengal as the source of the spread of Islam to the archipelago.

But what if the maritime trade stemmed from the Persian Gulf? In that case, it is very likely that Islam propagated its existential meaning in this archipelago directly from Arabia. But based on what evidence? Considering the centuries-old maritime trade between the Persian Gulf and the coast of China one might wonder if China was the origin of the arrival of Islam to this archipelago. According to this controversial argument, did some of the "*wali sanga*" (nine saints), actually come from China?

Scholars continue to argue in order to arrive at the historical truth. Only some years ago Drewes,[6] a prominent philologist who wrote about a variety of texts on Islam in Java, vented his skepticism about the possibility of there being only one single solution to this issue. If Islamization is defined as the third phase in the process of the beginning of a deliberate spread of Islam, then the growth of political power should also be taken into account.

Thus, the start of the sophisticated debates Anthony Johns initiated seemed to lose their initial spirit.[7] It is not debated any longer whether the propagators were traders who earned their living while taking the time to convey the "divine message", as often asserted. Or is it, as Johns stressed, that this proselytizing was due to members of Sufi Orders who actively traveled around to introduce the scripture. When the traders were waiting

5. T. Ibrahim Alfian, *Kontribusi Samudra Pasai terhadap Studi Islam Awal Asia Tenggara, Yogyakarta: Ceninnetss Press, 2002. This inscription quotes Q.S. a-Rahman (55) and Q.S. al-Aniya (21).*

6. G.W.J. Drewes, "New Light on the coming of Islam to Indonesia?", *B.K.I.,124, 4, 433-459.*

7. Anthony H. Johns, "Tentang Kaum Mistik dalam penulisan sejarah Islam" in Taufik Abdullah (ed.) *Sejarah dan Masyarakat: Lintasan Historis Islam di Indonesia. Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1987.*

for the right wind to continue their voyages it is possible that various things may have happened and, like in the case of Ibn Battuta, wandering religious scholars may have been a normal phenomenon?[8] Moreover, if scholars had listened to the stories recorded in all kinds of traditional historiographies, they may have come to the conclusion that the different historical events they contain are illustrations of regional differences.

III

The scholarly debate about the arrival of Islam in the archipelago is part of the efforts of scholars to explain the origins of socio-cultural realities and the impact of Islam's presence in all areas of life. When the development and spread of Islam was further explained, various unusual additional explanations were also put forward. It was said that Islam spread since the 16th century when several power centers had embraced this religion and that it was related to what Schrieke said was a "race with Christianity".[9] Meant to address a different historical fact but similar in tone, this is also what van Leur commented about the deep level of the Islamization process in Java. This Islamization process, he said, just hit the awareness of the upper layer of the Javanese community. So for him Islam in Java was only a thin outer cultural layer and Islam was thus not an essential element of the basic structure of the cultural awareness of the Javanese.[10] But, is this historical reality, and, also sociologically, true?

We should realize that the objective reading of historical sources is often biased by theoretical assumptions, usually inseparable from cultural presumptions, and often even by a combination of both. The problem is compounded when cultural and theoretical assumptions are reinforced by colonial political interests. Starting from the three modes of presumption of what is called the usually colonial policy was formulated. But never mind. With or without the three modes of presumption that might be felt subversive the usual historical sources also threw various possibilities of reconstruction-- like the actual problem of origins before being coiled by various shades of historical dynamics. If so, it may be said that the case of Samudra-Pasai is unique as well.

The impressions we get from reading the memories of Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta about Samudera-Pasai are strengthened by oral stories recorded in two written texts – the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* and the *Sejarah Melayu* (or *Sulalatus Salatin*). Although the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* tells that even though Pasai had been defeated by the Hindu Kingdom Majapahit in East

8. Taufik Abdullah, "Kata Pengantar", in Ross E. Dunn, *Petualangan Ibnu Battuta: Seorang Musafir Muslim Abad 14", Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 1995, xiii-xxi.*

9. B.O.J. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies, vol. II. Bandung/The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955.*

10. J.C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society, Bandung/The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955.*

Java, it remained the center of Islamic thought. This is confirmed by the *Sejarah Melayu* written by Tun Sri Lanang that tells that the *ulama* of the Sultan of Malacca (Sultan Mansur Shah) had not given him a satisfactory answer on a religious esoteric problem and so he decided to send his envoy, Tun Bija Wangsa, to the Sultan of Pasai. Although Samudera-Pasai's power had plummeted, the Sultan of Malacca apparently still appreciated its religious authority. When also Pasai's scholars failed to give a satisfactory answer, the Sultan of Pasai himself whispered the answer in the ear of the messenger. With this answer he returned to Malacca and delivered it to the Sultan in secrecy. But what was the answer?[11] The *Sejarah Melayu* also kept it a secret for its potential readers.

Because of its role as the first center of Islamic power as stated in a relatively intact inscription and validated by foreigner's records and the two Malay texts mentioned above, it is clear that the story of Samudera-Pasai is quite unique. A Portuguese source, written in the early 16th century (although the text was only discovered in 1949), needs to be discussed here as well. It records Tome' Pires's visits to ports in Sumatra and Java in the early 1510's.[12] When he called at the port of Pariaman, for instance, he related that the Minangkabau kingdom, which was located in rural areas, had three kings. One of them had converted to Islam. So, if the stories Tome' Pires heard were true, the Islamization process of the Minangkabau had already begun in the early 16th century. He saw on the north coast of Java that, after the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in 1511, the port cities had been under Islamic control. He said that one port city was originally Hindu, but that its ruler had managed to turn his territory into an Islamic city-state. In addition, there was also an urban power center that had converted to Islam because traders succeeded in influencing the local authorities. In fact, another town-trade center had converted because Muslim traders had overthrown the old ruler. In short, Tome' Pires mentioned three patterns of conversion, first, voluntary alignment to Islam; second, Islamization by traders; and third, being forced into Islam because of political pressure. Although he reported what he heard in these ports, these Islamization patterns were apparently rather common. Although the coastal cities of Java would eventually embrace what Pigeaud called a "coastal culture", in other areas the distinction between these early experiences influenced the shape of the development of Islam in Java.

The Islamization of Samudera-Pasai is evident in a wide range of authentic historical sources. The Islamization of other regions and kingdoms had

11. "Alkisah Tjeritera jang kedua puluh", *Sedjarah Melaju in accordance to the publication of Abdullah (ibn Albdulkadir Munsji) re-published and annotated by T.D. Situmorang and Prof. Dr. A. Teeuw with the assistance of Amal Hamzah. Djakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1952, pp.168-173.*

12. Armando Cortesão (translator), *"The Suma Oriental of Tome' Pires". London: Hakluyt Society, 1944.*

usually been recorded earlier in their respective oral traditions. However, parts of the oral tradition, or the 'mirage of reality' in Jan Vansina's words, were copied or processed into what is now known as traditional historiography. With almost no exception the written oral tradition narrates stories about how a person or group of people from other regions in the archipelago managed to persuade the local authorities to convert to Islam. These 'preachers' may also have been sent by another rulers. So, it is understandable that texts about the Islamization process no longer served only as historical annals but came to be used to account for the fundamental changes that had occurred. In this way a sort of network of collective memories was created.

It is common in the oral tradition and the collective memory of most areas in the archipelago that the Islamization events were associated with the arrival of Islamic propagators from other regions who were preachers, traders and even adventurers. If the stories of the Islamization process as recorded in the collective memories of the areas were brought together, the historical linkages of these regions would become apparent. It is thus no wonder that many people say that Islam is the historical foundation of the unity of Indonesia?

Gowa-Tallo's historical memory as recorded in *Lontara* manuscripts, states that the king of Tallo had been the prime minister in Gowa before he became the first ruler to have embraced Islam. He embraced Islam due to the influence of three religious scholars from Minangkabau (1603). After him, the king of Gowa followed in his footsteps. The tradition of the descendants of *Sawerigading*, the mythical ancestors of the people of South Sulawesi, says that something good must be delivered to the others. Because of this it follows that Gowa-Tallo, as Makassar's twin kingdom, spread Islam to the region of the Bugis people, such as Bone and other areas. The role of the Minangkabau clerics continued when Gowa-Tallo came to the aid of the crown-prince of Bima against his uncle, who had seized the throne. After his victory, the king of Bima also converted to Islam. Islamization also took place in other region like South Kalimantan, as narrated in the *Hikayat Banjar*. The crown-prince of Banjar asked the Sultan of Demak to help him to evict his uncle from the throne. When Demak defeated the uncle, the kingdom began to present itself as the Sultanate of Banjar and it produced some great religious scholars in the 19th century.

The story of the Islamization process that started from the ordinary power system was usually also recorded in traditional historiography. These stories usually provide the reason why the Islamization process took place. An abortive coup attempt by members of the royal family, foiled due to the help of the Muslim empire, is the first example. Of course, expeditions to extend power were common as well. After successfully having established Cirebon as the center of Islamic power, Sunan Gunung Jati continued his expeditions

to establish the sultanate of Banten. His son then expanded his influence to Lampung. However, when they were about to attack Palembang, Banten's troops returned. The very young sultan was killed in the battle to extend his power. While, as narrated in the *Hikayat Patani*, the case of Patani in the Malay peninsula shows the important role of the visits of foreign traders. Patani may also be regarded as the second example of how trade relations were another pathway in the Islamization process.

Once upon a time, the king of Patani fell ill and could not be cured. The hope of a cure only came after someone notified the king of a scholar from Pasai who might be able to treat him. When this scholar was summoned to the palace, the cleric would treat him only if the king promised to convert to Islam if he recovered. But when he did recover, the king did not keep his promise. Then the illness returned and once again the king promised to convert to Islam and again he did not. This went on three times and only after the cleric threatened that he would not be willing to treat him anymore, the king finally told him that he indeed converted to Islam. And, according to the *Hikayat Patani*, the experience in other areas was copied and there was no longer "eating pork and idolatry", but other things continued as usual.[13]

A long standing sultanate is not only keen to expand its power while spreading Islam. It took Ternate two generations before the kingdom became Muslim. Because of the influence of travellers from Minangkabau, the crown-prince of Ternate had become interested in Islam. Developments took off when his son, who had just ascended the throne, began his studies in Islam, first in Makassar and then in Giri, in Sunan Giri's boarding school. From then on Ternate grew as a Sultanate and apparently through diplomacy spread Islam to Limbotto and Gorontalo in north Sulawesi.[14]

It should be recognized that the relationship between Islam and politics was very important. The cultural basis for the legitimacy of power as inherited by Majapahit was kept alive, but the real power was in the hands of Demak. Therefore, let subsequent studies tell how "eternal" this culturally valid power basis really was. In the meantime, if we follow the historical stories closely, as those of Tome' Pires, other power centers formally based on the ideological foundation of Islam had been established as well. It turns out that the spread and development of Islam in Java depended on the relationship and sometimes on the competition between three social groups: merchants-rulers-clerics or, when viewed from the perspective of social institutions, market-palace-mosque/*pesantren*s. However, the Walisanga council occupied a special position. Some *wali*s, such as Sunan Kudus, Sunan Gunung Jati, and even Sunan Giri were clerics-cum-rulers. Sunan Gunung

13. A. Teeuw & David K. Wyatt, *Hikayat Patani : The Story of Patani, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.*

14. J. Bastiaans, "Persekutuan Limbotto dan Gorontalo" in Taufik Abdullah (editor), *Sejarah Lokal di Indonesia, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1985 (2nd reprint), 199-231.*

Jati did not only establish the Sultanate of Cirebon, but he also expanded his power and established the Sultanate of Banten. His offspring even crossed the Sunda Strait into Lampung, to plug in the power. The Walisanga Council also guarded the diversification of Islamic notions and teachings. It punished Sheikh Siti Jenar because he was convicted of having spread a message to the general public he should not have delivered. His teachings appeared to have caused the mosque to become empty.

Regarding the dynamic relationships between the three social institutions, i.e. markets, palace and mosques/pesantrens, a sort of historical comparison can also be made. It appears that there were two traditional typologies of power. The first may be referred to as the "integrative tradition". Most of the sultanates in the archipelago have a tradition of the division of tasks between the "king" ("sultan", or ruler), "scholars" (or the keepers of the faith), and the developers of religious knowledge. This occurred in a context where the social institutions mutually supported each other. This ideal situation is usually described as a reflection of the integrative relationship between scholars and rulers. If the nature of the Islamization of the coastal cities of Java as reported by Tome' Pires is used as a comparison, an "integrative tradition" was present during events and historical trends that show how "(the followers) of Islam founded the power center" (Islam founded the state). The case of Pasai shows this very clearly.

The second pattern occurred during events when the "the state Islamized itself" (or the state converted to Islam). If we follow the *Sejarah Melayu*, the King of Malacca was an example of a ruler who chose Islam as his guide. The Lontara of Makassar also contains the story that the king of Tallo was finally persuaded to choose Islam as the new religion of the state because of the political and mercantile situation in his country. In 1605 he officially converted to Islam and later (1607) managed to persuade the king of Goa to join him.[15]

If the first pattern is "integrative", a situation of the division of labor between rulers and ulama. The second pattern may be referred to as "the tradition of dialogue".[16] This is a tradition where the functions of rulers and scholars were not clearly distinguished. There were times when relations were very intimate, but there were also times when conflicts between them occurred. This tradition is a socio-political medium that enables scholars to be part of the ruling elite. Some members of the Walisanga, such as Sunan Kudus and Sunan Gunung Jati, were not only great scholars, but they were also the ruler of their respective areas. It is thus not strange that in some instances in this tradition, conflict and competition came up between the

15. J. Noordyn, *Islamisasi Makasar, (terjemahan S. Gunawan), Jakarta: Bhratara, 1972.*

16. An explanation of these two traditions see Taufik Abdullah, "Islam and the Formation of Traditions in Indonesia: A Comparative Perspective", *Itinerario: Special Issue India and Indonesia: General Perspective, 1, 1989, 17-36.*

clergy as the keepers of the faith, and the ruling elites, the *umara*. In this regard it is understandable why Sultan Agung (1613-1646), the ruler of Mataram, was not satisfied just to carry the name and the title of Sultan Abdul Muhammad Maulana Matarani of Mecca.[17] He also deliberately called himself Sayiddin Kalifatullah Panatagama and with this title he was not only a worldly king but also a "caliph" who governed religious life. But was he also not still recognized as the "husband" of Nyai Loro Kidul, the immortal queen of the southern ocean? In this way he wanted to base his integrated order on the "tradition of dialogue". The "tradition of dialogue", which was derived from the dynamics of Islamization in an atmosphere of political competition, would at any time present itself. In this tradition we can understand that Amangkurat I, the Mataram ruler who was reluctant to use the title of Sultan, preferred to call himself *Susuhunan*, did so because he was loath to continue the integrative efforts of his father, Sultan Agung. As Rijklof van Goens reported, Amangkurat I just killed about two thousand scholars. He saw this group as a threat to his royal power. In fact, says Van Goens, so many got killed that after many days many bodies had still not been buried. Amangkurat I's political notion and behavior show that the process of Islamization occurred in an atmosphere of political competition.

Interesting is also the statement of Kyai Maja, a scholar and chief of a *perdikan* village who faithfully accompanied Pangeran Diponegoro. But eventually he decided to leave the ranks of the resistance. He was forced to do this, he said, because he saw that the prince had made himself a "*ratu*" (lit. king), a ruler within the resistance group.[18] Kyai Maja was still distrusted by the Dutch. Kyai Maja, his family and his followers were banished to the Minahasa. Apparently the Dutch could not trust him, was not the ulama the chief assistant of Prince Diponegoro the enemy of the Dutch.

"The tradition of dialogue" between rulers and scholars which almost always oscillated between "romance" and "conflict" was trapped in the vicissitudes of history. Sometimes the moments of intimate peace occurred but the trap of the historical character of the "dialogue" was just too reluctant to resign. In addition to their traditional social institutions, "the *perdikan* villages", which were controlled by priests and later by *ulama*, the continuation of "the tradition of dialogue" was rooted also in the critical events at the beginning of the Islamization process. Historical memory did not forget the fact that the kingdom had been defeated and that "Islam had conquered the state". After all Majapahit lose its power because it had been defeated by the Islamic sultanate of Demak.

17. Ricklefs, *Mystic Synthesis in Java, 51.*

18. Peter Carey, "The Cultural Ecology of Early Nineteenth Century Java: Pangeran Dipanagara, a case study", *Occasional Paper no.24. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1974.*

From the trajectory of the stories on the Islamization process it is apparent that the spread of Islam was actually local and started with a single point of "dismissal" and then moved on to places inhabited by other communities. These initially isolated local communities became the beachheads for a temporary halt in the process of spreading Islam. Subsequently, the propagators departed from the "beach dismissal" each in his own style to continue to share the received sacred messages. Either through the living oral tradition or in traditional historiography the "receiving areas" did not forget the services rendered to it by the "sending areas". On the contrary, because political passion might come into play, the "source areas" usually did not remember and did not even know that this had happened. The services were not only forgotten when political power came into play. So it was narrated that the twin kingdom of Goa-Tallo came to aid a prince from Bima to regain the throne his uncle had taken away from him. When these expectations were met, Goa-Tallo also sent religious scholars, who came from Minangkabau, to deliver the message of Islam.[19]

Since the fall of Majapahit (although local information says 1478, historical records tends to place its fall in the early years of the 1520s), the extension of Islamic territory did not only continue, it did so even more extensively. It was extensive despite the fact that in 1511 Malacca, one of the world trade centers and the center of the spread of Islam, had fallen into the hands of the Portuguese, who acted in a spirit of vengeful "conquest". After these two political events in which two great powers had bent their knees, the Nusantara world experienced an atmosphere of "stable instability". Great kingdoms constantly presented themselves and competed incessantly, while small power centers were too busy looking for ways to escape the dangers posed by the major central powers. From a cultural point of view, however, it appeared to be a time of flowing political power in which various literary works were written and Islamic thinking and scholarship began to sail through cultural life and creative thinking.

IV

Examining the theological messages written on the inscription on Sultan Malikus Saleh's tombstone, it seems that the text simply conveys the creatures' recognition of their relationship with God. It also states implicitly that from then on Pasai had become part of the "Muslim world". But it seems that the religious life that radiates from the tombstone's text is as if it was left alone in isolation. Thence, the tombstone exudes a monologue.

This historical source relates the story of the Sultan's activities to expand

19. M. Hilir Ismail, *Peran Kesultanan Bima dalam perjalanan Sejarah Nusantara, Mataram: Lengge, 2004, also Henri Chambert-Loir & Siti Maryam R. Salahuddin, Bo' Sangaji Kai: catatan Kerajaan Bima, Jakarta: École francaise d'Extrême Orient & Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1999.*

Islamic territory and the pleasure he had in discussing with scholars. We may understand the story in the sense that Samudera-Pasai was visited by large numbers of religious scholars. At the time, however, Majapahit, as reported in the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai*, arrived as conqueror but later forged ties of friendship. As told in the *Hikayat Banjar*[20] the daughter of the king of Pasai was married to the king of Majapahit, and her brother who came to visit her was welcomed by the king and allowed to settle; both played a role in the Islamization process of the region. The *Sejarah Melayu* tells how important Pasai had been in the development of Islam in the archipelago. It also includes the thrilling episode of the Portuguese attack against Malacca. It was told that when the army rested at night, Sultan Ahmad proposed a reading of the *Hikayat Amir Hamzah*, but the army rather liked to listen to the *Hikayat Muhammad Hanafiah*.[21]

This little episode is an important historical fact. Apparently, before the fall of Malacca, Persian texts had started to be translated into Malay. Therefore, Islamic cosmopolitanism had also started to enter the cultural life of the Malay world. From historical sources we know precisely that towards the end of the 15th century, the Malay world had been increasingly and intensely involved in the cultural dynamics of the outside world. In addition to translating Persian texts, Hindu-Javanese literature such as the *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana* were also translated. Because these translations were highly popular, Nuruddin al-Raniri, the influential cleric at the palace of Sultan Iskandar Muda, had to remind the people that these Javanese texts were un-Islamic. Thus, the story of the Five Pandawas had to be Islamized as well.

Towards the end of the 16th century, Hamzah Fansuri (born in Barus and died in Mecca in 1570)[22] had started the tradition of Islamic fundamental thought and literature. Apart from his mystical ideas, his poetry produced a Malay sense of aesthetic life. It is not exaggerated to say that he is the pioneer of the Malay literary tradition and Malay thought who will always be remembered. Among his work is the following poem:

"Know yourself, O the child of *jamu*

Do not forget your-own self

Knowledge of the essence ought to discern

That made you be known as your existence

20. This episode in J.J. Ras, *Hikayat Banjar: A study in Malay Historiography, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1968.*

21. *Sedjarah Melaju, Alkisah Tjeritera jang ketiga puluh empat, 296-298.*

22. Claude Guillot dan Ludvik Kalus, "Batu Nisan Hamzah Fansuri" dalam Claude Guillot & Ludvik Kalus, *Inskripsi Islam Tertua di Indonesia, Jakarta: KPG, EFEO, Forum Jakarta-Paris, 2008, 71-100.*

Hamzah Fansuri's main concern was the relationship between the Creator and mankind, His creatures. Many of his poems exude an atmosphere of reform in social and religious life. He strongly condemned meditation but he did show what the right efforts were in order to become closer to God. However, at the highest stage of his philosophical and religious contemplation he arrived at the concept of existential monism (*wahdat al-wujud*).

After Hamzah passed away, his disciple Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani, also wrestled with the problem of the relationship between creatures and God. But he reminded mankind that "this secret is too difficult and without directions from a perfect teacher, or if a student is not wise, he will gain nothing since lust only [leads to] heterodox unbelief."[23] Aware of the problem of this sacred relationship, the Wali Sanga finally sentenced Sheikh Siti Jenar. The saints accused him of teaching the concept of the "too perplexed secrets" to the general public. In his *Serat Cabolek*, Yosodipuro, the Surakarta[24] court poet, tells us that eventually the Sunan also punished Kiai Mutamakin by banishing him to foreign territory. Formulating the court's support for orthodoxy, the *Serat Cabolek* describes how, when arguing with Ketib Anom, the *kyai* failed to defend his religious opinions and attitudes. Before Yosodipuro proved the erroneous foundations of Kiai Mutamakin's theological attitude, Ketib Anom and Nuruddin ar-Raniri had already harshly attacked Hamzah Fansuri's mystical orientation by going as far as burning his books. For them, the notion of the *wahdatul wujud* as promoted by the mystic poet and his disciple Shamsuddin practically unified the Creator with His creatures. In Aceh Darussalam, Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) can be regarded as the monarch who maintained strict Islamic orthodoxy.

Then, after al-Raniri's speedy departure,[25] Aceh Darussalam entered a period with a more tolerant atmosphere. It is said that the cleric-poet, who had written many works including the encyclopedic *Bustanus Salatin*, had to leave Aceh Darussalam because he had lost his patron. Under the reign of Sultan Iskandar Thani (1637-1641) and his religious adviser Sheikh Abdur Rauf al-Singkili (died 1680), an expert and the first writer on Malay Quranic interpretation, a more open atmosphere was created while the influence of the religious thoughts and reflections emanating from Aceh Darussalam remained widespread. In the early 19th century, for instance, the *Sirat al Mustaqim* (1634) used by Sheikh al-Banjari as its model. According to him, al-Raniri's work was too hard to be understood by laymen.

Because the relationship of mankind and its Creator had become a

23. Teuku Iskandar, "Shamsuddin As-Sumatrani: Tokoh Wujudiyah", *Dewan Bahasa, 9, 5, 1965.*

24. Soebardi, *The Book of Cabolek: A Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation and Notes; A Contribution to the Study of the Javanese Mystical Tradition,* The Hague ; Nijhoff, 1975.

25. Takashi Ito, "Why did Nuruddin ar-Raniri leave Aceh in 1054 A.H.?"*BKI*, 134, 1978, 488-491.

theological issue, the questions came up what power system should be adopted to regulate social life and whether the political system and the kingdom were in line with Islamic teachings? A good look at history was in order. The fall of Malacca had provided opportunities to Aceh Darussalam and other Islamic power centers, but as al-Raniri narrated in his work *Bustanus Salatin*, the sultanate experienced political stability and prosperity under the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda.

Could Iskandar Muda and his successors have learned from a text that contained a theory on the state that had been generated before he ascended the throne? A few years before the Sultan came into powers in 1602, Bukhari al-Jauhari had introduced the *Tajus-Salatin,*[26] which may be regarded as the first text on political theory in the Malay world. This text not only adopted the concept and attitude of justice as the foundation of ethics and the wisdom of power but also saw it as a political strategy. The wisdom that sparks from the Malay text caused it to have been repeatedly translated into Javanese. Moreover, history noted also that the *Tajus Salatin* was the favorite reading of Mangkubumi (Hamengkubuwono I) and Diponegoro. It is thus interesting to learn that in the mid-19th century, Abdullah Abdul Kadir Munsyi, commonly considered a "barrier figure" between traditional Malay and "modern" Indonesian literature, said that the weakness of the Malay sultans (in the Peninsula) was the fact they had no longer understood the *Tajus Salatin*'s messages.

That was towards the end of the 18th century. At the start of the 19th century tens or even hundreds of Islamic manuscripts in Malay, Javanese and other languages in the archipelago were written. Different schools and religious thinking tendencies were introduced. In this atmosphere debates were common even severe ones especially when they focused on the relationship between God and His creatures. The manuscript known as *keropak Ferrara* (17th century), because it is stored in the library of Ferrara in Italy, shows a "fundamentalist" tendency, but the *Serat Dharmagandul* (20th century) which is not "fundamentalist" at all. So, we may understand also why the integrity of the Islamic community is problematic.

It is not strange that the so-called 'fundamentalist' tendency showed its most radical form in Minangkabau in the early of the 19th century during what is called the first phase of the "Padri War" (1803-1821). It was told that at that time the supporters of this movement had launched an action of war that was no longer a "war of throwing stones" at the village borders. A war of conquest had broken out. "So it was called *sabilillah,* (lit. the way of God to denote the Holy War), so that its legal status was clearly valid," wrote Faqih

26. Taufik Abdullah, " The Formation of a Political Tradition in the Malay World", in Anthony Reid (ed.), *The Making of an Islamic Political Discourse in Southeast Asia,* Clayton, Victoria: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1993, 35-58.

Saghir, a cleric who preferred to preach in an atmosphere of peace.[27] It was on the basis of the principle saying "People who do not pray and who refuse to practice the Qur'an carefully lose the right to life and to their property, according to the sacred books of *fiqh*."[28] In 1821, the Dutch intervened and the Padri War (the second stage) ended in 1837 and Minangkabau land fell into the hands of the Dutch. But, while this matrilineal ethnic group started to formulate its identity --"*Adat bersendi syarak. Syarak bersendi kitabullah*" (Traditions hinges on the Sharia, and the Sharia hinges on the Scripture of God), the legends began to generate their Islamic spirited traditional history. The cultural and historical reasons why the Minangkabau remained its matrilineal kinship system, whereas the Islamic inheritance system is patrilineal were also formulated. Since the mid-19th century many debates took place in Minangkabau about mystical orders, while the process towards religious orthodoxy accelerated as well. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Minangkabau had replaced Palembang and Penyengat Island (Riau) as the center of religious thought. "Islamic modernism", which was near to the "*kaum muda*" (lit. young people) movement aspired to become more and more involved in the "developed world" as well.[29]

Indeed, since the end of the 18th and especially in the beginning of the 19th century when the penetration of foreign power had become increasingly widespread, religious thinking accelerated. The total number of Indonesian pilgrims and Muslims who even resided in the Holy Land increased as well. The number of Muslims connected in networks of teachers and students and religious scholars in the centers of Islamic studies also rose, as was the number of *surau*, *meunasa*, *pesantren* and *madrasah* in the country. Since the late 18th century and especially the 19th century Palembang presented itself as one of the centers of Islamic thinking together with Patani in the Malay peninsula, now part of Thailand. Sultan Badaruddin II of Palembang was not only a very anti-Dutch king but also a poet and thinker. Residing in Arabia and usually writing in Arabic, Sheikh al-Palimbani sent his Islamic thoughts to his homeland. In the Aceh War (1872-1904), Aceh, which saw itself as the "veranda of Mecca", still managed to generate a story about the holy war, but no longer written in Malay but in the Acehnese language. Towards the end of the 19th century, Penyengat Island (Riau) also came up as a center for the production of Islamic manuscripts. One might even say that in Penyengat, the palace of the Raja Muda of the Sultanate of Johor-Riau had become the "capital" of

27. Sjech Djilal-eddin, *Verhaal van de aanvang der Padri onlusten op Sumatra,* ed. Dr. J.J. de Hollander, Leiden, 1837.

28. S.A. Steyn Parve', "Kaum Padari (Padri) di Padang Darat Pulau Sumatra" (1885) its translation in Taufik Abdullah (ed.) *Sejarah Lokal di Indonesia,* Yogyakarta: UGM University Press, 1985.

29. Taufik Abdullah, "Modernization in the Minangkabau World: West Sumatra in the Early Decades of the Twentieth Century" in Claire Holt et al. (editors), Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972, 179-245.


Malay and Islamic thinking. Raja Ali Haji and his masterpiece, the *Tuhfah al-Nafis* will never be forgotten.

With the 20th century came the call for "progress", Islamic modernism movements, religious debates in Minangkabau,[30] and the Muhammadiyah was founded in Yogyakarta. The early 20th century was also marked by efforts to create an "Islamic ideology". Anticipating a take-over by the Semarang Branch of the Sarekat Islam, which had become influenced by Marxist ideology, Sarekat Islam national figures, especially H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto and Haji Agus Salim, held the ground for their Islamic "ideology". In 1926, Soekarno, a young leader obsessed with the ideal of the national unity, published his classic article, "Nationalism, Islam and Marxism" in which he invited these "unifying" elements to unite in the cause of national ideals. This was on the sidelines of the struggle of thinking about various cultural aspects of Islam and "how faith could be a stimulus for the manifestation of a cultural life that was meaningful and dignified for life in the world and in the hereafter" while the arts developed and manifested themselves. It is not surprising that *langgar*, *surau*, mosques and other venues showed that the teachings of one Islam manifest themselves in numerous architectural styles to symbolize regionalism. A plethora of material culture shows the regional character of the Islamic taste. In addition, Islamic arts, dance, music, and so on, develop without abandoning regional styles. Thus, we may say that each field of Indonesian culture has its own Islamic style. But, despite its different outward and inward manifestations, Islam remains an ever-present unifying symbol. The same holds true for Islamic literature. Despite being written in different regional languages and sometimes bound by their own literary traditions, the message of Islam can still be captured by those from other regional cultures.

Finally enjoy the wealth of knowledge that has vividly been presented in this book.

30. A fascinating insight is provided in B.J.O. Schrieke, *Pergolakan Agama di Sumatra Barat: sebuah sumbangan bibliografis"* Jakarta: Bhratara 1973 (the original writing was published in *TBG*, 59 (1919-1921), 249-325.





Chapter One

Islamization and Patterns of Cultural Encounters

Islamization and Patterns of Cultural Encounters

Taufik Abdullah

Introduction

The title of his book might not be approved,[1] but in his classic study on ancient Southeast Asia, Coedes[2] wanted to show that despite the extant local differences and regional diversities, this area has a similar state foundation, namely the Hindu feature. In this concept ---whether intentionally or not, but seems to simplify--- he combines the diverse Hinduism with Buddhism, which is similarly complex, into a generally applicable name. Considering Sanskrit as the language of the sacred texts, which not only provide religious teachings, but also assumptions and theories about power and the inter-state, or more precisely inter-dynastic relations, the Hindu cultural feature fertilizes the atmosphere of a higher civilization in its cosmopolitan design. With all sorts of given symbols and being fertilized by the atmosphere of this higher civilization rulers showed their legitimacy. So, in their own worlds they are becoming the "center of the universe".[3]Thus, in spite of the unstable inter-state or inter-dynastic relations and the annoying trade competition, whatever stability attained, with Hinduism the world of Southeast Asia have different moods and the relatively understanding inter-cultural relations.

Missionary activities or the wandering religious preachers, literary and religious translations run by the centers of power, and the particularly long-distance trade that had begun at least since the 5th century AD[4], increase the cosmopolitan cultural atmosphere. In this situation, the concept of cultural borrowing does not seem to mean anything. All cultural elements, wherever they come from, are treated as public property. The most important thing is that all used elements are communicative in inter-community relations and be able to answer the problems of each community. In turn, this cosmopolitan atmosphere also plays its role in the formation of a timely situation with the outside world, which at any times can also be taken as a model. In this situation, it can certainly

1. See H.J. Benda's objection to the term "Hinduized" in "The Structure of Southeast Asian History: Some Preliminary Observations", *JSEAH*, III:1 (March, 1962), p. 106-38.

2. C. Coedes, *Les etats hindouises d'Indochine et d'Indonesie*, Paris: Editions E. de Boccarid, 1964.

3. Though it is very brief, but it is very suggestive. This was discussed by R. von Heine Geldera *Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia*, Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1955 (a reprint from *Far Eastern Quaterly*, 1942).

4. On this point see a classic book O.W. Wolters, *Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the Origins of Srivijaya*, Ithaca, New York : CornellUniversity Press, 1967.



A map of the arrival of Islam in Indonesia. A number of scholars, mostly Dutch, hold the theory that in the initial stage of the advent of Islam in the Archipelago it came from the Indian sub-continent, not from Persia or Arabia.

Source: *Indonesia Dalam Arus Sejarah* (Indonesia in the Course of History), 2012.

be understood, for example, that the 7th century a Chinese traveler who was a student of religion, I-Tsing, could stop first at Sriwijaya, in his voyage to Nalanda, India. Sriwijaya, which was not only the center of maritime commerce, but also a center of Buddhist studies, was used as preparation for studying more difficult texts in Nalanda.[5]

This cosmopolitan intellectual atmosphere was fertilized by commercial and power interests as well as maintained by the authorities of port cities and, though different intensities, also by those who master the agrarian regions. It was in this atmosphere slowly and gradually Islamic penetration occurred. Both as a religion, as well as commercial and political forces, Islam did not disrupt the cosmopolitan cultural atmosphere, but it slowly changed the ideological basis of the cosmopolitanism. Islam came and spreads by way of investing the previously developed situation. Indeed, the actual process of Islamization---more than the Hinduization--- cannot be separated from the development of long-distance trade. As early as the 7th century and especially the 10th century Arab traders from the Persian Gulf had made archipelago waters as a haven in their trade to China. Thus, it can be understood that the report of Arab traders who stopped, or perhaps just heard from other voyagers, on the islands of Java and Sumatra, were so many in numbers.[6] The role of Arab traders in the waters of the archipelago is increasingly important, as in the 10thcentury, China banned the arrival of Arab traders in their ports. At this moment the Arab traders were forced to become more active in local trade.[7]

The unification of government and economic development in China under the new dynasty, T'ang, made the increasingly growing region of the Indian Ocean into a mutual understanding of cultural atmosphere.[8] Towards the end of

5. I-Tsing complete report was translated into English by a Japanese scientist, J. Takasusu, and published in 1896. But brief quotes about *Mo-lo-yu* and *Che-H-fo che* (Srivijaya?) was entailed in Gabriel Ferrand, L'empire Sumateranais de Qrivijaya, *Journal Asiatique*, 1922. However, in fact there is no study about Srivijaya that ever forget I-tsing's report.

6. See Gabriel Ferrand, L'empire Sumateranais dan terutama G.R. Tibbets, *A Study of the Arabic Texts Containing Material on Southeast Asia*, Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1979.

7. Rita Rosa de Meglio, "Arab Trade with Indonesia and Malay Peninsula from the 8th to the 16th Century", in D.S. Richard (ed.) *Papers on Islamic History II: Islam and the Trade of Asia; a Colloquium*, Oxford ; Bruno Gassier & Philadelphia : University pf Pennsylvania Press, 1970.

8. See K.N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean*, Cambridge University Press, 1965.

the 12th century, i.e. the age of the oldest Islamic cemetery found in Java, the Indian Ocean region has become "The sea of Arabic language".[9]

The nature of cultural transformation, if this term could be properly used, is the problem that always provoke academic debate. However, the process of Islamization of Southeast Asia in the early stages actually means the introduction of new cosmopolitan basis of ideology and, at the same time, the emergence of a new model of higher civilization. In his article, supported by thorough research and rigorous argumentation, Andre Wink[10] stated that although the Islamization of India and the Indonesian archipelago was going on after the fall of the Abbasid political unity, only India which had three paradigmatic aspects of the Middle Eastern political tradition. All three were the bureaucratic and fiscal policy of money economy, the emergence of the Islamic military-bureaucratic apparatus, and finally, the Persian pattern of state administration. Identification of the paradigmatic aspects would still be debatable---Brakel,[11] for example, showed the inner life atmosphere of the 17th century Aceh court that was hardly different from Mughal palaces--- but Wink's opinion about the cultural and political differences in a new cosmopolitan atmosphere is a strategic analytical tool. From this concept of paradigmatic feature we get a theoretical framework for understanding why certain behavior patterns can be found only in India, but not in Al-Hind, across the Sindh, although there was a sense of unity bound by long-distance trade and understanding of Islamic cosmopolitanism.

Commercialization, the state establishment and the formation of people bound by the "rope of Allah", as in India, were the three main aspects of the process of Islamization of the archipelago and other Southeast Asian regions. From a historical standpoint, these three aspects can be seen as an element disseminating behavior patterns in politics or other fields, as well as laying the foundation for varieties of structural



The tomb of Kudus, the grave of Maulana Malik Ibrahim in Gresik.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period), 2010.

features of the power setting. Therefore, we used to be reminded by the so-called "anthropological facts", although they are actually just stereotypes, on the Sumatran somehow said to be more virtuous than the Javanese or the Acehnese who are considered more likely to aspire for an Islamic state establishment than, say, the people of Solo city in Central Java. Differences in religious dimension, which involves knowledge on doctrines, attachment to religious rules, etc. of each follower, as well as differing strength of the religious belief (force) and the scope of religious influence (scope)[12] within the social life of various social bonds is a cliché. But how should we explain this diversity within the history of nation-building in Indonesia or Southeast Asia in general?

It is obvious that Java had further dived in the process of Hinduization, before transforming to embrace Islam. Such opinion provides a highly empirical validity. Look at the marks, as revealed by the beautiful temples, which is until now---though resulted from a reconstruction--- can still bring admiration. But can the empirical reality of this so deep influence or so long historical experience under the auspices of the Hindu atmosphere simply be used as a tool to explain various cultural symptoms and structural dynamics raised by the process of Islamization? If it were applied as a source of information, it would be visible how inadequate this simple empirical knowledge is. The use of this empirical knowledge as a source was basically nothing more than a reversal of the academic tendency emphasizing the occurrence of historical discontinuity. The use of empirical knowledge denies the view of the fall of Majapahit and the spread of Islam as factors breaking the historical continuity.

One of the most prominent academic tendencies among the first generation of colonial scholars was is to see the advent of Islam as an "aberration" and therefore, it was cut off from the flow of the history of Indonesia and Southeast Asia in general. While the second generation had always stressed the continuity is lost, no matter how Islam emerged and Majapahit Empire had fallen.[13] If archeologists like Krom and

12. The concept of *scope* dan *force* from religious influence in social and private life was introduced by C. Geertz dalam bukunya *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971 (Phoenix Edition).

13. See for example C.C. Berg criticism to the historical opinion of the archeologist, influenced by Krom ---an pioneer of the ancient Javanese study, in his writing, "Javanese Historiography -- a synopsis of its evolution" in D.G.E. Hall (ed.), *Historians of*



***Deurham* coin from the era of the rule of Samudera Pasai. The coins were the media of exchange and they signify Arabian cultural acculturation in the Kingdom of Samudera Pasai.**

Source: Private collection of Abdul Hadi WM

Stutterheim, or even Islamologist, like L.W.C. van den Berg, and others saw the fall of Majapahit as the beginning of a "new era" that Islam (and therefore, said van den Berg[14] Islamic law was in force among natives), is not the case with a later view. Berg, Schrieke, even Drewes, and their followers[15] emphasized the unbroken linkage in the history of Java. In a speech that until now is considered a classic, because it was so precisely formulated views of scientists who were fascinated with the idea of this linkage, van Leur[16] said that Islam in Java was a "thin layer" on top of the Javanese civilization. However, supposedly this information is true---something that should be debated--- whether this could explain the differing manifestation of Islam as a local and communal culture and religion among the Javanese community?

Moreover, attempts to make a room for these opposing academic tendencies, stating that the history of Indonesia should be seen as an arena of the clash of change and continuity forces are mere complete truism for an academic issue.[17] Does the historical arena always show clashes of these two?

Therefore, another analyzing device that, who knows, could be more strategic should be sought. Also to use the concept of "shaping traditions" can be considered for this purpose.

As something handed down from the past, tradition is not only related to the fundament of legitimacy but also to the system of authority. As a concept of history, tradition can be discerned as a cultural paradigm for viewing and interpreting reality. Because the process of shaping tradition is essentially a process of selection---when ideals

South East Asia, London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1962, 13-23.


14. See Mohammad Daud Ali, "Kedudukan Hukum Islam dalam Hulcum Indonesia", dalam Taufik Abdullah & Sharon Siddique (eds.) *Tradisi dan Kebangkitan Islam di Asia Tenggara*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1989, 208-238.

15. C.C. Berg, as well as some other Dutch Indonesians, is included into scientists who emphasize the natural continuity aspect of the history of Java. The arrival of Islam did not change anything; besides, recently someone holds the power is a sultan. See, for example "Islamization of Java", *Studia Islamica* (Paris), 1950, 4: 111-142. Berg further developed the theory of this continuity in his later writings. In his article published after his demise, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, vol II, (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1957) B. Schrieke explicitly shows that since the earliest Hindu kingdom to the appearance and rupture of Mataram, traditions and political culture of Java had practically unchanged.

16. J.C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1955.

17. See Taufik Abdullah, *Islam dan Masyarakat: Pamulan Sejarah Indonesia*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987, 226-230.





always have to face realities and at times freedom should find *modus vivendi* within the structural necessity--- so, tradition can also be seen as a set of values and knowledge systems determining the nature and style of cognitive community, namely social groups bound by the shared acknowledgement to what is considered as a valid and correct knowledge. Tradition gives awareness of identity and connective feeling with something considered to be earlier.[18] Using the term introduced by the historian of epistemology, Thomas Kuhn,[19] tradition as used in this section may also be referred to as "cultural paradigm", which provides the foundation of thinking patterned to be taken for granted that is generally accepted by the community who belong to it.

History is an arena of continuous dialogue between internal and external realities. History is a forum where mankind or it could be a community (as is always emphasized by the school of *Annales*) ---as an historical actor--- trying to fight all kinds of obstacles and pressures that hinder their desire. From this perspective, a tradition can be seen as an atmosphere of human freedom which should direct a continuous dialogue within the structural and external realities. Therefore, an attempt to find varieties of traditions underlying the differing Islamic communities is a way to understand the course and prospects of their own history.

However, the formation of the tradition is more likely to be discerned if the pattern of cultural clash, namely when Islam met local culture, being considered first. The pattern of the clash is also not the same. So is the pattern of "collective memory", as recorded by traditions and distinctly defined by the traditional historiography.

This chapter will be used to see this pattern of cultural clash. The next chapter will discuss the ideological foundation of the Islamic empire, while the fourth chapter discusses the formation process of power centers and political tradition.

Perhaps it is not the purpose Tomé Pirés to start a never-ending controversy about the process of Islamization in the Archipelago. But when he stated in his book, which has long been forgotten, that after "the Moor and the mullahs" multipled, they tried hard "to make the

A Muslim community resided in Majapahit.Archeological evidence for this was found in the graveyard of Troloyo, in the village of Trowulan, district of Mojokerto in the center of the Capital of Majapahit. The tombs of Troloyo are generally thought to date from the 14th-16th centuries and are inscribed with ancient Java scripts.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period), 2010.

The tombstone of Malik Al-Shaleh, the first Muslim ruler who died in 1297.


Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period), 2010.

king (of Pasai) to be the Moors too".[20] In other words, the happening of the Pasai King's conversion is a result of a *coup d'etat*, according to the recent term, run by an alliance of traders with their religious advisors. Thus, the economic strength was the main element causing local authorities to embrace Islam. Tomé Pirés wrote his work two centuries after the historic events he told took place. Hence, his statement cannot be considered as a testimony. He is more likely to tell a story he had heard in the haven of his sojourn or, who knows, he simply conveyed a theoretical conjecture, based on his knowledge of other areas. Similar things can be said, who he discussed the process of Islamization in the north coastal regions of Java.

According to Tomé Pirés, there were three patterns of the Islamization process. First, the Muslim traders established new local power centers. Second, they successfully converted the local authorities. And, third, as Tome Pires told in the Pasai case, they had successfully seized power. So for Tomé Pirés, the spread of Islam was closely related to the establishment of Islamic power centers. And it was also closely related to commerce. He also said that it was the custom of the Muslim traders, if their number in a local community is so plentiful; they would bring the mullahs--- according to the terms used by the translators--- i.e. the ulama.

Archeological evidences and local testimonies as well as foreign reports are scattered historical sources and often mutually annihilating. It is certainly difficult for historians to make a "standard" reconstruction on the initial process of Islamization. Therefore, it can be discerned that the progress has been made in the methods and research techniques and discovery of new historical sources as well as the more sophisticated cultural theories, but Drewes,[21] a leading expert in the field of Islam and philology, finally arrived at a rather negative conclusion that before all the relevant Chinese sources and Tamil inscriptions can be processed, the certainty of the historical process would remain vague, as the more frequently obtained was merely an approximation.

Drewes might be night, if using Ranke's concept on the reconstruction of the past events; we must describe all things in the





past "as what really happened." However, it should also be realized that history is not simply a matter of "historical certainty", which requires every stated event to be proven by clear sources, it is also a matter of understanding on the dynamics of community's behavior in facing various challenges; hence, the "collective memory" of the referred past communities plays its important role. A memory is a result of a selection process. Not all experience is remembered, and not all remembered will always be recorded. The collective memory is a frequent event that had also been recorded by oral tradition, passed down from one to other generations, could be just, like Vansina[22] said, "a mirage of reality" ---thus, not the true reality--- nevertheless, it is the "living" reality in the sense of the community that belong to it. Collective memory is also an overview of how the past is to be "understood", as it is also part of the contemporary life.

Thus, if history is to be viewed as the desired series of events that makes the players take active roles, we can also assume that in the historical process the actors do not just react to their own environment, but also to their concept of fairness. They may also act according to what they think reasonable. In the behavior pattern, fairness is based on the actor's knowledge and world view. A warehouse or, it could also be a repository of collective memories, knowledge, and people's perceptions about their structure and culture, as well as normative desires of traditional society is an oral tradition and, especially, a traditional historiography. In the traditional historiography all are mixed up with 'myths' in a sense that the past is to be depicted and believed, and 'history' in a sense is the past as it is "really" experienced. How thin the real boundary that separates these two things,[23] if

22. Jan Vansina. *OralTradition: A Study in Historical Methodology* (trans. by H.M. Wright)London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965, 76 ff.

23. In one of Van Leur's criticism in the 1930 on the study of Indonesian history was the undergoing fragmentation. If the ancient times was dominated by archeologists, he said, "the Islamic era" is the region of the philologists, while the VOC and the Dutch colonial era is done by the archivists. What the "historian" do? Apart from the criticism, philologists who studied the ancient texts, especially those that can be classified as traditional historiography, such as the chronicle, tales, history, genealogy, *tarsila*, legend, *lontara*, or whatever its name is rendered great for "weeding out" of history from the wilderness of the story told by the texts. One of the pioneers is R. Hoesein Djajadingrat who wrote a dissertation (1913), which is now generally regarded as a classic masterpiece titled *Critiche Beschouwing van de Sajarah Banten: Bijdrage Kenschetsing van de Javansche Geschiedschrijving*. This book has been translated into Indonesian (1983), by Djambatan publisher. This dissertation has not only been able to

Left **Cloves.**

Source: *Indonesia Dalam Arus Sejarah* (Indonesia in the Course of History), 2012.

Right **The Tomb of Fatimah, daughter of Maimun, and Maimun son of Hibatallah in Leran Gresik, East Java. It is told that she died on 7 Rajab 475 A.H (2 December 1082 A.D).**

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

history has joined myths, then all of them would have been myths. If history has been covered by all sorts of stylistic values, assumptions and aspirations, says an historian, it should be called just "the past".

The real myth can be seen as the embodiment of a world view in form of a story. Thus, by understanding the mythical structure we can expect to get, on the one hand, the societal conceptualization of the past, as an embodiment of cultural-concerns, and on the other hand, as a potential source of historyas past time events. The first gift of those who want to learn history is the accepted situation as such by the concerned people, while the second is materials to allow past events to be reconstructed. Therefore, to understand the process and the dynamics of early Islam in the archipelago, an overview of the various traditional historiographies is also necessary.

Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai (the History of the kings of Pasai) and *Sejarah Melayu* (the Malay Annals) are two of the renowned traditional historiographies in the Malay Islamic world,[24] by which the first may be older than the latter.[25] The importance of *Sejarah Melayu*, which may have been written by the Johor court poet, Tun Sri Lanang, within the tradition of the Malay culture lies not only in the literary value, but also on the wealth of information about the early days of the Malacca Kingdom as well as social and political life of the 16th century maritime empire.[26] It is understood that Malay traditional historiography has become one of the most popular subjects in academic researches. Historians regard the book as a potential source of



The cemetery of Sultan Suriansyahin Banjar. The arrival of Islam to Banjarmasin, as told in the *Hikayat Banjar*, was driven by the emergency felt by Pangeran Samudera, the crown prince of Negara Daha.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia, 2009

information about various past events in the Malay world, and anthropologists have examined the symbolic meanings as a tool to maintain the social unity and the power legitimacy.[27]

Passages in the *Sejarah Melayu* and *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* outlines some similar past events---such as the establishment period of Samudera Pasai, the change from a segmented state to become an empire, which had the conquered people and the sultan, as well as the process of Islamization. The book shows that the heyday of Pasai stems from the conversion of Mirah Silu's, "man of prowess" (if Wolters'[28] term can be used) has attracted many followers as he got wealthy suddenly.


So it was told in *Sejarah Melayu* that a scholar from Mecca, Sheikh Ismail sailed through Fansur, Lamuri, Ham, Perlak, and finally arrived at Samudera. He successfully converted the local authority, Mirah Silu, and returned to the ship. Mirah Silu dreamed in the night. Prophet Muhammad had spat into his mouth. So he could read the Quran. Sheikh Ismail was then enthroned him as the sultan with the name Malik as-Saleh.

Another version is found in *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai*. On the night Mirah Silu dreamed. He was visited by the Prophet Muhammad spatting into his mouth and teaching him to utter that "there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His messenger". The Prophet gave him the name Malik as-Saleh and forbade eating slaughtered meat without correct rituals. The Prophet also informed him that a person named Sheikh Isma'il would come to visit him. When Sheikh Ismail met Mirah Silu, how shocked he was to know that Mirah Silu had been able to recite the *shahada* smoothly. And people also have known his title Malik as-Saleh. Then, the performed duty by Sheikh Ismail, scholars who come from the "country above the wind" was simply to Islamize people. After that, he gave Malik as-Saleh regalia he brought from Mecca. Mirah Silu had been formally regarded as the sultan.

These differing versions show a perception on the self and attitude to the outside elements. However, both versions represent not only the

27. See for example, P.E. and Josselin de Jong, "The Character of the Malay Annals" in John Bastin & R. Roolvink (eds.) *Malayan and Indonesian Studies*, Oxford: Clarendom Press, 1964. In this article Josselin de Jong explains her view on *Sejarah Melayu*as an illustrated concept of the Malay culture on power.

28. O.W. Wolters, *History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspective*, Singapore: ISEAS, 1982, pp. 5-7.



The Al-Fatihah, is the first chapter of the Quran.

Source: *Perpustakaan Nasional* (The National Library of the Republic of Indonesia).

recognition that Islam is a religion obtained by an engagement with the long-distance trade, but also a form of cultural accountability on religious conversion. And, no less important is the provision of a new legitimacy patterned to be a higher and cosmopolitan civilization. This story can also be collaborated with the archeological evident, namely the king's cemetery complex in Samudera Pasai. From here can be known that the first Muslim ruler was Sultan Malik as-Saleh, who died in 1297.

The development of Samudera town, as well as its sister town, Pasai, which had by then beat the older Samudera, must be viewed in relation to maritime trade in Southeast Asia.[29] The increasing height of trade relations between China and the Arab world and the increasing importance of commodities from Sumatra and Java (such as pepper, resin, camphor and so on) when Sriwijaya was the center of maritime trade in the South had collapsed---are likely to be due to the invasion of the Chola Empire in the 11th century, the *Pamalayu* (that is the aggression to the "Malay World") of Kertanegara (the King Singasari in East Java) and the constant threat of Java, provided many opportunities for the emergence of the river state of Samudera Pasai. Since the beginning of its development as a power center, until the end (1524), defeated by Aceh Darussalam, Samudera Pasai ---with the interrupted hegemony of Majapahit--- though relatively prosperous, showed many signs of situations that the establishment of the new kingdom was still in the process. This kingdom did not just have to continue to deal with those groups that had not been subjugated and converted to Islam from the interior regions, which were the hinterlands of Samudera Pasai to acquire trading commodities; but, this kingdom also should resolve the prolonged political conflicts and family feud. Even if the political situation were unstable, Samudera, a small country beside the Peusangan river estuary, became a center of religious learning. Famous Arab traveler, Ibn Battuta, told about on going high quality of theological discussions held by sultan's theologians, some of whom came from Persia to his palace.[30] Samudera's reputation as a knowledge center then was taken

29. Kenneth R. Hall, *Maritime Trade and State Development* in *Early Southeast Asia*, Sydney/ Wellington: George Alien & Unwin, 1985, pp. 1-25.

30. *Ibn Batuta Travels in Asia and Africa 1325 - 1354*, H.A.R. Gibb (transl & ed.) London: Routledge & Kegan, 1957, p. 274.

over by Pasai, its shadow city. It was to Pasai one of the prospective saints (the Wali Sanga), Sunan Bonang came to seek knowledge. Sunan Gunung Jati, who according to Djajadiningrat's reconstruction was Fatahilah or Falatehan, who named Kalapa to become Jayakarta and founded Banten sultanate, was born in Pasai.[31]

It was also from Pasai, according to *Hikayat Patani* (the Patani Chronicle),[32] the process of Islamization of Patani a Malay kingdom located across the Straits of Melaka. It was said that the King of Patani was seriously ill and none could cure him. Some one reported that an *ulama* from Pasai might be able to cure him. The *ulama*, Sheikh Sa'id came and said that the king could be cured, after being recovered the king converted to Islam. The king promised to convert to Islam. But after being recovered, he forgot his promise. He was sick again. The same thing happened again. It was only after the third time that the king was finally truly converted to Islam.

"Syahdan at that time", said *Hikayat Patani*, "all people in the country also embraced Islam, and all people outside the country region none converted to Islam. As for the king, though he embraced Islam, only idolatrous and eating pork that were abandoned; other than that, all pagan work remained unchanged."[33]

The last statement is a recurring situation, which led the missionaries to repeatedly visit the having been Islamized kingdoms. When Islamization of Patani occurred, political and economic position of Samudera Pasai had been much diminishing, but its reputation as the center of religion continued.

Two centuries after the founding of Samudera Pasai, the same pattern of cultural encounter between Islam and the local situation can also be seen in Aceh Darussalam, which also started from a potential trade center that had begun to be frequently visited by Muslim traders. Local sources, that had been collected



Majapahit coin with Arabic script. The Muslim trader community had its place in the center of politics in 16th century Majapahit.

Source: Majapahit Trowulan, 2006.

by Djajadiningrat,[34] in different versions, underlines that the transformation of the segmented state---or *meurah* referring to *Bustanus Salatin*--- to become a centralized state took place after man of prowess converted to Islam. After freeing itself from the domination of Pidie, Aceh Darussalam gained victory over Samudera Pasai in 1524.

The history and traditional historiography of Sulu and Maguindanao show the same historical trend. The process of Islamization was in line with the formation process of a centralized empire, which replaced the segmented royal villages. In *Tarsila Sulu* it is said that the first coming were the Muslims, mostly traders. Among them was Mr. Masha'ika, who married with the local. They were the first to introduce elements of Islam. Then, the *makhdumin* came and intentionally spread the religion. The ever remembered name by tradition is Karim ul-Makhdum.

Ten years later, according to the *Tarsila* or the genealogy of the kings of Sulu, Raja Baginda of Minangkabau was stranded in Buansa. At first, the chief commander of Sulu in Buansa wanted to harm Raja Baginda, but failed. It was only after they learned that he was a Muslim, he was accepted and respected.

Raja Baginda, who was supposedly guarded by imams, got married in Buansa. Then Sayyid Abu-Bakr came ---another version calls different name--- from Palembang. He was married with Paramisuli, the daughter of the King. In this way he actually tied himself to a leading family. So Abu Bakr then was appointed as the sultan with the title, Sharif al-Hashim. He was then considered the founder of the Sulu Sultanate. Abu Bakar was also the ancestor of the sultans in the Sulu Island.

In addition to demonstrating the role of Islam as the founding of the supra-village organization, *tarsila* also clearly indicates its association with the outside world. In another island ---Raja Baginda of Minangkabau--- as well as the Islamic world ---Abu Bakr is a *sayyid*, the descendant of the Prophet, and came from Palembang. The same trend is also shown by the traditions of Maguindanao, who inhabited the southern island of Mindanao. According to Majul, it was at the same time as the Mindanao region was visited by the Arab *makhdumin*. They were the first to form an Islamic society. At the beginning of the 16th

34. Hoesein Djajadiningrat, "Critisch Overzicht van de Maleische Werken Vervatte gegevens Over Geschiedenis van het Soultanaat van Atjeh", *BKI65* (1911): 135-138.

century, Syarif Muhammad Kabungsuan did not only continue the process of Islamization, but also, and more importantly, laid the foundation of the Sultanate of Maguindanao. Then it is not too surprising that *tarsila* often considers him the only person responsible in the process of Islamization of Mindanao.[35]


Unlike Samudera Pasai or Aceh Darussalam, Sulu Island (inhabited by the Tausug), Manguindanao, and Maranao, have almost the same situation with Patani (as narrated in *Hikayat Patani*) on the conversion process of Malacca. It was a maritime empire whose origin starting from the largest power center in the Malay tradition, namely Palembang. The Islamization occurred after establishing itself as a power center. Both *Sejarah Melayu* and the Portuguese report show that Islamization of Malacca began after Muslim merchants and *mullahs* successfully converting the royal family[36] or, it could be, the king who took the initiative to make himself bean adherent of Islam. In other words, the process of Islamization took place in a state structure, as it is said in *Sejarah Melayu*, already having a basis of genealogical legitimacy. However, it occurred when there had been many Muslim traders, ---regardless their low level of "Islamic culture", as it was sharply criticized by Shibab al-Din Ahmad ibn Mjid, Vasco da Gama's signpost, in *Hawiyat al-fil Ikhtusar fil Urn al-Bihar---*[37]that religious conversion also shows the ability of the king, the third ruler of Malacca, to maintain the royal splendor. "Rulers," said Wolters, "are to avoid public insult in the state affairs". And, at the same time it was a way to raise the prestige of Malacca, which was still protected under Pasai, and, who knows, causing the forward motion of Thai kingdom of Ayuthya, which was always threatening, to be restrained.[38]

The patterns of Islamization through the conversion of a palace or the power center can also be found in other port cities. Ternate and Gowa-Tallo were

Islamized by their respective trade communities, whose number and political role continued to grow. Ternate was finally Islamized throughthe close trade relations with Java. Being the "Prime Minister" of Gowa, King Tallo's affinity with the teachings of Islam was propagated by hisMuslim community, as then in 1605 he accepted Islam and persuaded the king of Gowa to follow.[39]

Conversions to Islam in Banjarmasin, as told in the *Hikayat Banjar*,[40] were driven by urgent need felt by Pangeran Samudera, the crown prince of Daha state. After the old king's demise, i.e. his father, the throne was taken by his uncle. He himself was only a local authority in Banjar, which was a region conquered as a vassal state of Daha. In such a disposal Pangeran Samudera asked for military help to Demak, which had attained the hegemony in Java after the fall of Majapahit. The Sultan of Demak would only help Pengeran Samudera if he promised to embrace Islam. After he expressed his readiness, Demak sent their troops to punish Daha and raised Pangeran Samudera as Sultan Suryansyah (1525). Banjarmasin Sultanate was then established.

The Islamization of the palaces of Patani and the royal twin Gowa-Tallo as mentioned by traditional historiography of the two regions, which is also justified by other sources,[41] reflects the king's recognition of a possibility given by Islam to overcome the cultural and economic problems at that time, whereas Islamization of Ternate clearly demonstrates their economic motives. Perhaps, this was also driven by the interests of traders and the Muslim preachers to win the "race with Christianity" as suggested by Schrieke.[42] While the Islamization process in Banjarmasin seems to justify the renowned opinion of van Leur.[43]The Islamization process, he said, is sociologically (as if all the causes of social events were only legitimate to be found merely within the dynamics of the social world) driven by political interests. This case refers to van Leur's competing



The Grand Mosque of Demak before the construction of its minaret.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period), 2010.

political and economic situation of trading cities on the north coastal regions of Java.

It is understandable that scholars of comparative religions would give a negative reaction to the simplification of the process of conversion as described above. For religious conversions could not be seen as a transfer of political parties with differing political programs. But what is important is that these types of cultural encounters and conversion processes that seem to vary show a very impressive similarity. Unlike in Samudera Pasai, the Islamization processes in Malacca, Gowa-Tallo and so forth, did not provide the basis for the establishment of power centers or, say, a state. Islam does not transform a village into a new form of power organization, as happened in Samudera Pasai. Religious conversion was run at the power center that had been previously there.

So, from a comparison of the various types of Islamization process and the establishment of those states, there appear two dominant patterns. The first is the situation in which Islam plays a decisive role in the process of the state formation or the supra-village pattern central authority, while the second is a condition in which Muslims have to face problems of structural accommodation. Clearly the latter is said by *Hikayat Patani*, "only idolatrous and eating pork that were abandoned; other than that, all pagan work remained unchanged."

But in both patterns of religious conversion, the power centers, whether in the form of districts located on the edges of rivers or the relatively centralized maritime empire, play their role as the "crossing bridge" or "beachhead" of Islamization for the surrounding areas. In the Islamization process of the bridge, one can clearly talk about the peaceful penetration of Islam, or arguing whether traders or Sufis-travelers who became major carriers of "revelations", or whether Islam came directly from Arabia or possibly via India or even from China.

The nature of the Islamization of the surrounding areas had started to depend on the internal dynamics as well as external pressures of the subsequent "crossing bridges". And this can take place in an atmosphere of peace or not. Efforts of Samudera-Pasai to Islamize interior regions may not only be driven by religious fervors, but can also be driven by economic and political factors, while the "Islamic war" firstly launched by Gowa-Tallo to all other kingdoms in South Sulawesi has another story. The grounds for maintaining the tradition that

had long been established between "the descendants to *manurung*" (those who descend from the sky), which teaches that "the person who gained something meaningful must be willing to share with others", then Gowa-Tallo spreads Islam.[44] But in the process Gowa-Tallo became the most dominant force in the region, Wajo (1610) and finally Bone, Bugis kingdom that was the most profound and powerful, were Islamized and politically subdued.

Issues of surrounding territories that have not been Islam are also faced by the Kingdom of Sulu, whose base was in Buansa. It seems, according to *tarsila*, after Sultan Abu Bakar being named Sharif al-Hashim, people living in the mountainous regions (the Buranun) remained "in the world of unbelieve". Then, coastal people suggested the Sultan to "fight the mountainous and Islamize their food and clothing," which turned out to be liked by the children of the Buranun. With this friendship approach, the Buranun chief and his men eventually converted to Islam. No conquest, but the Islamic territory had been expanded.[45]

Brunei, which was undergoing an Islamization process when the kingdom had already been established[46] ---thus, like the Patani or Malacca--- by not simply looking at the interior but also across the ocean, in making the waters as a "crossing bridge" of Islam. The royal family of Brunei established a supra-village power organization in the Gulf of Manila (Luzon). The just growing "sultanate" that was faced by the Spanish when they landed in Manila in 1570.[47]

Relative cultural freedom owned by Samudera-Pasai to formulate the structure and system of power, which reflects a picture of its own, is an expensive luxury for the centers of Islam in Java. Samudera-Pasai, which stemmed from a segmented political tradition after the Islamization process, was theoretically possible to lay the new state foundation. But in Java, the newly founded Islamic power had a political system and the arrangement of power structures that had long been established. Although the archeological evidence shows that the Muslim trader community had earned a place in the political centers of the 16th century and



The Grave of Sunan Giri.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period), 2010.

further enlarged in the 14th century, but only in the 15th century that this community became political and religious threat to the power center, namely the central palace of Majapahit.

After the death of Hayam Wuruk, the greatest king of Majapahit, along with the Supreme Governor Gajah Mada, in 1380's, the "golden age" of Majapahit, which is beautifully described in *Negarakertagama,* began to be threatened by local rebellions. The process of centralization, which had gradually weakened the autonomy of the village,[48] towards the end of the 14th century had been stopped. The center had also showed the competing local authorities, its weakness in dealing with the international trade. The provisions of Canggu (1358)[49] who freed merchants and craftsmen from the power of the local aristocracy and redirect them under the supervision of the king, might free the king from his dependence on the support of the local aristocracy.

48. J.G. de Casparis, "Pour une histoire sociale de 1'ancienne Java principle an Xeme's", *Archipel* 21 (1981) : 2125-154 dan "The evolution of the socio-economic status of East-Javanese village and its inhabitants" in Sartono Kartodirdjo-(ed.) *Agrarian History,* Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada UniversityPress, 1986, hal 3-24.

49. J. Noorduyn, "Further Topographical/Notes on the Ferry Charter of 1358", *BKI* 124 (1968): p. 460-481.

But the king continued to have a weak position ---mainly due to the dynastic quarrels--- giving great opportunities to the rich merchants in various districts of the coastal areas, to keep away from the king's power. With huge profits gained from the international trade, the merchants did not only convert people to Islam but also built independent political centers.

Demak, Jepara, Rembang, Tuban, Gresik, and Surabaya appeared as centers of commerce, religion and political activities.[50] The weakening palace power to the districts of the coastal regions at the time of intense local opposition movements against the center, the structural weaknesses of the poly-palace[51] system finally brought about deadly consequences. When the center of the palace was unstable, small palaces began competing to replace its position. Under the spiritual guidance of Sunan Kudus ---one of the Wali Sanga, Demak finally successfully replaced Majapahit (1520s) as the central

50. See van Leur, *Indonesian Trade*,see also M.A.P. Melink-Roelofsz, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.

51. F.H. *van* Neerssen (dan R.C. de longh), *The Economic and Administrative History of Early Indonesia*, Leiden/Koln: EJ. Briil, 1077.



Islamic iconography on a tombstone from Traloyo.

Source: *700 Tahun Majapahit suatu Bunga Rampai* (700 Years of Majapahit: An Anthology), 2012.

palace.[52] With this new position, Demak did not only hold political hegemony, but also made itself as the most important "crossing bridge" of Islam in Java. Giri-Gresik might have the oldest and the most authoritative spiritual and religious authority, and the blessing of Sunan Giri might be necessary to ensure the legitimacy of a ruler, but the Sultan of Demak held the political reins in Cirebon, which had been Islamized in the 15thcentury. Under the direct political rule of the sultan of Demak, Sunan Gunung Jati, the *pandita ratu* of Cirebon, built his political power at Jayakarta (1520s) after beating the Portuguese, and establish a new Islamic dynasty in Banten. Pajajaran Kingdom that was increasingly isolated in the interior, whose alliance with the Portuguese marred by Fatahillah, was finally attacked by Banten in 1579/80. Within Banten, which was an extension of Cirebon and Demak, Fatahillah would then appear as Sunan Gunung Jati, who became the unrivalled center of spiritual in West Java, although it still remained as one of the small palaces under the political domination of the palace-center in Central Java.[53]

52. H.J. de Gtaaf, *De Eerste Moslimse Vortendommen op Java. Studien over de Staatskundige Geschiedenis van de 15de* e« *16de -Eeuw,* 'S-Gravenhage: KITLV, 69.

53. G. Th. Pigeaud, *Literature of Java*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967, vol. II.

Although achieving political success quickly and played a role as the most important "crossing bridge", Demak had no structural independence as relatively owned by Banten. If Banten, as a new dynasty, was located at the border of the Pajajaran cultural region---it was told that the transfer of the capital from the hinterland to the coast, namely to Surasowan, was carried out on the advice of Sunan Gunung Jati--- so Demak, replacing the palace center of Majapahit, did not only have to face the problem of political legitimacy, but also cultural calling for continuity. The cultural dilemma of the Islamic political domination within the Ciwa-Buddhist tradition, along with the concept of power-concentric, had far deeper penetrated consciousness, and had become far clearer after the palace had been moved by the adopted son of Sultan Trenggana, Jaka Tingkir, to Pajang[54] in the hinterland. This dilemma

54. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, Part II, 220 - 267. The general theory about the necessity of continuity in the Javanese cultural thinking and relentless effort to get the validity of the power legitimacy, see, among others, B. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*. "Part two: Ruler and Realm in Early". The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1957. Especially with regard to the shift of Majapahit-Demak-Pajang-Mataram, see Anthony H. John, "The Role of Structural Organization and Myth in Javanese Historiography" *JAS*, XXIV, 1, Nov

became even more important with the emerging and the appearance of Mataram as the holder of hegemony (1588).

Unlike the pattern of Samudera-Pasai, where Islam encouraged the formation of supra-village states, also unlike the pattern of Malacca, where the palace was Islamized, the political history of Java shows Islam as a challenger, then becoming a substitute for the existing power. At first, the archeological evidences found in Leran and Tralaya show Islamic communities grew at the outskirts of the power center. Then, as Tomé Pirés and other sources as well as the Javanese tradition says, the Muslim communities had successfully established local power centers. Javanese tradition clearly shows how important the roles of traders and scholars. In this connection, it can also be understood that the central role given by tradition to the saints[55] or wali and especially to those who are considered being included into the Wali Sanga[56] in the process of Islamization and the establishment of Islamic power centers. The guardians also played a role in the emerging process of dynasties, which alternately ---Demak, Pajang (although only one king), and Mataram--- as the holder of hegemony on the island of Java.

This historical process apparently leads to a dilemmatic situation. How do the "new people" must lay their foundation of legitimacy? Manifestations of power and symbols of legitimacy cannot be just detached from the old power structures and the entrenched symbols of validity.

From this brief discussion, it appears two important things. First, differing patterns of "cultural formation" when the Islamization process has reached the stage of state formation. Although the Islamization of the territories which then function as a "crossing bridge" begins with the relatively



The Graveyard of the Kings of Gowa. When the palace of Gowa-Tallo formally had converted to Islam, it caused at least three patterns of "cultural encounters" along the process of the establishment of the centers of Islamic power.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

similar process ---traders and Muslim preachers came and then formed a community--- but on the next stage, when the power centers were formed and the dynasties were established, differences in political traditions also manifest themselves. In the span of time since the end of the 13th century, when Samudera-Pasai was founded, until the early 17th century, when the palace of Gowa-Tallo officially embraced Islam, at least three patterns of "cultural clash" had occurred in the process of establishing Islamic power centers.

Although in this time span the progress of Islam should be retained, such as for example, as claimed by *Negarakertagama*, and implicitly recognized by *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai*,[57] when Samudera Pasai was under the hegemony of Majapahit (1350s), this age not only can be considered as the period of formation of Islamic kingdoms, but also the foundation of the Islamic political tradition. The second thing reached its peak in the 17th and the 18th century, two centuries marked by the rise and crisis of Islamic kingdoms.

Second, differences in the patterns of Islamization process and the supra-village organization power formation as if gaina justification from the traditional historiography. Being written or at least begin to be drafted, when a political tradition had found its form like *tarsila*, chronicle, story, or *lontara*, those writings do not merely record the collective memory, but also and more importantly, reveal the myth of fortitude, as well as the foundation stone and reinforcing legitimacy.

In the history of Islamization process and the power centers establishment, Islam does not only show the differing patterns of cultural clash between the coming Islam and the local culture. This historical event also shows how various "Muslim regions" in Southeast Asia are also woven by various networks between the sending areas, namely the "deployment bridge", with recipients Islam recorded by the collective memory. These networks then were also reinforced by the chains of teachers and pupils and finally by the increasing book spread. Thus, although the patterns of the cultural clash are

57. By putting on a structural approach to the myth, something which is formulated as a "unity of socialized linguistic form" who wants to believe to be "true", Berg in his writings (published in Indonesia, in the early 1950s) said that the concept of "Greater Majapahit " is simply a myth. Power was more a mental attitude rather than power in a real sense. In summary, these writings formulated in C.C. Berg, "The Javanese Picture of the Past", Soedjatmoko et. all (eds.): *An Introduction*, 87-118. Berg very extreme views that do not trust the local sources of cause heated debate among philologists, archeologists, and historians.

different, as described above and as a result the emergence of different political traditions ---something that will be discussed later--- the foundation of the spiritual power from the center of the Islamic empire in Southeast Asia is not different.

One of the debates about the process of Islamization in Southeast Asia is about from where the religion is brought into the region. Then, based on the style of tombstones used in Samudera Pasai and Gresik, and apparently also by taking into account of the trade route, Moquette[58] came to a conclusion that Islam came from Cambay, Gujarat. This view seems to be influential for quite long, as it has also been inserted into the historical text books. But a British scientist, Marrison,[59] shows that this is not possible. According to him, at that time Gujarat was still under the influence of Hinduism. He also said that Islam is more likely to have come from South India. This opinion is also supported by Tome Pires, the 16th century Portuguese traveler, whose manuscript of his report has coincidentally discovered (1949). But the debate has not been completed. In a very fiery style an Indian subcontinent scientist, Fatimi,[60] denied Marrison and finally determine Bengal as the "sender" of Islam to the archipelago. He even said the immense possibilities that Mirah Silu, who was mentioned in *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* and became Malik as-Saleh, was also a "Bengali". The debate could also still be forwarded. Because China, with its trade centers in Canton and the Central Asian regions that had undergone a process of Islamization, as well as the influence of the Hui ethnic group in the Ming Dynasty (the 14th to the 17th century) can also appear as "the challenger".[61] How about the homeland of this religion itself --the Arab Peninsula? In his inaugural address as a professor of PTAIN Yogyakarta and then defended in the first seminar about the coming of Islam to Indonesia (1963), Buya Hamka proposed a "theory" that Islam came to the archipelago directly from Arabia as this had occurred probably in the first century AH. This opinion was supported

by several ulama whenever they were called for analyzing Islamic history.[62]

All theories do not fabricate things. In fact, it is quite possible all these theories are complementary. However, Islamization of Southeast Asia is not only complex, but also something that is still ongoing. But, as Drewes[63] said in his writings doubting the strong arguments of almost all theories, then the historical certainty can only be obtained if the various requirements have been met. So let all these theories be regarded as merely a useful academic exercise.

From the description of the cultural clash patternit seems that the arrival of Islam more remembered as part of the dynamics of the relationship among regions in the archipelago. Admittedly, *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* and, with a slightly different version, *Sejarah Melayu*, could tell a story about Mirah Silu's dream and the arrival of Sheikh Ismail of Mecca, end with the establishment of the empire and the crowned of the local ruler as Malik as-Saleh.Or, *Sejarah Melayu*, which seems to use cultural accountability patterns like *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai*, is about the king of Malaka, Raja Tengah who dreamed of meeting the Prophet teaching *shahadah*, circumcising him, and saying that the next day would come a ship from Jeddah. The king also wanted to validate his dream. The next day, before sunset, a *makdum* come and pray at the beach---just as he had seen in his dream. So, he himself and his dignitaries converted to Islam led by the *makdum*. From then on, Raja Tengah had been known as Sultan Muhammad Shah.[64]

Pasai and Malacca have a unique historical claim in the history of Islamization and such is recognized in various local traditions ---as if from both centers a continuing relay begins. Historical and spiritual prestige of Pasai was then inherited by Aceh Darussalam; like Johor that could never forget their dynasty is an extension of the successful Palembang-Malacca dynasty in Malacca.



The Palace of the King of Luwu, Palopo.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

It is also recognized in the other collective memory of other areas. Thus, Sulu and Mangindanao remember Johor as the sender of "guidance" to them. Regardless of chronological chaos, but *Hikayat Marong Mahawangsa* is commonly referred to as *Hikayat Kedah* (the Tale of Kedah), which states that Aceh as the kingdom persuaded them to convert to Islam.[65] While Minangkabau remembers Malacca as the "sender" to Islam as they never forget Aceh as the foundation stone of their surau tradition---began in Ulakan, led by Sheikh Burhanuddin, (Tuanku Ulakan) who have studied with the Sheikh Abdur Rauf al-Singkili (Tuanku di Kuala), in the 17th century.[66] In contrast, Pahang remembers that they converted to Islam by the immigrants from the Minangkabau.

The role of the Minangkabau immigrants and religious preachers is also remembered in the tradition of Luwu and Gowa-Tallo.[67] With the emphasis of the different propaganda, according to tradition, the religious preachers, whose subsequent title were Dato ri Bandang, Dato Patimang, and Dato ri Tiro, had successfully converted the royal family of Luwu and Gowa-Tallo. The Bima tradition also said that the area was taken to the brace of Islam by Dato ri Bandang.[68] In *Salasilah Kutei*, which may come from the year 1620, shortly after the King Makota converted to Islam, Kutai was visited by two saints, namely Dato ri Bandang and Tuan Tunggang Parangan. But, because Makassar had a theological crisis, Dato ri Bandang was forced to return, then only Tuan Tunggang Parangan stayed in Kutai. He was the one who had successfully become the King of the Crown (Raja Mahkota), to be a true Muslim, after proving the superiority of his knowledge.[69]

65. R.O. Winstedt, "History of Kedah", *JSBRAS*, 81 (1920) 29-36.

66. Until now each congregation in Ulakan is the center of Syattariyah mystical order and every month of Safar the followers of this order do worship ceremony called Basapa. About Sheikh Burhanuddin or Tuanku Ulakan, see Ph.S. van Ronkel, "Het Heiligdom Oelakan te", *T.B.G.*, 56 (1914): 281-316. Transcription of manuscripts found Ulakan about Tuanku Ulakan, which translated into Dutch by van Ronkel, see Karel A. Steenbrink, *Some Aspects of Indonesian Islam in the 19th century*, Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984, 179-184.

67. See Christian Pelras, "Religion,Tradition and the Dynamics of Islamization in South Sulawesi", *Archipel*, 29 (1985): 107-136. See also J. noorduyn, "De islamisering' van Makassar", *B,K.I.* cxii, (1956); 247-266.

68. On the missionary activities of Dato ri Bandang in the eastern Indonesian waters see Henri Chambert-Loir, "Dato' ri Bandang. Legendes de Pislamisation de la region de Celebes-Sudi", *Archipel*, 29 (1985): 137-163.

69. C.A. Mees (ed.), *De Kroniek van Koetei*, Santport, 1956.



The Palace of the Sultanate of Ternate.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia, 2013.

In the middle of the 15th century the capital of Campa, Viyaja, fell into the hands of Vietnam, which came from the north. The population of Campa who were still living in the country might then undergo a conversion in the 17th century.[70] But in the historical memory of Java, Campa is kept in mind in relation to Islamization, where Raden Rahmat, the son of a Princess of Campa getting married with an Arab origin. He came to Majapahit to meet his aunt, who was said, as narrated partly by *Serat Kanda*, to have married the King of Majapahit. He was later known as Sunan Ampel, one of the oldest saints.

Sunan Giri, commonly called the Pope by the Dutch sources, was not only very influential among the saints, but also remembered as a missionary to the eastern parts of Indonesia. After converting to Islam in Makassar, a trade city becoming the trade center after the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese, the King of Ternate, Sultan Zainal Abidin (who before converting to Islam had the name Kolano Tidore Vongi) went to Giri (1495) to deepen his religious knowledge. It was here, according to the *Hikayat Tanah Hitu* (written by Imam Rijali), he met Pati Tuban, one of the four primes or rulers of the Land of Hitu (Ambon). Both bound an agreement to federate "until the Last Day ---an agreement that would be used by the palace of Ternate as a basis for claiming the islands of Buru, Seram, Ambon, and Banda.[71] Shortly after returning to Ternate, having more conflict with Bima, Sultan Zainal Abidin died. But, at that time Ternate had made himself a power of Islam. The Portuguese had participated in political competition and trade. The royal rulers after Zainal Abidin increasingly manifested themselves as holders of Islamic powers. Through the power of trade and Islam Ternate spread its political influence. In this situation either through marriage or union agreements Ternate attracted small kings to come to follow in its footsteps. Here, for example, happened to the Gorontalo-Limbotto alliance, which at times hit by the crisis as well. A friendship treaty between the King of Ternate with both allied rulers became a channel for the spread of Islam to North Sulawesi.[72]

70. On the Islamization process of Campa, see Pierre-Yves Manguin, "The Introduction of Islam into Campa", *JMBRAS*, lviii, part 1 (1985): 1-28.

71. Paramita R. Abdurachman, " 'Niachile Pokaraga: a sad Story of a Molucca Queen", *Modern Asian Studies*, 22, 3 (1988): 571-592.

72. J. Bastiaans, "Persekutuan Limbotto dan Gorontalo" published in Taufik Abdullah (ed.) *Sejarah Lokal di Indonesia*, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1990 (3rd edition), 199-231. This article is originally in Dutch published in *T.B.G.*, 1938.

Shortly after the departure of Sultan Zainal Abidin, Pati Tuban returned also to the Land of Hitu. When he got home he bound an alliance with Waiputih and Eran. Then, "when the Pati Tuban came from Java, the land of Hitu believed in God and embraced the religion of the Prophet Muhammad".[73]

This chain is still to be forwarded. Not only each region has a collective memory about from where they got the religion they profess up to now, but also the complex pattern of inter-state relations between the sending area and the receiving area cannot be simply determined. It is not too difficult to understand the relationship between Ternate and Gorontalo, because it was clear at that time (the 17th century) that Ternate was a respected force. Likewise is the relationship between the Sultanate of Demak and Banjarmasin, as narrated by *Hikayat Banjar*. Demak was successful in helping Prince Samudera to regain his kingdom and, according to the promises he made, he had to establish an Islamic kingdom. But in the process of Islamization, the relationship between Majapahit and Palembang, as recorded in the Javanese tradition, was quite unique. Majapahit was the holder of political hegemony, and in fact Palembang was only his vassal. But in Palembang it was Raden Patah, son of Brawijaya, who grew up and became a Muslim. He was also the last, as narrated by *Babad Tanah Jawi*, who beat the Majapahit palace, and transferred the central palace to Demak.[74]

Apart from all sorts of historical complexities, if any local collective memories recorded by traditional historiography and oral tradition are being described, there will be found networks of inter-regional relations. If a line is drawn from each recipient district to its sender region respectively, then what will we see? From the collective memory about the Islamization, the map of Southeast Asia and particularly the archipelago (including the Malay Peninsula) would look filled with lines that intersect one another, but the whole is integrated ---none is apart from the network chains of the collective memory. In other words, Islam is not just putting on a cosmopolitan cultural atmosphere, which has been fostered by



The tomb of Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin II of the Sultanate of Palembang in Ternate. This tomb marked the friendly relations between the Sultanates of Palembang and Ternate.


Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia, 2013.

the maritime trade, or simply changing the ideological-spiritual foundation of the old power centers or fosteringthe new ones. Islam expanded the territory of the cosmopolitan atmosphere and more importantly, a gradual and sometimes also having to pass through zig-zag paths, making its teachings and doctrines belonged to all members of the community. It is also commonly regarded as one of the factors allowing Islam to cracks the social factory of Hindu-Budhdhist community ---"everyone is equal before God".[75]

If then historians began to question the origins of Indonesian nationalism, in its most simple sense as the integration of the nation, they refer to Islam as one of the main factors, then it cannot be simply interpreted as the essentially universal nature of Islam, but also ---even more importantly---on the network of this collective memories. The intense function of the network of collective memories gets stronger, because the peak of the spread of Islam in fact coincided with the arrival of traders and Western conquerors: Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and others. Although the relational stability between states continued and dragged Western powers into the arena of conflict and competition between neighboring countries, however, as seen from the above description, the network was not within the country or neighboring power centers, but within more distant regions. So, Mataram as the heir of Demak, for example, can still be seen by Banjarmasin as the sending country that will be able to help.

These things will be discussed further in another section. However, ultimately the most decisive factor was the mobility of religious scholars and their relevance in various shades of social networking---the teacher and pupils, the pupil and the fellow students, the writer-reader and, no less important, the religious scholars-rulers (*ulama-umara*), and the religious scholars-the community. The tradition of *umara* or ruler surrounded by religious scholars, while addressing the religious issues, as reported by Ibn Battuta continued, until the end of the Islamic kingdoms. The story of the king surrounded by the *ulama* and about a prosperous country visited by many ships from China as well as preachers and missionaries, moreover as if it was one of the literary conventions of Malay literature. This tradition was also one of the factors that led to the transition of Islamic intellectual centers ---rich

75. See for example W.F.Wertheira, *Indonesian Society in Transition*, TheHague/Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958.



The remnants of the palace of the king of Penyengat. At the end of the 19th century the Island of Penyengat in Riau was the luminous star in Malay-Islamic thought.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

and prosperous king to be protective of scientific progress. If the 17th century may be said to be "the century of Aceh", when the Sufis illuminated the world of thought, then the 18th century can also be regarded as the "greatness era of Palembang", at the time of Sultan Palembang became a patron for writers and ideas of religious issues---including the king himself.[76] The end of the 19th century was a time that Penyengat Island, Riau, was a sparkling star in the world of the Malay Islamic thought. From a small island, which lies near the island of Bintan and the position of the Johor viceroy, the early support came to publish the first reformist magazine in the Malay World, *Al-Imam*. Published in Singapore, *Al-Imam* magazine (1906-1908) laid the intellectual foundation of the modernist Islam reform movement, which initially exerted influences on the young *ulama* of Minangkabau, but then spread everywhere throughout Southeast Asia.

From the above discussion a few important things appear. Islamization of Southeast Asia is a long historical process, which even today still continues. Despite all the debates on the various theories about the coming of Islam, the process of Islamization should be seen in advance as a local event ---started from a "beachhead", which at once serves also as a "crossing bridge" for the spread of Islam everywhere. Collective memories about the Islamization is a record of cultural encounter occurred at the beachhead. Frequently, the collective memory is recorded in oral traditions or in the traditional historiography that could also get verification from other sources.

The most decisive phase in the process of Islamization was when a "beachhead" became the center of an Islamic power for the surrounding regions. The style of events that generate power centers was used as a basis for forming the pattern of cultural encounters. From here we can discern some patterns, as described above.

76. For the description of Palembang, see G.W.J. Drewes, "Palembang Manuscripts and authors", which was published as an Appendix of his book, *Directions for Travellers on the Mystic Path*, (Verhandelingen van het KITLV, 81) The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. Though not writing religious issues Sultan Mahmud Badruddin (1804 -1821, with an interval, for being impeached) wrote some revolves poetry, like *Shair Sinyor Costa, Shair Nun, Hikayat Martalaya*. He was always remembered by the Dutch government, because in the event of a power transfer from the Netherlands to the British, in 1811, he invaded the Dutch fort and killed all its occupants. The most famous author and scholar of Palembang of the 18th century is Abd al-Samad al-Palimbani, who spent his life in the Holy Land. Some of his writings in the Malay language, see Ibid, p. 222-224. He also wrote books in Arabic.



A dresser in the Palace of Luwu, South Sulawesi, which still contains ancient historical manuscripts.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia, 2007.

Though originally a local style, in a sense that each locality has its own dynamic style, however, as recorded by the local collective memory, each locality was to see itself as part of a "sending and receiving" chain of divine guidance, i.e. Islam. This memory was not just recorded, but also being experienced continuously with the establishment of a network of religious scholars, namely between teachers and students, students and the fellow pupils. Thus, although the conversion event was a local event, which experiences a style of cultural encounters, variously-mixed with differing cultural accountability as well, but the various networks are not only channels of the spread of religious thought, but also, and no less importantly, putting cultural and ideological foundations and also ideals of the relationship between the king's and the servants and both with the Almighty.

Inflicted upon the local reality and pattern differences of the cultural encounters, which form the structural base of power, which is also local, the cultural and ideological foundation will form a political tradition of each power center. But what is the cultural basis of Islamic power center that in turn will also determine the character of its political tradition, which acts as the ethos and vision of life in the political behavior pattern?

Now, the question arises, what is the traditional form of Islamic state in Southeast Asia? What is the foundation of political tradition as mentioned above? This talk hopefully will be able to explain the political and cultural behavior of the community of Islamic power centers.





Chapter Two

The Process of Islamization in Traditional Historiographies

The Process of Islamization in Traditional Historiographies

Muhamad Hisyam & Setyadi Sulaiman

In the Malay Archipelago, the Islamization process has been recorded in three main sources: the writings of foreign visitors, oral tradition, and traditional historiography. These sources offer a wealth of information on the way Islam was recognized before it was adopted as the faith of earlier societies.

The travel accounts of Marco Polo (1254-1324)[1] tell us of the Muslim community that lived in the region of Samudra Pasai—especially the people of Perlak (Felech) — in 1292 together with Arab traders. In his view, Perlak was an Islamic city surrounded by areas of non-Muslim pagans.[2]

In addition to Marco Polo's travel accounts, the Islamization process of the Indonesian-Malay world can also be found in Ibn Battuta look.[3] In his *Travels in Asia and Africa: 1325-1354*, he draws our attention to the religious and intellectual life in Samudra Pasai, the oldest Islamic kingdom on the tip of North Sumatra that, by the 14th century, had embraced Islam for only less than half a century. When he visited Samudra Pasai in 1345, Ibn Battuta recorded that the country's ruling monarch bore Islamic titles, viz. Malikut Tahbir bin Malik al-Saleh, and that most of Muslim society adhered to the Shafi'i School.[4]

Net to these travel accounts, the one by Tomé Pirés[5] should also be

1. Marco Polo was a tourist from Venice, Italy, who made a journey to the archipelago and China. He visited Samudra Pasai in 1292. About his experiences in various regions of the world for about 24 years, see for example, Russell Freedman's *Adventures of Marco Polo* (Schlastic, 2006), Jonathan Clements, *Marco Polo,* (H. Books, 2007), Demi's *Marco Polo* (Marshall Cavendish, 2008), Stephen Feinstein, *Marco Polo: Amazing Adventures in China, Great Adventures of the World*, (Enslow Publishers, Inc. 2009).

2. Manuel Komroff (ed.), *The Travel of Marco Polo,* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), Chapter 9, 'Of the Island of Java Minor' and Chapter 10 'Of the Kingdoms Named Samara and Dragoian". For his complete account, see Marco Polo, *The Travels* (Ronald Latham), (London: Penguin Classics, 1958).

3. Abdullah Muhammad ibn Battuta was a traveller who was born in Tangier, Morocco. Apart from being an *'alim* he was also a famous Muslim intellectual. His adventures took him from West Africa to Pakistan, India, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Southeast Asia and China. For a biography of Ibn Battuta, see Ross E. Dunn, *The Adventures of Ibn Battuta: A Muslim Traveler of the 14th Century* (Revised Edition), (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

4. Ibn Battuta, *Travels in Asia and Africa: 1325 – 1354* (translated by H.A.R. Gibbs, London: Asian Educational Service, 1929).

5. Tomé Pirés was a pharmacist who worked for a prince in Lisbon, Portugal. He arrived in Malacca in 1512 to buy medicines. After his arrival in Malacca, he collected all the information he could get in the busiest harbor of Southeast Asia. In Malacca he started to write his book *Suma Oriental*, which he finished it in India on his return journey to Portugal in 1515. For a biography of Tomé Pirés, see, for example, Armando Cortesão, *The Suma Oriental*



The Grand Mosque of Padangaran in the Bayat region, Klaten, Central Java.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

mentioned. In his *Suma Oriental*, Tomé Pirés provides us with information on the way the Javanese rulers in the northern coastal regions of the island had become Muslims. He writes that the coastal areas were inhabited by many merchants from Persia, Arabia, Gujarat, Bengal, Malaysia, and other countries. There were Moors living among them. They were rich traders who managed to build mosques and who invited *mullahs* (*'ulama*) to come over from many countries. They arrived in great numbers and their numbers continued to increase. Their children considered themselves Javanese, because they had been living in the area for about 70 years. In some places, Javanese pagan rulers turned to Islam, while the *mullah*s and Moor merchants took possession of their lands (Cortesão, 1994: 182)

In his work, Pirés gives the impression that the spread of Islam did not only take place in Samudra Pasai, Malacca, Java, and the Moluccas but that it went further to Patani, the northern part of present-day Malaysia and southern part of Thailand. According to him, relationships between Muslim traders and the local communities had been established gradually. It is through these relationships that Islamization took place. Moreover, Muslim traders and local residents inter-married and in this way increased the number of Muslim families. In his notes, he writes:

> "Every man has one or two wives and also as many concubines as he wants; they live together peacefully. The ruling kingdom observes the following habits: a pagan marries a Moor woman or a Moor man marries a pagan woman according to their ceremonies; in the excitement of their parties they used to drink much wine. That is the way with men and women in Java." (Cortesão, 1994: 268).

Elsewhere in his book, Tomé Pirés recorded the marriage between a princess of Pasai origin and the second king of Malacca, Xaquem Darxa (Muhammad Iskandar Shah) who was about 72 years old and had become a Muslim. He said that at that time the king of Malacca had not only converted to become a Moor, he had also ensured that the entire population embraced Islam. He lived in matrimony for about eight years, surrounded by *mullah*s. He

of Tomé Pirés: An Account of the East from the Red Sea to Japan: Written in Malacca and in India 1512-1515 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1994); Rui Manuel Loureiro, *Manuscript de Lisboa da 'Suma Oriental' de Tomé Pirés* (Contribuicão para uma edicão critica), (Lisbon: Instituto Portugues do oriente, 1993), pp. 13-26.

also left behind a number of children from his first wife, who had also become Moors and one of her sons inherited the kingdom and ruled under the name Modafarxa (Mudzaffar Shah) (Cortesão, 1994: 242). Through Tomé Pirés we also learn that Islam had already been present in Cirebon at least since 1470-1475. After having visited Cirebon in 1513, he noted that Cirebon was a harbor where around 1,000 families lived, and where the rulers were also Muslims.[6]

In addition to the accounts of foreign visitors, there are also oral traditions. Had they been examined in more detail, these sources would also have earned an important place in the story of the introduction of Islam. In many parts of Indonesia, Islam grew rapidly immediately after someone had had a dream in which he had met the prophet. The person told his neighbors of his dream and the story spread from one person to the next and eventually everybody believed that the dream had been true and that the prophet apparently had halted where they lived. In this case, the question is not whether the dream was true or false, but that the story had turned into an oral collective statement which the local community accepted as the truth and that in the end, Islam had developed because the people assumed the story was true.

The third sources that explain the process of Islamization in the archipelago are traditional historiographic works in the form of chronicles, *serat*, *lontara*, and many others. These works had found their ways to almost all areas of the archipelago. The following will discuss some of these traditional historiographic works that in the opinion of the present authors are important in relation to the Islamization of the archipelago.

Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai and Sejarah Melayu

We will start our discussion with two texts from the Malay world. They are the oldest literary works that relate the history of the kingdom of Samudra Pasai in the 14th century and of that of Malacca in the 15th century. They are the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* (*The Pasai Chronicles*) for Samudra Pasai and *Sejarah Melayu* (*Malay Annals*) for the Malacca kingdom. The two texts seem to have been written much later than the time when the kingdoms were still in power. The *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* was written before 1511 when Malacca fell to the Portuguese and

6. Projokusumo, Taufik Abdullah and Hasan M. Ambary, *Sejarah Umat Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: PP MUI, 1991), p. 78.

the *Sejarah Melayu* was written around 1612. However, as many scholars stated, the writing of both texts may have taken much longer and may even have started in the early period of the existence of these kingdom. Thus, 1511 and 1612 may be the years when the texts were completed. It is probably historically justified to presume that both texts, as will also be discussed below, represent the intellectual and religious discourse in the early period of Islam in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago.

The *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* tells that Malik al-Saleh whose former name was Merah Silu, was the first Muslim ruler who met the Prophet Muhammad in his dream in which he obtained the magical knowledge of Islam which the Prophet had spat into his mouth. In his dream, the Prophet guided him in how to pronounce the confession of the creed (*shahadah*). After having awakened, the new Sultan found that he could to read the Qur'an although he had never been taught how to do this. Also he had been mysteriously circumcised. The next day, a ship arrived from Mecca carrying Sheikh Ismail. When he heard that Malik al-Saleh had pronounced the *shahadah*, the Sheikh installed him as Muslim ruler and initiated him by clothing him in the royal mantle of the kingdom of Mecca. Ismail then continued to teach the people how to pronounce the *shahadah*, "There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is His Messenger". After some time, the ship left Samudra, while the Indian holy man stayed behind to establish Islam more firmly there.[7]

A similar story can be found in the *Sejarah Melayu*. In the text it is told that King Muhammad Shah— Malacca's second ruler—had a dream that he met the Prophet Muhammad who taught him to pronounce the *shahadat*, gave him the new name of Muhammad, and informed him that the next day a ship would arrive from Arabia carrying a scholar whom he must obey. When he had awakened, the king found that he had been mysteriously circumcised, and when he repeatedly uttered the *shahadah*, the members of the royal palace (who certainly did not know Arabic) were apparently very confused because they thought the king had gone mad. Then the boat indeed arrived and landed Sayid Abdul Aziz where he led a prayer on the beach. The people were astonished and started to ask about

7. Russel Jones, "Ten Conversion Myths from Indonesia", in Nehemia Levtzion (ed.) *Conversion to Islam*, (New York: Holmes & Meier.), pp. 133-135; M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1300, Second Edition* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 8-9.

the meaning of his prayer movements. The king told them that the man was no other than the man he had seen in his dream. After that, the palace officials followed him and they converted to Islam. The King was granted the title Sultan Muhammad Shah and he commanded all his subjects to embrace Islam. Sayid Abdul Aziz himself later became the king's teacher. From then on, Islam spread massively in Malacca.[8]

Hikayat Patani

In addition to the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* and *Sejarah Melayu*, the process of the Islamization of the archipelago is also recorded in the *Hikayat Patani* (The Story of Patani). Here are some excerpts:

> *After the king had reigned for several years he had three children, the eldest a son named Kerub Phīcai Painā, the middle one a daughter named Tunku Mahācai, and the youngest a son named Mahācai Pailang.*
>
> *Then, some time later, king Phaya tu Nakpa fell ill, the skin of his whole body was cracked, and although several astrologers and doctors treated him he did not recover. Then the king gave orders to the prime minister to have the gong beaten in all the districts of the land, proclaiming that whoever undertook to treat the king and cured him would be taken as his son-in-law. Then the king suffered such acute pains that he could not sit still. The prime minister immediately took his leave and went to sit in the audience hall, ordering the minister of state to have the gong beaten in accordance with the king's orders. The minister of state immediately took his leave and ordered his people to beat the gong and announce the royal proclamation. The gongs were then beaten in all the districts of the land, for seven days, but no-one undertook to do what the king had requested.*
>
> *Then the people who were beating the gong passed by the village of the people from Patani, who were sitting in the religious centre of that Kampung Pasai. There was among them a man from Pasai called*

8. In another section of the *Sejarah Melayu* also tells of the arrival of a distinguished *'alim* from Arabia who resided in Malacca to teach about Islam, along with the coming of two 'ulama from Java by their journey to Pasai and Mecca. These *'ulama* would become prominent saints, viz. Sunan Giri and Sunan Bonang. On this see C.C. Brown, "Sejarah Melayu' or 'Malay Annals': a translation of Raffles MS 18", *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, volume 25, no. 2 & 3, 1952, pp. 41-3; Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*..., p. 19; Jones, "Ten Conversion Myths from Indonesia" ..., p. 136-7.

Sheikh Sa`id. After he had heard the proclamation from the men who were beating the gong, he came outside and stood at the gate of his village. Then the men who were beating the gong passed near the gate where Sheikh Sa`id was standing. Sheikh Sa`id said: "What are you beating the gong for?" The man in charge of the gong said: "Don't you know that the king of this land is very ill and that the skin of his whole body is cracked? Several astrologers and doctors have tried to cure him, but he has not recovered; far from recovering, his illness has even grown more grave. Therefore the king has ordered the gong to be beaten, and whoever undertakes to cure the king, if he recovers from his illness, the king will take him as his son-in-law." Sheikh Sa`id said: "Go back and tell the king with due respect that I do not wish to become his son-in-law, but if the king is willing to become a Muslim, I shall undertake to cure his illness."

When the man in charge of the gong had heard this he immediately returned and respectfully reported to the minister of state all that Sheikh Sa`id had said. The minister of state immediately went to report the words of the man in charge of the gong to the prime minister. After he had heard the words of the minister of state, the prime minister entered the palace and appeared before the king, respectfully reporting all the minister of state had told him. The king spoke: "If this is true, send immediately for the man from Pasai." So sheikh Sa`id was sent for. He came and appeared before the king. The king spoke to Sheikh Sa`id: "Is it true that you are able to cure my illness?" The sheikh said respectfully: "If my Lord will become a Muslim I shall cure Your Majesty's illness." The king spoke: "If I recover from this illness I shall do whatever you say."

After Sheikh Sa`id had made this agreement with the king he sat down to treat him. After seven days the king was able to go out and give audience to the minsters and officers. Then Sheikh Sa`id respectfully took his leave of the king and returned to his home. A few days later, the king had recovered completely. But the king went back upon his agreement with Sheikh Sa`id.

After two years had elapsed the king fell ill again, suffering from the same disease as before. Again the king sent for Sheikh Sa`id. After the sheikh had arrived the king spoke: "Please treat

this illness of mine. If I recover this time, then indeed I shall not ignore again whatever you say." The sheikh said: "If your agreement with me is truthful, then I will cure Your Majesty. But if your words are not sincere, then I will not treat you." When the king heard the words of Sheikh Sa`id he solemnly confirmed his agreement with him. Then Sheikh Sa`id sat down to treat the king. Five days later Sheikh Sa`id respectfully took his leave of the king and returned to his home. Half a month later the king had recovered from his illness. The king again went back on his agreement with Sheikh Sa`id, however.

A year later the king again fell ill and his illness was worse than before, so that he could not sit still for one; moment. Then the king again sent for Sheikh Sa`id. But Sheikh Sa`id said to the king's servant: "Go and report to His Majesty that I will not treat Him anymore, because the king does not keep his promises to me." Then the king's servant returned and reported all the sheikh's words to the king. Then the king spoke to his aide-de-camp: "Go and call the man from Pasai and tell him that if this time I again recover from my illness, then I shall not break my agreement with him. By the idol(s) which I worship, may I never recover from my illness if I break this agreement."

Then the aide-de-camp went and transmitted all the words of the king to Sheikh Sa`id. Then Sheikh Sa`id said: "All right, let the king's idols be my witness; but another time I shall not be willing to treat the king." Then the sheikh went and appeared before the king. After he had arrived the king spoke: "Please cure my illness once more. If I recover from my illness, whatever you say, truly I shall not be unheedful of your words again." Then Sheikh Sa`id said: "All right. Let me cure Your Majesty's illness. If Your Majesty this time still does not enter Islam after recovering, then if in the future Your Majesty falls ill again, even though Your Majesty may want to kill me, I shall consent to that, but I decline to treat your illness again." The king spoke: "Good, I shall do whatever you say." Then the king was again treated by Sheikh Sa`id. Three days later Sheikh Sa`id respectfully took his leave of the king and went home. Twenty days later the king had completely recovered from his illness.

One day about a month later the king was sitting in the audience hall, while his ministers, officers and all

his subjects were attending. The king spoke: "Well my ministers and officers, what is your opinion? For I intend to become a Muslim." They all said respectfully: "Hail my Lord, whatever your order may be, we humbly accept it, for we are all but servants to Your Royal Majesty." When the king heard the reply of the ministers and officers he was extremely pleased, and entered his palace.

The next morning the king sent his senior aide-de-camp to go and call Sheikh Sa`id, and he ordered the prime minister to assemble all his ministers, officers and other subjects. Then the king took his seat in the audience hall, waited upon by all his subjects. At that time Sheikh Sa`id came and appeared before the king, escorted by the senior aide-de-camp. When Sheikh Sa`id had arrived the king paid him great honour. Then he spoke: "I have called you on account of my agreement with you regarding my wish to become a Muslim." When the sheikh heard the king speaking these words he quickly kissed the king's hand and placed it on his head. After that the sheikh taught him the Statement of the Creed, which runs this: I profess that there is no god but Allah and I profess that Muhammad is Allah's prophet. And the king professed the religion of Islam for good. After the king had pronounced the Statement of the Creed, Sheikh Sa`id taught this Statement to all the ministers, officers and subjects present as well.

After Sheikh Sa`id had finished teaching the Statement of the Creed to all these people, he respectfully said to the king: "My Lord, Your Majesty should now assume a name in accordance with Muslim names, as Your Majesty is now a Muslim, in order that Your Majesty may receive more blessings through the intercession of the prophet Muhammad, the Apostle of God - may God bless Him and give Him peace – in the World to Come." The king spoke: "If that is the case you should give me a name." Then theming received the name Sultan Isma`il Syah Zillullah Fil-`Alam from Sheikh Sa`id. When the sheikh had given the name to the king, the king spoke: "You should also give my three children names at once so that in all respects I become a good Muslim." Sheikh Sa`id said respectfully: "May Your Majesty's might and prosperity increase, so that till the end of time Your Majesty's children and

grandchildren may be forever secure and safe on the royal throne in the land of Patani, Abode of Peace." Then Sheikh Sa`id gave the eldest son the name of Sultan Mudhaffar Syah, and the middle one, the daughter, he gave the name of Sitti `A'isyah, and the youngest son he gave the name of Sultan Manzur Syah. After Sheikh Sa`id had finished naming the children of the king, the king bestowed on Sheikh Sa`id a large quantity of gold and silver and a great variety of beautiful fabrics. Then Sheikh Sa`id respectfully took his leave of the king and returned to his home in the religious centre of Kampong Pasai.

At that time it was only the subjects within the town who became Muslim, but of all the subjects outside the area of the town proper not one became a Muslim. As for the king himself it is true that he became a Muslim inasmuch as he gave up worshipping idols and eating pork; but apart from that he did not alter a single one of his heathen habits.9

The quotes above describe an early process of Islamization in the Malay world. When the king of Patani decided to convert to Islam, he thought that he had adopted a foreign element in his life. Although he had chosen Islam as his religion, he limited himself to no longer worshipping idols and eating pork, but he did not discontinue the rest of his pagan habits.

9. A. Teeuw & D.K. Wyatt, *Hikayat Patani, The Story of Patani*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 2 vols. Vol. 2:148-152.

Hikayat Marong Mahawangsa

The *Hikayat Marong Mahawangsa* (*Kedah Annals*) tells that in the region of Kedah (now part of Malaysia), Islam was probably spread by Sheikh Abdullah Yamani who successfully convinced King Phra Ong Mahawangsa to convert to Islam. Sheikh Abdullah Yamani was a disciple of Sheikh Abdullah Baghdad who was said to have been a holy man whose prayers were efficacious and were always fulfilled. Sheikh Abdullah Yamani was very good at reading the Qur'an and in explaining the meaning of its contents. One day, he visited King Phra Ong Mahawangsa and the king told him that he had had an incident with the chief of the devils. After having related what he had experienced and who he was, Sheikh Abdullah Yamani invited King Phra Ong Mahawangsa to convert to Islam. The King agreed at once and he converted to Islam followed by the queen and his subjects. King Phra Ong Mahawangsa was the first

king of Kedah who converted to Islam and later changed his name to Sultan Mudzaffar Shah. Ever since, Sheikh Abdullah Yamani acted as the local community's teacher of the Qur'an and all other knowledge related to the 5 pillars of Islam. The news about the King of Kedah's conversion to Islam spread all over the kingdom, and everywhere the people hastened to embrace Islam. Having successfully converted Kedah, Sheikh Abdullah Yamani returned to Baghdad.[10]

Hikayat Banjar

This story starts in the beginning of the 16th century when Prince Samudra had built a new palace in Banjarmasin. In the *Hikayat Banjar* (The Banjar Chronicles), the Islamization of Banjar took place after Pangeran Samudra's rebellion against his uncle, Prince Tumanggung, who held ground in Nagara-Daha. Prince Samudra claimed his right as the ruler as it had been the wish of his grandfather who had previously handed down the kingdom to him. Adopting his aides' advice, Prince Samudra dispatched an envoy to Java to ask the Sultan of Demak for armies to support him. The Sultan would readily come to his assistance if the prince would convert to Islam. When the prince told of his readiness to do so, supporting armies arrived accompanied by Khatib Dayyan, an influential person who took care of the conversion. Prince Samudra embraced Islam and after him, his aides did the same. When he had conquered Nagara-Daha, he was crowned and he took the name Sultan Suriansyah. He became the first Muslim sultan. The *Hikayat* says the following about this: "After Pangeran Samudra set up his court in Banjarmasin he became a Muslim. He was converted by the religious leader (*panghulu*) of Demak".[11] Because Sultan Suriansyah converted, many people also went over to Islam, and especially with the extensive support he had received, Islam grew massively and flourished in the region.[12]


Javanese Traditional Historiography

In Java, Islamization tends to be the main theme of texts from the early period

10. *Marong Mahawangsa: The Kedah Annals*, (translated from a Malayan text by James Low (publisher/??? 1908), p. 111, 166, as quoted by Jones in "Ten Conversion Myths from Indonesia" ... p. 146-147. See also Dzulkifli bin Mohd. Salleh (ed.) *Hikayat Marong Mahawangsa* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1968).

11. J.J. Ras, *Hikajat Bandjar: A Study in Malay Historiography*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), pp. 439.

12. J.J. Ras, *Hikajat Bandjar*), pp. 426-441; Jones, "Ten Conversion Myths from Indonesia"...p. 146-7.



The Major *Babad Surakarta*, canto 17 verse 1–7 (Leiden University Library Cod.Or.1978).

Source: J.J. Ras, 'Javanese Traditions on the Coming of Islam in Indonesia', in J.J. Ras, *The Shadow of the Ivory Tree. Language, literature and history in Nusantara*. Leiden: Vakgroep Talen en Culturen van Zuidoost Azië en Oceanië, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden pp. 214-142, p. 296.

of Islam just like in the Malay world. However, unlike Malay texts such as the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* and the *Sejarah Melayu*, which much more accepted Islam as an integral part of the initial formulation of Malay culture, Javanese literary texts put much more emphasis on a continuation with pre-Islamic culture. This is especially the case in the accounts of the period of the transition to the Islamic era. With the emphasis on pre-Islamic culture, the change from royal successions from Hindu-Buddhist to Islam became part of the discussion.

An important Javanese text is the *Babad Tanah Jawi* (History of the Land of Java). Classified as a "historical" Javanese text, the *Babad Tanah Jawi* justifies the shift from Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit to Demak and later, by the mid-16th century, to Mataram. The *Babad Tanah Jawi* emphasizes that from pre-Islamic times onwards, all the kingdoms in Java had been ruled by one royal lineage right up to the period of the Islamic Mataram Kingdom. Thus, the establishment of the Islamic Javanese kingdoms stayed within the sequential development of Javanese culture. It was because of this that the kings of Mataram acquired their magical-religious legitimacy to rule in the new, Islamic-inspired Javanese empire.

Also in the *Babad Tanah Jawi*[13] we find how the Kingdom of Cempa converted to Islam. One day, a person from overseas named Makdum Ibrahim Asmara visited the king of Cempa. He invited the king to convert to Islam and the king simply accepted his invitation. After the king converted to Islam, his aides and his people followed in his footsteps. Makdum Ibrahim Asmara married the king's youngest daughter and after the king had died, his son succeeded him.

Makdum Ibrahim had two sons, Raden Rahmat, the oldest, and Raden Santri, the youngest. Both wanted to go to Java to meet their uncle, the King of Majapahit.[14] The king also dispatched another prince, Raden Burereh, to Java. The three of them arrived in Majapahit where the king gladly welcomed them and they stayed in Majapahit for one year. Raden Rahmat married the daughter of Tumenggung Wilatikta,[15] after which he settled in Ampel Denta, while Raden Santri and Raden Burereh became Arya Teja's sons-in-law;

13. H.R. Sumarsono (Translator) *Babad Tanah Jawi*, Yogyakarta: Narasi, first edition, 2007.

14. The King of Majapahit referred to in the text may be his aunt's husband who in *Babad Bondhan* is named Dwarawati, or who the Banjar Chronicle calls the Princess of Cempa.

15. Tumenggung Wilatikta was the regent of Tuban, the father of Raden Said who was later known as Sunan Kalijaga.

Raden Santri married his elder daughter while Raden Burereh betrothed his younger daughter.

The story tells that King Brawijaya wanted to destroy Sunan Giri, because he thought that Giri's authority and power posed a threat to Majapahit. Gajah Mada was dispatched with thousands of soldiers to wipe out Giri and when they arrived they found that the Sunan was busy writing. When he saw that his enemies had arrived to destroy his palace, he put aside his pen and he prayed to Allah for help. The Sunan's pen suddenly turned into a dagger that, moving on its own, went berserk, stabbing Majapahit's soldiers and many of them died. The soldiers who were still alive returned to Majapahit. When the commotion was over, the dagger returned to the Sunan's hand stained with blood. The Sunan prayed that Allah would forgive whatever he might have done wrong and he told his followers that from that moment on the dagger would be called *Kalam Munyeng*.

When Sunan Giri died, his grandson, Sunan Perapen was crowned as Sunan. When it was announced that Sunan Giri had passed away, King Brawijaya attacked Giri but Sunan Perapen was unable to face him and he fled to the beach. Brawijaya and his troops looked for Sunan Giri's grave and when they found it they ordered the two crippled men who guarded the tomb to dig it up. They refused, but when they were forced to do so, they started digging. When they reached Sunan Giri's remains, a swarm of hornets suddenly emerged that attacked Brawijaya and his troops so that many of them died. Brawijaya survived and with the remains of his troops he went back to Majapahit. Surprisingly, immediately after the event the guards who were initially unable to walk were healed. The incident was reported to the Sunan Perapen who returned to Giri which became prosperous as it had been before.

After Giri had defeated him yet again, King Brawijaya set his eyes on attacking Bintara as he had been told that the original jungle there had been developed into a city under the leadership of Raden Fatah, who was no other than Brawijaya's own son from his marriage with a Chinese Princess. Knowing that Bintara was becoming grander and more developed, King Brawijaya feared that it might decide to attack Majapahit. Therefore, Brawijaya devised a plan to destroy it. Moreover, the Bintara's Ruler had failed to visit him already for three years. Adipati Terung, Raden Bintara's

younger brother was dispatched to go to his elder brother in Bintara to demand an explanation for why he had not come to pay his respects to his father. Having having arrived in Bintara, Adipati Terung was told that religious restrictions did not allow Muslims to serve a pagan king. It was predestined that Bintara would become a kingdom, and the beginning of Javanese Muslim rule.

> Adipati Terung understood his brother's position, but he lacked the courage to return to King Brawijaya without bringing Raden Patah along. A large meeting was held in preparation for the attack on Majapahit, for which many rulers arrived, like the regent of Madura, Arya Teja, the regents of Cirebon and Surapringga, and the Pandita Priest of Giri who all arrived in Bintara with their armies. The Muslim saints and the Muslim citizens also assembled. When they were ready, they all set out for Majapahit. Because the army was so big, the people of Majapahit did not dare to fight. The Bintara army entered the town square and Adipati Bintara and the Adipati Terung sat on a throne in the royal pavilion facing their armies. Gajah Mada warned King Brawijaya that the Bintara army had arrived. After hearing this, King Brawijaya went to investigate the truth of the report and he was shocked to see that Raden Patah was already sitting in the pavilion facing thousands of his soldiers who had gathered in the town square. Brawijaya knew that he was not going to survive a battle and so he and the entire royal family and the leaders of the palace left. Simultaneously, a large star-like object emerged from the palace, bright like lightning and with a loud bang it fell down on Bintara.

Adipati Bintara entered the palace. He gasped and wept because he found nobody inside. He then returned with his guards and his troops to Bintara. Arriving in Bintara, Sunan Ampel Denta said that Raden Patah had become the King of Majapahit as it was his inheritance. However, Sunan Giri said he would act as king in the ancient palace of Majapahit for only 40 days. He had put various spells on the palace in advance so that nothing of the pagan kingdom would remain. After 40 days, the palace was carried to Bintara where Raden Patah was crowned King of Demak from where he ruled over the whole island of Java under the name Senopati Jimbun Ngabdur Rahman Panembahan Palembang Sayidin Panatagama. All the Javanese then embraced Islam and they

became the subjects of Demak. Then the saints held a meeting and decided to build a mosque in Demak for which the tasks were divided over all the saints after which they set out to work. When the time came to set up the main pillars of the mosque, Sunan Kalijaga had not yet made his pillar because he was meditating in Pamantingan. When Sunan Kalijaga arrived in Demak, the mosque was almost finished but for the one pillar that had yet to be made. Sunan Kalijaga rushed to collect the wooden leftovers from the production of the other pillars and he secured them together so that the last pillar was also ready and could be put in place. In the morning, the mosque was finished on the first day of Dulkangidah in 1428 of the Javanese year.[16]

A similar discussion of the Islamization process of Java is also presented in the Javanese text, *Serat Centini*. The text is often referred to as the "encyclopedia of Javanese culture" and contains much information on the early history of Islam in Java. Like the *Babad Tanah Jawi*, the *Serat Centini* emphasizes that the change in and the transition of the Javanese kingdoms came about through an uninterrupted line of succession from the Hindu-Buddhist kings through Islamic Demak and subsequently Mataram. The *Serat Centini* uses the genealogical sequence of the Javanese kings to present a mythological explanation of ---and to solve--- the historical problems of the changes that took place along the Islamization process. This is particularly significant for the Javanese who stress the continuity of the old culture. Therefore, what appears in the text as later developments is to be accepted as "historical facts".

Furthermore, this Islamization process is also recorded in the *Hikayat Banjar*[17] in which is told that when King Tunggal Meteng of Majapahit, and his chief governor Gajah Mada, controlled Java a number of kingdoms outside Java yielded to his authority. Among Majapahit's vassal kingdoms in that period were Palembang, Jambi, Bugis, Makassar, Johor, Patani, Pahang, Minangkabau, Pasai, and others. After King Tunggal Meteng and Gajah Mada had died, the king's youngest son, Dipati Mahanguruk and Mahurdara replaced them. This succession marked the beginning of Majapahit's decline.

In order to forge an alliance, the King of Majapahit intended to marry the daughter

16. Derived from the *Babad Tanah Jawi* translation made by H.R. Sumarsono published by Narasi, Yogyakarta, 2007.

17. Ras, *Hikajat Bandjar* ... 1968.

of the Sultan of Pasai, but the Muslim Sultan vacillated because the King of Majapahit was a pagan. However, had he refused the king's request, Majapahit would have annexed Pasai by force. Therefore, the Sultan agreed and the King of Majapahit married the Sultan's daughter. After some time, the Sultan longed for his daughter and he wanted to know how she was and thus the Sultan dispatched his youngest son, Raja Bungsu to pay a visit to the princess of Pasai in Majapahit.

Arriving in Majapahit, the King welcomed Raja Bungsu with great dignity and after a prolonged stay in Majapahit, Raja Bungsu desired to return home to Pasai to tell his father, Sultan Pasai, that his daughter was fine. However, because the Princess of Pasai did not want her brother to go, the King of Majapahit prevented Raja Bungsu from returning to Pasai and rather suggested him to stay in Majapahit. The King invited Raja Bungsu to choose where he wanted to stay in Majapahit and he chose Ampel Gedang where, assisted by five bodyguards, he built a village. He began to preach and Ampel Gedang became a Muslim village. After some time, people from around Ampel Gedang also converted to Islam. The King of Majapahit was aware of what was taking places, but he did not intervene as he had given permission to conduct missionary activities.

Soon after, Raja Bungsu of Ampel Gedang had become famous and Ampel Gedang had become a sacred place. People from all over visited Ampel Gedang to embrace Islam and to become Raja Bungsu's disciples and followers. Because of the great ruler of Ampel Gedang's fame, a high-ranking official from a country called Jipang also wanted to pay him a visit. One day, the officer from Jipang and a number of his bodyguards disdainfully headed to Ampel Gedang. When he entered the palace and met Raja Bungsu, the Jipang officer was overwhelmed by Raja Bungsu's clean and radiant face. Immediately he knelt before Raja Bungsu and asked to be pardoned for his disrespect. He then asked Raja Bungsu to accept him for conversion to Islam. He also asked permission to remain in Ampel for a few days to study Islam with Raja Bungsu. It is said that in a very short time, he mastered the most important knowledge needed to practice Islam, such as how to make ablutions, pray, and fast as regulated in Islamic law. He then returned to Jipang, and in a short time he had become a Muslim leader with many followers. He maintained good relations with Raja

Bungsu to help him to spread Islam. After some time the Jipang officer proposed to Raja Bungsu to marry his youngest daughter. The latter agreed and he told the officer that he himself would officiate at the wedding ceremony because, according to Islamic law, a father had the right to marry off his daughter. Later on, the Jipang officer was appointed as the *panghulu* (headman) of Ampel because of his vast knowledge and his ability to carry out *panghulu* duties. It is told that when the *pangulu* from Jipang was in Ampel Gedang the region developed rapidly into a center of Islamic *dakwah*, while surrounding communities had also become Muslims.[18]

The *Babad Arung Bondhan*[19] is a Javanese traditional historiography that covers the history of Java from the time when Java was still empty, through the Hindu-Buddhist period up to the establishment of Demak as the first Islamic kingdom. The story is largely the story of the ruling figures. The initial arrival of Islam as told in the *Hikayat Banjar* as mentioned above is also found in the *Babad Arung Bondhan*. From this we may presume that the story in the *Hikayat Banjar* also refers to a Javanese traditional historiographic works like the *Babad Arung Bondhan*, *Babad Tanah Jawi, Serat Damarwulan*, and *Babad Demak*.

The *Babad Arung Bondhan*, more explicitly states the names of the figures that are also mentioned in the *Hikayat Banjar*. In the chronicle, the Sultan of Pasai is also called King of Cempa, the King of Majapahit who marries the daughter of Sultan Pasai is called Angkawidjaja, the daughter of Sultan Pasai's name is Dwarawati, and the son of the Sultan of Pasai, Raja Bungsu, is also called Sayit Rahmat. In the chronicle, two sons of the King of Cempa are sent to Majapahit, namely Sayit Rahmat and Jenal Kabir. However, Jenal Kabir never arrived there because he stopped in Garage while Sayit Rahmat, before reaching Majapahit, stopped in Tajuk (Kudus) where he married Nyai Lara Nguyun, the daughter of Ki Nuraga. However, when his wife was three months pregnant, Sayit continued his journey to Majapahit, leaving his wife behind in Kudus. Arriving in Majapahit, Dwarawati who had become one of the King of Majapahit's consorts was delighted to see her nephew.

18. See Muhamad Hisyam, *Caught Between Three Fires*, INIS, Jakarta, 2001, p. 11-12.

19. Titik Pudjiastuti, *Babad Arung Bondhan, Javanese Local Historiography, Text Edition and Commentary*, ILCAA, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo 2008.

In the chronicle, Sayit Rahmad does not feature as Dwarawati's brother, but as her nephew. Dwarawati asked her husband (the King of Majapahit) to give Sayit a piece of land and he gave him Ampel Denta. Sayid married the daughter of Tumenggung Wilatikta, but it is unclear whether this is the same person as the Jipang officer in the *Hikayat Banjar*. Sayit Rahmad arrived in Java in 1302 of the Javanese calendar which corresponds to 1380 A.D. During Sayit Rahmat's golden era, the British attacked Majapahit, but the enemy was sent back. Around that time scholars from Arabia also arrived and they settled in Ampel, strengthening the Islamic *dakwah* previously organized by Sayit Rahmat. The King of Majapahit, Brawijaya was aware of the situation but he did nothing.

Meanwhile, the Islamization process is also recorded in the *Babad Cirebon* (Chronicle of Cirebon) that mentions a marriage between Sunan Gunung Jati and Princess Kawung Anten that might have been inspired by religious, apart from economic, motives. Furthermore, it is also clear that in Gunung Jati (about 5 km north of the city of Cirebon) a *pesantren* (an Islamic boarding school) had been established under the leadership of Sheikh Datu Kahfi located near the village of Pasambangan.

Besides, the *Babad Cirebon* also explains that Cakrabhumi---then known as Cakrabhuwana--- made the pilgrimage to Mecca with his sister, Rara Santang who married the Sultan of Egypt and gave him a son called Sheikh Sharif. Sheikh Sharif or Syarif Hidayatullah succeeded his uncle, Cakrabhumi as the ruler of Cirebon in about 1479 A.D. and he set up his government in Lemah Wungkuk. He built a palace named Pakungwati, which later became the permanent residence of the kings of Cirebon.[20]

The Islamization process is also summarized in the *Sejarah Banten* (History of Banten), a Javanese text with stories of Islamic conversion. For this study we focus in the *Sejarah Banten* on stories related to Sunan Giri's origins. According to this work, there was a foreign holy man named Molana Usalam who arrived in Balambangan, East Java, which was an area that only embraced Islam at the end of the 18th century. The ruler of Balambangan had a daughter

20. J.L.A. Brandes and D.A. Rinkes, *Babad Tjerbon*. VBG. DI. LIX, 1911: 93;) see also, Uka Tjandrasasmita, "The Introduction of Islam and the Growth of Moslem Coastal Cities in the Indonesian Archipelago" in Haryati Soebadio & Carine A. Du Marchie Sarvaas, *Dynamic of Indonesian History*, (New York, Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company Amsterdam, 1978), p.150.

who suffered from an incurable disease but she was cured when Molana Usalam gave her a betel nut to chew after which she married him. However, when Molana asked the ruler of Balambangan to embrace Islam, he refused. Therefore, Molana Usalam left Balambangan with his wife, who was pregnant at the time. When the princess gave birth to a baby boy, he was put in a coffin and thrown into the sea. The coffin ultimately stranded in Gresik, where the baby grew up to become a Muslim, and later the first Sunan of Giri.[21]

In addition to the historiographic works discussed above, the Islamization process in Java is also recorded in the *Babad Godok* (Chronicle of Godok), an old text that has been handed down from generation to generation in the village of Cangkuang, Garut, West Java. It tells the story of Kian Santang who spread Islam in Java and who, according to oral tradition, was suspected of being the son of Prabu Sri Baduga Maharaja alias Prabu Siliwangi, the last king of Pajajaran. Originating from Cirebon (Sindangkasih, Majalengka), Kian Santang was very famous and a legend in the eyes of the Sundanese, especially of those who live in the Pasundan area (the Priangan or Preanger). According to the *Babad Godok*, Kian-Santang had several other names like Gagak Lumayung, Garantang Sentra, Pangeran Gagak Lumiring, Sunan Rahmat, and Sunan Bidayah. He was the son of King Pajajaran Sewu. Kian Santang converted to Islam and settled in Godog, Karangpawitan, Garut. Before converting to Islam, he first went to Arabia. There are several versions of the tale of how Kian Santang spread Islam. Among them is told that Prabu Kian Santang mastered his magical powers under Sayyidina Ali and he had been unable to pull out a stick Ali had stuck in the ground until he had recited the *shahadah*. He returned to Pajajaran in 1445 after which he used the name Haji Lumajang and started to spread Islam in Batulayang, Lebak Agung, Lebak Wangi, Curug Fogdog, Curug Sempur, Padusunan, Karang Serang, Cilageni, Dayeuh Handap, Dayeuh Manggung, Cimalati, Cisieur, Cikupa, Cikaso, Pagaden, Haur Panggung, Cilolohan, Warung Manuk, Kadeunghalang, and Cihaurbeuti. He died in Godog, Karangpawitan, Garut and was buried there.[22]

21. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*,... p.10.

22. The *Babad Godog* is also known as 'Wawacan Prabu Kian Santang Aji'. It is a 71-page long text that used to belong to Encon. It is in the form of a poem (*tembang macapat*), written on *dluwang* (tree bark) paper and preserved in Cakuang, Lelesan, Garut.

Another work that also recorded the Islamization process in Java is the *Serat Kandaning Ringgit Purwa*, which spells out the story of the early spread of Islam in Java through the roles of saints at the end of the Majapahit era. In canto 414 we are told that after the construction of the mosque in Cirebon had been completed, the saints gathered in the mosque in Demak and discussed the preparations to take up battle against Majapahit. Sunan Giri proposed that each of them sent one of their sons to join the army, so that ordinary people could directly see their involvement. Raden Putra Sabrang Wetan, the grandson of the Adipati of Bintara, named Raden Madi Pandan, took part in the expedition leading 300 troops. Also in canto 414, it is recalled that after their first victory over Majapahit, Sunan Bonang suggested that Raden Madi Pandan, who here is for the first time referred to as "Ki Pandan Arang", was sent to Pulo Tirang to teach Islam to the pagan hermits and to cultivate the land because, as he predicted, it would become a great city. Ki Pandan Arang became Prince Pandan Arang and Pulo Tirang became Semarang. Finally, after he reached the position of the Ruler of Semarang, Pandan Arang decided to retreat to the village of Bayat to deepen his life with religious activities. He suggested that Semarang be entrusted to his younger brother, Raden Ketip. When he told of his plan to the Sultan of Demak, he approved and installed Raden Ketip in the new position.[23]

Another part of the *Serat Kandaning Ringgit Purwa* reveals that Sunan Ngampel was not only a great leader of missionary activities, but also a principal figure in the ancestral bonds between the saints who spread Islam in Java. Moreover, it was Sunan Ngampel who eventually sent Muslim successors to the locations where they would later built their palaces. One of the persons who brought Islam to the palace was the Princess of Cempa, but the person who yielded Islamic authority was the son of Sunan Ngampel's older sister. Meanwhile, the other important center of Islamic missionary activities was Ampel Denta.[24]

Like the *Serat Kandaning Ringgit Purwa*, the *Serat Darmo Gandhul* also contains extraordinary stories of the spread of Islam in Java. It was originally written by Ronggo Warsito who wrote it under the pseudonym Ki Kalam Wadi. It is written in prose and relates the trips of several

23. J.J. Ras, "Tradisi Jawa mengenai Masuknya Islam di Indonesia," in Nico Kaptein, *Beberapa Kajian Indonesia dan Islam, Kumpulan Karangan*, (Jakarta: INIS, 1999), p. 132-135.

24. Ras, Tradisi Jawa ... p. 127.

saints and how they spread Islam in Java, including the cultural obstacles they encountered and the clashes they had with local beliefs.

Some Notes

The excerpts from these traditional historiographic works explain several things. First, they describe the Islamization in the early periods, especially in the Malay regions. This is especially the case with works like the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* and the *Sejarah Melayu*, which are strongly colored by mythological elements. They must be understood---just as historians say--- not as the historical reconstruction of the ongoing Islamization process in the Malay regions, but rather as the expression of the local Malay community of their acceptance of Islam. It appears that a mythological way of expression was used to explain the ongoing religious changes in a society that centered around its king. The royal political system in the Malay world, even since pre-Islamic times, should be understood in the sense of A.C. Milner –a anthropologist on Malay --- as "the condition of having a king"---which played a decisive role in social life. In a monarchy, the king or the ruler is described as the manifestation of a power that totally defines social life.

Thus, the pattern of Islamization illustrated above is an effort to contextualize Islam within a society with a kingdom-based cultural system. This becomes even more evident in the formulation of the legal system that is in force. In Malacca, this regulation is found in another text, *Undang-Undang Malaka* (the Malacca Legal Code). The text starts by saying that all regulations are extensions of the power of the kings of Malacca and simultaneously the institutionalization of the continuing political behavior of the kingdom. Furthermore, the text also gives the king the right to be in control of law enforcement and that every legal institution---including that of the "Kadi" mentioned in the *Sejarah Melayu*--- falls under the regal system.

Second, along with the Islamization process, trans-regional relationships allowed Muslim groups and Islamic kingdoms to feel much closer to other Muslim groups and Islamic polities. The *Hikayat Banjar,* for example, mentions how Demak accepted Islam and how the King of Demak helped to Islamize Banjarmasin. It also mentions the Javanese role in establishing Kota



Sejarah Melayu. **Collection Leiden University Library Cod. Or. 1703.**

Photograph Dick van der Meij

Waringin. Demak accepted Islam after the King of Majapahit had married the princess of Pasai who was a Muslim.

Third, the Islamization of Java took place after Aceh had converted to Islam. The early proponents of Islamic propagation in Java usually came from the palace in Aceh. The Javanese converted to Islam voluntarily without coercion after having seen the pious proponents of Islamic propagation who had arrived from distant lands. These proponents were not merchants or general laymen, but high-ranking nobles. Their privileged positions enabled the common people to look up to them and to see them as examples. Thus, the miracles enacted by the proponents of Islam as recorded in traditional historiographic works attracted people to Islam, made them convert to Islam, and eventually to follow varieties of Islamic teachings.







Chapter Three
The Formative Period of the Sultanates

The Formative Period of the Sultanates

Jajat Burhanudin

The establishment of Islamic kingdoms, or sultanates, was an important phase in the present of Islamization of the Nusantara Archipelago. The establishment of these sultanates marked the beginning of a more intensive integration of Islamic values into the social and political system and the kingdoms became the centers for the application of Islamic teachings. If Islam previously presented itself in various commercial centers in the form of restricted religious communities, through the establishment of the sultanates, Islam began to turn iit self into a political and cultural force. After all since the pre-Islamic times cultural and political bases were centered in kingdoms.

Samudera Pasai and Malacca: The first two Islamic kingdoms

Samudera Pasai was the first Islamic kingdom in the Nusantara World. The year 1297 inscribed on Malik al-Saleh's tombstone as the year when Samudera Pasai was transformed into an Islamic empire. This is further strengthened by other local sources. The *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai*, one of the classical Malay texts about the history of the kingdom, notes that Malik al-Saleh was the first Muslim ruler in Samudra Pasai. The story began when Meurah Silu, the head of a village community, converted to Islam changed his name to Malik al-Shaleh and built his palace in Pasai. The text also relates that his conversion to Islam took place after he had a dream. He met Prophet Muhammad who taught him to recite the two sentences of the creed. After that, Merah Silu changed his name to Malik al-Saleh and Samudera Pasai became *Samudera dar al-Islam* (the Islamic abode of Samudera), a designation emphasizing the kingdom's position as a Islamic domain.

Apart from its mythological and legendary elements, the *Hikayat Raja-raja Pasai* gives the impression that Malik al-Saleh's conversion to Islam occurred in tandem with his rise to power as the ruler of the kingdom. The historical evidence of this Islamic sultanate is strengthened by Marco Polo, a Venetian wanderer. In his traveler notes he stated that some year before the year that was written on tombstone, 1292, Samudera Pasai had not yet developed into a kingdom, and that it also had not yet converted to Islam. At the time, Samudera Pasai was just a small trade center on the northern coast of Sumatra just like Perlak, Lamuri, and other trading centers in the surrounding regions. The change of Samudera Pasai into a kingdom and its development into a



Coins of the Samudera Pasai Kingdom from various periods preserved in the Museum of Aceh.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

leading power in Nusantara World in the 14th century, took place in line with the Islamization of the archipelago.

A similar situation occurred in Malacca. Parameswara, the founder of the kingdom, was the first king who converted to Islam thanks to scholars from Samudera Pasai who emigrated to Malacca. As in Samudera Pasai, the King of Malacca converted to Islam shortly after he had assumed power and after that he was renamed Sultan Iskandar Shah. Parameswara's conversion to Islam is described in the *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals), a classical Malay text on the kingdom of Malacca, it is said that one night the king had a dream met the prophet Muhammad who instructed him to recite the two sentences of the creed. That even symbolized the convertion of the king conversion to Islam, with this convertion Malacca became an Islamic empire.

However, despite the myth historical certainty on the first king of Malacca still debate able issue and who was the first Islamic King? Nevertheless, the most important thing that needs to be emphasized is that the early development of the Malaccan Sultanate, like Samudera Pasai, took place in tandem with the progress of Islamization and trading activities. The available historical sources, such as the records of the journey of the Portuguese Tome Pires, illustrate that the Malaccan kingdom was established in the beginning of the 15th century co-incided with the intensification of the process Islamization and the growth of maritime trade in the Straits of Malacca. Like the case of Samudera Pasai, the conversion of the King of Malacca to Islam attracted international Muslim traders who boosted the economic and political development of the newly established trade-center.

In the history of the archipelago, Islamization, trade, and the establishment of the kingdoms were integrated in such a way that they formed the main characteristic of the historical development of Islam in the region. International Muslim traders in the archipelago not only came for their own economic interests, but also to spread their religion. Supported by the rulers in Nusantara, regardless of their respective underlying motives, the merchants enacted their dual roles: they were economic actors as well as religious preachers who introduced Islam to the local communities of the archipelago.

In the history of the Nusantara world, the beginning of the 13th century was crucial moment. That was the time



Pasai Harbor.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period), 2010.

when process of islamization began and it was also the period when the first Islamic Kingdom established. After previously having been concentrated in the southern hemisphere of the island, in this period maritime trade in Nusantara started to take an alternative route that involved regions on the Sumatra's north coast. The changed of route took place after the fall of the Buddhist kingdom Sriwijaya in Palembang and then in Jambi in the 11th century. For about three centuries Sriwijaya was the dominated the trade center in south Sumatra and in the Strait of Malacca, but after that the kingdom to decline. Military attacks from the Cola Empire in India are considered to have been responsible for the decline of the empire. However, as explained by O.W. Wolters, there was another determinant factor namely the cessation of political support from China that hitherto had acted as Sriwijaya's protector.

The history of the archipelago, reflects the fact that China played a decisive role in the political and economic development of the region. The political and economic policies of the Chinese contributed much to the growth of the northern region of Sumatra into a bustling trading center for multinational merchants. During the reigns of the Yuan and Ming dynasties in the 13th and 14th centuries, China targeted trade development in Southeast Asia. This was especially due to the fact that China needed a safe transport route to India, especially safe from the pirates whose number was on the increase in the South China Sea. In this constellation, China chose Sumatra's northern regions as their places of transit. The regions were geographically very strategic as they benefited from the trade routes between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

China's policies were supported by the socio-political conditions of the archipelago. After the fall of Sriwijaya, there was no polity had the dominant power in the area. At the same time, the kingdom of Majapahit in East Java failed to have no effective authority on the north coast of Java. Therefore, the region developed into the trade centers and without any into centers of power. This development was also supported by the available agricultural resources, especially spices. That were produced in various regions of Sumatra. The areas became the ports that were popular for international traders in the Indian Ocean up to the South China Sea. Since the 13th century, the north coast of Sumatra had been directly and extensively involved



A stamp from the kingdom of Aceh from the reign of Sultan Alauddin Daud Shah, year 1316 A.H./1899 A.D.


Source: *Yayasan Lontar.*

in international maritime trade. Under these conditions, Samudera Pasai and Malacca grew into Islamic empires. Muslim traders dominated trading activities in the region and they became agents of Islamization in the archipelago. They formed Muslim communities in the coastal cities of north Sumatra.

Based on his study of Chinese sources from the 14th century, Wang Gung Wu, came to the conclusion that Malacca was essentially under the direct protection of the Chinese Empire. This is supported by a study conducted by W.P. Groeneveldt and Rockhill, two experts on the history of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. They noted that the Chinese Empire had sent its envoy, Cheng Ho to, the kingdom of Samudera Pasai and to Malacca in the 14th century and that he even escorted the king and the queen and their son to visit China.

In this regard, it is important to note that Chinese involvement in Nusantara appears to have been restricted to the provision of contributing facilities for the development of Samudera Pasai and Malacca into Islamic kingdoms. Historical studies proof that there is no evidence that suggests that the Chinese presence exerted influence on religious conversion and cultural formation of society. In this last aspect, it is Islam as brought by international traders that appears to have occupied a dominant position in the archipelago. Malay rulers and their subjects immediately embraced Islam and turned it into the political ideology of the kingdoms. As noted by historians, because Chinese present in the archipelago purely for economic and commercial interests. At the same time, there was an intensive current of Muslim traders from different countries had not only save important implications for the economic development of the kingdoms, but also brought about the Islamization of the region.

In the early 14th century, China withdrew its interests in the region, necessitating the kings of Malacca to look for new forces to maintain their power in the archipelago and they turned to Islam. The Islamic conversion of the Malaccan rulers took place at a crucial moment it was the time when the kingdom's major concern was the consolidation of its political authority. Therefore, as noted by Tome Pires, Sultan Iskandar Shah, the first king of Malacca, declared himself as having converted to Islam some time after he had secretly embraced it. In this regard, O.W. Wolters considered the king of Malacca's conversion to Islam was a strategic political attempt to avoid



Banten Harbor.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period), 2010.

international isolation after the exodus of the Chinese from the region.

From the above facts we may say that the Islamization of the archipelago took place in line with political engineering in the kingdoms. The Islamization process was so effective that Islam was integrated into the kingdom's political system, that was in like the development of the international maritime trade. Under these conditions, the Malay Islamic world had indeed become intensely engaged in the early formation process of its kingdoms, and in formulating the social and cultural foundations of those kingdoms. In Samudera Pasai and Malacca, the integration of Islam and politics was clearly reflected in the political behavior of the rulers. The Malay kings not only presented themselves as the holders of political control, but also as the supporters of intensive Islamization. The religious elites and Islamic scholars occupied important positions in the political life of the kingdom, next to the economic elites who were known as 'orang kaya' – 'the powerful man'..

The North African traveler of the 14th century, Ibn Batutta's noted the great attention of the Samudra Pasai ruler gave to Islam. According to him, Sultan Malik al-Zahir, the second ruler of the kingdom, was a very deferential person who used to pray in the palace's mosque and who recited the Qur'an there. He was also known for his intimate relations with religious scholars and to have appreciated Islamic jurists. A similar picture was found in the kingdom of Malacca. The written by the Portuguese Tomé Pirés in the 16th century show that the king of Malacca tried to introduce Islamic teachings in his kingdom, in line with his intensifying relations with the trade centers in the Muslim world in the Middle East. This is evident from the Malay text, the Undang-undang Malak (Laws of Malacca) that, shows the legal prohibition on usury in trade, such as stated in Qur'an (QS 2: 275), it was in force as a royal official regulation, requiring business transaction to abide to the teachings of Islam.

In the 14th and the 15th centuries, Samudera Pasai and Malacca came to the fore as leading Islamic power centers in the Nusantara world. Particularly for Malacca, some historians even noted that the kingdom attained remarkable progress in commercial economy and in the the process of Islamization. Meilink-Loelofsz, an economic historian, for example, notes that Malacca seemed to have been designed as a trading center in the archipelago, just like other

trading cities in the world. However, the Malaccan Empire did not last long. A century after its foundation, Malacca fell into the hands of the Portuguese (1511).

The Growth of the Kingdoms

The fall of Malacca to the Portuguese practically ended its leading rule in Nusantara. However, the event did not have a significant impact on the development of Islam in general. The Portuguese conquest was immediately followed by the creation of socio-political and religious conditions that served as the basis for the ongoing process of intensive Islamization and the spread of Islam more widely over various regions. This, in turn, brought about the birth of new centers of Islamic power, that were not only concentrated on the northern coast of Sumatra, but also scattered over other regions in the archipelago.

The creation of these conditions was supported mainly by the development of maritime trade after the fall of Malacca, it also showed an increase in the volume of commercial activities involving other regions in the Nusantara world. After the fall of Malacca the trade route moved from the Strait of Malacca to the Sunda Strait, and to the west coast of Sumatra. From Strait of Sunda traders went to regions even further in the archipelago. This new maritime trade traffic visited the territories that had been frequented by international Muslim traders. As a result, after the fall of Malacca, other Islamic kingdoms were established in the western hemisphere of the archipelago.

One of the leading Islamic empires in Sumatra was Aceh that reached the peak of its power in the 16th and 17th centuries. Initially it was only a small-scale trade center, like others in north Sumatra, but soon it developed rapidly after having become directly involved in international maritime trade. Since the fall of Malacca, foreign Muslim traders who previously concluded their businesses in Malacca had moved to Aceh. Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah (d. 1530) was responsible for laying the foundation of the establishment of the Kingdom of Aceh. During his reign, the territory of Aceh was no longer limited to the Aceh River valley, then known as Aceh Besar but had also covered the surrounding areas. In 1520, he conquered Daya in the far west and then Pidie and Pasai in the eastern regions respectively in 1521 and 1524. In this way, Ali Mughayat Shah had laid the firm foundation for his successors for the growth of the kingdom and Aceh came up as a leading Islamic power in the archipelago.

In the process of becoming an empire, it is important to stress that Aceh produced commodities it could sell in international markets. Areas conquered by Ali Mughayat Shah, especially Pidie, Pasai, and Daya, were famous for their pepper and spices products. Therefore, the conquest of these areas turned out to be a strategic step in the development of the kingdom and not only because of the commercial relations they had with international traders who visited the kingdom. It also controlled regions that were politically significant to the ruler's consolidating efforts, which had mainly taken place during the reign of the later kings of Aceh, as they successfully gave the kingdom its dominant political and economic position in the western region of the archipelago.

Alongside Aceh, various other Islamic kingdoms had been established that also participated in maritime trade after the fall of Malacca. One of the most important and frequently in rivalry with Aceh was Johor in the southern Malay Peninsula. The Johor rulers were the direct heirs of the Malacca dynasty. Sultan Mahmud, the last king of Malacca fled after to Johor his kingdom had fallen into the Portuguese hands. He selected to flee via Batam or commonly called Bintan. Located in the Riau-Lingga archipelago, Batam is described in the *Sejarah Melayu* as a safe and very friendly area and eventually it became the center of a new kingdom the Sultan had created with the full support of the "*orang laut*" (lit. sea people), a group of Malay communities that had settled on the sea. However, Sultan Mahmud found himself again under Portuguese attack in 1526 and he relocated to the center of his new kingdom to Kampar on the east coast of Sumatra. After his death, he was replaced by his son, Sultan Alauddin Ri'ayat Shah, who resumed his efforts to build up the kingdom. Between 1530 and 1536, he finally succeeded in establishing his power in the upstream regions of the Johor River and he is remembered as the first king of the Malaccan dynasty of the Sultanate of Johor.

Although Johor did not progress in the same way as Aceh, in many respects it also developed into a leading Islamic kingdom. This development took place mainly after it had gained access to international maritime trade. It is important to emphasize that Johor's involvement in maritime trade was mainly the result of an alliance it had established with the Netherlands Trading Company, the VOC (*Vereenigde Oost-*

Indische Compagnie). During the time of Johor and Aceh the political conditions in the archipelago were characterized by the presence of two western powers, the Portuguese in Malacca and the Netherlands in Batavia. This had important repercussions for the political developments of these kingdoms, as they were scattered over various regions of the archipelago. However, regardless of the clear influence of these western powers, which will be discussed later, it is important to explain here that the alliance the rulers of Johor had struck with the VOC seemed to have been a determining factor in the development and progress of the kingdom.

Perak and Brunei were two other kingdoms in the western part of Nusantara that were established following the fall of Malacca. Especially Perak can be said to have been, like Johor, a response of the Malay people to their defeat in Malacca. The Keingdom of Perak was established an empire in the early 15th century. The first king, Muzaffar Shah, was the son of Sultan Mahmud Shah, the last ruler of Malacca. He was also a half-brother of Sultan Alauddin Ri'ayat Shah, the first ruler of Johor. According to the *Malay Annals*, he abandoned Malacca to go to Siak and continued his journey to Kelang. From there, with the support of Muslim traders, he was recognized as the king of Perak. Around 1528, Perak proclaimed itself a kingdom, just like Johor, as the direct successor of Malacca.

Perak was experienced a vital development in the Malay world. Located about eighty kilometers from the estuary of the Perak River, the kingdom was renowned for its production of tin, that made it very attractive to foreign merchants. During the reign of the second king, Sultan Mansur Shah (1549-1577), Perak was visited by European and Indian traders who wanted to make investment in tin mining. By then, Perak had undergone rapid change. The number of inhabitants of the main city of Perak had reached more than five thousand people. Moreover, as one the successors of Malacca, the rulers of Perak were also noted for their contribution to the development of Malaccan-Malay culture and they are also reported to have introduced the royal governmental system that was similar to the one that had been in force in Malacca.

Brunei is located on the north coast of Borneo and it had become an Islamic Kingdom upon the arrival of Muslim traders might also some members of

the former political elite of Malacca, who pushed the king's conversion to Islam around 1514 and 1521. Unlike the sultanate of Perak, Brunei established itself as an empire as it had also been deeply engaged in international maritime trade. Chinese sources noted that two kingdoms were the forerunners of the kingdom: the Vijayapura and P'o-ni. Since the 5th century, Chinese traders had often visited these two kingdoms. Chinese sources noted that the kingdom of P'o-ni continued to grow up to the 15th century when it stood under the protection of the Chinese Emperor. Since the 16th century this kingdom had become the Islamic kingdom of Brunei after having had close contact with Muslim traders.

According to local tradition, at that time the Johor rulers offered a set of splendid royal gifts to the Muslim ruler of Brunei, as they had been given privileges in some areas along the north-west coast of Borneo. In line with the Islamization of Brunei, social transformation also took place among the people. They evolved into a society that adopted many Malaccan-Malay cultural traditions, even though ethnically they belonged to the Bisaya tribe, an ethnic tribe in Borneo.

In Java the Sultanate of Demak was established in the early 16th century and it was the first Islamic kingdom in the island. Like in Sumatra, the establishment of Demak was an important hallmark in the process of the Islamization of Java that, previously, had only seen Muslim trading communities in the centers on the north coast of Java, such as Tuban, Gresik, Giri, and so forth. Because of insufficient historical data, historians disagree about Demak's founding process. The year 1478 has already been considered as the time of the establishment of Demak, although it was Javanese mythology that drew the dividing line in history, marking the boundaries between the ancient Hindu-Buddhist era as represented by Majapahit and the new Islamic era of Demak. The first ruler of Demak was Raden Patah who was a descendant of the Majapahit king and a Chinese princess, who had been presented to him by the king of Palembang. In Javanese traditional historiography, Raden Patah's genealogy is explained in such a way that it leaves the strong impression that the sultanate was a direct heir of the Hindu empire of Majapahit.

Despite the many legendary and mythological elements in Javanese traditional sources, the most important thing to explain here is that the



Gresik Harbor in 1930.

Source: *Atlas Pelabuhan-Pelabuhan Bersejarah di Indonesia* (Atlas of the Historical Harbors in Indonesia), 2013. (Cek di KITLV).

establishment of the Sultanate of Demak had significant consequences for the history of Islam in Java. This is not only because Demak was the first Islamic kingdom in Java and thus considered responsible for the end of the Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit era. Demak had indeed actually played a major role in the Islamization process of the Javanese. Soon after having been solidly established as a kingdom, the Demak rulers immediately conquered various regions in Java. Up to the middle of the 16th century, the kingdom had taken control of most of the eastern parts of Java: Tuban (1527), Madiun (1429-1530), Surabaya, Pasuruan (1530), Gunung Penanggungan, which had become the last basis of Hindu-Buddhist power in 1543, Kediri (1549), and the final target Blambangan and Panarukan in 1546.

The Kingdom of Demak started to flourish during the reign of Sultan Trenggana who ruled from around 1504 until 1546. He had a very important role in the expansion of the sultanate's territory to the above mentioned regions. In fact, he died while waging battle in Panarukan, it was the time when tried to expand his territory. Indeed, it was, during the reign of Trenggana, Demak grew into a leading empire and acted as the center of Islamization in Java. In the Javanese historical tradition in the mosque of Demak was a sacred place its existence strengthened the image of Demak as the protector of Islam in Java. In addition, the Demak Mosque was the gathering place of the "*wali sanga*" who are considered responsible for the spread of Islam in Java.

The advent of Demak as the leading Islamic kingdom in Java was immediately followed by the establishment of other Islamic kingdoms, especially Banten and Cirebon. The rulers of Demak indeed played important roles in the early process of the establishment of both kingdoms. Sheikh Nurullah, also known as Sunan Gunung Jati, was responsible for the establishment of the Sultanate of Banten, and later of that of Cirebon. He was a member of Demak political elite who was sent by Demak to open up new settlements in West Java, the area that became the basis of the establishment of Banten and Cirebon in 1525. De Graaf and Pigeaud, noted that Nurullah expelled the Regent of Pajajaran the Hindu Kingdom soon after he assumed power in Banten. Along with the Islamization process of the local community, Nurullah then expanded his territory by seizing the harbor city of Sunda Kelapa from Pajajaran, and he renamed it Jayakarta, or Jakarta as



A portrait of an old mosque in Minangkabau.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

it is known today. The conquest of this harbor city simultaneously ruled out the possibility of cooperation between the Portuguese and the Pajajaran kingdom. With military aid from Demak, the Banten authorities managed to prevent this possibility.

Nurullah's role in Banten appears to have been limited to that of laying the foundation of the Islamic kingdom. Soon after successfully having consolidated the political power of the kingdom, he handed the seat of power over to his son, Hasanuddin; meanwhile, he himself decided to build his own kingdom in another area, Cirebon. It has been difficult to find the reasons behind Nurullah's decision to leave Banten and to move to Cirebon; however, as told by historians, religious motives, especially his wish to devote himself to spiritual life and the spread of Islam, seemed to play a dominant role. This can be explained, for example, by the fact that after his arrival in Cirebon it is not recorded with any certainty whether he consolidated his political power apart from building a royal palace as he had done in Banten. It seems that he required a large mosque to be built in imitation of the mosque of Demak. From this we can understand why Cirebon had its own religiously spiritual prestige that even surpassed that of Banten. Within the community, especially in West Java, Cirebon was already regarded as the center of Islamization.

It is important also to note that the development of these two sultanates –especially Banten– also supported the development of the maritime economy on the north coast of Java as a result of the massive influx of Muslim traders from the Malay world after the fall of Malacca. Located on the coast of the Java Sea, Banten became a new trading center that was visited by many international traders. Banten was also strategic as a "gateway" to the eastern parts of the archipelago, especially Maluku, which were renowned for their production of pepper and spices. Historians noted the presence of merchants from Turkey, Arab, Persia, Bengal, and Gujarat, in addition to the Chinese who had settled long before and who had become the subjects of the Sultanate.

Moreover, the presence of international traders was also supported by the fact that Banten –like Aceh in Sumatra– was a region that produced goods that were sold in international markets, especially pepper. In contrast to Central Java, which was more suitable to agriculture, Banten and West Java were more suitable for

plantations. Therefore, the conquest of Sunda Kelapa was economically very strategic. Sunda Kelapa was a busy harbor for trade in commodities and this is what had attracted the Portuguese's interest to establish economic ties with Pajajaran, the ruler of Sunda Kelapa before it was taken over by the sultanate of Banten.

Still within the framework of economic interests, it is crucial to mention that the second ruler of Banten, Hasanuddin, expanded his power to Lampung and surrounding areas in the south Sumatra. These areas were very important for the economic development of the Kingdom, especially their plantation products such as pepper that attracted many international traders. Therefore, as J. Kathirithamby-Wells asserted, the rising demand for pepper in international markets was the basis of Banten's growth along with Aceh rather than the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese. The argument is that after the fall of Malacca only areas that produced pepper could develope into large Islamic kingdoms, such as Aceh and Banten, and Ternate and Makassar in the eastern part of the archipelago.

Similarly, in a later development, Banten expanded politically only in areas with a very high potential for the production of goods that could be traded in international markets. The third ruler of the kingdom, Maulana Yusuf (reigning from 1570 to 1586), expanded his territory by conquering Pakuwan, the capital of Pajajaran, now known as Bogor, after which the kingdom of Pajajaran practically ceased to exist. Unlike his predecessors, Maulana Yusuf was known for his attempts to expand his empire. During his reign, Banten attacked Palembang out of Lampung, which had long been part of Banten territory, it was during this expansion he died in the battlefield.

The major impact of the maritime trade for the development of Islamic kingdoms along the north coast of Java and also in other areas in the archipelago further influenced Demak's political interest in the eastern part of Java. As was the case of West Java, the ruler of Demak appeared to have "tolerated" the establishment of the Islamic kingdoms in East Java and they had a relatively large degree of autonomy like Kudus, Jepara, Gresik and Surabaya. The rulers of these kingdoms, as will be explained below, still recognized Demak as the center of the Islamic sultanates in Java. However, at the same time, rulers who had the status of religious scholars, so-called "*raja-*

ulama" played important roles as the holders of effective political control within the kingdoms.

Gresik, to discuss one of the leading kingdoms in the eastern regions of Java, developed into an Islamic empire that dominated the eastern tip of Java. The prominence of this kingdom cannot be seen without paying attention to one of the great "*wali sanga*" (lit. nine saints), i.e. Sunan Giri, who is considered responsible for the Islamization of Java. Therefore, the development of Gresik was supported by the spiritual prestige of its leader as the leading religious scholar in Java. Located at the eastern end of the north coast of Java, from the beginning Gresik had been the center of commerce and Islamization for its surrounding regions. Tome Pires' notes illustrate that since the beginning of the 16th century Gresik had become the richest and most important maritime-trade city in Java. A large part of the business transactions took place in this city, conducted by international traders who called at Gresik were the merchants from Gujarat, Calicut, Bengal, and from the Eastern parts of Nusantara, especially Maluku and Banda.

The early beginning of Gresik's growth into one of the Islamic empires, which De Graaf and Pigeaud dubbed "the smaller kingdom" compared to Demak, is likely to have taken place in the first half of the 16th century. In this period, Sunan Dalem, another name for Sunan Giri, was not only a religious leader; he also held political power in Gresik. However, as far as the available historical data go, there are no detailed records of his policies and political behavior as ruler of Gresik. The only thing that we can be assured of is that the ruler of Gresik successfully created a kingdom that held political autonomy, even when Mataram had ahead dominate Central Java. However, Amangkurat I, the king of Mataram manage to control Gresik and he diminished the role of all coastal kingdoms in northern Java. However, in the religious domain, Gresik became into the center of Islam in the eastern part of the archipelago, next to its function as the center of the economic activities of the maritime-trade. It should be noted that Gresik had become the basis for the Islamization of Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara, and Makassar in South Sulawesi. In this regard, it is also important to note that Gresik was an urban and cosmopolitan kingdom and the location of the well-known Islamic "*santri*", a Javanese term referring to

the devout members of the Muslim communities.

After the death of Sultan Trenggana, Demak slowly declined rise of following the establishment of the kingdoms of Pajang and Mataram. Especially the Mataram marked the beginning of the decline of Demak and that of the other Islamic kingdoms in Java this phenomenon simultaneously initiated the emergence of the hinterland kingdoms as the dominate power. Pajang and Mataram were located in the interior of Java, in the areas now known as Surakarta and Yogyakarta. The move of the power center to the hinterland had far-reaching implications for the cultural and religious orientation of the Javanese community which turned rural, feudalistic, and religiously syncretic, replacing the coast-cultural elements of north coast Java, which was cosmopolitan, urban, and pious.


Sunan Prawoto, the heir to the throne of Demak, was unable to maintain the territorial integrity of the kingdom. This condition was exacerbated when Sunan Prawoto came into conflict with his challenger, Aria Penangsang of Jipang, his own nephew, which ended in Prawoto's death. Meanwhile Jaka Tingkir, Trenggana's son-in-law who was Demak's representative in Pajang, built up his own power irrespective of the control of Demak that had begun to weaken. After Aria Penangsang's victory, Jaka Tingkir immediately attacked and defeated Jipang to consolidate his power. Then in about 1582, Jaka Tingkir finally proclaimed himself the "sultan" of Pajang which, according to Javanese traditional sources was said to have occurred after he had secured Sunan Giri's political support. From then on Pajang established itself as an empire while Demak declined because of political conflicts among the royal family and finally it succumbed to Pajang and then Mataram.

It is important to underline that Pajang did not last long and historians tend to consider it a phase in the transitional process from Demak's coastal to Mataram's inland kingdom. During his short rule, the ruler of Pajang had indeed gained recognition as Demak's successor and supreme ruler over the kings of the coastal Islamic kingdoms in the eastern part of Java. However, this recognition did not seem to give him the political legitimacy he needed to sustain the continuity of his kingdom. Immediately after the demise of Adiwijaya, Pajang's second ruler, the kingdom suffered a setback and then continued under the control of Mataram,

which was increasingly powerful in the interior parts of southern Java. In a Javanese traditional story, as De Graaf and Pigeaud show, Panembahan Senapati was responsible for the decline of Pajang as he initiated the founding of the Islamic kingdom of Mataram. He was the son of Ki Ageng Pamahanan who is considered to be the ancestor of the Mataram dynasty and who had supposedly contributed to Jaka Tingkir's victory over Aria Penangsang in Jipang, where both had been members of the Pajang military forces. In fact, since his merit was so great because he defeated Aria Penangsang, Ki Ageng Pamanahan was given a special territory and Javanese traditional sources tell that he cleared his own forest in Mataram, which became the basis for the establishment of his own kingdom.

In the early period of the kingdom, around the end of the 16th century, Mataram's power was limited to the areas that were previously under Pajang's domination. Panembahan Senapati, the first king of Mataram, slowly built his political power by conquering several other regions in Java. His first target was Demak, where he drove out the last descendant of Demak's dynasty, Pangeran Puger, who tried to revolt after entering into an alliance with the ruler of Surabaya. Having been defeated by Mataram's army he was finally forced to flee to Malacca, and subsequently to Banten. Furthermore, Panembahan Senapati conquered Pati and Madiun by defeating King Progala of Pati, who was his brother-in-law. Subsequently, in around 1590, Kudus capitulated after the Prince of Kudus had fled to East Java, and in 1599 Jepara and Kalinyamat were also subdued.

Thus, until the last decade of the 16th century, Mataram had secured almost every important area in Central Java. Senapati's further territorial expansionist efforts included the efforts to conquer the eastern parts of Java, where he tried to ensure that Mataram continued to be recognized by the Islamic kingdoms in East Java. However, Senapati met with a tough challenge from the ruler of Surabaya who was emerging as the holder of political hegemony in East Java. According to De Graaf and Pigeaud, a battle between Surabaya and Mataram was about to take place when Senapati dispatched a large army to the east. But, due to Sunan Giri, battle could be avoided at least until Senapati's death in 1601 and after he had been replaced by his son, Panembahan Seda ing Krapyak (1601-1613). During the reign of both kings, Mataram was still unable



The Mosque of Kudus: a mixture between Hindu and Islamic architecture.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period), 2010.

to control entire Java. However, the most important thing to note in this connection is that as early as the first decade of the 17th century, Mataram had established itself as an important kingdom in Java.

Turning to the eastern parts of Nusantara, Islam developed in line with the rise of maritime trade marked by the establishment of two leading Islamic Kingdom, Goa-Tallo in South Sulawesi and Ternate in Maluku. Just like in Banten in Java and Aceh in Sumatra, the two kingdoms made their progress after joining the international maritime trade following the conquest of Malacca. Supported by the production of spices, the two kingdoms dominated the eastern trade corridors of the archipelago, because of which they had to reckon with the interests of the Portuguese and the Dutch in Maluku.

The transition of the double kingdom, Goa Tallo, to Islam, around 1602 or 1607, took place when Muslim traders who initially were only members of religious communities, established socio-political forces to serve as agents of Islamization. This reached its peak when the kingdom saw the arrival of three clerics from the Minangkabau are (West Sumatra), who were formally responsible for the conversion to Islam of the ruler. The process of establishing an Islamic empire in Goa-Tallo differed from that in Aceh that had accepted Islamization from the outset. In Goa-Tallo the king's conversion to Islam meant that the kingdom was also to turn Islamic due to the social pressure of the Muslim traders who had become increasingly powerful and politically more influential.

Therefore, about two years after Sultan Alauddin the ruler of Goa converted to Islam in 1607, and the subsequent kingdom of Tallo adopted Islam as their official religion and ideology. Along with the spread of Islam, the rulers of the twin kingdom Goa-Tallo expanded his territory by subjugating other kingdoms in Sulawesi. This territorial expansion was mainly inspired by economic interests in order to get the commodities international traders were looking for. As will be described in detail below, Goa-Tallo had succeeded to turn into a leading Islamic kingdom in the eastern part of Nusantara by controlling economic resources and trade in Sulawesi.

Like Goa-Tallo, the kingdom of Ternate had seen progress in line with the development of spice trade in the eastern part of Nusantara. Having been established in the 13th century, the kingdom of Ternate later developed into



The Great Mosque of Sang Cipta Rasa at the Kasepuhan Palace, Cirebon.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

a leading empire in Maluku after the arrival of Malay and Javanese traders who were looking for spices. In fact, in its later development, precisely after the fall of Malacca, the kingdom was also visited by international traders, especially Arabs and Persians, who tried to find the main spices producing regions. Through this development, Ternate saw such rapid growth in the economy and in politics that it surpassed the other kingdoms in Maluku: Tidore, Jailolo, and Bacan. At the same time, the ruler of the kingdom, Raja Zainal Abidin, converted to Islam. It is said that during his rule in Ternate he had enough time to study Islam in Sunan Giri's Pesantren in Gresik.

Kingdoms and the Islamization of the Archipelago

The development of Islam in the archipelago seems to have been a very prominent phenomenon. M.B. Hooker, an expert on the history of Islamic law in Southeast Asia, came to the conclusion that Islamization in the archipelago appears to have been "a political phenomenon". According to him, it was in the kingdom that progress in economic development occurred, and also where the local people became acquainted with Islam as brought by international traders. The integration of Islam and the political dynamics of the kingdom may be further explained by the pattern of the initial Islamization process. Islamization took place in tandem with the establishment of kingdoms, based on the intensive involvement of various Nusantara regions in the long distance trade in the Indian Ocean after the beginning of the 13th century. The establishment of Samudera Pasai on the northern coast of Sumatra and Malacca at the Malay Straits—to mention only two cases—clearly shows this pattern of Islamic development. Local sources about both Islamic empires, the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* and the *Sejarah Melayu*, illustrate that the initial establishment of the kingdoms of Samudera Pasai and Malacca took place in line with the acceptance of Islam by the Malay community. In fact, the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* emphasized that the acceptance of Islam was an existential foundation of the Samudera Pasai kingdom it described. In this situation, the Islamization of the archipelago not only involved important roles for kingdoms, but, later, the development of the political structures in these kingdoms which also took place in line with the contemporaneous intensification of Islamization which

was getting stronger footholds within society's socio-cultural life. This turned the kingdoms into political bases of more intensive Islamization and the institutionalization of Islamic values. The religious institutions that were established in the kingdoms functioned effectively as means to disseminate Islamic teachings.

In addition, another important factor that brought about the emergence of kingdoms in the Islamization process of the archipelago was the political culture that stressed the dominant role of the kingdom in societal life. In the Malay world, political culture was institutionalized within the "royal" political system, which, as translated by A.C. Milner, was "the condition of having a king". In this political system, the king had a decisive role that exceeded political life in the kingdom and included the existence of his subjects. Thus in Islamization, this political culture appears to have been the cultural basis for Malay society easily acceptance of Islam as its new religion. The conversion of the Malay kings' to Islam became an invaluable political force for the Islamization of the community inside the kingdoms. In the *Sejarah Melayu*, for example, it is told that Sultan Mahmud Shah of Malacca immediately ordered all the royal officials and general people to embrace Islam after he himself had converted to Islam.

The Samudera Pasai and Malacca Political Bases for the Spread of Islam

Ever since the early days of their development in the 13th and 14th centuries, the Samudera Pasai and Malacca had shown that they played important roles in the Islamization process. The rulers of both kingdoms are recorded to have paved the way for the development of Islam in the Malay world, a development that hardly met any significant obstacles. The most significant thing was that the Malay kings, in line with their political and economic interests, invited international Muslim traders to conduct their business in their kingdoms. According to Tomé Pirés, it was said that the kings of Malacca had established socio-religious facilities such as mansions and mosques for international Muslim traders so that they could come and sojourn in the kingdom.

This kind of policy, although highly political and economic, had important implications in the process of Islamization. The Muslim traders in Malacca formed a social force and

served as agents of the Islamization process in the local communities. The traders conducted commercial activities and simultaneously acted as preachers who introduced Islamic teachings into the Malay community. By doing so, the Malay kings not only managed to ensure that the kingdoms made significant progress in the economy and in politics, at the same time they also became the centers of Islamic propagation in the archipelago. Moreover, the Malay kings were also recorded to have applied sets of rules designed for the benefit of the business activities of Muslim merchants. For instance, in the Laws of Malacca, it is stated that Muslim traders' business interests were protected by legal provisions. The text, for example, contains the terms for trading transactions, lending venture capital, market surveillance mechanisms, and other rules intended on securing trading activities.

For these reasons, the Malay kingdoms, more precisely Malacca, were not only described, such as written in Tomé Pirés' record, as places with a remarkably level of international mercantile visits, where a large variety of languages was spoken. Ibn Batutta, a the North African wanderer in the 14th century, described Malik al-Zahir, the ruler of Samudera Pasai, as a very devout worshipper and that he highly respected the scholars who lived in his kingdom. They often sat together at the royal mosque to read the Qur'an and to study Islamic sciences. In other words, this Malay king was very supportive of the dual role of the international Muslim traders in his kingdom. He not only supported Muslim merchants' economic activities, by the set of rules mentioned above, but also their activities to propagate Islam among the local communities, including the royal court.

After the fall of Malacca in 1511, the basis of Islamization switched to Aceh. Established in around 1514 under Ali Mughayat Shah (reigning until 1530), Aceh immediately made important progress in the economy, politics and religion, similar to that of the first two Islamic kingdoms above. The fall of Malacca had little implications for the trading volume or for maritime trade activities in the archipelago. The international Muslim traders who previously went to Malacca now simply found a new, more developed trade center in Aceh. This was primarily due to the success of the Acehnese kings in expanding their territories and by so doing ensuring the supply of the commodities international traders wanted. On the east coast of Sumatra,

Aceh had subdued Pidie, Pasai and Deli, all of which produced spices. Efforts of conquest were also taken further to the western part of Sumatra like Tiku, Pariaman and Bengkulu, areas famous for gold mining and agriculture. In the Malay Peninsula regions like Kedah, Pahang and Perlak also bowed to Aceh after the hegemony of the Johor sultanate had been crushed.

In line with economic growth, Aceh later came up as a prominent Muslim political power in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago since the 16th century. Aceh had its glory under the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607—1636), that was the time when Islam was institutionalized as a socio-cultural and political force. If during the first two Islamic kingdoms of Samudera Pasai and Malacca Islam was more prominent in terms of trade and economic activities, in Aceh the force of the influence of Islam could be felt in almost all important aspects of social life. In the development of the kingdom's political structure, Islam had become the most dominant element as proven by the establishment of religious institutions, that played important roles in the implementation of Islamic teachings in public life. Islam also began to be taken as a social ideology that determined the dividing line between regions within the domain of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) and those outside (*dar al-harb*). The Aceh authorities increasingly used the concept of *jihad* which had slowly been introduced by the increasing growth of Islamic influence.

The rapid development of Islam in Aceh was possible because of several reasons. B.J.O. Schrieke, assumed that to some extent it was due to the early process Christianization that had been conducted due to the presence of Europeans in the archipelago. This theory is supported by W.F. Wertheim, who saw the upsurge of European Christianization as one of the driving factors behind the more intensive Islamization of the Archipelago. However some recent studies show the important relationships that had increasingly interwoven between the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago and the centers of Islam in the Middle East especially Mecca and Medina. Anthony Reid, a historian of Southeast Asia, may be regarded as the leading scholar behind the introduction of this assumption. He noted that in line with its intimate relations with the Islamic world, during Aceh's heydays Islam in the archipelago went through its most crucial stage of development. It was characterized mainly by the occurrence of a "religious

revolution", in which Islam occupied the most important position within the formation of the world view that came to consider pre-Islamic times as the age of darkness. This latter assumption was further elaboration upon by Azyumardi Azra, a leading historian from the UIN Jakarta, in his work on the networks of Malay scholars in the Middle East. Azra proved that since the 16th century the ties between the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago and the Middle East had not been limited to trade, but also included intellectual and religious levels. Through the Nusantara scholars who studied in Mecca and Medina like Hamzah Fansuri, Nuruddin ar-Raniri and Abdurrauf al-Singkili, Islam in the archipelago came more directly under the influence of the Islamic discourse in the Middle East. Religious scholars became responsible for religious-intellectual transmission in the archipelago.

Following the arguments of the two scholars, the development of trade in Aceh had put the kingdom on an axis closely connected to other trade centers in different parts of the Muslim world like the Middle East and the Ottoman Empire. In his *Bustan al-Salatin*, Nuruddin ar-Raniri described Aceh as having scholars from the Middle East who taught various disciplines of Islamic knowledge. Meanwhile, the ties with the Ottoman Empire were further recognized as having been particularly important in encouraging Acehnese rulers to wage war, though unsuccessfully, against the Portuguese in Malacca in 1615 and 1629. There is no clear evidence of the direct involvement of the Ottoman Empire in the attack, but it may be assumed, that the closely interwoven connection with the Ottoman Empire had instigated attacks on territories that had fallen into the hands of non-Muslim rulers. After all succesful attack against Malacca was economically very strategic for the control of the trade routes in the western parts of the archipelago.

Along with the rise of Aceh in Sumatra, Java was also undergoing an intensive process of Islamization. The establishment of Demak (1516) was an important stage in the process of Islamization in Java because it meant the end of Majapahit and the begining of a new period . If the Islamization had previously been based in coastal economic centers like Tuban, Gresik, Panarukan, Pati, Jepara and Kudus by the establishment of Demak this process were made in accordance with centralized royal policy.

Demak expanded its power by way



The Mosque of Indrapuri in Aceh is a silent witness of the arrival of Islam in Indonesia.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

of Islamization. In the eastern part of Java, it conquered territories that went through a process of Islamization such as Tuban, or regions that still adhered to Hindu-Buddhist beliefs since they had been under Majapahit as Wirasari in 1528, Madiun in 1529, Blora in 1530, and Surabaya and Pasuruan in 1531 and 1535 respectively. Meanwhile, Lamongan, Blitar, and Wirasaba were conquered in 1541 and 1542. A year later, Demak also conquered mount Penanggungan, which had become the last bastion for the Hindu-Buddhist elites. The expansion efforts continued up to Panarukan and Blambangan.

The expansions into the eastern part of Java were made in conjunction with the conversion of the local communities to Islam. For that reason, Demak was subsequently well recognized as the power behind the Islamization of Java. The Demak mosque, built around the second half of the 15th century, was believed by Javanese community to have been the rallying center of the "nine saints" (Wali Sanga), a group of saints responsible for the Islamization of Java. One section of the *Hikayat Hasanuddin*, a text about the kings of Banten, mentions the names of the prayer leaders (*imam*) in the Demak mosque. They were the saints (wali) who came from various regions in Java and they included Pangeran Bonang, Sunan Makdum Sampang, Kyai Pambuyan and Sunan Gunung Jati. The ruler of Demak had appointed them as prayer leaders in the mosque and as teachers on various disciplines of Islamic teaching. This suggests that, as the first Islamic kingdom in Java, Demak played a key role in the Islamization of Javanese society.

This role became increasingly clear in the Islamization of West Java. Demak supported the establishment of an Islamic Kingdom in Cirebon and Banten. Demak also sent Nurullah, then known as Sunan Gunung Jati, to establish its power in Banten and Cirebon, along with the conversion of their inhabitants to Islam. The two power centers developed into great Islamic kingdom with important contributions to the Islamization process of the Sunda region which had been under control of the Hindu kingdom Pajajaran. This mainly took place after the north coast of Java had become more crowded by Muslim traders who alighted there after the conquest of Malacca. At that time, the traders had spread to the eastern part of the archipelago so that Banten and Cirebon soon became the centers of trade and Islamization. In fact,

particularly in Banten, political expansion and Islamization had succeeded not only in thwarting the most powerful alliance between the Portuguese in Malacca and Pajajaran in Pakuan, the ruler of Banten, Sultan Hasanuddin, even managed to beat Pajajaran. In 1527 this victory was further coupled with the success of conquering Sunda Kelapa the area was later named Jayakarta (or Jakarta today).

An almost similar pattern of policy was also conducted in the regions of East Java. The kingdom of Demak allowed Kudus and Jepara to remain relatively independent, and it offered the free hands to Sunan Kudus and Ratu Kalinyamat to proceed with the program of Islamization. Next to Demak, Kudus developed into a the renowned Islamic centers. Sunan Kudus, was also a very influential Muslim figure who contributed to the spread of Islam in Java. Sunan Kudus was one the "Nine Saints" (Wali Sanga) Similar attempts were also made by Sunan Giri in Gresik, so that the area developed into a center of trade and Islamization at the eastern end of Java and further on to the island of Lombok in Nusa Tenggara.


The policy of Demak did not seem to have been an effective political mechanism in Java. In the second half of the 16th century, with the new sultanate had to face a number of royal political conflicts, tinged by pre-Islamic Javanese political traditions as Pajang and subsequently Mataram. Mataram foundation can be seen as the inception of the sort of Islam that suited the demands of Javanese culture. Growing on an agricultural basis, Javanese culture put more emphasis on a centralized power center, the mono-palace, unlike the coastal culture of Demak, which acknowledged the existence of poly-palaces and thus of various centers of power. Mataram represented an empire that based on the Javanese culture of the interior. Sultan Agung (1613-1646), Mataram's greatest king, is credited with the most merit in basing his kingdom on the Javanese cultural style. Thus, the destruction of the Islamic power centers on Java's north coast by the Mataram ruler, Amangkurat I (1646-1677), was merely a Javanese culture call that required the establishment of only one power center.

The important role of Mataram's in the process of Islamization may be explained in its successful integration of Islam into the more overall system of Javanese culture, as well as in the core of the centralized Javanese-royal political system. This means that simultaneously

it guaranteed the continuing process of Islamization at the community level because it was in line with the ongoing process of cultural adaptability. Indeed, Mataram's political determination had spawned sharp conflicts as it had ended the domination of coastal Islam, being considered as representing Islam's urban and cosmopolitan culture, and put forward the dominant form of Javanese Islam, which is often seen as "syncretic". However, as many historians noted, the establishment of Mataram also means the intensification of Islam in the formulation of the identity of Javanese culture. Islam had become crucial for the royal political system or at the very least, Islamic symbols had become part of the political foundation of the kingdom. The next ruler, Amangkurat IV (1719-1724), proclaimed himself as the "God's vice-regent on earth" as expressed in his title *kalipatullah*, a title derived from the Islamic political tradition.

Turning to other areas, a more intensive process of Islamization took place in Sulawesi and Maluku after the establishment of two leading Islamic kingdoms in the Eastern Archipelago: Goa-Tallo and Ternate. It is noteworthy that the development of these kingdoms coincided with the massive exodus of Muslim merchants from the Malay world after the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese. The merchants were looking for new environments in the eastern parts of the archipelago for their trading activities, however in the process they also played importants rules in established new economic and political centers. The kingdoms prospered in line with their active involvement in the ever-increasing maritime trade and with Islamization. The latter point is proved by the presence of three Malay religious scholars who introduced Islam to the kingdom of Goa-Tallo. They were Abdul Makmur who was well-known by the epithet Datuk ri Bandang, Sulaiman or Datuk Patimang and Abdul Jawad or Datuk ri Tiro. According to Anthony Reid, they had been sent by Aceh and actually at the request of Muslim merchants who had been living in Goa-Tallo.

After I Mangarangi Daeng Manriba, the king of Goa-Tallo, had converted to Islam in 1605, he added the title Sultan Tumenga ri Gaukanna to his name and the Islamization process in Sulawesi continued with the king's political support. The king of Goa-Tallo seems to have strongly supported the Islamization in several small kingdoms in the region. In 1611, for example, the ruler of Bone, Latenrirua, and his people accepted Islam after the king



The tombs of the Kings of Gowa. Ternate and Gowa-Tallo were converted to Islam through traders who called at their ports and later their numbers and political roles increased.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period).

of Goa-Tallo had asked him to utter the two sentences of the creed. Moreover, Islamization through royal conversion to Islam proved very effective among the people of South Sulawesi who were totally obedient to their king. Sine the people was encapsulated in the concept of *manngaru*, the oath of loyalty, they follow the king's religion. Therefore, after about six periods since the first king of Goa-Tallo had converted to Islam, almost all the people in South Sulawesi, had turned Muslim.

The Establishment of Islamic Institutions

The vital role of the kingdom in the process of Islamization of the Nusantara world can further be seen in the political systems that were following society's increasing acceptance of Islam. Particularly since the 16th century, the most crucial period of Islamization, the kingdom had not only served as the basis of Islamization, it had also given its appropriate role in the growing Muslim community. In this case, the kingdom was to be the basis for the implementation of Islamic teachings in social and political life. It is important to emphasize that, especially since the 16th century, Nusantara society had undergone significant changes in almost all aspects of life due to growing important of Islam. Denys Lombard, even noted that this period was marked by the formation of "a new kind of society" that was mostly based on Islamic values. Anthony Reid said the same when he noted the emergence of a "religious revolution" among the people of the Nusantara world. He saw Islam in period as having come to the fore as the ideological foundation for the formulation of reality. Such was reflected, among other things, in the use of the concepts *dar al-Islam* (the Islamic domain) and *dar al-harb* (the non-Muslim's domain).

The emergence of the kingdom as that was based on Islamic teachings is evident in the establishment institutions that was in line with social developments was the formation of a "new kind of society". In this context, three important points should enter the discussion on the role of the kingdom in the institutionalization of Islamic values. These three elements are the roles of Islamic scholars in the political life of the kingdom, the establishment of the juridical institution of the *kadi* responsible for the legislative process of Islamic law in the kingdom, and the growth of educational institutions, *surau* and *pesantren*, that effectively functioned as

the centers of Islamic education within the communities.

The King and Religious Scholars

The *Sejarah Melayu* describes theological debate on the status of people who are going to enter heaven or hell: are they to be in their respectively abodes eternally? Sultan Mansur Shah, the king of Malacca, is described in the *Sejarah Melayu* as having dispatched an envoy to Samudera Pasai in order to get the correct answer on this issue. According to the text, it is said that the king of Samudera Pasai immediately summoned a religious scholar, Tun Makhdum Tua, to come to his palace to give the answer. Tun Makhdum Tua said that they will remain forever both in heaven and in hell.

This description in the *Sejarah Melayu* strongly suggests that the clergy held an important position in royal political life. Members of the clergy are described as responsible for giving the final verdicts on the religious issues that sprang up in the kingdom. This accords with the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* especially the part about the accolade given by Sultan Malik al-Saleh, the king of Samudera Pasai, to an old teacher from Mecca, called Shaikh Makkah, who came to the kingdom to spread Islam. The text says that the scholar was not only accepted as a bearer of Islam, but also given full support by the king to fulfill his mission to Islamize the people.

The description of the important position of religious scholars in both Malay texts confronts us with a pattern in Malay tradition that tends to offer religious scholars important positions in royal life. They were under the full protection of the rulers and they acted primarily as their religious advisers. This reinforces the view that the kingdom, particularly in the Malay world, not only acted as the center of power and the economy, but also as the center of Islamic activities.

In the 17th century, religious scholars particulary the Sheikh al-Islam were even more powerful in Aceh. They ranked among the highest officials right under the Sultan. European sources noted that these scholars were present during all political decision to be made by the ruler. The alim, religion scholar was determined to have a say in deciding highly important policies, especially those dealing with international cooperation. Sir James Lancaster, a British envoy to Aceh in 1602, described that an ulama appointed by Sultan 'Ala al-Adin Ri'ayat Shah (1589-1602) was



Aristocrats of the Bima Sultanate

Source: Private Collection Abdul Hadi WM

present as the royal representative during the conclusion of a friendship treaty between the two kingdoms. Furthermore, Lancaster wrote that the '*alim* of Aceh, whom he called the "chief bishop", was a person respected by both the king and his people, and that he surpassed the positions of the ancient nobles. Other European sources paint a similar picture, like that of Frederik de Houtman, a Dutch envoy who stopped in Aceh in 1599 and had the opportunity to witness the important role of a religious scholar, whom he called "*schech*" (sheikh), as the king's adviser. The sheikh persuaded for de Houtman to convert to Islam.

It is noteworthy that two famous scholars were given the position of Sheikh al-Islam: namely Hamzah Fansuri (d. ca. 1607) and Nuruddin ar-Raniri (d. 1658). Both were leading scholars in the 17th century and both were engaged in a theological debate about ascetic and sharia oriented Sufism. Moreover, in their position as the Sheikh al-Islam, these religious scholars played vital point of power in the royal courts as they were responsible for settling not only matters limited to religion but also other important issues. When he took up his position as Sheikh al-Islam, as noted in Dutch sources, Ar-Raniri, for example, played an important role in politics and the economy. He cancelled a ruling to be issued by the ruler of Aceh, Sultanah Safiyyat al-Din (1641-1675), who was considered to be more inclined to grant the interests of Gujarati traders than those of Dutch merchants. He thus appears to have been a scholar whose influence surpassed his formal position as Sheikh al-Islam.

The important position of the clerics in the kingdom, especially in Aceh, certainly had significant consequences for developments in the archipelago. In addition to demonstrating Islam's strong influence in political life, the important role of scholars reflects the tradition in the Malay world, described by Taufik Abdullah, as an "integrative tradition". In this tradition, Islam went through a process of institutionalization both conceptually and structurally, as well as having become an inherent part of the social system and ongoing cultural formation. In Aceh, Islam emerged as an ideological power base and as a source for the formulation of the ruler's ethics. In Aceh or the Malay world in general, the king was not only a political leader but also a religious leader. Therefore, when the idea of Aceh as the "verandah of Mecca" was formulated, Islam became the basis of the cultural and political forces in Aceh.



Calligraphic art in Arabic script on leather forming the shadow-puppet figure of Semar.

Source: *Indonesia Dalam Arus Sejarah* (Indonesia in the Course of History), 2012.

The crucial position of scholars at court can also be found in the history of Goa-Tallo. Clerics in that kingdom indeed played an important role ever since Islam was introduced. As noted earlier, the Islamization of Goa and Tallo was related to the arrival of three religious scholars. Consequently, Goa-Tallo not only played a role as a gathering place for trader-scholars, but also wanted to offer religious scholars important positions in cultural life. In the 17th century leading scholar in the archipelago, Sheikh Yusuf al-Makassari (1627-1699), was called Tuanku Samalaka or "blessed teacher". In fact, the ruling family of Goa-Tallo claimed Sheikh Yusuf as part of the royal family, and they treated his family well. Sultan Abdul Jalil, the king of Goa, asked the VOC to return Sheikh Yusuf is remains after he had been buried for a long time in South Africa. (He was exiled to the South Africa because of his involvement in the was stated by Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa of Banten against the VOC).

The development of Islam in Java, as noted by Taufik Abdullah, shows a "tradition of dialogue". Different from the Malay world's "integrative tradition", the "tradition of dialogue" shows a developmental pattern characterized by separateness and by tension between the power of pesantren-based religious scholars and that of the holders of political authority, the palace-centered king. Similarly, in a later development, *pesantrens*, as will be discussed later, continued to function separate from the power centers. Furthermore, the "tradition of dialog" tended to put the clergy in a "subversive" position, at least they were considered potentially damaging to the empire's cosmic system. The "tradition of dialog" is clearly evident, for example, in the *Serat Cabolek*, the 18th century Javanese text composed by Yosodipuro I, the court poet of Solo. This text not only illustrates the circumstances of the tension between those who preferred a more Sufi-oriented Islam represented by Haji Mutamakkin, and those in favor of the sharia represented by Ketib Anom Kudus. The most important thing that the text reveals is that the contemporary political attitude of the Javanese royal rulers tended to favor the "court scholar", Ketib Anom Kudus. From the text, as in the case of Sheikh Siti Jenar, a Pantheist Sufi figure in Java, it can be argued that the monarch's inclination was not only caused by his preference for a heretical type of Sufism, but by the social and political circumstances. The mystical teachings Haji Mutamakkin and Sheikh

Siti Jenar introduced were understood as manifestations of religious patterns not under royal control and that they were considered to cause on the reemergence of a clerical-king who would undermine the power center, Mataram.

The Kingdom as Islamic Legal Institution

The role of Islamic kingdoms in the implementation of the sharia can be traced back to classical texts. In Malacca, the rules were codified in the Law of Malacca, comprising royal rulings on almost all aspects of life, and in the Maritime Laws of Malacca, which specifically regulated the safety of maritime trade in the kingdom. Both laws show in what way the kingdom played a role in implementing Islamic law. The Law of Malacca, for instance, contains the regulations on the rights and obligations of the king, as well as those of the political elites in the kingdom; marriage and divorce law, criminal law to create safety in the kingdom; and regulations pertaining to trading activities. All these regulations were a combination of laws derived from the Qur'an and customary law.


A similar situation could be found in Pahang. The legal provisions in Pahang (or the Pahang Digest) was put together for the royal ruler of Pahang, Sultan 'Abd al-Ghafar Muhyi al-Din Shah (1592-1614). It contains many strong Islamic elements. In fact, almost half of its articles are translations of Islamic legal texts of the Shafi'i school. Like the Malaccan texts, this text also considers the king of Pahang as the "caliph" responsible for the enforcement of Islamic law. The *Hikayat Patani* says that in Patani, the king implemented Islamic law after he had converted to Islam. It was reported that he ended his idol worship and stopped eating pork, even though many other pre-Islamic customs were preserved.

The rulers of Aceh also wanted to impose Islamic law in their kingdom. The *Bustan as-Salatin* notes that Sultan Ala al-Din (1579-1586) was a pious king known to have urged his people to abide by Islamic teachings. In fact, in Aceh, Islamic law was also implemented by an institution especially designed for the task, i.e. the institution of the *kadi*. Unlike Malacca where the king made legal decisions himself, in Aceh there was a separate legal institution occupied by scholars. Beaulieu, a French traveler who arrived in Aceh in 1621, noted that there were two legal institutions in the kingdom: namely (1) a purely judicial

one in charge of religious affairs, dealing with social behavior that was clearly contrary to Islamic law like drinking alcohol, gambling, and not doing prayers or fasting; and (2) a juridical body that dealt with social issues like marriages, divorces, and inheritance matters. Beaulieu's information was confirmed by that of Jacob Compostel, a Dutch envoy who visited Aceh in 1536. He noted that the Sheikh al-Islam, whom he called "the great bishop" (archbishop), held court almost every week to judge thieves and alcohol drinkers, as well as those who committed acts in violation of royal commands. Compostel did not name of the Sheikh al-Islam when he was in Aceh and he only mentioned that the court rules were often carried out on the orders of Sultan Iskandar Muda.

The importance of the *kadi* in the public administration of Aceh can also be seen from local sources. The *Hikayat Atjeh* notes that the *kadi* was an exalted position in the royal government structure, equal to that of the economic elites, the wealthy, and the military elites, the *hulubalang* (lit. military commanders). Moreover, it also describes the *kadi*'s involvement in the selection of the new sultan after Ali Ri'ayat Shah's death in 1579. Beaulieu also noted the *kadi*'s involvement in the rise to power of al-Mukamil in 1589, especially after he had successfully mediated between conflicting economic elites: the wealthy and the royal family. Therefore, as announced in the *Hikayat al-Mukammil*, soon after assuming power, he appointed a jurist to head the *kadi* institution and who became the *kadi malik al-adil* (the jurist of the just king) with the title Raja Indera Purba. The *Hikayat Aceh* also says that the *kadi malik al-adil*, in this case Sheikh Sham al-Din, a 17th century leading scholar in Aceh, did not only play an important role in the judicial processes in the kingdom but he was also involved in the royal policies of the kings. It is important to emphasize that in Aceh, the *kadi malik al-adil*, as noted by the Dutch historian Van Langen, was known to be the "head of the Supreme Court" responsible for the enactment of Islamic law. In fact, in a tribunal trial his presence was an absolute requirement for a court ruling to be accepted as valid, as was his endorsement of the sultan's decisions. The *kadi malik al-adil* was thus crucial within the royal bureaucracy. The king was the patron of the scholars who served as important agents for the enforcement of Islamic law in the kingdom.

Efforts to enforce Islamic law by the ruler can also be found in other kingdoms



A shipyard on the island Onrust which functioned as a place of quarantine for pilgrims leaving for Mecca or returning fromthe Holy Land.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period), 2011.

in the archipelago. In Banten, for example, as noted by B.J.O. Schrieke, the *kadi* was instrumental in the strict implementation of Islamic law, especially for those who consumed cannabis. In addition, Dutch sources reported that the *kadi* of Banten, who held the title "Pakih Najmuddin" always based his legal rulings on the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In Banten, the enforcement of Islamic law was carried out as it was done in other kingdoms in the Malay world. Therefore, the *kadi* of Banten had an important political role, especially in legitimizing the power of a new king. Martin van Bruinessen noted that in Banten in 1574 the young sultan was only able to occupy the seat of power after the *kadi* had given him religious legitimacy. The *kadi* had a decisive role not only in formulating royal policies, but also in determining who was to be the king. According to Van Bruinessen, the *kadi* was responsible for the entire administration of the kingdom in the absence of the king when he was away to expand his territory, and he played an important role in diplomatic missions.

Banten was an exception in the development of Islam in Java. In Demak, for example, the enforcement of Islamic law was not done as intensively as in Banten or in the Malay kingdoms. Although a legal institution was recognized to have existed in the Javanese community, i.e. "*penghulu*" (lit. headman), a Javanese term referring to a legal officer in a kingdom, pre-Islamic traditions remained dominant. Raffles' study on the Javanese text *Surya Alam*, the legal and regulatory sources of the Demak kingdom showed that Islamic elements, especially the sharia and Islamic jurisprudence, had no place as they were not as important as pre-Islamic Javanese traditions. Instead, the text put more emphasis on esoteric Sufism, which seems to mean that the implementation of Islamic law was disregarded. This was reiterated by Pigeaud and De Graaf in their classic work, where they argued that the role of "*penghulu*" in the implementation of Islamic law was limited to marital problems only.

The latter trend was even stronger in Mataram. In this kingdom, as far as the available data indicate, the *penghulu* and the *kadi* had no role whatsoever in deciding urgent political issues at the ruler's level. In fact, in line with "the tradition of dialog", clerics in Mataram were considered sources of disturbances in the order of the Javanese cultural cosmos, unlike those in Aceh who occupied positions just below the sultan.

Thus, the *penghulu*s in Java continued to serve as marriage registrars, before the Dutch colonial government finally elevated them as part of the government bureaucracy in the 19th century. While the king was not the only one in the kingdom to implement Islamic free from scholars' involvement, the tendency to eliminate sharia influence from the legal system and from royal life seemed to have strengthened. Therefore, the king as the axis of the world wielded increasingly strong political power while religious scholars with religious authority were relegated to *pesantren*. As described above, this separation process and the tensions it often caused between royal and clerical authority increasingly colored the growth of Islam in Java.

In Goa-Tallo in South Sulawesi, the enforcement of Islamic law appeared to have reflected the development that had already taken place earlier in the Malay world. Islamic law, *sarak*, became one of the important elements in Bugis-Makassar cultural society, the *Pangngadereng* or *Pangngadekan*. When Islam had become the religion of the community after the Islamization of Goa-Tallo, *sarak* was given a position parallel to that of pre-Islamic cultural components: *adek* (custom), *rapang* (legal analogy), *bicara* (legislation), and *wari* (social stratification). Later, *sarak* colored all Bugis-Makassar cultural aspects. The enforcement of Islamic law was also in the hands of the *kadi* (*Daeng ta Kaliya*) although he did not play the kind of dominant role in political decisions as in the Malay world. The *Daeng ta Kaliya* was responsible for settling social problems. Thus, the implementation of Islamic law in Gowa-Tallo was the ruler's concern.

Islamic Educational Institutions: Mosques, Surau, and Pesantren

Along with the role of political-based Islamization followed by the establishment of Islamic institutions, the kingdom at the same time also served as the center of Islamic education. The Islamization of the archipelago also made the kingdom, as power center, the center of Islamic education. Samudera Pasai in the 14th century is the best example. Ibn Batuttah's notes, as cited above, clearly show that Islam, particularly Islamic law, was studied in the palace and that the ruler, Sultan Malik al-Zahir, fully supported it. In fact, many scholars from Islamic countries visited Samudera Pasai and they served as lecturers at the royal court. Ibn Batuttah mentions several names including al-Qadi al-Sharif al-Shirazi from Persia, Taj al-Din al-Isfahani

from Isfahan, and Amir al-Dawlasah from India. Hence, Samudera Pasai was recognized as the leading center of Islamic education, and many people came to visit and study Islam, such as Nur al-Din Ibrahim Mawlana Izra'il, who later became known as Sunan Gunung Jati,-one of the "nine saints" responsible for the Islamization of Java and for the founding of the Islamic empires of Cirebon and Banten.

In Samudera Pasai, Islamic education seems to have been limited to the royal palace, or at least it had not yet been institutionalized into an institution designed for that purpose. Only in Aceh, and especially since the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda, Islamic education was offered in special institutions called *meunasah*, *rangkang*, or *dayah*. *Meunasah*s were originally places of worship, but subsequently they served as venues for the education of Acehnese children where they learnt to recite the Quran. After having been educated in a *meunasah*, students would continue their religious education at a higher level in a *rangkang*, which was usually set up near a mosque. The highest level of education was available at a *dayah*, an Islamic educational institution for those who wanted to explore religious knowledge. Unlike a *rangkang* that was located in the vicinity of a mosque, a *dayah* was established as an educational institution separate from a mosque, and later, *dayah*s would specialize on a certain field of traditional Islamic knowledge. In this way, *Dayah Tafsir* for Quranic interpretation and *Dayah Fiqh* for Islamic law, and so on came into being.

It is important to explain as noted by Azyumardi Azra, that teachers in Aceh mostly consisted of Middle Eastern scholars. This accords with the *Bustan as-Salatin* that recorded the presence of scholars in Aceh who taught various fields of Islamic knowledge: Quran interpretation, Islamic jurisprudence, Sufism, and so on. These scholars came to Aceh because it had already been integrated into the Islamic world (*dar al-Islam*) at an international level. Later, Islamic education was entirely conducted by local religious scholars who were commonly called *teungku*, an honorific title in respect of their higher level of Islamic knowledge.

In the 17th century, Islamic educational institutions in Aceh were at the basis of the further growth of similar Islamic educational institutions in other areas in the archipelago. These institutions were set up by scholars after they had visited Aceh. Thus, in Minangkabau,



The Sultanate of Malacca during the process of Islamization. The Strait of Malacca has been a route of bustling commercial traffic since the 7th/8th century connecting the Middle East, India, the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, and China.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period), 2011.

(West Sumatra), for example, Tuanku Burhanuddin opened educational institutions at the coastal town of Ulakan after he had completed his studies in Aceh under Abd al-Rauf al-Singkili. This educational institution became known as a *surau*, a Minangkabau term meaning "place of worship". In the Malay world, *surau*s had developed into centers for the implementation of Islamic education, like *meunasah* in Aceh.

The Surau of Ulakan occupied an important place in the process of the Islamization of the Minangkabau. Because of Burhanuddin's charisma as the founder of the mosque, and because he was a follower of the Shattariyah Sufi order, Minangkabau tradition recognizes Ulakan as the origin of the Islamization in the region. Indeed, the Surau of Ulakan played an important role as the center of Islamic education and like Burhanuddin; those who had finished their studied at this Surau subsequently established similar institutions in their home towns, for instance Surau Tuanku Nan Tuo in Cangking and Surau Pemansiangan.

In Java, *pesantren* did not fall under royal control, especially not after Mataram had come to power in the 17th century. This was certainly a consequence of the "tradition of dialogue" in Java, which presupposed separateness, and often tension, between religious authorities and kings. Mataram's policy, especially after Sultan Agung who wanted to turn the Mataram palace into a mono-palace, the single power center in Java, was not accompanied by the destruction of Islamic educational centers. *Pesantren*s increasingly grew into the sources of the Islamic way of life of the local rural communities. Islamic scholars, or *kyai*s in Javanese, emerged as cultural brokers, in Clifford Geertz's term, to transmit the universal teachings of Islam to the communities in the countryside.

Therefore, over time, *pesantren*s in Java not only functioned as the centers of Islamic education they also appeared to have constructed legitimate reality in Islamic terms. Their separation from the palace appears to have given the *kyai*s the freedom in their boarding schools to play other roles than merely that of "religious masters" or "pedagogues of Islamic knowledge". They had a very significant role in the process of social and cultural formation in rural Java. Hence, *pesantren*s became important agents of Islamization in interior Java, which in turn gave them their rural character. This makes it understandable that during the Dutch colonial period



***Pesantren* (Islamic Boarding School) Lirboyo in Kediri) as a center of Islamic leaning.**

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia, 2013.

*kyai*s were prominent actors in resurrections against colonial power.

Particular Cases of Boarding Schools in Java

*Pesantren*s in Java deserve particular attention in this study, especially their relations with the Mataram kingdom. *Pesantren*s in Central and East Java were part of the Javanese political culture of Mataram, where regulating religious matters was an important aspect.

Sultan Agung's anti-coastal policies should not be understood as being "anti-Islamic". At the end of his reign, Sultan Agung was increasingly involved in strengthening the study of Islamic teachings in his kingdom. In 1633 he paid a visit to Tembayat, to the tomb of Sunan Bayat, one of the saints in Java. At that time he also changed the Javanese calendar from the solar system of the Hindu-Saka year to a mixed system of the lunar Islamic-Javanese calendar (*Anno Javanico*) (Ricklefs 2001: 53-5; 1997: 237- 52). His successors intensified the Islamization of Javanese culture and Mataram witnessed the translation process of Islam into the core of Javanese culture, as can be seen in the increase in the production of Javanese texts that were increasingly Islamized like the mystical genre of *suluk* (Florida 1995: 14-5; Soebardi 1971).

This development was particularly obvious during the reign of Pakubuwono II (1726-49) when the translation process of Islam into Javanese culture gained momentum. As explained by Ricklefs (1998), Islam and pre-Islamic Javanese literature were both very influential. In line with the Javanese belief system, Islam gave meaning to the real politics of the Javanese ruling elites. Partly driven by the ascent of the young Pakubuwono to the throne in April 1726, when he was only 16 years old, cultural efforts to make him recognized politically had become very important. As a result, in addition to acknowledging the presence of the VOC in Batavia, the Javanese-based ideology for the newly appointed king began to be formulated.

The role of Ratu Pakubuwono, the king's grandmother, in the cultural affairs of the royal palace cannot be underestimated. Under her direction, Javanese texts were written to provide the king with a new ideology and she used the glory of Sultan Agung and Javanese culture but particularly Islam as her main sources. She "endeavored to turn her grandson into a pious Muslim monarch" (Ricklefs


1998: 15). Three Javanese texts were written under her directive: *Carita Iskandar* (1729), *Carita Yusuf* (1730), and the *Kitab Usulbiyah*. In these "sacred books", Islam is the main foundation of Javanese cultural formula. Not only the relationship with Ratu Kidul, the native goddess and supernatural wife and protector of the Javanese kings, began to disappear from these texts, the works also showed a strong desire to turn Islam into the main source of inspiration as well as the cultural paradigm of the Javanese kingdom (Ricklefs 1998: 90).

The non-Javanese contents of various stories in the texts, such as countries in the Middle East, were adapted to a Javanese atmosphere so that the texts could teach the Javanese rulers about Islam-based ethical behavior. Some examples from the *Usulbiyah* will be presented here. The text tells of the Prophet's migration from Mecca to Medina, which is presented in a way very similar to the realities in a Javanese palace. In addition to describing Medina as a commercial city, as it is, the text also says that Medina "is a wilderness inhabited by wild animals and poisonous snakes", which reminds us of the *Babad Kraton* when it describes the founding of the Kartasura kingdom in 1680 in the forest of Wanakerta (Ricklefs 1998: 78-9). Therefore, like in the Malay world, the text attempts to position Islam at the heart of Javanese royal politics. However, it should be emphasized that Islam as presented in these texts was clearly Javanese in nature. We may also point to another Javanese text written under Ratu Pakubuwono's direction, *Suluk Garwa Kencana* (1730). Like the Malay *Taj us-Salatin* and *al-Mawahib*, the *suluk* strongly emphasizes that the notion of an ideal king should be formulated in relation with Sufi teachings as defined by the Sufi concept of the "perfect man" (*insan kamil*) (Ricklefs 1998: 122-3). At the same time it also underlines the importance of the sharia in the royal political practice. Included into the series of works by Ratu Pakubuwono is the renowned *Serat Cabolek*, in which the king is considered responsible not only in politics, but also in the field of religion. Most importantly, the king is presented in the text as the defender of the faith, whose job, along with that of the clergy, is to keep the world from danger and to instate the sharia (Soebardi 1975: 41-2).

In addition to what has already been mentioned, the important role of Islam in Javanese culture is also manifest in the relationships patterns between the king and *pesantren*, the domain of religious scholars. In this case, the king pioneered

the construction of *pesantrens* in areas that were traditionally designated for religious purposes, the so-called Desa Perdikan, villages under the royal authority that were granted special autonomy for religious functions and exempted from taxes.[1] Like the "Hindu village" in the pre-Islamic times where religious leaders and astrologists were responsible for harmonizing the cosmic system (Crawford 1820: II, 266), the Perdikan Village had a cultural meaning within the Javanese cultural and political system. The king's major concern was the creation and supervision of the state-system, in which religion played the important role of "a vital way for balancing [harmony between macrocosm and microcosm] and therefore should be included into the government goal" (Moertono 1968: 83).[2]

As in pre-Islamic Majapahit, the king of Mataram appointed scholars in particular villages with certain duties including guarding the royal elites' cemetery, teaching Islam, and organizing religious activities in the villages' mosques. In these villages, clerics were authorized to regulate all things related of the villages' problems, up to the level where they acted like the owners of the villages only accountable to the king of Mataram. Perdikan Villages formed religious communities under the leadership of a religious scholar, where Islamic regulations were created and applied. *Pesantrens* were initially established in these Perdikan Villages. Fokkens (1886: 478-480) explained the locations of these villages in detail and he referred to the fact that the teaching of Islam in *pesantren* was one of the most important aspects of the villages social life.[3] Therefore, Perdikan Villages are considered to have contributed to



A cosmopolitan milieu at the Batavia Harbor. For Southeast Asians, being Muslims means to be a member of the economic community of international commerce.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period), 2011.

the Islamization process of the local communities (Fokkens, 1886: 483; Steenbrink 1984: 169).

Pesantren Tegalsari is a good example. Located in what are now called Madiun and Ponorogo in East Java, Tegalsari was officially founded as a Perdikan village during the reign of Pakubuwono II (1726 - 1749) of Mataram. The royal decree of the Penghulu Ageng in Surakarta, Tapsir Anom Adiningrat (on behalf of the King of Mataram) states that the King declared Tegalsari a Perdikan village, and he appointed a cleric, Yahya, along with two of his brothers, Kasan Besari and Moekibat, as village leaders. The royal decree also stated the main tasks of the villages' leaders which included creating social order, teach Islam to society and organize religious duties, and engage in the settlement of social problems (Fokkens, 1886: 489-497). These tasks, especially those related to Islamic teachings, later evolved into institutionalized teaching in what is now knows as a *pesantren*. Tegalsari became a famous Pesantren in Java. A Dutch survey on education in the archipelago in 1819 mentioned the importance of Madiun and Ponorogo, the location of Pesantren Tegalsari as one of the most important centers of Islamic teaching, where students came to learn Islamic higher knowledge (Van der Chijs 1864: 218).

It is thus not surprising that Pesantren Tegalsari became an important place for the teaching of Islam to the political elites and the royal family of Mataram. Raden Ngabehi Ronggowarsito (1802-1874) is a fine example in this regard. Born in Bulawarti, Surakarta, Ronggowarsito came from the family of Yosodipuro, the great poet of the Mataram Kingdom in Surakarta. His nickname was Bagus Burham and he lived in Surakarta until he was 12. He was then sent to Pesantren Tegalsari to study Islam under the supervision of the famous scholar Kasan Besari. Having mastered Islamic knowledge and Javanese esotericism (*kebatinan*), Burham returned to Mataram in 1819 to become a clerk. After several years of service during the reign of Pakubuwono VII (1830-58), Burham reached the height of his career when he was appointed chief clerk (*panewu sadasa kadipaten anom*) in 1826, and later was given the title Raden Ngabehi Ronggowarsito III, succeeding his father Ronggowarsito II (Simuh 1983: 38-40). Ronggowarsito was certainly not the only poet to have studied in a pesantren. His grandfather, Yosodipuro I (died 1803), was reported to have been educated at a Pesantren in Kedu, and it was

common for young men of the gentry, like Ronggowarsito, to have studied at a *pesantren* (Drewes 1974: 205).

Tegalsari is just one example out of many Islamic boarding schools that were established in Java. The Dutch survey mentioned above confirms this development. It offers strong evidence of the spread of *pesantren* throughout Java: Banten, Bogor, Karawang, and Priangan in West Java; Tegal, Pekalongan, and Rembang in Central Java; Gresik, Kedu, Surabaya, Pasuruan and Banyuwangi in East Java (van der Chijs 1864: 215-219). In these areas, a number of *pesantren*, especially in the Central Java and East Java, were established in Perdikan villages. Therefore, it is not surprising that the palace gentry had a close relationship with scholars at *pesantren*. After reading the *Serat Centini*, Soebardi (1971: 331-49) concluded that its author came from the aristocratic milieu of the Mataram court and that he was familiar with Islamic education in *pesantren*.

However, it must be said that the *Serat Cebolek* shows that boarding schools had existed outside the kingdom. Thus, the establishment of *pesantren*s proved the beginning of a new religious landscape after the fall of the maritime empires and the shift of the centers of Islamic education away from the courts to *pesantren* in rural Java. With this development, religious scholars began to enter a new period in their history. *Pesantren*s made religious scholars deal with and be parts of rural Muslim communities, which brought about a different Islamic discourse away from the cosmopolitan environment of the maritime kingdoms in the coastal areas.





Chapter Four

Political Traditions in the Formative Period

Political Traditions in the Formative Period

Taufik Abdullah

The Power Structure and Traditions

Having failed to dispel the Portuguese when they attacked Malacca in 1511, the Sultan of Malacca and his army took a rest at the outskirts of the capital. The lasykar wanted the *Hikayat Muhammad Hanafiyah* to be read aloud but the Sultan preferred to listen to the *Hikayat Amir Hamzah*, the legendary story of the Prophet's uncle. However, because all his commanders and their soldiers were adamant that their desire be met, in the end, it was the story of the Prophet Muhammad's great-grandson was read.

This is one episode in the tragic events that befell on the once mighty maritime empire Malacca as depicted in the *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals). It clearly shows how intimately familiar the empire was with the Islamic literary tradition and the symbolic function Islamic heroic stories had in times of crisis. In other parts of the manuscript it is told that the sultan loved to discuss complicated religious issues as well.[1]

1. The *Hikayat Amir Hamzah* is a translation from the Persian, made may be at the end of the 15th or the beginning of the 16th century. On the stories being read see L.F. Brakel, *Hikayat Muhammad Hanafiyah*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, 1977, 2 vols.

If the statement of Ibn Majid, the Arab sailor who carried Vasco de Gama to Calcutta, on the Islamic cultural situation in the 15th century bears any truth and is not just an outcry of exasperation because the socio-cultural circumstances did not comply with what he wanted, the episode might only be an invention or, more precisely, just a Malay literary convention. Perhaps the story is part of the efforts of the Johor palace to boost the Malacca's grandeur as the builder of the foundation of the Malay Islamic tradition.

At the time the *Sejarah Melayu* was written Johor, Malacca's direct successor, tried to establish its political hegemony in the Straits of Malacca. However, it is noteworthy that reading heroic stories during pauses on the battlefield is not a strange thing in the classical Malay literary tradition. It also seems that it was not just a literary convention, a tradition that was maintained up to the 19th century. The role of the *Hikayat Perang Sabil* (The Chronicle of the Holy War), by Teungku Cik Muhammad Pante Kulu during the Acehnese "war in the way of Allah", for example, is remembered until now.[2]

2. On this see T. Ibrahim Alfian, *Perang di Jalan Allah*, Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1987.



The graveyard of Sheikh Yusuf al-Makassary who was born in Gowa, July3, 1626 and who passed away while in exile in Cape Town on May23, 1699. He caused positive changes in Cape Town for which he was awarded the status of National Hero of South Africa in September 2005.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia, 2007.

Let us return to the *Sejarah Melayu*. Reading this story the event which was that probably took place about a century before the *Sejarah Melayu*, had the specific internal purpose legitimizing the dynasty and as a special reminder to the authorities of their moral responsibilities. In this atmosphere, the stories in the *Sejarah Melayu* may have served as examples for rulers to emulate. The *Sejarah Melayu* can also be seen as a call for the hegemony of the Palembang, Malacca, and Johor dynasties at the Straits of Malacca.[3]

The 17th century was the most decisive period in the history of Islam in Southeast Asia. Perhaps it was also in this century that Islam, as high society's cultural foundation and model, became increasingly widespread. If Schrieke's famous hypothesis is true that the development of Islam in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, was part of "the race with Christianity",[4] in the 17th century Islam had practically won. Gowa-Tallo local traditions on Islamization also state that Christian priests were too late to come from Malacca. When they arrived, three Minangkabau adat heads had managed to embrace the king. Towards the end of the 17th century, a new cultural atmosphere had become increasingly established. As told in the *Hikayat Marong Mahawangsa*, in this situation Sultan Iskandar Thani from Aceh sent the *Sirat al Mustaqim* by Nuruddin al-Raniri to the king of Kedah, who had officially become Sultan, to be the guide for the new Muslim ruler.[5] It is easy to disprove the historicity of the story mentioned above but it shows how important this century was in collective memory.

The 17th century may be seen as the time when tradition of the relationships between rulers and clerics in the Malay maritime kingdoms were founded. In times of intense political and economic

3. Conventionally, the dynasty started with Sri Tri Buwana, a prince who was supposedly a direct descendant of Alexander the Great (maybe this is an example of Shi'ite influence in the royal tradition of the Malay world) who had appeared in Bukit Siguntang and ended in 1699 with the murder of Sultan Mahmud II or Marhum Mangkat di Dulang. He did not have any legitimate children. Barbara W. Andaya & Leonard Y. Andaya, *A History of Malaysia*, London: The Mc Millan Press, 1982, 76-78. But a genealogy of the Sultanate of Trengganu, which is attached to the manuscript of the newly published *Tuhfat-al Nafis*, shows that the dynasty continued –through the Bendahara--- in the palace of Trengganu.

4. B. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, Part II, 232-236.

5. R.O. Winstedt, "A History of Malay Literature", *JMBRAS*, 17,111 (January, 1940), 100-111. It is certainly remembered that Kedah was Islamized in the 15th century whereas Nuruddin al-Raniri arrived in Aceh in 1623.



competition in the waters of western Indonesia, religious scholars who probably came from other regions in the Islamic world, not only acted as advisers or functioned to legitimize those in power, but also acted as mediators with the outside world. Under the spiritual guidance of these religious scholars, the rulers of the maritime trade centers saw themselves as parts of the cosmopolitan world of Islam. Political competition would probably never end, but culture was something they could share. Therefore, it is understandable that the *Sejarah Melayu* asserts that for their worldly connections, Aceh, Malacca, Minangkabau and others turned to Alexander the Great, the Macedonian King and the historical figure who had become a mythical figure in the East. It was also not surprising that the Sultanate of Sulu traced its origins to the Minangkabau and Palembang. Or that the Sultan of Banten asked Mecca to confirm his title ---a move the King of Mataram on Java followed --- although the ruler of the Holy Land might not have had the religious authority to do so.

After narrating Iskandar Muda's various triumphs, the *Bustanus Salatin* (The Sultans' Garden), states that:

"He is (Sultan Iskandar Muda) the one who built the mosque Baitur Rahman and several mosques in each *manzil* (region). He hardened Islam, ordered his people to pray five times a day, to fast during Ramadan, also to fast on preferable days, and to get rid of all those who drank wine and gambled."[6]

That was the "golden age of Aceh" as described by Nuruddin al-Raniri, the most influential scholar at the court of Sultan Iskandar Thani (1636-1641) the son in law and the successor of Sultan Iskandar Muda. Snouck Hurgronje may have been correct when he stated that Aceh's so-called "golden age" is merely a fairy tale. Nevertheless, in addition to its political and economic successes,[7] the quote above clearly refers to a particular aspect of Aceh's political tradition: the king has the monopoly over initiatives. Nuruddin al-Raniri, the trusted cleric of Iskandar Muda's successor, never failed to offer all honors to the sultan, although others may have contributed as well.

Historians can probably tell of Aceh's inclusion in the Indian Islamic cultural

6. T. Iskandar (ed.) *Nuruddin ar-Raniri: Bustanus Salatin* (Bab II, Pasal 15), Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1866, p. 36.

7. Denys Lombard, *Kerajaan Aceh: Jaman Sultan Iskandar Muda 1607-1636* (translation), Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1986.



sphere and that many royal symbols clearly reveal the cultural influences of the Mughal palace, as Brakel showed,[8] but in Aceh's historical awareness, Iskandar Muda's era was the period when Aceh's position as the "Veranda of Mecca" was consolidated. Also at this time, the powerful dictum "laws and customs are like nails and flesh" was coined and Aceh's cultural position defined. This cultural definition saw Islam as the basis of the cultural and political structure that positioned the sultan in the center of power and state symbols. In this constellation, religious scholars were the certifiers of power and the formulators of reality.[9] However, after his death, Iskandar Thani left no male heir which offered the Orang Kaya (The Rich People), the competing political and economic elites, the opportunity to elect a queen as their new ruler ---something that was discussed hypothetically in the *Tajus-Salatin* now had become a reality. If there was no acceptable male heir, the manuscript from the early 17th century said, a woman may be chosen as queen, because "God does not want a false ruler for His servants".

Nevertheless, in a system that required an authoritarian but just king, a period of relatively weak rulers started anyway. From 1641 to 1699, Aceh was ruled by four queens in a row.[10] It was a situation when not only Aceh's territory had been returned to its original borders, when Sultan Iskandar Muda ascended the throne, Aceh's politics were determined to a large extent by the Orang Kaya balancing of power. The clergy's position as the king's certifiers and supervisors survived and had even been endorsed by the *Adat Aceh*, which may be seen as a treatise about 18th century Acehnese ideology.[11]

Clerics are religious scholars. No matter how great their impact, efforts to turn religious scholars into parts of the power structure would only have

8. L.F. Brakel, "State and Statecraft in the I7tb century Aceh", in Anthony Reid & Lance Catles (eds.), *Pre-colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia*, Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 1975, 56-66.

9. See for example H.M. Zainuddin, *Tarich Atjeh dan Nusantara*, Medan, Pustaka Iskandar Muda, 1961.

10. For a brief biography of these queens see, Ismail Sofyan, M. Hasan Basry, and T. Ibrahira Alfian (eds.), *Wanita Utama Nusantara dalam Lintasan Sejarah*, Jakarta, 1994 (sponsor Bank Exim). For a more complete picture see Iljas Sutan Pamenan, *Rentjong Atjeh Ditangan Wanita*, Djakarta (n.p), 1959 (stencilled).

11. On the relationship between kings and religious scholars, see G.W.J. Drewes & P. Voorhoeve (eds.), *Customary Atjeh*, Leiden: VKITLV. Vol. 24, 1958.



A royal stamp that used to belong to a King of Aceh in the 19th century.

Source: *Yayasan Lontar*

ended in the loss of their clerical status. That is for example the case with the *mukim* which originally was a mosque-centered community. Following the Shafi'i school, the head of the *mukim*'s position changed into that of a mere secular ruler.[12] The problem would be different if the holder of legitimate authority was immobilized and no longer able to function properly. Then the clergy had to be able to find a solution to fill the vacancy because a power vacuum was contrary to society's innate nature. This is what happened as a direct result of the Dutch aggression in the, mistakenly called, Aceh War (1897-1904). In this war, the *uluebalang* or local authorities failed to fill the vacuum of inter-regional leadership. This situation led to scholars presenting themselves not only as war leaders, but also as the authentic formulators of Acehnese reality. Because of the Dutch intervention, in particular through the implementation of their "pacification" policy introduced by Snouck Hurgronje, the *ulama* were seen as counter elites opposite the *uluebalang* who served as their "allies".[13]

12. This was discussed by C. Snouck Hurgronje in *The Achenese*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1906, vol. I.

13. T. Ibrahim Alfian, *Perang di Jalan Allah*, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan, 1987. On the role of the ulama in the modern era, see Ismuha, "Ulama dalam Perspektif Sejarah" in Taufik Abdullah (ed.), *Agama dan Perubahan Sosial*, Jakarta: Rajawali, 1986; p. 1-110.

Departing from the wrong fundamental understanding of Acehnese society and Islam ---Islam was contrasted with the adat and represented by *ulama* while adat (customs) was represented by the *uluebalang* --- politics continued to run consistently and were properly maintained and eventually could create their own reality.[14] Thus, the *ulama* turned into counter elites who competed with the local authorities to gain power.

The formation process of the Islamic political traditions in South Sulawesi is rather unique. Under its 12th king, Bone, the largest Buginese kingdom, was forced to accept that it was military defeated by Gowa-Tolla, which had embraced Islam. In 1610, Bone formally converted to Islam. Thirty years later, Bone's 13th king, La Maddaremmeng (1613-1644), not only continued the merging of Islamic law into Bone' traditional institutions, it also launched a religious reform movement. La Maddaremmeng ordered his *kaula* to obey Islamic law totally.

14. This was first discusses by Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, Bandung/The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958, 9-31. For more on the anthropology of Aceh in the past, see James Siegel, *The Rope of God*, Los Angeles, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, pp. 7-77.

He also ordered the royal family to free its slaves. Through these actions, La Maddaremmeng actually started a "social revolution", because slavery was the economic backbone of the Buginese nobility. This revolution forced the nobility into action. Supported by La Maddaremmeng's mother, the Buginese nobility entreated Gowa to intervene and because of Gowa's military intervention, La Maddaremmeng, the pious revolutionary king, was defeated in 1644 and exiled to Gowa.[15] For 17 years, until the ascent of La Maddaremmeng's son, Arung Palaka, Bone stood under Gowa's political domination. The adventures of Arung Palaka and his allies with the Dutch Governor General Speelman, against Sultan Hasanuddin of Gowa, changed the course of the history of the Indonesian archipelago in the 17th century. But the religious reform movement La Maddaremmeng launched had a great impact on Buginese society.

Gowa-Tallo, like Malacca and Aceh, was totally emerged in the cosmopolitan world of Islam. These twin-kingdoms were not the only destinations of the *ulama* who either came from the Minangkabau that according to tradition was the land of origin of the preachers who converted them to Islam, or from other places in the Malay Islamic world. The royal aristocrates sent their children to the center of religious learning to study their newly adopted religion. One of them was Sheikh Yusuf, a cleric who in all respects can be seen as one of the shining stars among the Islamic thinkers who brightened the archipelago in the 17th century.[16] According to Makassarese traditions, after completing his studies in the Holy Land (circa 1678)[17] Sheikh Yusuf returned to Makassar (Gowa). He was disappointed with how lenient the religious practices were in his home land and every effort he made to improve the situation failed. Disappointed, he left Makassar and went to the kingdom of Banten in West Java where he became a teacher and a son in law and close ally of Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa in his revolt against the VOC.[18]

15. Leonard Y. Andaya, *The Heritage of Arung Palaka: A History of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the Seventeenth Century*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981. See also Mattulada, *Menyusuri Jejak Makasar dalam Sejarah*, Ujung Pandang: Bakti Baru Berita Utama, 1982, p. 62-65.

16. A.A. Cense, "Pemujaan Syaik Jasuf di Sulawesi Selatan" in Taufik Abdullah (ed.) *Sejarah Lokal di Indonesia*, Yogyakarta, Gadjah Mada University Press, 1985, p. 237-216.

17. On the teacher-disciple networks Sheikh Yusuf passed in the Haramain, the Holy Land, see Azyumardi Azra, *Jaringan Ulama: Timur Tengah dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad XVII dan XVIII*, Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1994.

18. Uka Tjandrasasmita, *Sultan Ageng Tirtajasa*



He was arrested and exiled to Sri Lanka and subsequently to South Africa, where he died in 1699.

Meanwhile, the king of Gowa, Sultan Abdul Jalil, always dreamed of Sheikh Yusuf whom he considered a member of the royal family. Therefore, in 1705 the king asked the VOC to return Sheikh Yusuf's remains. The VOC finally fulfilled his request and Sheikh Yusuf was buried in his native land. He was given the title Tuanta Samalaka, or 'blessed teacher'. The king treated his relatives and followers in a special way,[19] which he not only did to honor them but especially to strengthen the bond between the palace and this holy man. Perhaps more than that, in the person of Sheikh Yusuf, the king had rediscovered Gowa's pride, which Speelman had affronted (1669). Thus the cultural concept of *panngadereng* had been realized, if only symbolically.

According to the *lontara Latoa*,[20] before the arrival of Islam four elements oversaw the state. They are *ode* (that oversaw people), *rappang* (that strengthened the state), *wari* (that strengthened family ties), and *bicara* (that oversaw arbitrary actions). Now, *sara* (religious obligations) was also added to these elements of *panngadereng*. From the point of social institutions, the addition of this new element was reflected in the appointment of a *parewa sara* (religious official) who accompanied the *parewa ode* (the customs official). Both had the same position. Under the direct supervision of the king, this social institution, which was not only found in Gowa-Tallo but also in the Buginese regions, not only intended to reconcile conflicts that might arise between two sources of value (the tradition and religion), but seems also to have created social rules that should not contravene the religious teachings the *parewa sara* 'proposed. Finally, in 18th century, South Sulawesi, which had undergone a process of Islamization via the palace in the 17th century, also produced an ideological handbook i.e. *Kitab Budi Istirakat Indra Bustamil*, which apparently is an adaptation of the *Tajus Salatin* meant for the ruler who was now described as Allah's representative

Musuh Besar Kompeni Belanda, Djakarta: Yayasan Kebudayaan Nusantara (1967).

19. Cense, "Pemujaan".

20. Mattulada, *"Latoa: Suatu Lukisan Analitis terhadap Antropologi Politik Orang Bugis"*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia, 1975.



(*khalifatullah*).[21] So, after two centuries of embracing Islam, the Bugis-Makassar Islamic tradition had become part of the "Malay Islamic world".[22]

The historical experiences of the Acehnese and the Bugis-Makassar people are only some examples of the formation of a tradition that started to take shape after Islam had become part of the social setting and the culture that was already there. The Islamization process of Aceh Darussalam and that of the successors of Samudera Pasai, Sulu and Maguindanao cannot be separated from the founding of their own states, while in Malacca, Patani and Gowa-Tallo the process had taken place after these kingdoms had become relatively steady. However both show ---in different ways--- a tendency toward the formation of "integrative" styles of tradition. This was a tradition in which Islam underwent a conceptual and structural orthogenetic process of "indigenization". Ideologically Islam became an integral part of the cultural system. Islam was seen as the cornerstone of the community and in personal life. In this "integrative tradition" Islam was the dominant element in the new cognitive community and within the political paradigm used to decide what was genuine and what was not.

In this process of the formation of these traditions, also a gradual marginalization occurred of the old cultural understandings and elements. Perhaps historians and anthropologists can see that some cultural elements that still functioned were the continuations of pre-Islamic traditions within the traditions of integration. However, pre-Islamic leftovers were actually treated as part of the Islamic world. In the process, these elements' meaning and significance, if not their substance, underwent a process of Islamization. And, the search for an adequate form of orthodoxy was one of the dynamic elements of the tradition of integration which was continuously affected by the contemporary movement towards Islamic scriptural orthodoxy. In this way, a selection was always made of those elements that could be integrated. The integrative tradition's main theme was none other than the continuing selection process and the accommodation to new elements. In society, this process often led to internal contradictions. From this

21. According to Winstedt, the writing of this book is not good as having low literary value, but it is still necessary to be studied for its influence for the Malay thinking, R.O. Winstedt, *A History of Malay Literature*, pp. 93-96.

22. Christian Pelras, "Religion, Tradition and the Dynamics of Islamization in South-Sulawesi", *Archipel*, 29, 1985, pp. 125-126.

perspective, La Maddaremmeng's social revolution, Nuruddin al-Raniri's effort to attack Hamzah Fansuri and Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani's *wujudiyah* notions in 17th century Aceh, and the Paderi movement in Minangkabau in the 19th century,[23] shared underlying similarities as all intended to attain a social and world order that was in accordance with religious doctrine.

Nevertheless, cultural elements did not simply disappear not even over time. Another characteristic of the tradition of integration is to eliminate non-integrated elements whose existence was quietly acknowledged or even used but unacceptable for the ideal conceptual framework. Spells, incantations, the position of shamans, *bissu* (in South Sulawesi), or *comoh* in the Malay Peninsula were real and actual and allowed to exist outside the legitimate culture's framework.

In the continuing process of the construction of traditions, the sovereign ruler always occupied the dominant position, both as advocate and as opponent of waves of information. As the sovereign, he was not a god in the Siwa-Buddhist concept, but rather God's representative on earth. Not only his actions should be religiously meaningful, but he himself was also part of the religiously supported political system.[24] All disruption within the system had to be avoided and irregularities within the system had to be straightened out. It is for this reason that Sultan Iskandar Thani supported and protected Nuruddin al-Raniri's radical orthodox movement. In the same vein, the Queen of Aceh who had succeeded Iskandar Thani supported the moderate scholarly movement to remove al-Raniri from the palace.[25]

With the *Bustanus Salatin*, al-Raniri made a valuable contribution to the formation of the political tradition in Aceh. The Sultan held the monopoly on social initiative, and his actions had to be manifest God's will.[26] Iskandar Muda defeated Pahang the book says not because he wanted to expand his territory but as the manifestation of "too miraculous Divine wisdom and His

23. On Minangkabau, see Taufik Abdullah "Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict in Minangkabau", *Indonesia, 2* (October) 1966, p. 1-24.

24. See A.C. Milner, "Islam and the Muslim State" in M.B. Hooker (ed.) *Islam in Southeast Asia*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983, 23-49.

25. Takashi Ito, "Why di Nuruddin ar-Raniri Leave Aceh in 1054 A.H.?" *BKI*, 134, 1978, 488-491.

26. Teuku Iskandar (ed.), *Nuruddin ar-Raniri: Bustanus-Salatin (Bab II, Pasal 13)*, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1966.



The Grand Mosque of Bua, Palopo.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia, 2007.

Supernatural Power for the enactment of His Will on someone". Because of his victory, Iskandar Muda begot a foster child whom he turned into his son-in-law and who became his wise successor, Iskandar Thani, al-Raniri royal patron.

The king as Allah's representative (*khalifatullah*) was the apex of power and proof of the validity of the hierarchical order. The *Tajus-Salatin* mentions that there are two authorities, the throne and the prophecy (*nurbuwah*), the world and religion. The king is the last orbit. When the king was not involved in the debates or the dissent that occurred between both authorities, often the religious views would dominate. This happened in Aceh when the king allowed scholars to carry out reform. Of course the power elites subsequently tried to install a relatively weak ruler whom they could control.


This is precisely what happened in Palembang. The opinion of the religious rulers or princes with the title *Pangeran Natta Agama* was more important than that of the *Tumenggung Karta Negara*, who prosecuted crime, even though according to the Quran and the adat, the Sultan had to accept their decisions before they could be executed.[27] It was similar in the Kingdom of Sulu. "At least according to the prevailing custom, if there was a difference of opinion between the holder of the highest religious office and the military commander as the highest authority in Sulu's political hierarchy, according to a Spanish writer, the views of a judge (*kadi*) should be accepted."[28]

One of several things *Tarsila* emphasized is that both in Sulu (with Sultan Sharif al-Hashim) and in Maguindanao (with Sharif Kabungsuan), the first king was a newcomer who was asked to become the king. The newcomers were none others than missionaries. Hence, it is understandable that the other title of the Sultan of Sulu was *Paduka Malasari Maulana Al-Sultan* to indicate both that the king was a propagator of religion (namely *maulana*, the designation for missionaries before they were recognized as *Sunan* or *Wali* in Java) and Sulu's attachment to the traditions of the Malay world.[29] One might even say that the foundation of the legitimacy of the power of the Moros, who, according

27. See P. Ro de la Faille, *Dari Zaman Kesultanan Palembang* (terjemahan), Djakarta: Bhatara, 1971.

28. It is quoted by Malvin Mednick. "Some Problems of Moro History and Political Organizations" in Peter G. Cowing dan Robert D. McAmis, *The Muslim Filipinos*, Manila, Solidaridat Publishing House, 1974, pp. 13-26.

29. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines*, p. 321.



to one expert was a "single society"[30] ---although not a "single culture", was determined by its genealogical bonds with these first kings. Without this bond, no *datu* or regional head, and especially no sultan, would have been recognized. This means that he is the proof of *tarsila* and that he was the descendant of the Prophet ---his title *sayyid* or *sharif* (from the lineage of Hasan or Hussein) was a requirement.

Although Sulu (compared with Maguindanao and Maranao with its many centers) had reached the highest level of unification, its political system allowed for the possibility of competition for the position of Sultan. When recognized as Sultan and thus as "God's Caliph on earth", the institution of *ruma bicara* (consisting of the influential *datu*, the crown prince and the dignitaries of the kingdom) prevented him from becoming a tyrant and his political authority was not infrequently quetioned by the *datu*s, the local aristocracy. Each time a *datu* thought the Sultan had overstepped his sovereign prerogatives in politics and the economy or when he felt that it had gone beyond what the *tartib*, the traditional provision, allowed, the Sultan would always be facing a lawsuit. Nevertheless, the lawsuit was never directed at the "sanctity of the sultanate institution".It is here, Majul said, "that the awareness of Muslims is found, who tend to feel the need of having a sultan". In other words, a *datu* would never challenge the Sultan's position of supreme religious leader.[31] Indeed, Malay, traditional political thinking not only cursed disobedience towards the sovereign, it also precluded a situation where there would be no king at all, something unimaginable situation in this tradition.[32]

Thus, the tradition of integration was based on the cultural recognition that power was the ideological basis as determined by Islam. Although structurally power was divided into traditional and religious, both were integrated in the king who was the commander of the faithful, i.e. the Muslim leader (*amirul mukminin*).

A different style of tradition developed in Java. In its concentric political system, It required the establishment of a new

30. Melvin Mednick, "Some problems of Moro History and Political Organization" quoted by Peter G. Cowing, *Muslim Filipinos Heritage and Horizon*, Quezon City: 1979: New Day Publishers, 1979, p. 45-46.

31. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines*, p. 317-337. 104.

32. See A.C. Milner, *Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule*, Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1982, p. 94-111.

central palace in order to solve the problem of political legitimacy and in order to maintain continuity. Without this legitimacy and continuity, the new central palace would only be able to depend on its military and economic power. However, this would boil down to having become a small but more powerful minor palace rather than the new central palace. Therefore, not only a political myth should be given its place in the changing situation, as far as possible, old structural arrangements and the social and cultural lifestyle of the ancient regime also had to be maintained. The old concept that power was something that descended on the elected person, should remain in force. This power concept gave the new palace ruler his legitimate basis and formed the ideological basis for the monopoly of power. The ruler might not have fallen from the sky, such as the descendants of the *to Manurung* in South Sulawesi, but light (*teja* and *wahyu cakraningrat*) had descended onto him. With this he was destined to be the center of the universe and the source of power. Within this framework, the King of Mataram's choice in 1624 of the title *Susuhunan* ---a title commonly used by a saint or a religious leader--- is understandable. He was known as Sultan Agung, and he had earned the title of Sultan after he Islamized various social institutions including marriage. He was not only the ruler of the world, but also the *panatagama*, the protector and regulator of religion.[33]

The Javanese tradition increasingly displayed the form it had taken after the political hegemony of Java shifted from coastal Demak, to the hinterland ---first to Pajang and finally to Mataram. An important consequence of this move of the power center to the interior was the separation of the three major social institutions that used to support Demak and the other coastal principalities. These three institutions were the palace as the center of power, the market as center of commerce and the boarding school as center of religion.[34] In the process of establishing itself as the owner of the newly established political hegemony, Mataram, which was an agricultural stage, militarily conquered the dynamic trading centers in the coastal regions one by one. All this occurred at a time when the VOC already had commercial and political interests in

33. H.J. de Graaf, *Puncak Kekuasaan Mataram* (translation), Jakarta: Grafitti Press, 1985.

34. Abdullah, *Islam dan Masyarakat*, pp. 110-158.



A letter from Prince Suryakusuma Raganata of Pamekasan to the Governor General of the VOC in 1749.

Source: ***Yayasan Lontar.***

Java. These military victories did not only mean the loss of potential competitors to the central palace, Mataram, but also the severance of Java's international economic relations. And, the VOC endeavored to prevent Java from restoring its role as an important trading center. Suspicious, Mataram monitored all forms of the growth of politics and trade that might occur in the coastal regions. Amangkurat I (1645-1677), Sultan Agung's successor, closed all ports when he saw that commercial activities had started to be resumed. Unlike Sultan Agung who was quite satisfied with the formal recognition of his power, Amangkurat I preferred to wipe out all local aristocrats, including his closest family members.[35]

One of the most important regions Sultan Agung conquered and Amangkurat I subsequently destroyed was Giri, whose ruler was nicknamed "the Pope" in the notes of the Dutch in the early 17th century. The destruction of the *Pandita Ratu* region, which had become the center of Islamization for the eastern part of the archipelago, was one of the summits of the separation process between the world of the *pesantren* and that of the palace. Apparently, traditional *pandita ratu* and the continuing of the institution of *perdikan* or "exempted land"[36] were the major causes of conflict in the multiple-palace political system in Java. Sunan Gunung Jati from Cirebon, Sunan Giri, Sunan Kudus and the other Walis were not just religious scholars in the strictest sense --- wandering religious teachers or preachers--- but they were also the rulers of their own regions.[37] In other words, they were the rulers of minor palaces. So, in the multiple-palace Javanese tradition they were also potentially challenged by the central palace. Sultan Agung's military movement against the coastal regions (except Cirebon that was respected by Mataram) clearly shows that the central palace indeed treated the *Priester-*

35. H.J. de Graaf, *De regering van Sunan Mangkurat 1, Tegal Wangi Vorst van Mataram, 1646 - 1677*, Leiden: VKITLV, Martinus Njjhoff, 1961.

36. *Perdikan* was an institution in the pre-Islamic era, which was established by royal decree in which a village or region was handed over to religious institutions. As a sign of the grace of the king, the village or the land was exempt from scrutiny and taxes for the king. On this ancient institution view see B. Schrieke, "Iets over het Perdikan Instituut", *TBG*, LVIII, 391-423, 1919, 391-423. About boarding school *Perdikan*, see Claude Guillot, Le role historique des perdikan ou "village frames": Le Cas de Tegalsari", *Archipel*, 30, 1985, pp. 137-162.

37. De Graaf,De Eerste Moslimse Vorstendommen op Java, Studien Over de Staatkundige Geschiedenis van de 15de en 15de en 16de Eeuw.

vorstendommen (Priests-kingdoms) areas as minor palaces that might challenge his suzerainty. The alliance of Trunajaya, the prince of Madura with his father in law, the ruler of Kajoran, the "abode of the righteous", to fight Amangkurat I of Mataram in 1670, the king who in 1646 had killed thousands of *ulama* and their families,[38] showed that the separation of the palace and the Islamic boarding schools pesantren had entered the minor palaces into the multiple-palace political system.

The destruction of the ruling *ulama* dynasties did not obliterate boarding schools as centers of religious teaching. Pesantren also had other political functions. They were places of refuge for disillusioned nobles. Like markets, *pesantrens* as learning centers of a universal religion entertained cosmopolitan tendencies. However, since they implicitly were also propagation institutions they could keep their cosmopolitan attitudes in check in order to fit local conditions. *Pesantren* leaders were *ulama* who were often part of chains of an international type of teacher-student networks that acted as cultural brokers.[39] In this atmosphere, *pesantrens* continued their role as institutions that competed with the palaces, which had become centers and symbols of power. In the process, a specific type of tradition emerged. If in other places a tradition of integration emerged with Islam at the core of strong, supportive myths, in Java, a "tradition of dialogue" emerged. This tradition first of all has to be seen as the outcome of ongoing cultural encounters and accommodation during the Islamization process. It resulted in the destruction of the Siwa-Buddhist kingdoms and the emergence of centers of political Islam and palace centers that had converted to Islam. However, this tradition was the arena where continuity and the impetus towards socio-cultural change had to find shared possibilities. Anthropologically we may see this as proof that the realm of the *abangan* element had to cope with the continuing penetration of ideas proposed by *santri* elements,[40] the adherents of the *pesantren* world view. Seen from the political and cultural perspective, this tradition of dialogue was a situation where one side may assume that the other was its challenger. Or if

38. De Graaf, *De regering van Sunan Mangkurat I.*

39. This has been discussed by C. Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji: the Changing Role of a Cultural Broken", *CSHS*, II, 2: 228-249.

40. An anthropological meaning of the sense was introduced by C. Geertz in *The Religion of Java*, Glencoe: XX, Free Press, 1960.



a mythological analogy can be used, this tradition was also an atmosphere of dialogue between left and right wings: the palace and the *pesantren*.

One aspect of this double-sided tradition is that one side may be considered the other as *counter elites*. When viewed from a geographical perspective the coastal areas can be seen as offering an alternative to the palace lifestyle and thus, seen from the point of history, the tradition of dialogue can also be seen as a process whose dynamics are determined to a large extent by the turn of the shifting rhythm of rout and rally, if for once we follow Toynbee. It means that at times the two halves of the tradition "fight", but at other times they are "intimate". However, in terms of palace political legitimacy and cultural continuity, the legalistic understanding of Islam and *pesantren*-driven cultural changes remain problematic. Conflicting situations are just one aspect of the tradition that also envisions harmonious relationships between the two variants within the same political and cultural world. This is a tradition where rulers, representing legitimate authority, and religious scholars never failed to pursue close relationships. This tradition highly respected clerics who were also proficient in the language (*kawi*) of the pre-Islamic literary tradition, which always reminded people that, "those who dare to oppose the king / and ruin the country, will be punished". Not because it was considered rebellious, but "because the king is always right / the representative of the Prophet / and the Prophet is the representative of God Almighty. The Prophet is the Messenger of God / and all His prohibitions apply for everyone".[41]

Within this context, the marginalization of pre-Islamic elements was a dilemma that could not always be overcome even if it went gradually as in the tradition of integration. An outsider might call this syncretism, but in this tradition, people wanted to find harmony and conformity.

The suppression of the truth of old religious doctrines by crushing Kawi philosophy similarly meant the rejection of the foundation of the Javanese cultural world. Meanwhile the rejection of Islamic teachings not only meant a return to Siwa-Buddha days but it was also the denial of history and of the socio-cultural reality. Thus, the *Serat Darmagandul*,[42] which praises the pre-

41. S. Soebardi (ed. & ten.), *The Book of Cabolek: A Critical Edition with Introduction*, Translation and Notes, a Contribution to the Study of the Javanese Mystical Tradition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 52-3.

42. G.W.J. Drewes "The Struggle Between



Islamic era and sees Islamization as a historical aberration was a cultural affront as it ignored the new world Java had become. Social conflicts were inevitable. In the same ideological atmosphere, religious leaders who rigidly adhered to the conduct and belief systems in the shari'ah perspective ---a very common phenomenon in the history of Islam in Java--- can also be seen as a cultural disruption. The *ulama* were culturally treated as foreigners who propagated the "Arab religion". The ideal figure was reflected in the figure of Ketib Anom, the main character of the *Serat Cabolek*, who understood both sides of the dialogical divide. However, the dialogue continued and the *santri* in their boarding schools continued their "Islamizing" of cultural symbols.[43]

A tradition of dialogue is always needed by the power and the palace world view. The palace orthodox style recognizes the existence of two worlds that should be in harmony, both in a situation of continuous and haunting centripetal threats, namely minor palaces' efforts to escape from the domination of the palace in the center. The Wali Songo assembly's condemnation of Sheikh Siti Jenar, with support of the Sultan of Demak, was not only because of Jenar's teachings, but because of his teachings' political implications. The pantheistic teachings Jenar propagated had caused social controversy. Similar to Kyai Mutamakin, the figure of the *Serat Cabolek*, Sheikh Siti Jenar's activities and teachings undermined the Sultan's authority and that of the saints as well. Therefore, his condemnation was a way of restoring and maintaining the legitimate power system.

Within the tradition of integration, kings were often described as the main actors in religious movements, and ulama as their right hands. It was Iskandar Thani who cleansed Aceh from Hamzah Fansuri's followers, although in actual fact he did so at Nuruddin al-Raniri's instigation. Sultan Iskandar Muda should be considered as the builder of the grand mosque and the one who ordered his people to adhere to religious teachings. In the tradition of dialogue, appreciation should be extended to the saints and the great religious scholars for important religious movements but not to the king. Not the Sultan, but the Wali Songo built the Holy Mosque of Demak. Indeed, it was the Wali Songo, not the Sultan,

Javanese and Islam as Illustrated the Serat Darmagundul", *BKI*, 122, 2 (1966), p. 309-365.

43. See for example R. Poedjosoebroto, *Wayang Lambang Ajaran Islam*. Jakarta: Pradnya Pramita, 1978: H. Effendi Zakarsi, *Unsur Islam dalam Perwayangan*, Jakarta: Alfa Day a, 1981.


who punished the "wayward" Sheikh Siti Jenar. The task of the king was to create harmony, if necessary by force, not to spread religion. The king was the guardian and the custodian of the cosmic order, not the founder of a new cosmic order. Sultan Prawata of Demak may have been a good person, but he was weak, for he preferred to live the life of a hermit rather than that of a ruler. In this way, he could only order his own inner-self, but he might keep the great cosmic harmony. His reign, which ended in his murder, was the end of Demak's heyday.

Traditions in Comparative Perspectives

Southeast Asian history is the story of the interaction between various unifying basic layers. One unifying layer was the creation of a new type of civilization. The arrival of Islam, like the expansion of "Hindu civilization" in an earlier historical phase was not, as a historian correctly remarked "a continuous line, but... a configuration of the tradition centers that stands out in the foreign neighborhood."[44] And in that process the universal religion of Islam that accompanied trade relations, was not only subjected to various types of cultural encounters and clashes, but also created several foundations for the formation of traditions that, as mentioned above, referred to specific political and cultural spheres. The formation of the tradition of integration in Aceh, Bugis-Makassar, Sulu, Maguindanao, and so on cannot be separated from the ongoing trade routes. The fall of Malacca to the Portuguese caused the Muslim traders to scatter everywhere. The fall of Malacca seemed to be the driving force for the emergence and the growth of new trade centers. It was the same in the case of the VOC's humiliation of Makassar that encouraged sailors and Bugis-Makassarese adventurers to turn the Straits of Malacca into their area of operation.

Adherents to this tradition also strengthened the resolve of King Soliman, the Muslim ruler of Manila, when the Spanish forces under the leadership of Legaspi landed in the beautiful bay of the island of Luzon in 1571. It is said that in his meeting with the Spaniards, Soliman said that he welcomed their arrival with open arms. But they should realize that he would

44. J.C. Heesterman, "The Hindu Frontier", an article in the the Third CGLY Conference in the Comparative Study of India-and Indonesia. Yogyakarta, September 22-25, 1986.



The battle of Kuto Gawang, Palembang, in 1659.

Source: *Yayasan Lontar*

not allow any abuse; they would have to pay with their death if they offended the people's integrity.[45]

What touched the Spaniards was not just this privilege, but that the newly established Islamic power gave them the right to live (1575). Nevertheless, the order to destroy the Moros in Sulu and Mindanao given to the commander of the Spanish forces was the beginning of wars that lasted for about three centuries. These wars strengthened the traditions of internal integration among Muslim communities to circumvent the possibility that one of the power centers might appear as unifier. Apart from the Sultanate of Sulu, the tribal kingdom of Tausug, there were no political communities in the southern Philippines that could be united. Not Maguindanao, especially not the Maranao. Here the power centers more imagined a situation of the presence of minor palaces without a central palace. The profound involvement of the Javanese cultural region to create unity and its Siwa-Buddhist government tradition were distinguishing factors in the initial Islamization process. The Islamic community began to be formed ---as evidenced by gravestones--- in the periphery, not in the center of power and culture. Therefore, after Muslim power had been established, its main concern was to cultivate an Islamic lifestyle, which was grounded in moral teachings[46] and the shift of cultural symbols away from Siwa-Buddhist towards Islamic.[47] All these are important and should not be ignored. However, the historical experiences because of various outside pressures should also not be ignored. What would have happened if the VOC had not involved itself in Mataram's internal dynamics? How would the wars of succession have ended, in which boarding schools were often involved, if the Dutch would not have interfered? The VOC was deeply involved in every affair and in each internal conflict and it affected the way events developed. The shift of the power center and the central palace, which was followed by the destruction of the minor kingdoms on the north coast as centers of trade and religious authority may be seen as a return to the pre-Majapahit era, when its rights on land and property were the kingdom's major sources of income. Meanwhile,

45. Quoted by Alunan C. Glang, *Muslim: Secession or Integration*, Quezon City: Alunan C. Glang 1971, pp. 6-7.

46. G.W.J. Drewes, *An Early Javanese Code of Muslim Ethics The Hague*: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.

47. A.H. Johns "From Buddhism to Islam: An Interpretation of the Javanese Literature of Transition", Comparative Studies in Society and History, IX, 1 Oct., 1966, pp. 40-50.




the coastal regions that created certain traditions, supported by markets and boarding schools pesantren, had to find other ways to preserve their perspective on cosmopolitan culture, if not their direct trading relations. As the owners of the legacy of the Wali Songo ---the saints who originated from the north-coast--- the north coast cities, especially Cirebon, developed works on Islamic mysticism. In the central court in the hinterland, literary works and pre-Islamic philosophy were re-used as the sources of in new cultural ways of thinking.[48] But political dominance was already the hands of the VOC. As a result, this development not only sharpened the differences in the maritime and agricultural state systems, as Van Leur said, or turned coastal life into a distinctive north-coastal cultural pattern, but also strengthened the development towards the tradition of dialogue.

The conceptualization of these two traditions is necessary as an analytical tool to understand the dynamics of Islam in each political region. Meanwhile, inter-state or regional inter-political relationships and various historical events had turned Southeast Asia into a region bound by a shared sense of unity. The Islamization of Patani, Bugis-Makassar, Sulu-Maguindanao and so on show how each felt to be part of the larger cultural world. No matter how the Islamization of Banjarmasin, Lampung and Palembang went, it was not isolated from Mataram's political domination. Subsequent developments showed that they were part of the Malay Islamic intellectual tradition. In fact, if the 17th century was marked by Aceh's leading role in the development of intellectual traditions, at the end of the 18th century it was Palembang's turn to be given this honor.[49] Like Aceh, which has its own language, Palembang also produced texts in the Malay language.

Dynastic relations and religious unity as well as shared political interests are various elements that can join various areas into a political unity in a joint effort against the penetration of economic monopolism and Western expansion. In this regard, for example, the initial phase of the perpetual war between the Moros and Spain was characterized by the involvement of Brunei and subsequently Ternate. At that time too (the 16th century)

48. Theodore G.Th. Pigeaud, *Literature of Java, Vol. 1: Synopsis of Javanese Literature*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967.

49. See for example G.WJ. Drewes, *Direction for Travelers on the Mystic Path: Zakariyya al-Ansari's Kitab Path al Rahman and its Indonesian Version. With an Appendix on Palembang Manuscripts and Authors*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, (KITLV-Verhandelingen 81), 1977.



Spain imagined that if it could defeat the Ternate-Sulu coalition, not only these two areas that would be under its control but Kalimantan and Java as well.

In the 18th century, the atmosphere of unity offered the possibility for the emergence of calls for para-Islamist-inspirited jihad both in Java and in the Straits of Malacca. It also offered the opportunity for a "political adventurer" to call for holy war in the Straits of Malacca and in the Sunda Strait under his direction. He wanted to build a palace founded on jihad against the unbelievers.[50]

The relationships between kingdoms or political entities that sometimes showed their efforts to give meaning to the concept of cultural unity in political behavior were frequently marred by conflicts. The triangle dispute between Johor, Jambi and Palembang (17th century), for example, cannot be explained by the two concepts of tradition introduced above. Both traditions ---the tradition of integration and that of dialogue--- can only explain internal conditions. It is in the interest of groups in power, whether the Sultan and his court officials and local authorities, or the clergy, to maintain the integrity of each tradition. So, the traditions in their respective territories served as the mythical foundations of their behavioral patterns. At the rational level, traditions emerged that could be used as yardsticks to determine what was reasonable and what not.

The declining power of the kings as the rulers in possession of the monopoly in taking initiatives because of the penetration of Western colonialism (the 18th century in Java and the 19th century in other cultural-political areas), meant the loss of one of the tradition's supporting institutionalizations. Meanwhile, modern bureaucratic systems and new styles of economic exploitation potentially threatened the sustainability of both types of traditions. But, perhaps it is not a historical irony that these traditions evolved into the bases of cultural identity on the one hand and as the new foundations for political conservatism, on the other. The mythologizing process that had taken place and was promoted by the literati, clerical or not, and the continuing validity of the structure of plausibility,[51]

50. J. Kathirithamby-Wells, "Ahmad Shah Ibn Iskandar and the Late 17th Century Holy War in Indonesia", *JMBRAS* XUI, 1, 1970, pp. 48-63.

51. On this concept see Peter L. Berger &Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, New York: Doubleday 7 Company, 1966.



One of the classical works by Hamzah Fansuri, from the 18th century.

Source: Indonesia the first fifty years 1945-1995.

which offered an atmosphere of compatibility between the trusted and the experienced, are factors that may have made it possible that this occurred.

Change certainly continued. The national state that was built on the ruins of the colonial state as well as the preceding, supporting and accompanying ideological mayhems that preceded it did not mean nothing. The shift in the political system and the socio-economic structure not only changed the realities the tradition had to face and that acted as a prism to understand this reality. Moreover, Islam as the foundation of the tradition of integration and that of dialogue has undergone various stages in its reform process. They ranged from efforts to underline ethics and the shari'ah in behavior to the problem of the role of religion in facing the modern world. Also, Islam has turned into an ideology that raises the issue of the place of Islam in the modern national state.


At certain moments the two systems of Islamic political traditions that came up in the 17th century and were tested and adapted in subsequent periods, also emerge to the surface. In Malaysia, the tradition of integration is part of the fundamental Malay identity of its communalistic political system, but at the same time it also presents itself as a dilemma, in regulating the modern state. Where does "Malay" end and "Malaysia" begin? Where are the limits of "symbols" (Sultan and Islam) and of "political reality" (federal state and citizenship) to be found? Perhaps it may be true to say that the 1955 elections in Indonesia showed, on the one hand, the creation of an alliance between the traditions of integration on the one hand and the tradition of dialogue of the *santri* and, on the other hand, it showed how former socio-political processes undermined the alliance's unity. Perhaps, turning traditions into political parties has met a dead end. However, as the experiences of the 1950s and 1960s showed, the inherent local nature of the two traditions sometimes reveals itself. So, indeed in political upheavals it was unclear whether they opted for national unity in line with the demands of Islam or for local anxieties that were channeled by traditions. The rigidity of the tradition of integration in each locality of the southern Philippines has caused the Moro as a whole to survive in its wars against the Spaniards for around three hundred years. But local obstinacy can apparently also be a hindrance for the creation of a unifying



movement, both inter-ethnic and inter-social strata, against outside pressure.

The modern age and contemporary events are beyond the scope of this article. However, if a historical trend can be used as a comparison, we can estimate that no matter what internal changes have occurred in the structures within Islamic communities, even up to the possibility of widening the tradition of dialogue supported by a kind of "court orthodoxy", they have increasingly become a political reality. However, the re-ideologization of tradition is not just a dream of the past. When the penetration of power is too tight and when the changes in the structure of ideal "satisfied society" are considered threatening, the essential foundation of the political tradition that initially had a local character may re-emerge as a national force.





Chapter Five

Mystical Union and the Ideal Raja: The Ideology of Islamic Kingdoms

Mystical Union and the Ideal Raja: The Ideology of Islamic Kingdoms

Taufik Abdullah

Reflections on Doctrine and Cultural Accommodation

One day, the Sultan of Malacca, Sultan Mahmud Shah, had to settle a debate among scholars that had been going on for a long time. The issue was so complicated that he resolved to send an envoy to the King of Pasai to ask him for the right way to settle the dispute. What could possibly be the answer to a statement as "who says that God is the creator and the eternal protector is an infidel; and who says that God is not the creator and not the eternal protector is a genuine infidel." After having listened to the questions, the King of Pasai summoned the royal scholars and he requested them to settle the dispute. However, none of their answers satisfied Malacca's envoy. In the end, the King summoned the envoy, Tun Muhammad, to appear before him and he whispered something in his ear that were the answers the Sultan of Malacca really.[1]

What the King of Pasai had said? The *Sejarah Melayu* does not say. However, perhaps the absence of the answer in the *Sejarah Melayu* reveals its cultural significant. This text, like other traditional historiographies, wanted to create and maintain a world of shared meaning. It wanted to offer a paradigm that could be used as the basis for communal life within a mutually recognized hierarchical system. In this system, it was unthinkable that everybody should know the king's answers. Only certain groups of people were allowed to know it, so the answer would cause damage to the listener or to the public.

The story above is only one illustration of the notion that a distinction had to be made between the group of *Jawara* and those who had deepened their religious understanding in order to understand the nature of divinity. Not everyone was allowed to join the discussions on complicated divine issues. Only the learned could, and were allowed, to enter this complicated theological sphere. The *Sejarah Melayu* is not the only the text that present this issue and it is also not the most well-known. In Javanese tradition, the story of Sheikh Siti Jenar, who was punished by the saints, is very famous and it is not hard to find other stories. People who divulged esoteric knowledge to the public in general were not only accused of disturbing the stability of the orthodoxy that had been confirmed by consensus; they were also

1. From the story of 2Q, the Shellabear (Abdulkadir Munsyi) version of the *Sejarah Melayu* edited by Teeuw & Situmorang, 1950, and the Raffles 19 version, which was translated by Brown (1953), Reprinted 1983, pp. 148-149.



Hamzah Fansuri's poetry from the 18th century.

Source: Indonesia the first fifty years 1945-1995.

looked as the dissidents who questioned the validity of the system of authority. The legendary Sufi, al-Hallaj faced the same problem (10th century A.D.).

Now we find ourselves confronted with a field of issues that touches on reflections and thoughts about the essence of and the demands for religious teachings and no longer with the cultural justification of the conversion process that had already taken place. In traditional historiography and in collective memory, the king, who had been the main focus of conversion myths ---his dream (Pasai), his pain (Patani), the king being visited by the Prophet (Tallo), and so forth--- was slowly replaced by *ulama* and Sufis who desperately looked for certainty. In conversion myths we can see how local rulers and kings had to go through a wide range of experiences before they could finally make the definite decision to convert to Islam. Now, cultural accountability had been replaced by an unyielding quest for the utmost truth. Conversion myths that wanted to lay the basis for a new paradigm by offering the mythological explanations of the necessity for a transformation of the religious and cultural foundations had been replaced by stories of triumphant intellectual competition.

Another tale tells of a Hindu priest who, equipped with his books wanted to enter into a debate with Sunan Bonang. However, on his way to meet the famous saint, his ship was stranded and his books were ruined. After having arrived safely, he met a man who was putting a stick into the ground. It was Sunan Bonang. In the theological debate that ensued between them the priest realized that his now-missing books could not compare with the true "book". After event he became one of Sunan Bonang's devoted disciples.[2]

In this atmosphere the world of meaning that inspired the cognitive community was no longer at stake, but the old-style higher civilization that needed to be conquered. With this mythological victory, the victor earned cultural legitimacy as the propagator of religion and the pursuer of the essential truth behind the teachings. In this way, the myth of the intellectual clash could be seen as the explanation of why old elements persisted in new way of thinking. The old elements' validity was not totally negated, but it had been turned into something subordinated to the new way that now featured as the "vessel of the hegemony" of the

2. Schrieke, (1916); 44.

world of values. It was in this way that the Islamization of the old elements occurred. Thus, for example, Raden Said (the son of the Ruler of Tuban), who roamed about as a gambler and a bandit, later came to be known as Sheikh Melaya (and eventually begot the title Sunan Kalijaga), after Sunan Bonang, in accordance with contemporary mystical-religious thought, demonstrated that material wealth did not guarantee happiness. Without negating the validity of this entirely mystical way of thinking, Sunan Kalijaga features in traditional historiography and in Javanese history not only as the most meritorious propagator of Islam, but also as an important power broker during a critical phase of the transition of power from Demak to Pajang and subsequently to Mataram.[3] Moreover, Sunan Kalijaga was a "culture hero" who brilliantly directed the change from the old foundation based on the cosmic system to the new one. Thus, observers could say that it was a continuation of the syncretic tradition, but the public saw it as a continuation of the old cultural world.

In the history of the dissemination of Islam that was seen as a series of intellectual confrontations, Sunan Kalijaga was not unique. He could easily find his counter parts in the Indian subcontinent.[4] The miraculous experiences of the pursuers of the Highest Essence can no longer be considered as coming from him (capable of manipulating supernatural power); but, in line with mystical thinking, as proof of God's magnificence. Islamization, as the overhaul of earlier religious-magical thinking, had certainly taken place. New meaning had been given to ancient "internal reality". It was only later, when the wave of scriptural thinking hit, that the doctrinal gap as seen from the sharia perspective became the focus of debates.

3. For an anthropological interpretation of Sunan Kalijaga's historical role see Geertz, 1967; for his legendary biography, see for example Soelarso (1974?), a publication supported by the descent line of the Kadilangu family — who are Kalijaga descendants.

4. See for example Schimmel, 1982; Lawrence, 1982; Alam 1989; and Roy, 1983. These works discuss various Islamic mystical orders, which, viewed from the perspective of Islamic law, are syncretic. A comparison with India shows that the main problem in the early debate on Sufism was not the invalidity of the old (Hindu dan Buddhist elements), but the superiority of monotheism, the absolute oneness of Allah. Compared with other places in the Islamic world, "strange" Java, in the context of Islam in the archipelago no longer seemed "strange". Shariah-centric thinking is one tradition in Islam and more importantly is also part of historical developments—first it was a possibility, then a reality and subsequently, it spread.



An understanding of the construction of the traditions that colored this higher civilization should include attention to the Sufis' rather high mobility since the early spread of Islam.[5] Not only Ibn Battuta reported that the Sultan of Samudera was continuously accompanied by Islamic scholars; also Tomé Pirés talked about the mullahs who invariably escorted merchants. Saints, called *maulana*, were active in the northern coastal cities of Java and they constantly went around, although they came from "outside the country". Sultan Mansur Shah sent Tun Bija Wangsa to Pasai, as stated in the *Sejarah Melayu*, because of the influence of Maulana Abu Bakr who had come to Malacca with the book *Durr Mauzum*. In his famous book, the *Bustanus Salatin*, Nuruddin al-Raniri also mentioned the names of scholars who came to Aceh, his own uncle among them.[6]

Texts show that the early 16th and especially the 17th century was a crucial period in the formation of the tradition of Islamic thinking in Southeast Asia. This period not only showed a high level of international and inter-insular trade activities,[7] it was also the heyday of several big Islamic kingdoms (Aceh Darussalam, Mataram, Banten, Makassar/Gowa-Tallo and Ternate) during which the basis was laid for the intellectual and political tradition. Through constant copying, as printing culture was still out of reach, religious ideas gradually spread and this was not passed over in traditional historiographic texts. It was told, for instance, that one king sent an important book to another king as a token of friendship.[8] It would

5. From this perspective, the emergence of the theory that mystics had spread Islam in Southeast Asia as stated by Johns (1961, 1963) is understandable, although Drewes' objection (1968) cannot simply be ignored.

6. This was in 990 AH during the reign of Sultan Alauddin Perak ibn Sultan Ahmad. According to the *Bustanus Salatin*, Sheikh Abu Khair bin Sheikh ibn Hajar, the author of *Saifu'l Qati'* (The Sharp Sword) arrived in Aceh and taught Islamic jurisprudence there. Sheikh Muhammad Yamani, an expert on Islamic theology arrived as well. During the reign of Sultan Riayat Shah (1568-1575), Muhammad Azhari taught metaphysics (*ma'qulat*). Al-Raniri's uncle, Sheikh Muhammad ibn Hassan ibn Muhammad Jilani, taught logic (*manti'* and *ma'ani*) and rhetoric (*bayan, badi'*), Islamic theology (*ushul*) and Islamic jurisprudence and law (*fiqh*). Iskandar (ed.), 1966: 32-33.

7. See Reid (1990), who calls this period the *Age of Commerce.*

8. Although from the point of view of empirical history this can be doubted, the testimony in the *Hikayat Marong Mahawangsa* that the Sultan happily greeted the conversion of the king of Kedah by sending al-Raniri's book, *Sirat al-Mustaqim,* shows cultural behavior that had become part of the royal tradition. Of course it was peculiar; al-Raniri had arrived at Aceh in 1637, while Kedah embraced Islam in the 15th century (Winstedt, 1969: 163-164). Al-Attas (1988 :) sees

not have been too hard for the king to learn of its contents, because he was always surrounded by clerics able of offering him their views on the contents of the book.[9] One of Southeast Asia's pre-colonial hallmarks was the mobility of the *ulamas* in times of upsurge of political and economic power.[10] Moreover, this continued even when the political hegemony had gone over in the hands of foreign powers.

this incident as evidence for the intensification of the Islamization process.

9. A document dated 999 AH states that during the *aqiqah* ceremony of the son of the King of Aceh, who would subsequently be known as Iskandar Muda, the *ulama'* gave the baby its name. "So on the seventh day a bull was slaughtered as *aqiqah* and his hair was shaved and weighed in gold which was given to the poor in charity as well as a festive meal. The clerics who were present offered prayers in thanks to God. Then the day that the baby got its name Sultan Alaud-Din Mansur Shah, the King of Perak, Pocut Abdullah Sulaiman Mansur, who would rule the kingdom of Aceh. Then Sheikh Abu al-Khair said, "This is Iskandar Muda Mansur al-Asyi. Then, Sheikh Yamin said, "Here is Makota Alam Mansur". Eventually, all the ministers and chief officials said, "This is *maiman* (who leads and possesses) the Land under the Wind. Then al-Sheikh Nur al-din said, "This is Alaud-Din Makota Alam Sultan Iskandar Muda Perkasa Allah Syah al-Quat." Quoted by Iskandar, 1980: 222-223.

10. This is often expressed in classical Malay texts. The king's wealth, the realm's prosperity and trade progress are always followed by accounts of the arrival of scholars. See for example, *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, by Raja Ali Haji, Matheson & Andaya (ed.)

The historical stages of Islam in Southeast Asia at a glance are as follows. Initially, the main theme was the creation of an Islamic cognitive community which was immediately followed by efforts to turn it into part of the Islamic world. At this stage, a variety of translations were made and the conversion myth was formulated. In the second stage, the boundaries between "disbelief" and "Islam" started to become more prominent. This is also the phase, as may be seen from the Trengganu inscription (14th century) and various other early Islamic texts (from the 16th century) of the introduction of Islamic doctrinal imperatives and ethics. While these stages continued, ta new period had been entered. Personal reflections on the relationship between humans as His creatures and the Creator had been to be intensifed. This was the trend that had slowly Aceh the "production center" of the brightest stars in the history of Islamic thought in Southeast Asia. These kinds of Religious reflections also dominated mystical literature in Java. How should the spiritual relationship between the servant and the Lord could be properly understood?

This Sufi tendency was also reflected in the formulation of a more realistic relationship between the servant and

the Lord, the slave and the master, i.e. of political power. How should the relationship between king and his subjects be seen? What was realyy the meaning of power? The influential *Tajus Salatin* saw this relationship from the Sufi point of view. Everything was looked at from the obligation of establishing harmony and cosmic unity. The theory on the state the book proposed did not differ much from those proposed by Sunnite books in the sense that the main emphasis was that the characteristic of the state rested on a ruler's personal moral imperatives, rather than on structural rules and regulations and power. However, is it not so that historical facts show that the pursuits of ideals are never realized? Thus, even in this period we are dealing with the efforts to create a political tradition aimed at surpassing ideal demands and structural obligations.

It is for this reason one can say that this period was a critical moment in the development of Islam in Southeast Asia. In the early stages the major theme was the efforts to build an Islamic community and to make it participate in a new kind of cosmopolitanism, while the main problem was the popularization of the teachings in the different type of cultural symbols. In the next phase, another problem had to be dealt with. More than ever before, old cultural idioms and structural obligations that were rooted consciously, were used as active partners in the dialogue. In the process of this dialogue, the marginalization of values and the eradication of seemingly worthless old idioms also took place. Or could it be that a process of adaptation took place and a situation of cultural symbiosis occurred. Only now also a new cosmic unity could be attained. However, the process did not always run in an evolutionary way. Cultural conflicts occurred and a return to nativistic values sometimes also happened.

Within the context of Southeast Asia as a whole, this unsettling cultural process caused different religious traditions among the Muslim communities. The cultural unity of the Islamic political tradition was at stake. No less important, cultural continuity and change were very serious internal problems. The process of the expansion of the reach of religious influence within social structures and behavior patterns and the deepening import they had within the consciousness and belief systems turned out to cause major cultural risks. However, this is not unique in the history of Islam. Ever since Islam expanded its wings to other major civilization centers, similar things happened.

Between Creatures and the Creator

It was once assumed that the mystical tradition or more precisely, the Sufi tradition in the Islamic world was directly influenced by Hellenism that had been parts of ideas. The spread of Islam to Persia, which had embraced Hellenism through the conquest of Alexander the Great and the Persian influence in the history of Islamic thought seemed to justify this assumption. Moreover, the debate between man's aspiration as the "creation" or the "emanation" of the Highest Essence also ravaged Sufi thought. In fact, some say that it is rooted in thoughts that developed in India. However, a distinction must be made between a possible acculturation process and the origin of this trend in thinking. So, in this respect, the Sufi tradition must first be sought in the teachings of Islam itself ---the history of the life of the Prophet and his companions, and especially from the Quran. It is in the interpretation of the Quranic verses that the main upheaval in the world of Islamic mystical thought occurred.

The expression "he, who knows himself, will know his God" (*man 'arafa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu*) was the beginning of the intensification of worship by way of Sufism. However a problem quickly arose when the concept of "knowing self" had to be formulated. How should the Hadith Qudsi that says *kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan an-u'rafa* (I am the hidden treasure, happy to be known) be interpreted? Everything is perceived as a mystery. In what way can "the hidden" and "happy to be known" be approached? Sufis were well aware of Allah's warnings in the Qur'an (QS. Al-Hadid/57: 16) that say: "Has the time not come for those who believe that their hearts should humbly submit to be mindful of Allah and the truth of the revelation that has been sent down? And let them not emulate those to whom the Scripture was delivered earlier, whose hearts, after a long period had become heavy and many of them even became sinners." But, how to do this? In QS al-Hadid/57: 3-4, God gave a hint, "He is the First and the Last, the External and the Internal, and He knows everything. He is with you wherever you are. Allah is All-Seeing of what you do".[11] Furthermore, QS Qaf/50: 15, "...We are closer to him than his own arteries." He is close, but it seems a long road has to be travelled to meet Him. In the process of becoming connected with God, not

11. The Indonesian translation is based on Surin, but the English translation of the verses is based on the Sahih International.

only intense theological debates took place (that are still in progress) and many types of mystical orders sprung up; the penetration of mystical thought into the philosophical world of other religions sometimes occurred as well.

Sufism, as the intensification of the service of God is an attempt to achieve the highest level of gnosis, the most perfect mystical level, when the "self" has dissolved into a feeling of unity with the Divine. But what does participation mean in this unity with the Divine? This was the starting point of a debate ---is it unity of existence (*wujud*), essence (*dhat*), or vision (*shuhud*)? The *wahdat al-wujud* (the unity of existence) negates the existence of reality, because it is incorporated in the "unity of existence" with God ---in which a monistic pantheist element was discerned. But the *wahdat al-shuhud* (the unity of vision) begins from recognizing that the highest level is the disclosure (*kasyf*) or the vision of God (*shuhud*), when the self has the feeling to be part of the Divine. If the former is monistic in nature, the latter remained within the essential distance between the Creator (*al-Khaliq*) and those the had created (*makhluq*).

Based on the texts left to us, we know that in Southeast Asia the debate on this issue took place in the 16th century. Hamzah Fansuri[12] was the torchbearer

12. Hamzah Fansuri came from Barus, on the west coast of northern Sumatra. There is no genuine source that offers direct information about this brilliant Sufi-poet, but experts tried to find it by critically studying his writings. However, different interpretations were inevitable, like the Prophet, who was not liked by Iskandar Muda, for his daring to reprimand loudly. Could Hamzah Fansuri, who refused to go to the palace of the Shah-e-nadi? Brakel said that the place could only have been in Aceh, as it is also mentioned in the *Hikayat Aceh*. But Drewes was adamant that it was the capital of Old Siam. On one thing they all agreed and that is that Fansuri came from Barus. "Hamzah Barus in the Malay country/precisely Kapur in timber/.....") (Quoted in Iskandar, 1965). But was he born there? The first difference appeared in al-Attas (1969) and (1970: 4- 8), in which he said no, he was born in Sharnawi, based on the poem:

Hamzah whose origin is Fansuri
Came into existence on the soil of Sharnawi

"*Wujud*" (lit. existence), according to al-Attas, has to be interpreted as physical existence, so it means to be born. But Brakel (1969), and Drewes and Brakel (1986) doubt this because al-Attas did not look at the rest of the poem,

"Hath khilafat original science
From Sayyid Abdul Kadir Jilani"

Apparently, al-Attas also did not consider the verses before and after this. In conclusion, "Fansuri's origin" is to mean the place of birth, while "Sharnawi" is where he found the "science of existence". Brakel (1979) reinforced this point by trying to reconstruct Barus' historical role, which was important in international perspective. Al-Attas failed to determine Hamzah's birth year, but he was certain that he (Hamzah) did not witness Iskandar Muda's ascend to the throne in 1607 because, among other reasons, al-Raniri did not mention him in the *Bustanus Salatin*. However, said al-Attas (1966: 44-5), it seems that he lived during the reign of Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah

in the history of Islamic thought, subsequently followed by Syamsuddin al-Sumatrani,[13] one of Hamzah's students, who at least tried to offer an interpretation of Hamzah's complicated verses. Al-Raniri, the great scholar from Ranir who was also a prolific and sharply witted writer, was strongly against both teachings.

(1588-1604). This is partly evidenced by his *Ikat-Ikatan Ilmu'l-Msa* that called the king "*mukammil*" (lit. the Perfect King).
Only Riayat Shah is known in Acehnese tradition as *Sayyid al-Mukammal*. However, using textual criticism, Brakel found a *taxallo* pattern, namely the freedom of self-expression, and he doubted that Fansuri composed this poem (1979: 79-81). This skepticism was reinforced by Drewes and Brakel (1986: 18-24). Brakel (1969) preferred to look at outside sources, namely foreign reports, for instance written by Admiral Beaulieu, who visited Aceh in 1620 and who mentioned the existence of scholars, "saints", who were highly respected.
It is unknown how many writings Fansuri produced but after conducting a variety of internal criticisms as well as text comparisons, Drewes and Brakel counted as many as 32 collections of poems. From these collections they removed various doubtful poems which are still included in Doorenbos (1933) and al-Attas (1970). In addition, there are 3 prose works, namely (1) *Asrar al-Arifin* (The Secrets of Gnostics), (2) *Sharab al-Ashiqin* (Lovers' Beverage) and (3) *al-Muntahi* (The End) ---all have been published and translated in al-Attas (1970). *Al-Muntahi*, which, according to the *Sejarah Banten* (History of Banten) was sent to Mecca along with two other books (± 1630) by the king of Banten, is a very difficult book. According Drewes and Brakel (pp. 12-23), as the name implies, it was intended for advanced mystics who wanted to deepen their understanding of "who knows himself, knows his Lord". On the many difficulties in the *al-Muntahi*, see also Brakel (1979: 85-89).

13. In his *Bustanus-Salatin*, al-Raniri wrote, "Syahdan the time of the death of Sheikh Shamsuddin ibn Abdullah as-Sumatrani, was on the evening of Monday, day twelve of Rajab, the year of Hijrah 1039. The Sheikh was learned in all sciences, and renowned for his expertise on the science of Sufism, and he composed several books." Iskandar (ed.) 1965. If this was said by a person very well known for being opposed to Syamsuddin's teachings, then of course we understand, too, that this is indeed a very authoritative scholar. He is also mentioned in the *Hikayat Aceh* as the foremost scholar in Aceh when Sultan Iskandar Muda reached adulthood. Foreign reports, particularly by Dutch and British travelers, state that he was a spiritual adviser to Sultan Iskandar Muda. In addition to being a prominent cleric, Syamsuddin also had enough authority to enable him to interpret Hamzah Fansuri's poems (see, Drewes and Brakel and also Hasyimi 194-225, 355-359). He wrote his interpretation in his book *Kitab Syarah Ruba'i*. Van Nieuwenhuijze used Syamsuddin's thoughts for his dissertation of 1945. Many of his writings have been lost, partly because they were burned when al-Raniri was influential. One of his works is the *Mir'at al-Mu'min* (1601) written in Malay which was also translated into Sundanese. Other writings are the *Mir'at al-Muhakkikin* and others. For a complete list see Saghir Abdullah, 1987. Winstedt said, "His mysticism, located between that in India and Java, is more speculative than emotional - and centers around the unity of existence and the perfect man" (Winstedt, 1969: 144). Nieuwenhuijze estimated that Syamsuddin died in 1630 AD --so quite a long time before al-Raniri arrived in Aceh (1637). And al-Attas is also right that al-Raniri "was the winner" in the debates against Hamzah Fansuri and Syamsuddin, because they were only "represented" by their followers. Moreover, he also won because, according to al-Attas, al-Raniri had distorted their writings (al-Attas, 1966: 16-17).

The main theological concern that caused their dispute was not unique in the history of Islamic mysticism Hamzah, and laters Syamsuddin, were not alone in this matter. Apart from the great Muslim mystics of Islam's "golden age" like al-Hallaj, Ibn Arabi and others, the problem of the exact relation between those created and their Creator was also taken up in Javanese mysticism, such as in the famous *Suluk Wijil* and *Suluk Kalifah*. No less important was the problem of the mystical origins (*usul suluk*) or the mystical principles that were extensively discussed in "Het Boek van Bonang"; which, according to Drewes' readings, should more appropriately be called "The Admonitions of Seh Bari". However, Hamzah Fansuri's role remains important in the history of thinking, not only because his works are among the oldest, but also because his Sufism reveals itself in a highly aesthetic form. One of the oldest mystical books, *Serat Suluk Sukarsa*, was probably directly influenced by Hamzah Fansuri, because the expressions used in it resemble those of Hamzah's poetry.[14] More importantly, as a whole, his poetry shows a very alluring journey of thought ---ranging from the necessity of the enforcement of the sharia and Islamic ethics up to the encounter with God the Creator. Hamzah read his poems to laymen, in order that:

> Keep to both what is incumbent on you and what is usage
>
> And do not neglect the five statutory prayers
>
> Distinguish, my dear sir, between permitted and forbidden
>
> For this is a pre-eminently good work[15]

Or, when he was just reminded again,

> "Oh all ye who are called Muslims
>
> Keep to Tradition and the Word
>
> For they contain God's full message
>
> Proclaiming that He is omnipresent[16]

There is no problem. From the point of orthodox sharia, the main elements are the Unity of God the Omnipresent, the need to follow the Prophetic tradition and understanding God's word. But, what if this is not only to be understood and followed, but also has to be followed by the intensification of nearing oneself with the Creator? How may we understand Hamzah's following advice?

14. Poerbatjaraka & Hadidjaja, 1952: 103.

15. Drewes & Brakel, 1986: 45.

16. Drewes & Brakel, 1986: 49.

Oh ye community of the Prophet

You should be possessed of the knowledge of God (gnosis)

For that knowledge is held by the saints

To be extremely lofty and most firm[17]

What does Divine gnosis actually really mean? Trying to find the answer to this question inevitably led to one of the most famous debates in the mystical world of Islam and this is essentially also one of the esoteric aspects of Sufi thought. Sufis also are more inclined to use allegories and metaphors in the way they express Divine gnosis. Describing his relationship with God, Hamzah used the term "sea"[18] to describe the sphere where God's "residence" and the world "meet" and sometimes he portrayed himself as a bird that has liberated itself from worldly ties.

As mentioned above, Hamzah and other mystics derived their mystical ideas from the hadith which states that "knowing self is the basis of knowing God

> *"When one was known by him, he knew God, then the Divine abode was always connected with knowledge, and divine knowledge was always connected to Divine existence. He surely obtained an attachment to God, and knew the path to His Unity by God as the word of God says, wafi anfusikum afala tubsiruna, it means: In yourself, then why do you not see Him."*[19]

17. Drewes & Brakel, 1986: 59.

18. The "sea" is a common parable in Southeast Asia from as early as pre-Islamic times. The "sea" is not only a geographic entitity that needs to be overcome, but also forms a vision in understanding realities. On this matter see Lombard, 1980. This also has deeply influenced Hamzah Fansuri's metaphores. The almost constant theme in Hamzah's writing is the endless "journey" in search of God, but it is a spiritual rather than a physical "journey". The theme of the journey is beautifully illustrated in the well-known poem, *Syair Perahu*. Life is like a boat sailing on the sea with high waves. But, when all hardships have been conquered, the wind would also abate and the boat would sail easily, because

Divine existence is the boat name
Divine knowledge will the oars
Divine faith is the steering name
Surely God is the name of the handler
Finally, the boat reached the destination
Wallahu alam is the name of the seacoast
Divine Wish is the sea's name
Divine Power is the harbor's name
Paradise is the country's name

For an aesthetic and literary criticism of this poem, see Braginsky, 1975. Only seen from the point of textual criticism, Braginsky could not ascertain that this poem was actually written by Hamzah, although it was published in Doorenbos and later also cited by Lombard. Drewes (Drewes and Brakel 1986: 18) agreed with this assumption. However, this cannot deny the paralels of thought and the tendencies of the poems that clearly were written by Hamzah (usually at the end of a verse where Hamzah introduced himself).

19. Johns, 1957: 56, a quotation of the Qur'an 51: 21. This commentary was closed by a quote of

But this became a problem. Does having knowledge about Allah essentially [mean] "knowing the path of unity with God"? Or, does having gnosis or *ma'rifat* actually means that union with the manifestation of God has been achieved? In his poems Hamzah describes himself as a "wanderer" who unceasingly seeks God. He was poor, but his quest was rich. He was endlessly restless "with his lust in opposition with waging war", but in the end he achieved "wealth in both universes and became king." Therefore,

> "Do not look for Hamzah
>
> His kind is not human
>
> His person, though perishable
>
> Is in constant union with the Real Being[20]

Although as a human being he was mortal, he had actually united with the true being, which is eternal. Finally religion, *din*, shows that a debt has to be paid during the life of a "child of trade". If this would have been settled, everything would merge into oneness. Hamzah was a radical mystic. In his book, *Sharab al-Ashikin*, he also asserted,

> "One more thing, when he looked outside of himself, all he saw was his own self. When he saw what he looked at, he also looked at himself, because, for an expert in truth, in essence nature is one with him, not two or three. If all of nature is one with him, than naturally, all he saw was himself as in the words of the Divine Messenger, *ra'itu rabbi biaini rabbi*, I see my God with God's blessing."[21]

For Hamzah, the relationship between God and nature was merely a metaphor, because only God really exists ---the universe is a reflection of His existence. It is like, "the sea cannot be separated from its waves, and waves cannot be separated from the sea."[22]

With this poetic metaphor, Hamzah compared the presence of the Divine essence with the boundless sea, *la ta'ayun*, because, he says "the mind (*budi*) and speech (*bichara*), our knowledge (*ilmu*) and gnosis (*makrifat*) do not pass Him." However, the limitless sea actualizes itself in five emanations, which stem from the *ta'ayyun awal*

Hamzah's poem,
"Know yourself, O the child of *jamu*
Do not forget your-own self
Knowledge of the essence ought to discern
That made you be known as your existence

20. Drewes & Brakel, 1986: 137.

21. Iskandar, 1965a.

22. Al-Attas, 1966: 48.

(consisting of knowledge, existence, vision, and light) through the light of Muhammad, when the "waves" and the "sea" start to be distinguished from each other, then manifest itself in the differentiated souls (human, animal, and plant) to finally, in the fourth and fifth stages, become the natural reality of the universe. However, all of this was because of Allah's divine will (*iradah*), not because something that just happened to happen.

In his writings, Hamzah consciously distinguished the scholars of the sharia, who observe things from the outside, and the people of the mystical path (*ahlu suluk*), who look for reality's true essence. The people of the mystical path were people who "never forget themselves, because the Divine Prophet said: *man a'rafa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu*, namely anyone who knows himself would know God".[23] In this context he mainly showed how relative all differentiations of reality is, when all is returned to their origins ---i.e. the highest Essence which possesses the will and the power to manifest all reality with the phrase "*kun fayakun*" ---"be", then all separated itself from all other.

23. In *Sharab al-Asyikin*, quoted from Iskandar, 1965

In Hamzah's cosmogony, that separation process was undergone through the intercession of the light of Muhammad.

In the concept of universality as a reflection of the Real Essence, Hamzah said, "majesty" (*jalal*) and "beauty" (*jamal*) have their place ---"i.e. that everything that is right derives from *jamal*, but all evil derives from *jalal*, unbelief comes from *jalal*, Islam is from jamal, Heaven from *jamal*, hell is from *jalal*, anger is from *jalal*, forgiveness is from *jamal*.[24] *Jalal* and *jamal* are two aspects of the Essence that manifests itself in the human mind when people observe worldly phenomena. Evil and goodness are worldly realities, but both dissolve in universalism. At the highest stage, "the waves and the sea are inseparable." In his system, Hamzah clearly differentiates these emanations of reality, but the relativism between the manifestations of "evil" and "good" are often insurmountable. Perhaps it is also this relativism that captivated authors who wrote about Javanese mysticism. "Good" and "evil" have blended in the concept of eternal and singular universality.

24. From *Sharab al-Asyikin*, quoted by Drewes & Brakel, 1986:170 -171. The concepts of "*jalal*" and "*jamal*" could originate from the well-known tradition of *Qalb al-mu'min bayna usbu'ayn min asabi 'al-Rahman* --- "the heart of a Muslim is between the two fingers of the Most Beneficient."

Because Hamzah Fansuri is regarded as an example of radical Sufi thought, the reformist elements of his writings are often overlooked. In addition to his aesthetic call for the community to be mindful of Islamic ethics and the teachings of the Prophet and the Quran, he also criticized the then still ongoing practice of meditation and he showed the correct way to become nearer to Allah. It might well be, as Brakel said,[25] that this is a sign that yoga was still practiced in Aceh. In other words, unexpectedly, Siwa-Buddhist influences were apparently rooted in Aceh. However, his criticism and advice also shows that Hamzah was not only busy with his attempts to become closer to the essential oneness. His advice also shows his transformative longing for religious life. But here it seems that Syamsuddin al-Sumatrani was more prominent. He was more ta teacher than a restless seeker. In his writings, he always reminded his audience that only those who had been educated could understand the esoteric elements of divinity. And to achieve this level one needs a perfect teacher, because:

> "This secret is too difficult. If the teachers would not be perfect and the students not wise, it cannot be attained, for when only with desire, it would become a heretical school. Therefore, for God's sake, do not disclose this secret outside its proper place. *Wallah billah wa kalam Allah* (by God, in God, and by His Words) for God's sake, do not show this to just anybody, because the secret is too difficult."26

One of Syamsuddin al-Sumatrani's contributions to the development of mystical thought is his creation of a systematic cosmogony, *martabat tujuh,* "the seven emanations", modified from the *al-Tuhfa al-Musala ila Ruh al-Nabi*, written by Muhammad ibn Fadl Allah al-Burhanpuri (1590).[27] This book was very

25. Brakel, 1979: 74–75.

26. Quoted from Iskandar, 1965b.

27. *Al-Tuhfa al-Mursala ila Ruh al-Nabi* (translated by A.H. Johns, 1965, entitled *The Gift Addressed to the Spirit of the Prophet*) is one of the most influential mystical works in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the story of the book that was written in 1590 is long enough, although it totals no more than 9 folios. The Javanese text that Johns also used, is in fact, as stated by Ricklefs (1973), first belonged to Kangjeng Bendoro Raden Ayu Danukusumo, the daughter of Sultan Hamengkubuwono I (1749-92) and the sister of Hamengkubuwono II (1792-1810, 1811-12, 1826-28). And indeed, according to Carey (1975) this book was studied by small groups of aristocrats in the palace. Raden Ayu Danukusumo, who was born around 1771, was married to a descendant of the family of Danurejo, the family of the governor who entertained close relations with *santri* families.

influential in the archipelago. Not only Syamsuddin and even al-Raniri, but also other, anonymous authors composed many commentaries on this book that was deeply influenced by books written by Ibn 'Arabi and al-Jili.[28]

In a text, which may have been written by a pupil of al-Sumatrani,[29] it is said that before anything existed, there was only God, *al-Haqq*. From this total and all-encompassing concept of oneness flowed the "*martabat wahdat*" (lit. unitary emanations), meaning "*yang punya esa*" (lit. He who owns oneness). After that came the "*martabat wahdiat*" (the single level), meaning "*yang esa*" (the one), from which emanated "*alam arwah*" (the nature of spirits), "*alam mithal*" (the nature of resemblance), "*alam ajsam* (physical nature), and finally "*alam insan* (human nature). Using other categories, the emanations of reality were divided into two groups, namely *a'yan tabithah* (consisting of *ahadiyah*, *wahdah*, *wahidiyah*) and *a'yan kharijah* (*alam arwah, alam mithal, alam ajsam, alam insan*), starting from a situation of total nothingness, to the highest level of the most real.

After having been introduced, the teachings of "the seven emanations" mentioned above have been very influential. The doctrine teaches that the creation process went through several stages and that reality consists of various levels within the "essential" emanation which is also reflected in various religious texts thought to have been written by the West Javanese legendary scholar, Sheikh Haji Abdul Rauf, who was supposedly one of Singkel's disciples.[30] In fact, also in a more literary and sophisticated style and using different terminology, this teaching reveals itself in the *Wirid Hidayat Jati* said to have been written by the very famous poet of the Surakarta palace, Ronggowarsito.[31]

One exciting and controversial issue is Ronggowarsito's attempt to include his

In two separated chronicles it is mentioned that the *Tuhfa*, in addition Pangeran Diponegoro studied also other books on Islamic mysticism and law, and the history of the prophet Muhammad.

28. On Ibn 'Arabi see Kautsar Azhari Noer's dissertation, published in 1995.

29. Jones, 1957.

30. Santrie, 1987. This ulama is one of the Javanese "holy men" Rinkes discussed in his unfinished series of writings (Rinkes, 1912).

31. Raden Ngabehi Ronggowarsito (1802-1873) is generally considered the last court-poet of the Javanese tradition. Like his predecessors, Yosodipuro I and Yosodipuro II (about Yosodipuro, see Soebandi, 1969) he studied Islam (in Pesantren Tegalsari, Ponorogo) besides the Javanese literary tradition. Writing many books, either on literature, history, or ethics Ronggowarsito was always quoted in crisis situations, especially his *Kalatida*.

concepts of mystical teachings into the Javanese world view. So *ahadiyat* in the "seven emanations", which is also called *sajaratulyakin*, is human nature called *atma*; the light of Muhammad is the "*martabat wahdat*", which is located beneath *ahadiyat*, i.e. *manawa*. And so on. Perhaps, the opinion that Ronggowarsito, like his predecessors (Yosodipuro I and II), tried to combine Javanese tradition and knowledge with Islamic elements is also true.[32]

Developments in orthodoxy did not do away with this mystical notion. The great 19th century Patani, Sheikh Abdul Kadir Abdul Rahim Patani, is a clear example. Although in his writings he made references to Nuruddin al-Raniri, he wrote his book in an atmosphere of "emanation".[33]

32. Simuh, 1987.

33. Sheikh Kadir Patani (died 1864) was a member of the Syattariah Sufi order – thus a follower of Sheikh Abdur Rauf al-Singkili. On his writings about "the seven emanations", Hasan (1980: 56-57) explains:
"Abdul Kadir presented the 'seven emanations' system in an understandable and straighforward style. The seven emanations are the *ahadiyah*, which is the essence of the key of His Essence. Second, the *wahdah*, which means that knowledge has to bow before the Essence, attributes, and all that exists on the general road (*jalan ijmali*). This situation is called the Essence of Muhammadiah (*hakikat Muhammadiah*). Third, the *wahidiah*, is like His knowledge on the substance, all attributes

In 1637 Nuruddin al-Raniri[34] landed

and all existing entities on the particular road (*jalan tafsili*). These three emanations are eternal (*kadim*) and called the Divine emanations. The fourth emanation is the world of the spirits (*alam arwah*), namely the domain of all souls associated with a few cases, assembled under the word "*kun*" (lit. be), with no more intermediary. The fifth emanation is the world of resemblance (*alam mithal*), where the spirit of the Prophet Muhammad is divided into countless collections. Each parable has a different meaning and belongs to a spiritual form of community. The sixth emanation is the so-called world of bodies (*alam ajsam*), made from the four elementss fire, air, water, and soil from which originate organic elements, like animals, plants, humans, and jinns. These animate objects are still under the word "*kun*". The seventh emanation is that of perfect man, thus called because it contains all emanations both physical and spiritual – the eternal such as the Ahadiah, which also includes the Wahdah and Wahidiyah. This essence is called *a'yan thabitah* (fixed objects), which are still subjugated to Divine Knowledge, while the next four emanations are called *a'yan kharijiah*, i.e. the expelled objects, which are only reflections of the fixed objects. Javanese mysticism as discussed by Zoetmulder (1990: 115-136) uses the same system, except that his attention is mainly focussed on a discussion of the first three emanations, which are within "divinity".

34. Nur al Din Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Hasan ibn Muhammad or better known as Nuruddin al-Raniri was born in Ranir, an old port city in Gujarat near Surat, India. His date of birth is unknown. He was of Arab al-Hamid aristocratic descent, one of the Quraish tribes. In 1620 or 1621 he made the pilgrimage. His uncle had taught in Aceh twice from 1580 to 1583 and later during the reign of Sultan Alau al-Din Riayat Shah from 1589 to 1604. Perhaps before settling in Aceh, al-Raniri had already been to Aceh and stayed in Pahang. But then during the reign of Iskandar Thani (1637-1641), who suceeded Iskandar Muda (1607-

in Aceh and Sultan Iskandar Thani (1636-1641) immediately appointed him as his trusted scholar. He also very quickly attacked Hamzah Fansuri and Syamsuddin as-Sumatrani's Sufi teachings which he accused of being examples of misguided *wujudiyah dhalalah* (deviating existentialism), "apostate" (*mulhid*) and "heretic" (*zindiq*). Al-Raniri's onslaught was part of his attempt to expand his own influence within the palace, or perhaps they were a reflection of the shock he experienced when he saw that esoteric teachings had become widespread among ill-trained groups of people and this may also have been an example of, as Drewes pointed out,[35] how the debates that were going on in another part of the Islamic world (India) were also reflected in the archipelago. What is clear is that al-Raniri's intolerance ---burning Hamzah and Syamsuddin's books as well as prosecuting their followers--- led Mulla Ibrahim (from Medina) to issue a fatwa reprimanding al-Raniri harsh ways of operation.[36] Moreover, no real debate could take place as al-Raniri attacked the *wujudiyah* teachings when Hamzah and Syamsuddin had already passed away.[37]

His harsh and intolerant attitude, plus his very strong dependence on the Sultan's power, did not help the attempts of the orthodox movement al-Raniri started. Shortly after the sultan had died, other scholars launched a counter-attack and Sultanah Tajul-Alam (1641-1675) thought it was not in her best interest to defend al-Raniri. Thus, al-Raniri was in a hurry to leave Aceh. According to a Dutch report, another religious scholar replaced him in the palace.[38]

In *Hujjat as-Siddiq li daf'i al-zindiq*, al-Raniri said that Hamzah's teachings were apostate and heretical, fallacious and cursed. "The heretical *wujudiyah* said that existence is one; this is the

1637), he played an important role, and he was even promoted, according to al-Attas, to Sheikh al-Islam. In 1644, after writing many books, like his very famous *Bustanus-Salatin* (1638), *Sirat al-Mustaqim* (1634), *Asrar al-Insan fi Ma'rifat* (1640-1644), and *Hujjat al-Siddiq li daf' al-Zindiq*, and other books, he rushed back to Ranir. He passed away in 1658 while he was finishing his book, *Rahiq al-Muhammadiyah fi Taufiq al-Suffiyah*. From al-Attas, 1986, on al-Raniri, see also among others Daudy 1983, 1987; Tujimah, 1961; Drewes, 1974; al-Attas, 1966.

35. Drewes, 1986.

36. Johns, 1975, 1976.

37. This fact was underlined by al-Attas, who tends to defend Fansuri (al-Attas, 1966: 16-17). According to al-Attas (*Ibid*, 27-29) Fansuri was no less orthodox than al-Raniri. Moreover, the "heterodox" Fansuri mostly resulted from al-Raniri's distortions of Hamzah Fansuri's writings.

38. Ito, 1978.

existence of Allah, the nature is Divine and God is the universe--- that is the saying and belief of a real infidel." Al-Raniri equated these teaching with those of the *nasara*, (Christians), "it is said that Jesus is God". Furthermore, he said, "Whoever wanted to interpret that God is nature and that nature is Divine... and again said that mankind is Divine... means to deny God and His messenger, and to justify the beliefs of the Jews and the Christians."[39] The correct *wujudiyah*, which is monotheist (*muwahhid*), is "that God's existence is one, uncountable and limitless, no totality and no halve, not assembled and not divided in parts, no special type and no generality, no substance no organic structure... and so He exists and created all things".[40] Al-Raniri wrote even harsher criticism in a text he wrote after his return to India, *Al-Fath al-Mubin a'la al-Mulhidin* (1657 A.D./1068 A.H.).[41] But the work in which he truly a frontally attacked Syamsuddin's group is his book, *Al-Tibyan fi Ma'rifati al-Adyan*, which according to al-Attas, was written between 1641 and 1644. It states, "when Syamsuddin al-Sumatrani's students' heretic, apostate group of the *wujudiyah* came up it was deviant... and the *sifat'ul qulub*?"[42]

Al-Raniri's attack against Hamzah Fansuri and Syamsuddin al-Sumatrani's teachings failed to do away with their influential Sufi ways of thinking. Indeed, this is also one aspect of the history of religious thought: the success of a new way of thinking did not mean the eradication of the old ways of thought. Quite often, what was "new" was more an intermezzo when the "old" had not yet reached the height of its development. And, al-Raniri's influence within the world of Islamic thought in the archipelago became more meaningful when orthodoxy had increasingly gained power. According to Sheikh Ismail al-Banjari, he used the *Sirat al-Mustaqim* to write his own book on Islamic law (*fiqh*). But this happened at the end of the century, when two decades had passed and after al-Raniri's hasty exit and when Sheikh Abdur Rauf al-Singkili had returned to Aceh in 1661.[43] As

39. Al-Attas, 1966: 86-89.

40. Al-Attas, 1966: 89.

41. Daudy, 1987.

42. Al-Attas, 1966, quotes p. 15.

43. If Rinkes' (1909) estimation that Abdur Rauf ibn al-Sinkel, born in Singkel and also known as Teungku in Kuala is not totally wrong, he went to the Holy Land when he was 25-30 years old, so he was probably born around the year 1615, because he was in Arabia ---studying with fifteen scholars and Sufis--- for about 19 years. Rauf only went home after his teacher, al-Qushashi, died and he had received the diploma from Qushashi's



Malik Al-Shaleh's tombstone showing a tendency to mystical cosmogony.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period), 2010.

a moderate, Rauf, refused to simply accuse someone of being an infidel. If a person was truly an infidel, why waste any words on him. If he were not an infidel, he said, the accusation would backfire. Known in Aceh's history as Teungku di Kuala because of his role as the holder of religious authority, Rauf was not only a Sufi thinker who, like Hamzah Fansuri, formulated his own cosmogony.[44] He was also the main pioneer in the codification of Qur'anic interpretation. He wrote the *Tarjuman al-Mustafid* in Malay.[45] From this orthodox type of Qur'anic interpretation we see the magnitude of the influence of *Tafsir al-Jalalayn* ---an ongoing influence that continues in pesantren up to the present[46]--- even though Rauf himself said that his interpretation was merely a translation of al-Baidhawi's Qur'anic commentary (*Anwar al-Tanzil wa Asrar al-Ta'wil*). Because of this interpretation, like al-Raniri, Abdur Rauf may actually also be seen as one of

successor, Maulana Ibrahim, to become the caliph of the Shatariah Sufi order. He arrived in Aceh in 1661 during the rule of Sultanah Tajul Alam Safiatuddin Shah (1641-1675). He came when the "revolution" al-Raniri launched during a turning point in the reign of the queen's husband, Iskandar Thani. Soon after his arrival, Abdur Rauf won the trust of the queen. In his position at the center of power, Rauf, in the historical tradition of Aceh was seen to "represent" Islamic law with the title Teungku Kuala. According to Iskandar (1965), perhaps because he had stayed in Arabia too long, he was no longer fluent in Malay which he mixed with Arabic. In addition to his famous book on Qur'anic interpretation, he composed the *Umdat Ila al-Muhtajin Suluki Maslaki'l Mufridin,* or in his own translation, *A Handbook for all those willing to continue on the path of men who use themselves.* In addition, he composed the *Kifayat al-Muhtajin* and *Mir'at al-Tullab fi Tasil Ma'rifat al-Ahkam Shar'iyah al-Malik al-Wahab.* Besides his own books, which sometimes offer information about him in hagiographic "biographies", such as in the text preserved in Ulakan, the center of the Shattariyah order on the west coast of West Sumatra (transcribed in Steenbrink, 1984: 179-184). The Surau Syattariah in Ulakan was founded by Sheikh Burhanuddin, one of Abdul Rauf's students. It was he who laid the foundation of the *surau* tradition in West Sumatra ---an upheaval in the same chain, the Padri movement started at the end of the 19th century.

44. The cosmogony system proposed by Abdur Rauf also had emanations in the process of creation starting from God's manifestation in the principle of *la taayyun.* It was very similar up to the establishment of the shaped world, *ahadiyat*, which was divided into several emanations. See Iskandar, 1965c.

45. In fact, a manuscript that was discovered contains the interpretation of Surah 18 and dates from the early 17th century. This brief commentary shows the influence of al-Khazin and al-Baghawi, while that of al-Baydawi was not too important. The *Tarjuman al-Mustafid* is more concerned with al-Baydawi than al-Baghawi. Al-Khazin and al-Baghawi are more concerned with stories and the historical tradition, while al-Baydawi and *Tafsir al-Jalalayn* written by al-Mahalli and al-Suyuti, put more emphasis on philological problems. Probably because of this, Jalalayn is more popular both in India and in the Malay world. See Riddell, 1984, 1990.

46. Van Bruinessen, 1990; Othman, 1987.

the founders of the continuing process of orthodoxy. But, more importantly, he was the disseminator of the Shattariah order. Therefore, up to now, his name has always been remembered and his grave has been turned into a shrine and a place of pilgrimage. Towards the end of the 19th century, the Shattariah, which Snouck Hurgronje said[47] had been heavily mixed with local elements, had to face attacks from the more "pristine" Naqshabandiyah order, and finally from the passionate reform movement in the early 20th century.

But ahead of that era, Sufi thinking continued to spread. And, at the same time, in the quest for the meaning of the essence of religious belief the use of the old cultural symbols continued. This was very clear and creative as well, as can be seen in Javanese mysticism (*suluk*), which also displays a monistic tendency. Using the parables of the shadow-puppet theatre, the *Suluk Kadresan*, written by Ibrahim Sesmara, states that there is no difference between the worshipped and the worshipper. Both are puppeteers, viz. he, who is the undivided universality, now and in eternity just as it has been since the old days. Through the mouth of Sunan Bonang who interpreted the shadow-puppet story of the battle between the Kurawas and the Pandawas, he covertly wanted to disclose the universality of battle as a way to know God. Apparently, the *suluk* shows that the correct view is only attainable by following spiritual guidance. Thence, at the highest level, people finally see how all oppositions dissolve within universality.[48]

47. Snouck Hurgronje, 1919.

The ideal state: *Tajus-Salatin*

Mystical reflection stems from the awareness of the transiency of life in the world ---we are just "ttravellers", said Hamzah; or living in the world is like a "spider-web", as written on a tombstone in Samudera Pasai in imitation of a Qur'anic verse ---then questioning the relationship between the temporal and the eternal. Therefore, it is not only the fact that body and spirit are united, which is problematic, but also, and especially, the kinds of relationships between creatures and the Creator (or between humans and the Highest Essence?). In this way, apart from being engaged in ethics and ontological debates, mystical thought can also not be separated from

48. Drewes, 1986. For a deeper discussion of the Javanese mysticism see Zoetmulder, 1990 was originally written in 1938 as a doctoral dissertation.

epistemological problems. Thus, the mystical foundation should eventually also include transitory life, so that the process of achieving essential universality could be realized, be it the unity of "witnes" or that of "existence". If a mystical order, backed by its legitimate pedigree, is an institution that allows a person to get the right guidance in his efforts to achieve essential universality, then how about the outside community that consists of laymen?

Attempts to explain the advent of the "Minangkabau realm" from the point of view of mystical thinking are common phenomenon, when social life and matters of state have been thought through. This is done not just in an attempt to Islamize the concept of the "Minangkabau realm" that has no functional political center, but also displays a tendency towards a Sufi cosmogony.[49] Sultan Malik al-Saleh's tombstone is indirectly also a token of the absolute recognition that the role of the king, or sultan, was inseparably linked with the mystical cosmogony system. The role of the king, when properly reformed and well could constitute a guarantee for the formation of a community that would accelerate efforts for the personal creation of the self as the perfect man (*insan kamil*). The historical experience that kings fail to play their role properly might have led al-Ghazali and other religious scholars to keep themselves distanced from kings, or to cause Hamzah Fansuri to reminding the people that:

> "Aho all of you who became poor do not befriend kings and emirs as the Messenger of Allah the Reminder prohibits us to be *saqhir* and infidels."[50]

However, in an attempt to conceptualize the formation of an ideal society, and even a perfect personage, the role of authorities remains important. This is not only reflected in the Sufis' role in accompanying kings as advisers, but also in a "social strategy", and of course in political thinking. So it is not surprising that the *Hikayat Sultan Ibrahim ibn Adham*, the story of a king who left the throne in order to become a Sufi, was

49. For a complete version of the Minangkabau legend, see Edwar Djamaris' dissertation, 1989; the complete version is reconstructed by comparing ca. 47 versions that were spread all over the Minangkabau. Most of these versions were written in the second half of the 19th century. Thus, they were written when the Padri War, which had started as radical religious reform, had already ended. For an interpretation of the legend, see Abdullah, 1972.

50. Drewes & Brakel, 1986 : 74.

quite popular. There are translations in Malay, Javanese, Sundanese, and Buginese. This tale relates in narrative form that the foundation of royal power is justice. But what is the position of a just king? Thus, the Sufi said that, first, a king must always caution his dignitaries and the people to obey the law. Secondly, people's complaints must be heard and investigated. Thirdly, a king should not covet wealth. And fourthly, a king must not discriminate his people based on their wealth.[51] Of course, it would be very interesting if all these simple words were written in modern language along with political jargon. But that is unnecessary. What is clear is that this moral theory runs parallel with the advice given in the *Tajus-Salatin*.[52]

Apart from the debate about the origin of this very famous book, the influence of the *Tajus-Salatin*[53] in the formation

51. Jones, 1985: 164-165. The oldest text of this translation dates from the 18th century. But, according to Jones the text has probably been known since the 17th century.

52. Jones, 1985: 164-165.

53. Winstedt (1969: 137) thought that the *Tajus-Salatin* (the Crown of all Kings) is a translation of a Persian text, but other experts tend to think that the book was composed in Aceh (Chambert-Loir: 1983: 84). The reason is that no original text in Persian has been found. Iskandar (1965) also thought that the text was composed in Aceh. The editors who transcribed the text, Khalid Husin (in Malaysia) and Jumsari Jusuf (Indonesia), also support this opinion (on the basis of both editions). Like certain parts of al-Raniri's work, the *Bustanus-Salatin*, the book certainly uses historical material and Persian moral anecdotes. All agree that it first became known in Aceh in 1603, and that it was very influential, not only as a guide for Malay kings, but also for Javanese rulers. Like the *Sirat us-Salatin (Bustanus-Salatin)*, the *Tajus-Salatin* had been translated into Javanese and, according to *Babad Yogya* (quoted by Carey, 1975: 334), was used by Sultan Hamengkubuwono I (Mangkubumi). On this king see Ricklefs, 1974b. Diponegoro suggested that his brother, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IV (1814-42), should study the book that Diponegoro had studied. "*Tadjus-Salatin*", said Carey, "is the first text copied in Keraton Yogyakarta, after the War of Java, a period showed a *renaissance* atmosphere in writing chronicles in the court, after the massive robbery of court library collections by the British in 1812" check quote(Carey, *ibid*). During the 19th century, it was reprinted four times in Java. In the Malay Peninsula, according to Hooykaas (1947) the Sultan of Johor used it to reject Raffles' offer that the Sultan would be willing to trade under Singapore. However, on the contrary, Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir Munshi accused the Malay kings of being decadent and outdated "Therefore, all kings should put the book *Tajus-Salatin* (meaning the Crown of the all kings) and chose it at daily basis, looking for people knowing and learning that book, as well as taking all advice of the scholars in order that Tengku know the all just kings and all the unjust monarchs check quote (Abdullah Munshi, 1965: 107-8). According to Winstedt (1969: 141), Abdullah Munshi tried to read Raffles' character by using chapter 19 of this book. Because he liked Raffles very much, it seems that his reading was correct. The text comprised 24 articles, but on the basis of the problems it discusses, it may also be divided into 8 chapters, i.e. the ideological basis (mystical), the ideal king, good ministers, the king's general tasks, the expected people's behavior, and

process of the political traditions of Southeast Asia is no longer a problem. However, the relevance of its influence in the way of thinking about the appropriateness of politics and power will become clearer when the text is compared with other texts that also want to paint a historical picture.

The *Tajus-Salatin* begins with a general guideline, "*man arrafa nafsahu faqad arafa rabbahu*" --- "who knows himself, knows his Lord", along with the warning that life is like a dream, "and in case he awakes from his sleep, he would not gain anything from his dreams", because the world is nothing but a "place to halt" or "home".[54] Now you enter, tomorrow you leave. Thus, by knowing ourselves, we know God. From knowing God, we are able to also understand the nature of creation; the world is "a ride" towards death. With this premise, obviously, the theory of the state this text wants to convey is the imperative typical moralistic call for universal harmony. The state, or more precisely the kingdom, should be an environment that allows individuals to gain divine knowledge and to unite under His blessing. This is only possible if all parties involved in the state processes ---kings, ministers, chief commanders, dignitaries, and people--- want to abide to and behave in accordance with the moral imperatives of each individual's position. So, the *Tajus-Salatin* expounds these moral imperatives in detail. All are illustrated with historical stories and legends as well as with Islamic mythologies.

At first glance it looks as if the *Tajus-Salatin* was written in a historical vacuum.[55] In a sense it makes no references to the contemporaneous situation when it was written. Perhaps it should just be seen as a theoretical

the aspects of wisdom in life and the ideal conduct (on the matters of *kifayat* (Muslim collective religious obligations), physiognomy, promises and so on). Chapter 24 consists of general messages on the 4 kinds of people in of society the text wants to reach, first, "the just and believer kings", second, "ministers, chief officials and the king's servants", third, "people, the righteous ", and fourth "all people of the book ".

54. The *Tajus-Salatin* asserts that this statement is a prophetic tradition, although it originates from al-Ghazali in his *Ihya Ulumuddin*. This is also mentioned in the *Suluk Suksma Lelana* by Ronggowarsito (Simuh, 1988: 60). This shows that Ronggowarsito was familiar enough with the *Tajus-Salatin* through a translation in Javanese or directly from the Malay text. The above quote is from article 1 of the *Tajus-Salatin*. The versions I used are Yusuf, 1979 and Khalid, 1966. However, I have not provided all the page numbers of the quotes because this would result in too many footnotes. Summaries of each article was made by Winstedt, 1969: 302-311 (Appendix).

55. The *Tajus-Salatin* delivers its theories on statecraft with historical and empirical events, see Abdullah (1993).

construction of how things should be. Because of all these imperatives, the text highly depends on quotations from other texts and almost every quote is accompanied by its source. However, although it is "historically void", the text of which we know has existed since 1603, clearly evokes the atmosphere of its time. Despite being an attempt to establish an ideal state, the *Tajus-Salatin* also has Sufi characteristics and it uses stories or anecdotal illustrations for every thought it wants to deliver. It appears that the text is directed to a community that was already "intimately familiar" with the kind of thinking it wants to express. Its advice and admonitions immediately opens up awareness to its audience. The words, and not the events, are powerful only in the context of a cognitive, intimate community ---in an atmosphere of logical validity and accompanying sensitivity. From this angle too, it is understandable that the *Tajus-Salatin* became increasingly popular because its presence was helped by various chronicles and other texts that strengthened this cognitive communal atmosphere.[56]

The text known under the name *Klopak Ferrara*, following the name of the library where the text is preserved (Ferrara, Italy), originates from the late 16th century and, as revealed by Drewes,[57] shows the atmosphere on the north coast, which was still a mixed community, so that this text clearly differentiates between Islamic and Hindu behavior. Therefore, it is not surprising that one of the political programs that emanates from one of the oldest texts is actually the expansion of the Islamic community. In other words, the text is an invitation to master the social system, through changing behavioral patterns from un-Islamic to Islamic. This is not so with the *Tajus Salatin* which was written in a historical context when power was already in the hands of Islamic rulers. This text emerged in a situation when disbelief had been abandoned and religious homogeneity had already replaced the

56. On Islamic Malay chonicles see Haraid, 1953. However, he always examined these chronicles from the perspective of the teachings of (the Qur'an and Hadith) as well as from a historcal point of view. Thus the idea came up that their authors did not master the Islamic teachings well or they slipped in pre-Islamic assumption or deviated from the original Arabic and Persian sources. Therefore, these chronicles also offered historical distortions. Had the author seen that the essence of chronicles is as texts, not as attempts to execute teachings or history, their valuation would certainly have been different. Moreover, in his elucidation he forgot that initially, these chronicles were delivered orally. If they were written (then) copies of these texts underwent a variety of changes. On the oral nature of these chronicles, see Sweeney.

57. Drewes, 1979: 76.

pluralistic atmosphere. So, in facing the hypothetical situation of the sustainability of pluralism or of "mixed society", the *Tajus Salatin* tends to encourage the use of power mechanisms. Article 21 describes the strategy that should be used to deal with social groups that were still un-Islamic, which was to make them believe gradually, without coercion, so that the pagan groups would ultimately abandon their religion. Although they were allowed to freely practice their religion, according to the advice in the *Tajus-Salatin* the infidels should not be allowed to build new houses of worship.

This is understandable as the text actually departs from the notion that an ideal state is an atmosphere of total unity and harmony between creatures and the Creator, between people and all the dignitaries and the king. If so, what exactly did this famous text want to convey? Although it talks about many different things, it is clear that the *Tajus-Salatin*'s main target was completely consistent with its title i.e. the Crown of all Kings (*Mahkota Segala Raja-Raja*).

In one of the stories quoted in this text we are told that Sultan Harun al-Rashid emotionally justified the sayings of Sheikh Shaqiq, the ascetic,

> "Yes, *Amirul-mukminin* (lit. the believers' chief). Know that you are the spring, and all ministers, chief commanders are only rivers in parable. If the spring is pure it won't matter if every river is muddy. But it is useless if the spring is muddy and all the rivers are pure."[58]

Of course the ideal situation is when both "spring" and "rivers" are pure. And, the *Tajus-Salatin* is the text made for this purpose: "This book is the sign of Divine blessing for the goodness of the world and the hereafter."

From the beginning to the end, it is clear that for the *Tajus-Salatin* unity of divinity in the context of power revolves around the necessity of creating an atmosphere of justice. And, as key element, the king should ensure that his atmosphere is created. Using the Sheikh Shaqiq's parable, everything starts with the "spring".

He is the *Sultan Khalifat al-Rahman* (the Sultan, the vicegerent of God the Merciful) and *Sultan Zill Allah fi al-Alam* (the Sultan, the Divine Shadow in the Universe). Otherwise, "the king is the shadow of the devil and the deputy of Satan, the enemy of Allah, instead." But, no matter how just a king may be, the ministers, officials, and commanders, the

58. Khalid Edition, 1966: 77.

so called "rivers" must always remember that the king is no more than a servant of God, who has been blessed by God with "royalty" and "majesty". That is why their main task is to maintain the sanctity of the trust that God has bestowed on them.

Because "adil" or justice is the beginning and the foundation of everything, the king and his aides have to meet several requirements. A king should be mature, knowledgeable, good-looking, generous, grateful, courageous, and sharp (by lessening eating meals and sleep), keeping his distance from women, and he should be a man, because women were less rational. The latter is described at length, but the text offers a solution. When there is no other option because of the absence of acceptable male heirs, then a woman can also be a king, "from the joy of all the servants of Allah so that no slander arises between the people so that they would perish."[59] In other words, in line with classical Sunni political thought, the presence of authority is a non-negotiable requirement. Anarchy ---when slander could be rampant--- is a situation that has to be avoided.

But what is justice? Citing its sources, the *Tajus-Salatin* confirms that " justice is the glory of religion and that of the sultan and the goodness of all mankind as well." So, justice is not only something that is religiously required and indispensable for humanity, but also beneficial for the affirmation of the sultan's power. Thus, for power "justice is divine wisdom". And a story was used to say that apart from the justice of a ruler --- repeating what had already been said by al-Ghazali--- its reward equates sixty times performing the *hajj*. Or, to cite another source, "one day is more recompensed than sixty years of prayers and on the Day of Resurrection a just king will gain the shade of the Divine Throne."

For the *Tajus-Salatin*, the validity of power or sovereignty (*daulat*) depends on the bonds between power and the concept of justice. Without justice validity also vanishes. The text clearly says, "The loss of sovereignty was due to tyranny". Later in Malay tradition the following expression became known "a just king is a king who is worshipped, an unjust king is a king protested". But, another problem emerged. Does this protest have to take the form of a "rebellion" against

59. Khalid, 1966: 64; Jusuf's content is slightly different. It might be true that the assumption that Iskandar Tsani was succeeded by his consort (1641), Sultanah Taj Alam, was on the advice in the *Tajus-Salatin* (Iskandar 1965d). In line with the Sunni political tradition in force since the time of the Caliphs, the presence of legitimate power is better than anarchy.

the power that is no longer morally legitimate? Is "losing sovereignty" the result of the people's actions by way of disobeying a despotic ruler or is the loss of legitimacy in fact God's punishment?

We should not forget that this text on political theory was generated or formulated in Aceh at the time it had not yet escaped a power crisis. Aceh Darusalam at the time of the birth of the *Tajus-Salatin*, as told by al-Raniri in the *Bustanus-Salatin*, was a kingdom often suffering from the assassination and dethroning of kings by the nobility. So the historical situation indeed showed that "justice" and "rebellion" were real problems. In fact, the question often came up, as also told in the text, whether an unjust king who did not follow the orders of Allah and the Messenger would be obeyed? If yes, would this not, as this text also asks hypothetically, mean following a "perfidious, ignorant, and infidel" king? So, the *Tajus-Salatin* answers the hypothetical question it asks itself:

> Answer: We follow just kings who conduct two things of Divine law. First, we follow what he says, second we follow all he does. As for all unjust kings we follow their words, but we do not follow their wrong deeds.
>
> Problem: We should deny everything an unjust king says and does, how do we follow his words?
>
> Answer: We follow what he says to avoid slander and the destruction of the country, if it were no hardship, we would never have to follow his words and his deeds, nor see his face, because an unjust king turns away from Allah's law; so one who turns away from God's law and denies His Sharia is the enemy of God and His messenger. We have to be hostile to Allah's enemies.60

If we have to be hostile to God's enemies, does this mean that a tyrannical king must be opposed? Is it lawful to rebel against a legitimate but tyrannical authority? The text does not elaborate on this hypothetical problem, but it offers a historical illustration. Moses and his people left Egypt, which was ruled by a despotic pharaoh. Moses did not ask his people to fight. During their escape to avoid tyranny, Moses and his people were pursued by the pharaoh and his army. Allah saved Moses and his

60. Jusuf's edition, 1979: 29-30; This part is missing in Khalid's edition. Perhaps it is an interpolation. But the ambivalent attitude the text shows is supported by the ambivalences of other texts when faced the last historical events, as will be discussed later. See also Abdullah (1993).

people with a miracle, by which Moses could cross the sea. But God punished the pharaoh. He and his army drowned in the sea.

This story is derived from the Scripture. But why is this story used to answer the hypothetical situation of living under a despotic king? By using this story as an illustration to explain the ethical dilemma between the need for justice by resorting to rebellion, then the conclusion to be drawn is that the text states that the king's despotic "sovereignty" cannot be taken away by the people who have been treated despotically, but by God. Submitting the solution to the dilemma to a transcendental decision, it is clear also that the *Tajus-Salatin* is a continuation of the Sunni political tradition that started its growth in the early days of the Caliphate; a legitimate but unjust government is better than a rebellion.

The issue of "sovereignty" and "rebellion" is one of the key issues in political thinking. Moreover, the problem relates to actual historical experience. This is a problem various traditional historiographies face when the texts explain actual events that happened and were experienced. The *Tajus-Salatin* has the "luxury" to make hypotheses and provide rather ambivalent answers, but traditional historiographies have to provide cultural accountability to dramatic events people experienced.

Perhaps it is here that we may see the superiority of this genre within the traditional literary tradition. Traditional historiography is like a "forum" of ideas, when two things must be reconciled and harmonized: the concept of what should happen and what had happened. From the attempts to describe and explain two opposing things, traditional historiography must not only question the nature of power, as will be discussed later, but also seek the ideological basis of the formation of the Islamic political tradition, which is closely related to the local socio-cultural situation.

The Ideal *Raja*: Appraisal and History

For the *Tajus-Salatin*, the kingdom cannot be separated from the king. In one of its stories it mentions that the "presence of the king in the kingdom is like the spirit within the body. When the spirit is separated from the body, surely the body will perish."[61] Milner's comparative study on Malay-Islamic kingdoms[62] also shows that a kingdom

61. Khalid edition, 1966: 68.

62. Milner, 1982, 1983: 82.

exists when there is a king. It is similar in the Javanese tradition. Anecdotal events reported by Dutch envoys show that the king is an essential element of the kingdom. This is precisely what the chronicles always underline and it is symbolized by the king's bold titles. In other words, the kingdom must first of all be seen as the extension of the person of the ruler and not as an organization or a power structure. Therefore, as discussed above, the envisioned ideal state is actually a "moral state" reflected by the just character of the king: "the (supposedly) pure spring".

But the king, not like the kingdom or the state, is not an abstract concept. A king is a person, who either because of his destiny or because of something else holds the reins of power. A just or unjust king is an actual and concrete living figure. His presence and the manifestation of his power have an effect on civilized society within the circle of his power. That is the reason why some matters have to be maintained also. Not only the legitimacy of his power should be guarded but also the people's loyalty to him must be fortified, but the king should also be reminded of the reciprocal responsibility between himself and his people as well as between himself and the higher power above him, i.e. God Almighty. This is what various tomb stones remind people through quotes from Qur'anic verses or from the Hadith. This is also repeated in the *Tajus-Salatin*. And this also is always sung in odes to kings or he is reminded by various traditional historiographies. Each veneration, moreover, and every historical myth, also simultaneously contains an expectation of the ruling king and advice to his later successors. In fact, the purpose of writing history books is explicitly mentioned in the *Sejarah Melayu*, and in many other texts, such as the *Hikayat Merong Mahawangsa*. In other words, it also was a literary convention. It may even be that a poem that seemed to have been aimed at Sultan Riayat Shah known in the Acehnese tradition as *al-Mukallam* was not written by Hamzah Fansuri, nevertheless, its content is an illustration of the ideal king.

> "Shah Allam the just king
>
> Our perfect King of the Poles
>
> The divine saint the perfect connector
>
> The wise king, the perfect[63]

In the same tone, Inche Amin, the author of the *Syair Mengkasar* illustrates Sultan

63. Al-Attas, 1966: 44-5; cf. Brakel's objections (1979: 79-8; and Drewes & Brakel, 1986: 18-24).

Hasanuddin (1653-1669), the king of Gowa, who had to face the VOC attacks under Speelman (1666):

> "Tuanku Sultan who is very shana
>
> The Perfect, Wise, and Prudent
>
> Knowing the fourteen knowledges
>
> Begot the essence of the four complete truths

Then it was also said that "his majesty is the beloved of the Last Prophet".[64] Both examples show the king as a ruler who is not only just but also a man who has reached the highest level of gnosis (*ma'rifat*). Again we see that a state or kingdom is a reflection of the king's personality.

Based on a similarly Sufi way of thinking but in the form of a discourse colored by local culture, the *Serat Centini*, an encyclopedic work dating back to 18th century Java, depicts the real world, which is like the shadow-puppet theatre played by a puppeteer. "The real puppeteer is the king himself. He is the deputy of the Prophet. The Prophet is the representative of God Almighty. The Prophet and the king are the embodiment of God."[65]

64 Skinner, 1962.

65 Quoted by Moedjanto, 1986.

In attempts to explain the characteristics of just conduct, the *Tajus-Salatin* says that it is truly subjective. What the king perceives as right, be it an action or a law imposed upon him, will also be felt well by the people. Contrarily, what he feels is bad for him, is also bad for the people. So the simple rule is common sense. This is the beginning of justice, and this is also the main basis of true "sovereignty". "Sovereignty", then, is not merely the foundation of power legitimacy, but in fact is also a reflection of shared feelings. "Sovereignty" is rooted in the unity between the people and the king. Moreover, it is based on justice, is a step to approach the king, the creature, to God ---as he becomes "the divine saint, the perfect connector".

The normative objective to be achieved is the entire cosmos. Irrespective whether it is reflected in odes or in advice, cosmic unity is the overall ideological basis of the Islamic kings in Southeast Asia; not only are they always depicted by using mystical idiom, they are also often involved in a mystic sphere regardless of the style or the nature of their monistic understanding. It is not exaggerated to say that, apart from their differences, most works produced by the court poets or palace writers can only be understood by using a mystical approach rather

than though the spectacles of *fiqh* or the law. However, before we continue with this, as having been said above, a king is not an abstract concept. A king is an empirical reality. Thus, a king had proof his legitimacy as ruler. He also had to account to his people for his actions, and to the normative tradition. Accountability is also the ideological tool to ensure the continuity of the dynasty and to increase his power. Perhaps, in this respect, Berg[66] was right that one of the functions of the works of court poets was to enlarge a king's magical powers. The constrained bureaucratic system in practice was more in need of other styles of more integrative tools.

It is in this effort to accountability that works like the *Tajus-Salatin* could serve as points of reference as to how the ideal should be. But whatever the case, that ideal had to meet real facts. The dialogue between the ideal necessity and historical reality was unavoidable. Thus, historical experience was also provided with normative significance. It was the provision of normative significance to history that formed one of the elements of the mythologizing process, a process that sometimes turned history into empirical knowledge about events that occurred in the past thrown backwards. History had become a myth that provided an intimate atmosphere among others by "resolving" all the possibilities of "what was believed" with "what happened". It was the myths that became part of the cultural consciousness. Myths were what constituted and simultaneously received validation in the knowledge system of the cognitive community.

Thus, the *Sejarah Melayu*, the *Babad Tanah Jawi*, and the *Tarsila* in the Sulu and Mangindanao traditions confronted themselves in their efforts to offer the basic legitimacy of the institution of the ruling dynasty. For it was in this context that, the king's presence and his power were acceptable. So Senapati, the founder of the Mataram dynasty was termed the legitimate heir, because he was not only a descendant of Brawijaya (the last king of Majapahit) but also the first Sunan Giri (one of the Wali Sanga). If this were not enough, the *Babad Tanah Jawi* states that he was also the recipient of the *wahyu cakraningrat* and the husband of Nyai Loro Kidul.[67] The

66. Berg, 1938/1974: 84.

67. On this see Anderson, 1972, Moertono, 1968, Moedjanto, 1986. Because "the mythical blanket" that covered Senapati is so thick, Berg, in his review of de Graaf's book on Senapati (1954) doubted that this figure was historically real. Berg tended to treat him as a mythological figure. This incited a heated debate between Berg dan de

Sejarah Melayu, which was written at the palace of the sultanate of Johor, the successor of the Sultanate of Malacca, (bu finally complete at Samalanga, a "province" of the Sultanate of Aceh) offers a picture that the Sultanate of Malacca was originated from Palembang, where the son of Alexander the Great alighted. In this way, Johor became a link in the uninterrupted chain. Moreover, Malacca also played an important role as a center of Islamic propagation. In fact, if necessary, Malacca could also try to stand up to Pasai's position as the center of religious learning.[68] The *Tarsila* also states that the organization of the first supra-village style of power center was established by Sharif Kabungsuan, a *maulana* a disseminator of Islam. Not only that, he was also a descendant of the Prophet. It was the same in Sulu. The fundament of the royal tradition was laid by Raja Baginda, who came from Minangkabau. This was confirmed by his son-in-law, Sayyid Abu Bakar, a preacher. He became the first king of Sulu. So, the Sultanate of Sulu cannot be seen without considering the relationship between Sulu (as the female "provider") and other Malay world (Raja Baginda) and the center of Islam (Abu Bakr, who was also a descendant of the Prophet).[69]

Although the validity of their foundations differed, the Islamic power centers in Southeast Asia share some important similarities. All of their great kings are remembered and portrayed as conquerors and the unifiers of their kingdom, defenders of religion, and monopoly holders of power, and wielding supreme religious authority. Whatever its motive, something Berg suspected as being due to the failure of the ruler of Mataram to defeat conquer Batavia,[70] it is clear that Sultan Agung was the king who initiated the process of the institutionalization of Islam into Javanese tradition. But not only because his name lived on in the *Babad Tanah Jawi*. He is told to have had two palaces, one in the Southern Ocean and one in Kota Gede. The Southern Ocean palace is the ---mythological--- abode where he lived with Nyai Roro Kidul, the perennial spouse of the Mataram rulers. Kota Gede, in its turn is real and, according to historical observations made by a Dutch rapporteur was "spacious and

Graaf on the possibility of using a chronicle as a historical source.

68. See Roolvink, 1965. The Sultan of Malacca inquired about a religious problem of which he already knew the outcome, but the Sultan of Pasai was unaware of this. This is told in one of the versions of the *Sejarah Melayu*.

69. Majul, 1973: 6-7.

70. Berg, 1955.



open".[71] This chronicle also tells us that the king often prayed in the Haram Mosque in Mecca. The *Babad Nitik Sultan Agung* says that this great king beat Minangkabau and Palembang by using his magical power and that he Islamized the royal families of both kingdoms.[72] Indeed, these things cannot be validated by historical proof, and the myth will simply disappear because of the lack of historical backing to substantiate it. Indeed, Sultan Agung, not only expanded the kingdom of Mataram by vindicating the political and trade centers on the coast, but also by making himself the *Khalifatullah Sayidin Panatagama,* the "representative of God and the regulator of religion." He was the *Panembahan*, the local ruler, who had become *susuhunan*--- the title that, before him, had only been carried by the saints--- and the Sultan, the Muslim ruler of an empire. The Dutch report also tells how the sultan forced Dutch prisoners to convert to Islam.[73]

Beaulieu, the French admiral, and other European witnesses were forced to shake their heads at the violence committed by Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) against anyone attempting to challenge his rule.[74] But for Nuruddin al-Raniri, the author of the *Bustanus Salatin,* the sultan was no less than the defender of religion, and the upholder of the law and religious morality. His conquests were not to increase his power. The event took place because of the will of God over the fate of mankind.[75] Iskandar Muda, according to the *Adat Aceh* (from the 18th century) laid the basis of the law in Aceh.[76] He combined several villages into a larger residential units, which were centered on a mosque. In accordance to the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence the construction of a mosque was justified if it had forty congregated people. Thus, the social organization of the kingdom followed worship regulations.

In this way, history (in the empirical sense) and myth (as something that is considered true) mutually reinforced the ruler's claim as the "one in authority" or the "crown of the universe". What differed was that Sultan Agung's mythical style represented *kejawen* mystical thought,

71. De Graaf, 1986.

72. Quoted by Moedjanto, 1986: 62-63. Of course, this story is merely a myth. On the Islamization of Palembang, see Abdullah, 1987: 201-204, and on Minangkabau, see Abdullah, 1966.

73. De Graaf, 1986: 107-108.

74. Lombard, 1981: 35-64. For another foreign report on the reign of the authoritarian Iskandar Muda, see Reid.

75. Iskandar (ed.)

76. Drewes & Voorhoeve, 1958.



whereas Iskandar Muda was portrayed as a religious scholar who opposed *wujudiyah* monistic thinking. The result of this difference is clearly reflected in the construction of political traditions.

The 17th century was the era of the rise of exemplary kings: bold, just, and wise. They were always well remembered in the collective memory and in tradition as the defenders of and the fighters for religion and even though they failed, they are remembered as such nonetheless Such was the attitude towards Sultan Hasanuddin of Gowa, the "rooster from the east" (in Speelman's phrase, now used as the symbol of the Gowa district). Similarly, Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa (1651-1683) had to meet the attacks of the VOC that conspired with the crown prince. Or Sultan Baabullah (1570-1583) of Ternate, who, albeit briefly, managed to avenge the betrayal of the Portuguese who had killed his father, Sultan Khairun (1570).

In the history of the Manguindanao Sultanates' struggle against Spanish occupation, Sultan Muhammad Dipatuan Qudarat (1619-1671) is the king most remembered. When he ruled, the competing sultanates in Manguindanao accepted him as a unifier. But more than that, he was also a brave warrior. He also revived the spirit of his neighbors, the Maranao rulers to remain firm in their opposition against the Spanish.[77] He was also a defender of and fighter for Islam. A contemporary Spanish report says that Sultan Qudarat was highly respected by his people who paid him homage as if he were Muhammad himself. The reason was that he was a Moro who was very brave, intelligent, and highly capable, in addition to faithful to "his cursed religion", and also the one who was always followed by success.[78] So, it is not surprising that the king was very concerned about any successful attempts of the Spanish that attracted Muslims to Catholicism. But, it seems, also because of his Islamic politics, Manguindanao policies were aimed at attracting foreigners to settle, to marry local girls and to convert to Islam. "Many slaves who have fled stay here", said a Dutch report, "and many Chinese had converted to Islam and been given wives by the Sultan (Sultan Baharaman, the successor of Qudarat), because everyone who comes here is received with open arms".[79]

Most of these exemplary kings were also thinkers and the protectors of religious knowledge and merciful providers of

77. Majul, 139.

78. Quoted in Mastura, 1984: 32-33.

79. Laarhoven, 1987.




The fortress of Tolucco, which was a Portuguese stronghold during the attack against Ternate. It was built by Fransisco Serão in 1540.


Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia, 2013.


dwellings for scholars, thinkers and authors of religious texts. Ibn Battuta's report about Samudra Pasai and Tome Pires' testimony about the ruler-traders who were surrounded by *mullahs* are evidence that this was common in Islamic kingdoms. Not only Iskandar Thani and his empress who later became his successor, Sultanah Tajul Alam Safiatudin, saw how also scholars competed for a place in the palace in order to advance their religious beliefs. Even Sultan Agung experienced this. Sultan Agung was very much upset by the criticisms launched by scholars from Tembayat, but how close he was with his advisers. According to Dutch reports, the scholar who was most familiar with Sultan Agung was "Kalifagypan" (maybe his correct name was Haji Fachrudin). He, the report said, was a man of manners.[80] Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa was reportedly also to have often been surrounded by a congregation of scholars. Foreign reports mention many scholars who came from the Middle East, through Surat, to Bantan.[81] Of course, the loyality of Sheikh Yusuf of Gowa's loyalty when he joined Sultan Ageng in his fight against the VOC[82] was always remembered. The tradition of kings being surrounded by scholars would continue, although later on religious life had become bureaucratized. This was a reasonable thing, said the *Tajus Salatin* (quoting the *Sifat as-Salatin* as its source), "let the king always be longing for companions who are people of knowledge and who are adamant to do religious work".[83] Because it was in this way a just situation could be achieved and finally cosmic unity could be realized.

However, the historical dynamics related to this natural necessity resulted in structural diversity and even in different political traditions in each kingdom. This only became evident when the formation of this ideal had entered the historical arena --in fields that combined ideal desire with structural necessity. At that point a choice had to be made. At that moment a constellation of power had to be determined and its ideological basis had to be formulated. In other words, the process of the formation of the political and power tradition had sbegan. We can thus also say that a structural difference came up between one centers of power with the other centers.

80. de Graaf, 1986: 106-7,120.
81. Schrieke, 1956 II: 241-242.
82. Tjandrasasmita, 1967.
83. Khalid's edition, 1966: 75.







Chapter Six
Early Islamic Thought in Nusantara

Early Islamic Thought in Nusantara

Oman Fathurrahman

Introduction

The 16th century,works on Islam in many sciences, such as Islamic mysticism, theology, the prophetic tradition, Qur'anic commentaries, and law started to appear and the erais therefore considered the first landmark in the formation of established Indonesian-Islamic thinking. This does not mean that beforehand Islam had not already spread throughout the Indonesian archipelago. Archeological evidence shows that at the end of the 13th or the beginning of the 14th century, Sultan Malikus Salih, formerly known as Merah Selu, had already established the Islamic kingdom of Samudera Pasai and had ruled it as its first king.[1]

Apart from the discovery of a tombstone engraved with his name, Sultan Malikus Salih is also remembered in two of the earliest works related to the Kingdom of Samudera Pasai and the Sultanate of Malaka, i.e.the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* (Chronicle of the Pasai Monarchs) and the *Sulalatus Salatin.* The latter work is more often called, with no clear reason, the *Sejarah Melayu* or Malay Annals.[2]

Though it is evident that Islam had come to the Indonesian regions before the end of the 13th century, as stated above, no authoritative works in any branch of Islamic sciences had ever been written before the 16th century. The chronicle of the Wali Songo saints had been famous in Java from the 15th century, but up to that moment, no works on Islam had conclusively been attributed to any of them.

This essay elaborates on the history of Islamic thinking of Indonesian *'ulama*, especially those who lived during the early formation of the Islamic-intellectual tradition in the Malay and Javanese regions. The discussions on the history of thought in certain disciplines of Islamic sciences, especially Sufism, were more detailed than in other disciplines, because scholars paid conspicuously more attention to these fields because of the adequate availability of sources.

Early Formation of Islamic Thinking

The first Malay Muslim thinker was Hamzah Fansuri (d. 1527) who left behind a number of mystical works in

1. For theories about theIslamization of the Indonesian archipelago, see the first chapter in Azra 1994.

2. See for example, Shellabear (1896), Winstedt (1938, 1969), Liauw Yok Fang (1993), and Teuku Iskandar (1995). I discussed this topic in Fathurrahman 2012: 167-177.



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Source: *Indonesia Dalam Arus Sejarah* (Indonesia in the Course of History), 2012.

the form of poems.[3] Although not as many as the Acehnese *'ulama* of the following generations, Hamzah Fansuri's works can mainly be characterized as translations and adaptations of the mystic-philosophical knowledge and doctrines often linked to Grand Shaykh Ibn 'Arabi (560-638 A.H./1165-1240 A.D.). This is probably one of the reasons why Hamzah's thoughts incited the many controversies they did, and why they were criticized and condemned, among others by the orthodox Muslim scholar Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 1658 A.D.).

Hamzah's understanding of mystical gnosis and other mystical concepts dominated several of his literary writings either in prose or in poetry to such an extent that it inspired many scholars to undertake research on his literary legacy.[4] Many of his poems were considered original and of high literary value. Moreover, the Malay language he used is full of symbolis

3. The most recent research about Hamzah Fansuri'swas doneby C. Guillot and Ludvik Kalus. In their 'Batu Nisan Hamzah Fansuri' in Claude Guillot & Ludvik Kalus (eds.)*Inskripsi Islam Tertua di Indonesia* (Jakarta: KPG, EFEO, and Forum Jakarta-Paris, 2008), pp. 71-93, they explain that based on archeological evidence Hamzah Fansuri probably passed away inMecca in 1527.

4. See for example Doorenbos (1933), Al-Attas (1970), Hasjmy (1975), Drewes and Brakel (1986), Bukhari Lubis (1993) and Hadi (2001).

mand thus invited an assortment of interpretations.

Several manuscripts of Hamzah's works are available. Three are prose works: *Sharb al-Ashiqin*, *Asrar al-'arifin*, and*al-Muntahi.* The total number of Hamzah's works that have come down to our erais rather small in view of his name as the celebrated pioneer of Malay mystical literature. However, we should bear in mind that most of Hamzah's works were destroyed in 1637 when the Acehnese authorities burned all his books on monism based on al-Raniri's fatwa against him.

Sharb al-Ashiqin is a summary of the *wahdat al-wujud*, the mystical notion found in Ibn 'Arabi, Sadruddin al-Qunawi, and 'Abdul Karim al-Jili's works. It centers on the union between God and nature, the stations needed to reach the culmination of profound knowledge (*ma'rifa*), and the practice of the Qadiriyah Sufi order Hamzah embraced. Though the book centers ona discussion of the *wahdat al-wujud* (existential monism), *tajalli* (divine theophany), and *'ishq* (mystical intoxication), it also offers the legal foundations underlining the importance of the mystical stages, i.e. the Shari'a, the mystical path (*tarekat*), profound reality (*hakikat*), and profound



understanding of mystical gnosis (*makrifat*).[5]

Hamzah's second book, *Asrar al-'arifin*, is a prose commentary on his mystical poems arranged by Hamzah himself, included in the midst of his explanation. The writing process of the longest among Hamzah's works may have been inspired by Ahmad al-Ghazali's *Sawanih*, Ibn 'Arabi's *Tarjuman al-ashwaq*, 'Iraqi's *Lama'at*, and 'Abdurrahman al-Jāmi's *Lawā'ih*. Comparing this work with the other two treatises , Abdul Hadi noted that the *Asrār al-'arifin* is the most distinguished and original of Hamzah's books.[6]

By contrast, *al-Muntahi* is Hamzah's shortest prose work though its substance is dense and profound. Drewes and Brakel (1986:12) concluded that *al-Muntahi* consists of collections of Qur'anic verses, prophetic traditions, mystical poetry, and ecstatic utterances by Sufis, all of which are employed to explain the spiritual meaning of the hadith statement, "a man who knows himself, will know his Lord".

In addition to these treatises, Hamzah Fansuri's mystical thoughts may also be found incollections of poetry such as his *Syair Perahu, Bahrunnisa, Syair Dagang, Syair Si Burung Pingai* and many others. However, some scholars have been reluctant to attribute these works to Hamzah Fansuri, since the evidence for this supposition remains weak.

The typically mystical way of thinking like that of Hamzah Fansuri continued to exist in a member of the next generationof Acehnese *'ulama*, Shamsuddin al-Sumatra'i (1550?-1630)[7] who was also famous for being the *Shaykh al-Islam*, the Palace supreme *'alim* during the reigns of three Sultans, i.e. 'Alauddin Ri'ayat Shah (1588-1604), 'Ali Ri'ayat Shah (1604-7) andIskandar Muda (1607-36)had the closest relationship with him. Observing his works, it is clear that Shamsuddin knew

5. Hadi 2001: 147.

6. Hadi (2001: 152).

7. His background was barely unknown, but his name simply appeared to be installed "Shaykh al-Islam" in court at the beginning of the reign of Sultan 'Alauddin Ri'ayat Shah up to the two following rulers. Paying attention to his works, it is very clear that he knew and was influenced as well by the notions of Hamzah Fansuri, even though there was no evidence that he had ever met him (See Anthony Johns, "Reflections on the Mysticism of Shams al-Din al-Sumatra'i (1950?-1630)" in Jan van der Putten and Mary Kilcline Cody (Eds.) *Lots Times and Untold Tales from the Malay World* (Singapore, NUS Press, 2009" 148-163). This article was then republished for greater readers in *Studia Islamika* vol. 18 no. 2(2011), p. 227-248. See also Peter Riddell, *Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses* (Singapore: Horizon Books, 2001), p. 110-115.



Hamzah Fansuri's poetry although no written evidence has been found that indicate that he knew Hamzah personally.[8]

Unlike Hamzah, Shamsuddin not only wrotehis mystic-theosophical thoughts in Malay, but also in Arabic. This is an indication of his superior intellectual capacity compared to contemporary Acehnese *'ulama*. In fact, he was a native Acehnese *'alim* who was highly competent in religious knowledge.

Shamsuddin's mystical ideas on profound mystical gnosis are especially manifest in one of his masterpieces in Arabic, *Jawhar al-Haqā'iq*, in which he explained his deep understanding of existential monism by way of underlining the importance of *tawhid*, in addition to his interpretation of the divine finest namesbased on the expression *la ilaha illallah.*[9] Several other works Shamsuddin wrotein Arabic include *Mir'at al-muhaqqiqin, Kitab al-Khirqah, Nur al-Daqā'iq,* and *Tanbīh al-Tullāb.* His works in Malay include *Anwar al-Daqā'iq, Bayan al-Qulub, Da'irat al-Wujud, Haqq al-Yaqin, Sharh al-Ruba'i, Mir'āt al-Iman* a part from many others.

The Global Network of Islamic Thoughts of Indonesian Islam

After Hamzah Fansuri and Shamsuddin al-Sumatra'i, from the beginning of the 17th century, the constellation of Islamic scholarship was both clearer and there were decisively more social relations between religious intellectuals and between the Malay-Indonesian Islamic world and other Islamic places, especially Mecca and Medina (*Haramayn*). The intimate relations between these two Islamic regions encouraged intellectual traditions marked by closemaster-disciple relationshipsbetween Malay-Indonesian *'ulama*and those of the Haramayn that continued to play its role as the center of Islamic learning.[10]

Several Malay-Indonesian *'ulama* extended their Islamic knowledge in the Haramayn. They were known as members of the *Jama'at al-Jawiyin* (the Javanese community) in Mecca. They include Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 1658), 'Abdurrauf bin Ali al-Jawi al-Fansuri (1615-1693), and Muhammad Yusuf al-Makasari (1629-1699) for the 17th century; Abdussamad al-Palimbani, Arshad al-Banjari (1710-1812), and Daud al-Fatani (d. 1847) in the 18th

8. Johns (2009: 150).
9. Johns (2009: 153).
10. On this see Azyumardi Azra, *Jaringan Ulama Timur Tengah dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad XVII dan XVIII* (Bandung: Mizan, 2nd reprint, 1994).



The emblem of the Muhammadiyah.

Source: *Indonesia Dalam Arus Sejarah* (Indonesia in the Course of History), 2012.

and start of the 19th century; Nawawi al-Bantani (1813-1879), Ahmad Rifa'i Kalisalak (1786-1870), and Ahmad Khatib Sambas (1803-1875) for the 19th century; Muhammad Saleh Darat al-Samarani (d. 1903) and Ahmad Khatib al-Minangkabawi (1860-1916) for the 19th and 20th century, and Muhammad Yasin al-Padani (1917-1990) for the 20th century.

As in other regions, the Malay-Indonesian world produced many texts in several branches of Islamic scholarship like Qur'anic commentaries, hadith, Islamic mysticism, law, and theology. It is not surprising then, that the Islamic world produced a wealth of extraordinarily texts and books in many branches of Islamic studies. Consequently, various catalogues (*faharis*) were produced which were indispensableto ensure that entire collections could systematically be consulted.

The long standing contact with other parts of the Islamic world produced another wealth of texts: translations and adaptations, and even "original" works. Texts were commonly hand written, first by their authors, and subsequently copied and spread by their disciples, and further disseminated by their followers in laterperiods for the sake of the transmission of knowledge. Now a days, most Indonesian Islamic texts remain in the form of manuscripts written on either European or local paper (such as *dluwang*, tree bark paper) and they spread out not only within the archipelago, but also to other places across the world where they came to be preserved especially in libraries and museums.[11]

Unlike in the Arab world, works on Islam produced by Indonesian *'ulama* were not only written in one language and related script, such as Arabic, for example, but in many local languages and related scripts: Malay, Javanese, Acehnese, Minangkabau, Madurese, Sundanese, Buginese, Sasak, Wolio, and many others languages using Jawi, Pegon, Serang, Hanacaraka, Cacarakan, Rejang, Kaganga, and other local scripts.

The locally produced Islamic texts were essentially the fruits of their authors' various interpretations of the universal and cosmopolitan nature of Islamic doctrines. They were sometimes written to adapt Islamic doctrines to the cultural contexts of the local Muslim societies.

11. Henri Chambert-Loir & Oman Fathurrahman, *Khazanah Naskah: Panduan Koleksi Naskah Indonesia Sedunia/World Guide to Indonesian Manuscript Collections*, Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia in cooperation with EFEO, 1999.



Hence, though the Islamic "seeds" were the same as those of their places of origin, the "soil" where they were to grow displayed a plethora ofsocial and cultural differences. Under these conditions, each *'alim* needed creativity to find and formulate his own identity and specialty. Taufik Abdullah therefore did not exaggerate when he stated that Indonesian Islamic texts were the result ofthe intellectual restlessness of the previous *'ulama* who had been searching for ways to reach the highest perfection of human nature.[12]

Moreover, the Islamic texts that emerged from the Veranda of Mecca, Aceh, were "pioneer" works within their fields. Hamzah Fansuri's mystical poems, as we have seen above, were also believed to be the forbearers of the poetic tradition of Malay Islamic literature in the archipelago andaffected the development of the Malay Islamic poetic genre also in the periods to come.

In Islamic law, we may mention al-Raniri's *Sirat al-Mustaqim* as the first book on Islamic ritual law written in Malay, where as 'Abdurrauf al-Fansuri's *Mir'at al-Tullab* was the first book on Islamic civil law written in the same language. In addition to the *Mir'at al-Tullab*, 'Abdurrauf Fansuri also authored the first complete commentary on the Qur'anin Malay entitled *Tarjuman al-Mustafid*, for which the author was much inspired by al-Suyuti and al-Mahalli's *Tafsir al-Jalalayn* and al-Baidawi's *Anwār al-Tanzīl*.[13]

Works in the field of hadith from the early period were also of noless significance. Al-Raniri's *Hidayat al-Habib fi al-Targhib wa Tarhib*, often referred to by its alternative title *al-Fawa'id al-Bahiyya 'an al-Ahadīth al-Nabawiyyah*, was the first book on hadith written in Malay. The lack of studies on the hadith writing tradition, including on the *Hidayat al-Habib*, was apparently the result of there stricted access to their primary manuscripts sources inrelated fields. *Hidayat al-Habib* was probably finished on 6th Shawwal 1045 A.H./14th March 1636 A.D. It comprises of 831 hadiths taken from various sources like Bukhari, Muslim, Tirmidzi, etc.

12. Taufik Abdullah, *Nasionalisme dan Sejarah*, (Bandung: CV Satya Historika, 2001), p. 14.

13. See Peter Gregory Riddell, "Abd al-Rauf al-Sinkili's Tarjuman al-Mustafid: A Critical Study of his Treatmen of Juz' 16", Ph.D. dissertation (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1984); Salman Harun, "Hakikat Tafsir *Tarjuman al-Mustafid* Karya Syeikh Abdur Rauf Singkel", Ph.D. dissertation (Jakarta: IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 1988); A.H. Johns, "The Qur'an in the Malay World: Reflection on 'ABd al-Ra'uf of Singkel (1615-1693)" *Journal of Islamic Studies* 9.2 (1998), p. 120-145.



In the Indonesian-Islamic world, almost all branches of Islamic studies developed in the early period, but works on Sufism seem to have dominated, especially in relation to certain notions prevalent among mystical orders like the Shattariyyah, Qadariyyah, and Naqshabandiyah. Moreover, several controversial works on Sufism had incited unrest within the Muslim community, as will be exposed below.

Mystical Thinking: Development and Debate

Along the course of Indonesian history, contestation and struggle for religious authority emerged along with the dissemination of ideas and interpretations of religious texts by groups of interpreters who tended to oppose each other. On the one hand, interpreters who subsequently became the majority, were identified as the proponents of the orthodox practice of the religious doctrines and rituals they believed to be "true"; on the other, the then becoming minority groups came to be identified as heterodox due to what they believed to be the true norms that differed from those of the majority group.[14]

In fact, it is difficult to decide whether an interpretation of a religious doctrine is "true" or "false", "valid" or "invalid" considering that each group has its own standards in measuring the truth. Nevertheless, the tension between orthodox and heterodox groups produced intellectual treasures that exposed the history as well as the dynamics of religious thinking in the archipelago specifically and in the Islamic world in general. These intellectual treasures usually consisted of hand written manuscripts of religious texts made by previous Muslim intellectual groups in response to the socio-religious circumstances of their time. The restricted access tothe local manuscripts that exposed the Muslim religious dynamics in the past has often been seen as one of the reasons why orthodox and heterodox tensions in the archipelago were not published more widely.[15]

In the early history of islamic reltion in Indonesia, issues that incited orthodox-

14. The most prominent example ofthis is Nuruddin al-Raniri's disputein the mid-17th century in Aceh with the followers of Hamzah Fansuri and al-Sumatra'i's existential notions, as it will be shownbelow.

15. In fact, the first gate toaccess to Indonesian manuscript treasures isthrough manuscript catalogues. On this topic see, for example, "Katalogisasi dan Pencatatan Naskah Nusantara" in Oman Fathurrahman etal. (2010, Chapter two).



heterodox tensions and contestations were oftenlinked to leading *'ulama* and their followers'differing interpretationsof mystic-philosophical doctrines. This suits the generally accepted theory that at an early stage a kind of mystical Islam came to the archipelago.[16]Since the 16th century, Islamic mysticism, either in its aspects of invocation and practical rituals or in its philosophical formulation, had spread out from Aceh to the rest of Indonesian archipelago,[17] including Java.[18]

The names of early Indonesian-Malay Sufis, particularly from Aceh like Hamzah Fansuri, Shamsuddin Sumatra'i, Nuruddin al-Raniri,[19] 'Abdurrauf bin Ali al-Jawi al-Fansuri (1615-1693),[20] and many other figures outside Aceh all enhanced their understanding throughtheir works that aimed offerinterpretations and explanations of mystic-philosophical doctrines, such as the concepts of *fana*, *ittihad*, *hulul, wahdat al-wujud, wujudiyyah, tauhidul wujud, martabat tujuh*, and so on.[21]

In several cases, orthodox tendenciesmingled with reigning regimes (read: the state, in the modern context),

16. Anthony Johns, "Sufism as a Category in Indonesian Literature and History", *JSEAH*, 2, II, (1998): 14; see also Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren: Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980), p. 30; Azra, *Jaringan Ulama* ... ChapterOne.

17. Anthony Johns, "Sufism in Southeast Asia: Reflections and Reconsiderations", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 26 (1995), p. 17.

18. M.C. Ricklefs, "Six centuries of Islamization in Java", *Conversion to Islam* ed. N. Levtzion (London: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 107.

19. Like Hamzah Fansuri, Shamsuddin al-Sumatra'i and 'Abdurrauf ibn Ali al-Jawi al-Fansuri, Nuruddin al-Raniri was also a Sufi who wrote about the notions of the *wujudiyyah* of Ibn 'Arabi's school that lead to the doctrine of existential monism (*wahdat al-wujud*). However, apart from his intellectual statute he was happy to contravene others by accusing both Hamzah and Shamsuddin of being heretics because they had stained Divine trancendency and stirred such notion as the plurality of creations. A comprehensive study on al-Raniri's genealogical knowledge can be foundin Azyumardi Azra, *The Origin of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Indonesian Malay and Middle Eastern Ulama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century* and Honolulu: Allen and Unwin and Hawaii University Press, 2004), pp. 54-69; see also Riddell (2001), pp. 110-125.

20. In Aceh's Islamic history, Abdurrauf is often classified as an ortodox scholar. Although he was an ulama ortodox, he was also a proponent of Ibn 'Arabi'smystical doctrines on the basis of which he also propagated the mystical doctrine of the *wahdat al-wujud* but he did so in a more contest manner. On the role of Abdurrauf within the context of mystical reform in the Malay-Indonesian world, see Azra (2004): 70-86and Riddell (2001), pp. 125-132.

21. The names of other influential figures but who will not be elaborated on in this essayincludeMuhammad Yusuf al-Makassari (d. 1699), Abdussamad al-Falimbani (d. 1789?), and Muhammad Nafis al-Banjari (1710-1812). On these influentual figures, see Azra (2004), chapters 5 and 6.



and displayed only reluctance and also marginalized heterodox tendencies. Remaining objections could also vary from the simply rejection of ideas up to extremist repudiation forcingopposing factions to resort torepressive actions. Many forms of rejection and orthodox-heterodox contestation not only occurred in the Malay regions and in specific periods in the past, but also spilled over other the regions like in Java, in subsequent periods, even up to the present.[22]

Al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah: The Mystic-Philosophical Conflict in the Archipelago

As far as common knowledge on the early history of Islam in the archipelago goes, *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah ila Ruh al-Nabi* (The Gift Bestowed upon the Prophet'sSpirit) is the earliest text that circulated among the Muslim society in this region.[23] It was written in 1590 by the Indian scholar, Fadl Allah al-Hindi al-Burhanpuri (d. 1620). He introduced the foundation of the mystic-philosophical concept that God is a Being Whose shadow is present in seven emanating dignified, i.e. *Ahadiyyah, Wahdah, Wahidiyyah, Alam al-Arwah, Alam al-Mithal, Alam al-Ajsam,* and *al-Insan al-Kamil.*[24]


Al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah is a brief treatise of only ten pagesand is thus a "*nubdhah*" or "summary" of mystical notions. It resemblesa cocktail of a variety of sources and needed to identify the key-concepts ofmystical thought.[25]For Sufis, the *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah*was important as it summarized and simplified Ibn 'Arabi's weighty mystical ideas into the mystical concept of the seven dignified stages. The first three

22. In this context, the term orthodoxy is often related to the school considered true based oncontemporary norms, where as heterodoxy refers to the opposite schools that were thus considered wrong, and even misleading. In the *Encyclopedia of Religion*, orthodoxy is defined as "correct and sound belief according to an authoritative norm", while heterodoxy means "belief in a doctrine differing from the norm", see S. Mc Donough, "Ortodoxy and Heterodoxy" in L. Jones [ed.] *Encyclopedia of Religion v. 10* (Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2005), p. 6909.

23. For several manuscript copies of this text, along with commentaries in various languages, see P. Voorhoeve, *Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts in the Library of the University of Leiden and other Collections in the Netherlands* (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1980), pp. 380-382.

24. Handwritten manuscripts of *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah* are preserved in the British Library (Ad 12305) and Leiden University Library (Cod. Or. 5594). For an edition of thetext, along with a Javanese version written in the poetic form of *tembang macapat*, see Anthony Johns, *The Gift Addressed to the Spirit of the Prophet* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1965).

25. Johns, *The Gift Addressed...*, p. 6.



Jong Java congress in December 1929.

Source: *Dengan Semangat Berkobar: Nasionalisme dan Gerakan Pemuda di Indonesia 1918-1930* (Blazing Vigor: Nationalism and Youth Movement in Indonesia), 2003.

lofty stages: *ahadiyyah, wahdah,* and *wahidiyyah*are aspectsthat belong to God Himself, whereas the other four lofty stages represent external aspects leading to worldly manifestation, which is phenomenal. In addition to offering brief but clear definitions as well as an explanation of the aspects within the concept ofthe seven *martabat*, al-Burhanpuri also added the clear conclusion that the highest spiritual achievement can only be attained through the monotheistic utterance of *la ilaha illallah.*[26]

The next development was that the *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah* matured into several other texts that served as commentaries such as *al-Haqiqah al-Muwafiqah li al-Shari'a*[27]written by Burhanpuri himself, 'Abd al-Ghani ibn Isma'il al-Nabulusi's*Nukhbat al-Mas'alah Sharh al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah*, Ibrahim al-Kurani's*Ithaf al-Dzaki bi Sharh al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah ila al-Nabi*,[28]'Abd al-Rauf ibn 'Ali al-Jawi al-Fansuri(?)'s *al-Mawahib al-Mustarsalah 'ala al-Tuhfah*,[29]and 'Abd al-Samad al-Falimbani's *al-Mulakhkhas ila al-Tuhfah*[30](in Malay). These commentaries generally tryto offer detailed explanations on the mystic-philosophical concepts that were briefly addressed in the*al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah.*

In Indonesian Sufism, *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah* became authoritative. This was the result of a process that started in the early 17th century when Indian Sufis studied the text and members of the *jama'at al-jawiyyin* (Muslim community of the Indonesian archipelago) joined them.

of the doctrine of existential monism (*tawhid al-wujud*) written in the Malay-Indonesian context. Itwill be specifically discused below. See Fathurrahman 2011, pp. 177-198, also Fathurrahman (2002).

29. This text was influential not only the Malay region, but also in Java. One manuscript of the text has a translation in Javanese in Pegon script.

30. In some sources, thebook is entitled *Tuhfat al-Mursalah*, which is similar with theoriginal text. See, for example, H.W.M.Syagir Abdullah, *Penyebaran Tarekat-tarekat Syufiyah al-Mu'tabarah di Dunia Melayu* (Kuala Lumpur: Khazanah Fathaniyah, 2000, p. 233). However, al-Falimbani wrote in this text, "...I namethis treatise *MulaKhkhas li al-Tuhfah...*" (p. 257). For a brief analysis of thetext see Oman Fathurrahman, "Penulis dan Penerjemah Ulama Palembang" in Henry Chamber-Loir [ed.] *Sadur, Sejarah Terjemahan di Indonesia dan Malaysia* (Jakarta: KPG, EFEO in cooperation with the Forum Jakarta-Paris, Pusat Bahasa, and Padjadjaran University Bandung, 2009), p. 1052-1053.



It is also assumed that some members of the *jama'at al-Jawiyyin* visited Aceh to meet Shamsuddin al-Sumatra'i. The latter then showed his interest as he might had highly appreciated the book of al-Burhanpuri. Al-Sumatra'i is known to have beenthe first Malay Sufi who disseminated *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah*'snotions of the *martabat tujuh* and the *wahdat al-wujud.*

As stated above, al-Sumatra'i wrote the *Jawhar al-Haqa'iq* (the Substance of Realities) in Arabic and it is acknowledged as the highest intellectual achievement ever made by a Muslim from the Indonesian archipelago.[31] It presents al-Sumatra'i's profound analyses of the mystical concept of existential monism (*wahdat al-wujud*) and also offers a description of God through His divineAttributes and His Finest Names.

In fact, *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah*'s impact went beyond al-Sumatra'i and other Acehnese Sufis. It was also adopted, accommodated, and reinterpreted by Sufis from other regions in the archipelago who believed that the mystical notions in the book posed no problems. They only thought that these notions needed to be more profoundly explained and interpreted after which orthodox Muslims would probably find them acceptable.

A good example in this context isal-Falimbani's *al-Mulakhkhas li al-Tuhfah*, which is a Malay translation of the *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah*. However, al-Falimbani seems to have "accommodated" the original text as he did not make a literal translation but made significant changes by his choice of specific words and his arrangement of the syntax of the Arabic text. He substituted verbs in the original, for example, with nouns and he divided up long sentences into simpler and shorter ones. This means that al-Falimbani reshaped the original text. It is as if he "translated" the text from Arabic into a kind ofArabic that was much easier to follow than that of the original text. Nevertheless , its substance and its systematic arrangement remained similar to the original text .

A.H. Johns gave the following example, "*wa inna dhalika al-wujūd laysa lahu shaykhun wa lā haddun wa lā hasrun wa ma'a hādhā zahara wa tajallā bi al-shakli wa al-haddi wa lam yatagayyar 'ammā kāna min 'adami al-shakli wa 'adami al-haddi...*" According to Johns, this part was rewritten by al-Falimbani into: "*...lā shakla lahū wa lā hadda wa lā hasra wa*

31. Johns, *"Reflections..."*, p. 152.



lā 'adda ma'a zuhūrihi wa tajallīhi bi al-shakli wa al-haddi wa 'adami tagayyurihi 'ammā kāna..." Thus, he omitted the introductory phrase "*wa inna dhālika al-wujūd*" and provided several alternative wordings, but the substance remains the same. Beside, al-Falimbani also omitted the first paragraph of the original text substituted by his own introductory remarks .

Several hypotheses may explain why al-Falimbani did what he had done with the *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah*. As explicated above, this book had incited tension and was vehemently rejected by orthodox Muslims in Aceh. As a consequence, al-Falimbani was forced to "modify" the text and totranslate it into Malay to make it easier for orthodox laymen to understand. As a matter of fact, al-Falimbani was never accused of committing heresy, even though he enclosed the mystical doctrine of the seven lofty stagesin his masterpiece, *Siyar al-Salikin*, as they had been taught by al-Burhanpuri in his *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah*and by al-Sumatra'i in his *Jawhar al-Haqa'iq*. After all, same 'seed' would not have resulted into a completely similar fruit, had it been planted in a different place and time. Such may be inferred from al-Falimbani, were he taken as an example.

Something different took place in Java. The seed of heterodoxy that had spread in Java in the 18th and 19th centuries were partly contributed to the introduction of the mystical *martabat tujuh* and *wahdat al-wujud* doctrines. There is, however, no written evidence that the spread of the *martabat pitu* and *manunggaling kawula Gusti* notions had incite dantagonism between orthodox and heterodox factions in Java with reference to the same notions in *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah.* However, it is clear that *al-Tauhfah al-Mursalah* was well known in Java.

An indication of this probable popularity is the discovery of a translation of *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah*in the shape of a Javanese poem (*macapat*). A.H. Johns conducted research on this Javanese version and demonstrated how close the composer of the poem had remained with the original text while he the poet also referred to several other copies of the text.[32]

In addition, a translation of a commentary on *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah* has also been found in Java . The book is entitled *al-Mawahib al-Mustarsalah 'ala al-Tuhfah* (Various Kinds of Gifts Related to the *Tuhfah*) and several manuscripts are

32. Johns, *The Gift Addressed...*, p. 13-20.



Arshad Al-Banjari

Source: Private Collection Abdul Hadi WM

preserved in a number of libraries. The Indonesian National Library has two manuscripts (A 97 and A 98),[33] one copy is available in the Museum and Yayasan Pendidikan Ali Hasjmy in Aceh,[34] while yet another copy of the manuscript may be consulted in Leiden University Library[35]

Responses to and Criticism against the Mystic-Philosophical Thought

Some scholars' complimented the quality and the intellectual weight contained inthe *Jawhar al-Haqa'iq* in particular, andin al-Sumatra'i's mystic-philosophical thought in general. However, in 17th century Aceh,Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 1666), an Indo-Arab[36] from Randir (Gujarat) who spoke fluent Malay severely opposed al-Sumatra'i's mystical ideas. Al-Raniri classified al-Sumatra'i, along with his predecessor Hamzah Fansuri, as the menwho disseminated deviating mystical notions, and he accused him of being heterodox as well. Hence, his thoughts, works and followers had to be combated and suppressed, because they deviated from the true understanding.

Being an orthodox scholar who accentuated the practice of the Shari'a, al-Raniri issued a fatwa stating that the monism doctrine these two Malay Sufi-scholars taught digressed from Islamic theology and thus that everyone who did not repent or refused to repudiate these notions should be considered heretics and sentenced to death.[37]

It is important to state here that al-Raniri himself might also be considered a Sufi*'alim* because he often wrote about and quoted Ibn 'Arabi mystical doctrines. However, he classified the *wujudiyyah* into two categories: monotheist (*muwahhid*) and heretic (*mulhid*). The first category denoted the true and straight *wujudiyah* notions that accorded with the Shari'a, where as the second

33. Tim Behrend [ed.] *Katalog Induk Naskah-Naskah Nusantara Jilid 4 Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Jakarta in cooperation with the EFEO, 1998), p. 6.

34. Oman Fathurrahman and Munawwar Holil, *Katalog Naskah Ali Hasjmy Aceh* (Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, in collaboration with Manassa Jakarta, 2007), p. 156-7.

35. P. Voorhoeve, *Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts*..., p. 171.

36. His mother was of Malay descent, whereas his father was a Hadrami immigrant who had embarked on the long journey of moving to South Asia and Southeast Asia. See Azra, *Jaringan Ulama*... (1994), 169; Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *Raniri and the Wujuduyah of the 17th Century Aceh* (Singapore, Malaysian Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, 1966), p. 12.

37. Azra, *Jaringan Ulama*..., 182.



was used to denote misleading and heterodox monistic doctrines and was especially addressed to Hamzah Fansuri and Shamsuddin al-Sumatra'i's works.

Althoughal-Raniri always mentioned Hamzah Fansurias a leading figure in the spread of the mystical heterodox notions along with al-Sumatra'i, there is no solid written proof that clearly states that Hamzah Fansuri's thoughts were influenced by *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah* as in the case with al-Sumatra'i. A number of sources discuss Hamzah Fansuri's mystic-philosophical thoughts and they assert that al-Sumatra'i's mystical ideas resembled Hamzah's, and thus some sources assume that they had entered into a master-disciple relationship.[38]

The problem is whether al-Sumatra'i ever met Hamzah Fansuri and subsequently acknowledged him ashis master? Scholars disagree on this issue. Drewes (1986) is of the opinion that the poems Hamzah Fansuri composed did not have a trace of any kind of the mystic-philosophical influence that emerged after 1590, the period when al-Burhanpuri finished his *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah*. Guillot and Kalus (2008: 82-83) clearly assert that the generally assumed relationship between Hamzah Fansuri and Shamsuddin al-Sumatra'i was in need of revaluation, especially after the discovery of a tombstone in Mecca dated 1527, which Guillot & Kalus concluded as being Hamzah Fansuri's grave.[39]

It is certain that Shamsuddin al-Sumatra'i admired Hamzah Fansuri's works as he also participated in the propagation of the latter's mystical notions and there is not a single source that denies this. It is also clear that he had studied Hamzah's poems as he often referred to Hamzah's mystical notions in his own works. Therefore, although we cannot as certain that al-Sumatra'i ever met Hamzah or that he adopted him as his direct Sufi master, al-Raniri insisted on classifying both as belonging to the group that spread heretical heterodox existential monism.[40]

After all, apart from conceptual similarities, it seems that the textual sources of Hamzah's mystic-philosophical ideas slightly differed from those of al-Sumatra'i. For example, in

38. See for example, Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *The Mysticism of Hamzah Fansuri* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1970), p. 3; Abdul Hadi W.M. *Tasawuf yang Tertindas* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001), p. 115-6.

39. A broad discussion on this matter see Claude Guillot and Ludvik Kalus, "Batu Nisan...", p. 71-93.

40. Claude Guillot and Ludvik Kalus, "Batu Nisan...", p. 82.



his works, Hamzah barely mentions al-Burhanpuri's *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah*, which may be taken as an indication for the correctness of the theory that Hamzah had already passed away in 1527, sixty-three years before *al-Tuhfah all-Mursalah* was written.

Al Raniri's "hostile attitude" roward the teaching and the following of Hamzah Fansuri was supported by Sultan Iskandar Thani (1637-1641) . As a consequence, Hamzah Fansuri's followers had to suffer bitterly. They were persecuted and forced to abandon their beliefs in the *wujudiyyah* doctrine; if not, they would be condemmed to death. In 1637, Hamzah Fansuri's works were collected and burned in front of the great *Baiturrahman* mosque in Banda Aceh because they were the sources of the theological deviation from the Muslim faith.[41] It is for this reason that in the history of socio-religious developments in Aceh, the year 1637 is often seen as a dark period for Hamzah Fansuri and Shamsuddin al-Sumatra'i's followers, along with the power change from Sultan Iskandar Muda to Sultan Iskandar Thani, who granted al-Raniri the religious authorization to denounce the notions of both Sufis to be perverted and need to be combated.[42]

At the time, al-Raniri himself had not long before arrived in Aceh coming from India and he was instantaneously trusted by Sultan Iskandar Thani, whom al-Raniri called Sultan Shah Marhum Darussalam who appointed him as *Shaykh al-Islam*, or the court's supreme religious scholar. In one of his works, *Fath al-Mubin*, al-Raniri related the story of his early arrival in Aceh where he had to face the problem of the monistic notions:

> "...*Shahdan*, when I arrived in Aceh under the reign of Sultan Shah Marhum Darussalam, there were people who adhered to absolute monism (*wahdat al-mutlaq*), the heretical existential one, which was also heterodox. Then, the King ordered to bring together all the experts on religion to scrutinize whose[thinking] wasright, and whose was wrong; thence they discussed with us several times in [King] Marhum's presence..."[43]

41. See Azra, *Jaringan Ulama...*, p. 182; Simuh, *Tasawuf dan Perkembangannya dalam Islam*, (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 1996), pp. 53-54; C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Aceh, Rakyat dan Adatlstiadatnya II* (Jakarta: INIS, 1997), p. 12.

42. See Oman Fathurrahman, *Tanbih al-Mashi: Menyoal Wahdatul Wujud*, Jakarta: Mizan in cooperation with the EFEO, 1999.

43. Nuruddin al-Raniri, *Fath al-Mubin 'ala al-Mulhidin*, manuscript no. 179/TS/4/YPAH/2005 from the collection of Yayasan Ali Hasjmy Aceh, folio 2. About this collection see Oman Fathurrahman and Munawwar Holil, *Katalog*



After listening to the arguments the adherents to absolute monism put forward, al-Raniri did not hesitate to declare them false and heretics and they were accused of having deviated from the basic principles of Islamic Shari'a. Al-Raniri issued his fatwa against them,

> "...whoever takes argument and evidence by rendering to the basic meaning of the unclear verses, the prophetic tradition on divine attributes, and the Sufi ecstatic utterances, he or she had become heterodox unbeliever."[44]

As became of al-Raniri's dissident fatwa on kafir (infidelity) which Sultan Iskandar Thani fully supported, the notions and the adherents to the existential monistic doctrines suffered a tragic fate as their works were burned and its followers were slaughtered.

Beside local sources like the *Bustan al-Salatin*, a travel journal written by Peter Mundy illustrates what took place during thissocio-religioustragic event. Mundy was a British traveler who visited Aceh in 1638 and thus he arrived only several months after the penalization of the *wujudiyyah*had taken place. It seems that Mundy based his report on aural communication with a number of witnesses who had been present during the execution of the *wujudiyyah*followers: they had been thrown into the fire and were thus burned alive.[45]

In fact, al-Raniri himself illustrated what had taken place in his *Fath al-Mubin*:

> "…and again they said, *al-'alam huwa Allah, Huwa al-'alam,* 'the universe is God, and He is the universe'. After this, the king ordered to present them to repent from their heretical beliefs. After several times of deterrence, as they keptrefusing to repent; hence they would be surprised by king's order.The kinginstructed to kill themalland he also commanded to collect all the works composed by their master in the middle of the field before a mosque called Bayt al-Rahman. Then, the king ordered to torch them all."[46]

Fath al-Mubin and *Tibyan fi Ma'rifat al-Adyan*: Judgment of Mystic-Philosophical Thought

In a dialogue between al-Raniri and Iskandar Thani on one side and the followers of the *wujudiyyah*, on the other

Naskah..., especially pp. 146-7.

44. Nuruddin al-Raniri, *Fath al-Mubin*..., p. 3.

45. Peter Mundy, *The Travel of Peter Mundy* vol. III part 2 (London: no publisher, 1999), p. 330.

46. Nuruddin al-Raniri, *Fath al-Mubin*..., p. 3-4.

side it seemed that both sides tried to show the corrections theological belief. Therefore, the works that have made it to our era may describe the *wujudiyyah* notions merely based on al-Raniri's version.

In the *Fath al-Mubin,* for example, al-Raniri illustrated that among the issues the people of *Wahdat al-Mutlaq* discussed was that they based their theological ideas of the *wujudiyyah* on unclear Qur'anic verses, like *yad Allah fawqa aydihim* (God's hand above their hands), or on prophetic traditions about the divine attributes such as *al-hajar al-aswad yamin Allah fi al-ard* (the black stone is the right hand of God on earth), as well as on the ecstatic utterances of some Sufis like *ana al-haqq* (I am [God] the Real), *subhani ma a'zama sha'ni* (the Glory of Me, the greatest condition of me), *ma fi jubbati illa Allah* (nothing in my robe but Allah). Al-Raniri saw that they had deviated in their interpretation of the Qur'anic verses, the hadith, and the Sufis' ecstatic utterances which, according to al-Raniri, all should be understood as being symbolic and not considered in their literal meanings. Al-Raniri said,


> "...hence they changed the meaning in the Jawi [read: Malay] language so that it suited their heretical belief system. Our response is that he or she will be called a heterodox unbeliever who adopts the basic meaning of unclear verses, prophetic traditions on divine attributes and Sufi ecstatic utterances as arguments and evidence."[47]

From this explanation in the *Fath al-Mubin*, it is clear that the perverted (sesat) and unbelief fatwa issued by al-Raniri against the followers of Absolute Monism can also be related to a similarly perverted fatwa issued against previous Sufis in the Muslim world, such as Abu Yazid al-Bistami (d. 875) who was famed for his doctrine of unity (*ittihad*) and his ecstatic utterance *subhani ma a'zama sha'ni* (the Glory of Me, the greatest condition of me), and the notion of *hulul* by Husayn ibn Mansur al-Hallaj (m. 922), who was famous for his ecstatic statement *ana al-haqq* (I am [God] the Real). As is known, both were accused of being perverted and the scholars of the Shari'a of their times sentenced them to death.[48]

Beside *Fath al-Mubin*, al-Raniri's other work *Tibyan fi Ma'rifat al-Adyan*

47. Nuruddin al-Raniri, *Fath al-Mubin*..., p. 3.

48. See Simuh, *Tasawuf dan Perkembangannya*..., 139-158.



Kitab Kuning *Alfiyah Ibnu Malik* written by Imam Ibnu Malik, on the grammar of Arabic

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

(henceforth simply called *Tibyan*) is considered the most important book on the deviancy of the *wujudiyyah* notions. More specifically in around two-third of the pages of this treatise, al-Raniri elaborated both Hamzah Fansuri and al-Sumatra'i's misleading notions. Al-Raniri himself specifically recommended everyone who wanted to know in depth the notions al-Raniri called the "beliefs of the perverted people" (*i'tikad kaum dalalah*) to read his *Tibyan*. In the *Ma al-hayah li ahl al-mamat*, for example, al-Raniri asserted ,

> "O students, if you want to know the beliefs of the perverted people, you have to scrutinize and read the *Tibyan fi Ma'rifat al-Adyan* that I have written."[49]

Al-Raniri introductory remarks in the *Tibyan*'sopening part show that the treatise was composed during the latter part of Sultan Iskandar Thani's reign (1636-1641) and the start of that of his successor, Sultanah Safiyatuddin (1641-1676). Al-Raniri wrote that during Iskandar Thani's reign, the court was actively involved in the debate against al-Sumatra'i's disciples, who were stereotypically dubbed "the heretically heterodox and even perverted people of the *wujudiyyah*" (*kaum wujudiyyah yang zindiq, mulhid lagi sesat*). He said,


> "At that time the heretically heterodox and even perverted *wujudiyyah* emerged, namely of the disciples of the perverted Shamsuddin al-Sumatra'i... they discussed with us for several days in the presence of the most pious Sultan of the era..."[50]

Easing Mystic-Philosophical Thought

The socio-religious upheaval that started in Aceh during the last period of Sultan Iskandar Thani's reign was due to the dispute over the philosophical mysticism in *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah.* This upheaval seemed to have been prolonged and yet to have abated in the intermediate period of his successor, Sultanah Safiyatuddin. This was proven by the discovery of an Arabic text on Sufism written around 1665 that contained a 'report' on the upheaval, the *Ithaf al-Dhaki bi Sharh al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah ila al-Nabi Salla Allahu 'Alayhi wa Sallama*, or in English "An offering to the skillful soul: An explanation of the book bestowed upon the Prophet [Muhammad] peace

49. See H.W.M.Syagir Abdullah, *Khazanah Karya Pusaka Asia Tenggara I* (Kuala Lumpur: Khazanah Fathaniyah, 1991), p. 53.

50. Nuruddin al-Raniri, *Tibyan fi Ma'rifat al-Adyan*, ms. no. 4209/07.1437 in the collection of Museum Negeri Aceh, fol. 2-3.



Kitab Kuning *Sifa Al Jinan fii Tarjama Hidayat as-Shibyan* written by Ahmad Muthohhar. Kitab Tajwid written in pegon, adapted Arabic script for Javanese

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

be upon him" written by a Kurdish *'alim* in Medina, Ibrahim ibn Hasan al-Kurani al-Shahrazuri al-Shahrani al-Kurdi al-Madani al-Shafi' (1616-1690).[51]


As hinted by the title, *Ithaf al-Dhaki* is a commentary (*sharh*) on al-Burhanpuri's *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah*. In fact, it is more than a commentary, because in more than two thirds of the text, al-Kurani introduced hisown Sufi concepts and spiritual experience.

Al-Kurani put his account in the opening section of the text (ff. 1v-1r) which in translation reads as follows:

> "...We had received information from a group of Jawi people (*jama'at al-jawiyyin*) that parts of a book on Sufism and the profound knowledge of reality (*ilmu hakikat*) circulated among the "Jawa" community and that it was being studied and taught by lovers of knowledge, but who did not have a understanding of the Shari'a as brought by the chosen Prophet (Muhammad) PBUH; and even without comprehending the profound science of reality bestowed upon the seekers of the divine path... such caused parts of them to skid from the right path, to resort to misguided beliefs, and even to descend into heretically heterodox (*zindiq*) and even wrong (*ilhad*)acts.
>
> They said that among the circulating books on the sciences of reality was the *Tuhfah al-Mursalah ila al-Nabi*written by Shaykh Muhammad ibn Shaykh Fadl Allah al-Hindi al-Burhanpuri... some of the *jamaat al-jawiyyin*asked me, who essentially has no knowledge, to write a commentary on that treatise to elucidate the conformity of the discussed problems within the basic principles of Islam, bolstered by valid proofs from the noble Qur'an and from the prophetic traditions.
>
> For a number of years this task was proposed to me several times and conveyed by more than one member of the *jama'at al-jawiyyin*...hence, after performing several prayers next to the prophet's tomb to seek Allah's guidance (*istikharah*), I decided to accept this task by writing the present treatise entitled *Ithaf al-dhaki bi sharh al-tuhfah al-mursalah ila al-Nabi...*"

These quotes explain why al-Kurani wrote the *Ithaf al-Dhaki.* In fact, we arefortunate that al-Kurani clearly mentioned the *jama'at al-jawiyyin* as well as the dynamics behind the

51. For a philological and historical analysis of this text see Oman Fathurrahman, *Ithaf al-Dhaki*....



Kitab Kuning *Taqrirot Nazam Al Imriti,* about Arabic used as teaching material for students in Pondok Pesantren Raudhatul Tholibin, Mojosari, Nganjuk, East Java

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

socio-religious upheaval in the Malay-Indonesian world. This is rare and very important information in connection with the socio-religious upheaval that occurred in the 17th century in Aceh.

In what follows, al-Kurani indeed did not specifically mention the dispute between Nuruddin al-Raniri and the Wujudiyyah group. However, it appears from his detailed discussion of the concept of Existential Unity (*wahdat al-wujud*), or what al-Kurani often called the *tawhid al-wujud* (the Unifying Existence), *wajib al-wujud* (Obligatory Existence), and the *wujud al-mutlaq* (Absolute Existence) that he tried to offer an explanation of the correct mystical discernment on the basis of the principles of the Shari'a as found in the Qur'an and in the Prophetic tradition.


Concurrently, al-Kurani also dealt with the problemsof the emerging inappropriate attitude that accused his fellow Muslims of having become misguided or being wrong and he accused them of disbelief (*takfir*). In his book, al-Kurani urges every Muslim to see others in proportion, especially by looking at their better sides. In a part of *Ithaf al-Dhaki,* for example, he says:

> "...put your brother's affairs at his most profound state, till he showed you things that you may change your mind. Do not underestimate utterances of a Muslim as far as you cannot find a sound interpretation of it...."

From *Ithaf al-Dhaki*, it appears that al-Kurani wanted to expresshis orthodox statute by way of underlining the necessary understanding and the practice of Sufism that concur withthe guidance of the Shari'a, but he could not tolerate heretical accusations among fellow Muslims. Correlating this with the heated debate between Nuruddin al-Raniri and the followers of Hamzah Fansuri and al-Sumatra'i's*wujudiyyah* notions, al-Kurani seems to have put him in the center relieving the two opposite opinions.

Al-Kurani complex intellectual background allowed him to be moderate and he consistently tried to allow himself a measure of empathy for different opinions and he would rather mediate between contravening ideas than adopt any of them. In his *Ithaf al-Dhaki* he says, *wa al-jam' muqaddam 'ala al-tarjih mahma amkana* (unifying two opposing ideas is preferable to choosing the better one as far as such is possible).

Another text to be put in the context of easing the opposition to the Wujudiyyah notions in Aceh is *Tanbih al-Mashi*



Kitab *Syarah Aqud Alujain*, written by Imam Nawawi Al-Bantani about household ethics in Islam

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

al-mansub ila tariq al-Qushashi written by Abdurrauf ibn Ali al-Jawi al-Fansuri (1615-1690).[52] In line with al-Kurani, Abdurrauf's text provides a more conciliatory reinterpretation of the doctrine of existential monism by way of underlining its agreement with the Qur'an and the Prophetic tradition.

Abdurrauf appears to have been very careful in deciding what position to take between the two opposing factions. In *Tanbih al-Mashi*, the spirit of Abdurrauf's mystical notions are implicitly in line with those of al-Raniri, viz. by expressing his disagreement with the exaggerated existential doctrine that underlines the absolute unity of God and nature; however, he also opposed al-Raniri's attitude of radically going against the heretical notions.[53]

In fact, unlike al-Raniri, Abdurrauf did not denounce the followers of the Wujudiyyah doctrine as infidels. He countered al-Raniri who accused these followers of being infidels by way of issuing a fatwa urging people to kill them, which caused severe enmity and a prolonged conflict in the Muslim community.

52. In-depth discussions on this literary work may befound in Oman Fathurrahman's *Tanbih al-Mashi.*


53. Azra, *Jaringan Ulama...*, p. 191.

Mystic-Philosophical Thought in Java

Religious conflict between orthodox Muslims who held on to the legal formal aspects of the Shari'a and followers of Islamic mystical notions also took place in Java. Shari'a scholars used the same motives to brand certain Sufis as religious outcasts. They were thrown because they were seen as embracing heterodox notions and the pattern followed the one that had occurred in the Malay regions, especially in Aceh and in the wider Islamic world, and as the care of, al-Hallaj.

The *Serat Cebolek* is one of several Javanese texts that illustrate motives happened to religious outcast against the notions of Islamic mysticism. The work is written in Javanese poetic form (*tembang*) and composed by the poet of the Surakarta Palace in Central Java, Raden Ngabehi Yasadipura I, who served during the reigns of Paku Buwana III (1749-1788) and Paku Buwana IV (1788-1820). In his capacity of royal poet, especially during the reign of Paku Buwana III, Yasadipura I was entrusted to compose literary works and he has written a number of texts like *Serat Cabolek, Babad Giyanti, Babad Prayut, Pasinden Badaya*, and many others.[54]

54. S. Soebardi, *The Book of Cabolek* (The



Manuscript of the Kitab Awamil on the grammar of Arabic in Pondok Pesantren Duri Sawo, Ponorogo, East Java

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

The *Serat Cabolek* tells the story of a Sufi named Haji Ahmad Mutamakin who lived during the reign of Sunan Mangkurat IV (1719-1726) and his son Paku Buwana II (1726-1749) in the village of Cabolek, Tuban on the northern shore of East Java. He is depicted as a disseminator of mystical tenets that digressed from the Shari'a among laymen which, of course, caused unrest within the Muslim community, especially among Shari'a*'ulama*a round Tuban. Haji Ahmad Mutamakin was also accused of disloyalty and even of harassing the local authorities when he named his two dogs Abdul Qahar and Kamaruddin that were the names of two officials, the *penghulu* and the *ketib* in Tuban. The *'ulama* of Tuban filed a suit against Haji Mutamakin's deportment with the King of Kertasura.[55]

In the *Serat Cabolek*, it was Ketib Anom Kudus who was to be the leading *'ulama* in Tuban who viciously challenged the mystical notions Haji Ahmad Mutamakin disseminated. He was depictedas an orthodox *'alim* who was not only qualified in Islamic knowledge, but also in Javanese traditions. It was Ketib Anom Kudus who led the *'ulama* of Tuban to propose to the King of Kartasura, Sunan Mangkurat IV to impose the death penalty on Haji Ahmad Mutamakin. However, due to Sunan Mangkurat IV's sudden death, the sentencing was delayed until after the installment of Paku Buwana II, the new king of Kartasura.

In essence, this case differs from that in Aceh as the mystical notions Haji Ahmad Mutamakin propagated did not lead to the doctrine of the seven lofty stages as inal-Burhanpuri's *al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah*. The knowledge of the profound reality only taught about the concept of the perfection of life. The story tells that Haji Ahmad Mutamakin took mystical lessons from a Yemeni Sufi master, i.e. Shaykh Zain and he found surprising similarities with the mystical tenets in the texts of *Bhima Suci*and *Dewa Ruci.* Nevertheless, both mystical tenets apparently put a similar emphasis on the possible union between man and the Hidden Reality (read: God), when one arrives at a certain stage.

In one episode in the *Bhima Suci*, for example, it is narrated that Werkudara (another name for Bima) was ordered to enter the garb cave (within the womb of) Dewa Ruci through his left ear. Inside Dewa Ruci's body, Werkudara attained the perfection of life through witnessing *Pancamaya*, which means the

Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 17.

55. Soebardi, *The Book of Cabolek* ..., p. 27.



uncovering of the nature of the essence (*alam hakikat*) for what was known to him as *mukashafa*, the *catur warna* (four colors: black, red, yellow, and white), an eight-colored flare, and an ivory doll. Then, Dewa Ruci explained the things Werkudara witnessed as being the notions of the knowledge of profound reality (*ilmu hakikat*), including the ontological connection between God and man.[56]

In the Book of Cabolek, Haji Ahmad Mutamakin's mystical notions were accused of being perversely heterodox but it did not end in the death penalty although Ketib Anom Kudus had certainly proposed capital punishment to the King of Kartasura, Paku Buwana II. In this case, the king granted amnesty under the clear stipulations that Haji Ahmad Mutamakin was no longer permitted to spread his mystical notions to any Muslim layman. It seems that, because he was a royal poet, the author of *Serat Cabolek*, Yasadipura I, wanted to underscore the king's benevolence in granting amnesty to a convicted person. The Serat Cabolek clearly also points to the superiority of the orthodox Islamic notions by presenting Ketib Anom Kudus, as the hero and, fully supported by the reigning king, as the judge who pronounces Haji Ahmad Mutamakin's mystical notions as perversely heterodox and contravening the Shari'a.[57] The *Serat Cabolek* differs clearly from stories of all the other cases of religious out casts, as Shaykh Siti Jenar, Sunan Panggung, Ki Bebeluk, and Shaykh Among Raga, as they allended with their executions.

Shaykh Siti Jenar was put on trial by the Wali Songo, as he was accused of disseminating the heterodox notions of existential monism. For Shaykh Siti Jenar, who, according to Javanese tradition lived during the reign of the Giri Sultanate, there is no reality in this world other than God. Thus, it is narrated that when one of the Wali Songo, viz. Sunan Giri asked him why he did not attend Friday prayers, Shaykh Siti Jenar replied that there was essentially no Friday, essentially no mosque, and nothing else but the existence of God the Real. In Islamic tradition, Shaykh Siti Jenar is the "Javanese al-Hallaj". The Wali Songo, representing the orthodox *'ulama*, sentenced him to death because of his mystical tenets.

A similar religious outcast was Sunan Panggung. The *Serat Cabolek* narrates that Sunan Panggung was an aristocrat

56. Hamid Nasuhi, *Serat Dewaruci: Tasawuf Jawa Yasadipura I* (Jakarta: Ushul Press, 2009), pp. 180-181.

57. Soebardi, *The Book of Cabolek*..., p. 41.



who resided in Demak. He was accused of being an infidel and murdered because his notions were seen as misleading the Islamic Shari'a. The story of Sunan Panggung is also told in the *Serat Kanda*, which explicates that he had deeply fallen in love with God. Sunan Panggung essentially saw nothing around but God. Besides, it is also told that he used to take his two dogs -named "iman" and "tawhid"- with him when he went to the mosque. It was presumably because of his heretical mystical notions and his perceived insulting behavior that the orthodox *'ulama* accused him of rescinding the Shari'a which would certainly endanger religious life among Muslim society. The tales of religious outcast against Shaykh Siti Jenar and Sunan Panggung might also belong to similar motives. The only difference between the two is that Shaykh Siti Jenar's life ended because he was be headed, where as Sunan Panggung was thrown into the fire together with his two dogs.

Other tales of religious out casts in Java concern those of Ki Bebeluk in the Sultanate of Pajang and Shaykh Among Raga in the Mataram Kingdom. Both were accused of embracing and disseminating mystical notions that digressed from the Shari'a and as a result they were sentenced to death by being drowned in the sea.

In short, the history and the dynamics of mystical thinking of the archipelago produced literary works that enriched the Muslim intellectual tradition. The following parts will specifically deal with the history and the development of Islamic thinking in the field of hadith.

Thoughts of the Indonesian Ulama in the Field of Hadith

We have seen above that Aceh bequeat hed the first round of intellectual works in the fields of Sufism, Qur'anic commentary, and Islamic law. Hadith was not among the pioneering works because of the restricted availability of primary sources and thus it was almost forgotten. Very few experts on Indonesian Islam paid special attention to the study of Hadith in Indonesia, nor did they trace how far back the tradition of writing books on Hadith developed in the archipelago. Nevertheless, most Muslims believe that the Hadith is the second most important source after the Qur'an. Therefore, within the general tradition of Islamic studies, books on hadith arranged them in various groups depending on the reliability of the narratives such as the *Sahih* byal-Bukhari (d. 870), the *Sahih* by Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj

(d. 875), the *Sunan al-Sughra* by al-Nasa'i (d. 915), the *Sunan* by Abu Dawud (d. 888), the *Sahih* by al-Tirmidhi (d. 892), and the *Sunan* by Ibn Majah (d. 886).

The tradition of writing books on Hadith among Indonesian *'ulama* was also not quite as peaceful as was perceived until recently. Although they are lessin number than any other field of Islamic studies, especially Islamic mysticism and law, local works on hadith mostly written in Malay consist either of complete Hadith compilations or as mere translations of Arabic books.

The scarcity of sources and because scholarly research about Indonesian Islam was too focused on Islamic mysticism and law are two of the deciding factors why studies on Indonesian Islam usually do not address Hadith. Moreover, this quiet academic climate was also weakened bythe sorely mistaken assumption that the historical transmission of Hadith in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago only started in the 19th century with Mahmud al-Tarmasi (d. 1919/1920). Accordingly, it seems that the Indonesian *'ulama* before al-Tarmasi like Nuruddin al-Raniri, Abdurrauf al-Jawi al-Fansuri, Nawawi al-Bantani were ignored as research concluded that they did not possess expertise in the field of Hadith.[58] This weak conclusion is in need of re-evaluation because a number of books on hadith existed before al-Tarmasi's time, as will be explained below.

As briefly touched upon above, the first book on Hadith in Malay was al-Raniri's *Hidayat al-Habib fi al-targib wa al-tarhib* also known under its alternative title *al-Fawa'id al-Bahiyyah 'an al-ahadith al-nabawiyyah.* The lack of studies about the tradition of writing books on Hadith, including on the *Hidayat al-habib* was apparently due to restricted access to primary sourcesas most were still in the form of hand written manuscripts.

Beside al-Raniri, Abdurrauf ibn Ali al-Jawi al-Fansuri (1615-1693) is another Indonesian 17th century *'alim* who produced a book on Hadith. His book, *Sharh latif 'ala Arba'in Hadithan li al-Imam al-Nawawi* is a Malay translation of Sa'd al-Din Mas'ud bin Umar al-Taftazani's *Sharh al-Arba'īn*which contains commentaries on circa forty Hadiths composed by al-Nawawi. So far, the search for manuscripts of this text has resulted in only two copies, one preserved in Leiden University

58. See Muhajirin, "Transmisi Hadits di Nusantara: Peran Ulama Hadits Muhammad Mahfuzh al-Tarmasi", Ph.D. dissertation, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2009.



Pondok Pesantren Mojosari, Nganjuk, East Java

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

Library (Cod.Or. 3301) and the second in the Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia (MS 1314).[59]

In addition to the aforementioned book, some scholars mention *al-Mawa'iz al-Badi'ah*as a book on hadith written by Abdurrauf al-Fansuri.[60] However, after careful reading, it should rather be listed as a book on ethics, because it mostly - but not exclusively - comprises of religious advice, or what the author called "teaching" (*pengajaran*) taken from the *hadithqudsi*,the revealed divine sayings uttered by the tongue of Muhammad revealed out of the Qur'anic verses). In fact, the attribution of this work to Abdurrauf al-Fansuri is yet to be supported by convincing data asno authentic source has been found that clearly states that the text was written by Abdurrauf.[61] Thus, the definitive attribution of this work to Abdurrauf al-Fansuri clearly needs further research.

Another book on hadith composed by a Malay Indonesian *'ulama* is Abdullah bin Lebai Abdul Mubin Pauh Bok al-Fatani's *Tanbih al-Ghafilin* which was completed in 1184 A.H./1770 A.D.[62] It is a translation of a Hadith book in Arabic by Abu Layth al-Samarqandi. Abdullah bin Lebai Abdul Mubin Pauh Bok al-Fatani himself was the son of Lebai Abdul Mubin bin Muhammad Jailani Pauh Bok al-Fatani, a cleric from Patani in Southern Thailand who lived at the same time as Abdurrauf al-Fansuri (1615-1693).

In the 18thcentury, Dawud bin Abdullah al-Fatani (born 1718), whom most sources mention as the author of writings in the fields of Islamic mysticism and law, in fact also produced some works on Hadith. *Fara'id al-fawa'id al-fikr fil imam al-mahdi*, which was completed in 1215 A.H./1800 A.D., is one of his works of which a manuscript copy is preserved in the Perpustakaan Nasional Malaysia (MS 652) while a second copy is part of the private collection of the late Hj. Wan Mohd. Shagir Abdullah.[63] It is a Malay translation of a book with a similar title by in Arabic written by Shaykh Mirghani ibn Yusuf. As

59. See H.W.M. Shagir Abdullah, *Khazanah Pusaka Asia Tenggara* (Kuala Lumpur: Khazanah Fataniyah, vol. 1, 1991), pp. 42-61; Hoesein Djajadiningrat, *Tinjauan Kritis tentang Sejarah Banten* (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1983), p. 59.

60. See for example Azra, *Jaringan Ulama...*; Oman Fathrrahman & Munawar Holil, *Katalog...*, p. 21.

61. Shagir Abdullah, *Khazanah...*, p. 173.

62. H.W.M. Shagir Abdullah, *Penyebaran Islam dan Silsilah Ulama Sejagat Dunia Melayu* vol. 6, Introduction to the Series-7, (Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Pengkajian Khazanah Klasik Nusantara & Khazanah Fathaniyah), p. 28; and vol 13 (2000), p. 37.

63. Shagir Abdullah, *Penyebaran....* (vol. 13, 2000), p. 17.



seen from its title, the collection of Hadiths in this book concern information about the Mahdi and it is thus the first book in Malay on hadith that specifically discuss the theological concept of the Mahdi.

Dawud al-Fatani also wrote *Kashf al-Ghummah* in 1236 A.H./1822 A.D., which is a Malay translation of a work under the same Arabic title composed by 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Sha'rani.[64]When printing reached its golden age during the 'Fataniyah dynasty, this book was one among many others that were edited and printed in 1303 A.H./1885 A.D. Another book in Malay from this period is *Shifa' al-Qulub* that comprises about forty Hadiths. Its author is unknown but the work was completed on 2nd Ramadan 1225 A.H./1st October 1810 A.D. Its introductory section states:

> "...I collected various prophetic hadiths whose narrations have valid chains of transmission (*isnad*) and are trusted accounts (*riwayat*). However, I omitted all sorts of *isnad* as I did not strickly take over each redaction. I took only the meanings so that one can write them with no difficulties, and one would not get bored reading it. I collected [those hadiths] in a book."

64. Shagir Abdullah, *Penyebaran*.... (vol. 10, 2000), p. 21.

According to several sources, Hasan Besut ibn Ishaq al-Fathani (d. 1860) also made a Malay translation of 'Abd al-'Azim al-Munziri's forty Hadiths. He entitled his translation *Hidayat al-mukhtar fi fadl al-talab al-'ilm wa fadl sahibihi min kalam sayyid al-akhyar*, which was completed in 1259 A.H./1833 A.D.[65]

A grand-disciple of Dawud al-Fatani, al-Nawawi al-Bantani (born 1230 A.H./1814 A.D.) was an *'alim* from Banten who continued the tradition of writing books on hadith in the archipelago in the following periods. His was specialized in Islamic law but two of his books concern Hadith. The first is in Arabic entitled *Tanqih qawl hadith bi sharh lubab al-hadith* and is a commentary on al-Suyuti's*Lubab al-hadith*.

The second is *Nasa'ih al-ibad sharh munabbihat 'ala al-isti'dad li yawm al-ma'ad* and was completed on Thursday, 21st Safar 1311 A.H./1893 A.D. and comprisesof 250 hadiths. As can be seen from its title, it is a commentary on the *Munabbihat 'ala al-isti'dad* by Shihab al-Din Ahmad ibn 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Shafi'i, who was well known to Ibn Hajar al-Asqallani.

It is clear that through his books on

65. Shagir Abdullah, *Penyebaran*.... (vol. 13, 2000), p. 42.



hadith, al-Bantani showed that he was part of the strong assembly of hadith *'ulama* and hence also was one of the authorities in this field. Another *'alim* who wrote a commentary on the *Lubab al-Hadith* was Wan Ali bin Abdur Rahman Kutan al-Kelantani, whose book *al-Jawhar al-mawhūb* was completed on Monday night, 2nd Jumada al-awal 1306 A.H./1888 A.D. If al-Bantani wrote in Arabic, al-Kelantani composed his commentary in Malay.

Ahmad al-Fatani, the son of another *'alim* within the Fatani family, Muhammad Zain al-Fatani was an *'alim* from the Malay-Indonesian region who paid great attention to the field of hadth at the end of the 19th century. Ahmad wrote several books on hadith, both in Arabic and Malay, viz. *Bisharat al-'amilin wa nazarat al-ghafilin*, *Hadis memulakan makan dengan garam dan disudahi dengannya*, *Hadis-hadis pilihan*, and *Daftar rijal hadis.*[66]

Mahfuz Termas, whose full name was Muhammad Mahfuz bin Abdullah bin Abdul Manan bin Abdullah bin Ahmad al-Tarmasi was the leading Hadith *'alim* at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. He was born in Termas, Pacitan, East Java, on 12th Jumada al-Awwal 1285 A.H./31st August 1868 A.D. He resided in Mecca up to his death on 1st Rajab 1338 A.H./20th May 1919 A.D.[67] Mahfuz Termas composed the *Manhaj Dhawi al-nazarfi sharh manzumat 'ilm al-athar* which was completed on 1329 A.H./1911 A.D., about nine years before he passed away. This work in Arabic is a commentary on Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti's *al-Manzumat 'Ilm al-athar* and turned Mahfuz Termas into aneminent Indonesian *'alim* who was also prominent in Hadith, and many *'ulama* from all over the Islamic world referred to this book.

Entering the 20th century, the writing of books on hadith in the archipelago did not subside. Among the works that were produced is the *Hadith 'Ataqah* by Muhammad Mukhtar bin Ataridi al-Jawi al-Batawi al-Bawaqiri, an *'alim* from Bogor, West Java. He proposed several problems on *'Ataqah Kubra.* It was completed on the 21st Zulhijjah 1330 A.H./1st December 1912.

Finally, the last book on hadith written in Malay I was able to find is Muhammad

66. HWM Shagir Abdullah, *Al-'Allamah Syeikh Ahmad Al Fathani Ahli Fikir Islam dan Dunia Melayu* (Kuala Lumpur: Khazanah Fathaniyah, 1992), pp. 44-48.

67. Abdurrahman Mas'ud, "Mahfuz al-Tirmisi (d. 1338/1919): An Intellectual Biography" *Studia Islamika*, 5:2 (Jakarta: PPIM UIN Jakarta), p. 33-35.



Young students of Pondok Pesantren Mojosari having fun in front of the classroom, Nganjuk, East Java

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

Idris 'Abdurrauf al-Marbawi al-Azhari's *Bahr al-madi Sharh bagi mukhtasar Sahih al-Tirmidhi,* a commentary on al-Tirmidhi's *Sahih*. The writing was completed on the 2nd Jumada al-Akhir 1377 A.H./24th December 1957 A.D. As explained in the introductory section to the first volume, it was written on the basis of his own reminiscences, the knowledge he received from the lessons from his master, Muhammad Ibrahim al-Samaluti while his studied at al-Azhar, in addition to some references from a number prominent sources. The author said,

> "...when I returned home, I kept using my pen on the surface of the paper sheets on what I could recall and understand from him, along with a few sentences from al-Shafi'i's *al-umm*, Nawawi's *Sharh Muslim*, as well as statements ofal-Qastalani, Ibn al-'Arabi, and many others..."[68]

This is all I was able to trace about the hadith ***'ulama***'s written tradition in the archipelago.The scarcity of references on this topic remains a challenge for scholars in related fields to continue further research.Being Close to the *Hidayat al-Habib*

Hidayat al-Habib was written in Aceh by the famous Malay-Indonesian *'alim*, Nuruddin al-Raniri, whose fullname is Nuruddin Muhammad bin Ali bin Husanji al-Hamid al-Shafi'i al-Ash'ari al-Aydarusi al-Raniri.[69] In fact he descended from an Arab, Indian, and Malay background. His mother was Malay and his father was a Hadrami immigrant from Southern Arabia , which had a long tradition of immigrating to the South and Southeast Asian regions.[70]

Azyumardi Azra[71] seesal-Raniri as areformersin the Malay Indonesian world in the mid-17th century next to Abdurrauf al-Fansuri (1615-1693). He began his political career in the Sultanate of Aceh not long after his

68. Muhammad Idris 'Abdurrauf al-Marbawi al-Azhari, *Bahr al-Madhi Sharh Mukhtasar Sahih al-Tirmidhi*, (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi wa awladuh, vol. 1, 1993), p. 3.

69. Like Hamzah Fansuri, Shamsuddin al-Sumatra'i, and Abdurrauf ibn 'Ali al-Jawi al-Fansuri, Nuruddin al-Raniri was also a Sufi who wrote aboutthe *wujudiyyah*notions of Ibn 'Arabi'sschool that lead to the doctrine of existential monism (*wahdat al-wujud*). However, apart from his intellectual statute he was happy to confrontothers by accusing bothHamzah or Shamsuddin of beingheretics, because they had polluted the divine trancendency and mixedit with the plurality of creations. A comprehensive study on the genealogical knowledge of al-Raniri can be foundin Azra *The Origin of Islamic Reformism* ... pp. 54-69; see also Riddell (2001): 110-125.

70. Azyumardi Azra & Oman Fathurrahman, "Jaringan Ulama", *Ensiklopedi Tematis Dunia Islam*, Edited by Azyumardi Azra (Jakarta: Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve), v, 115.

71. Azra, *Jaringan Ulama*..., p. 169.



arrival on the 6th Muharram 1047/31st May 1637. His unexpected appointment asgrand Shaykh by Sultan Iskandar Thani (reigning 1636-1641) indicated that palace circles had apparently known him for quite some time. Ever since, he had the full support of Sultan Iskandar Thani to tackle religious, other social economic and even political problems .

Being fully supported by the reigning sultan, Raniri grew into an influential and prolific *'alim* who authored a number of works in various disciplines of Islamic scholarship, especially Islamic law, mysticism and theology. Shagir Abdullah has listed no less than 34 titles of al-Raniri's works.[72]The *Sirat al-mustaqim*is one among them and is considered the first book on ritual in Islamic law, where as the *Hidayat al-habib*, which is the core topic of the present discussion, is the first work in the field of hadith. As do other sources, Shagir Abdullah also stated that the *Hidayat al-habib fi al-targhib wa al-tarhib*, which is also referred to by its alternative title *al-Fawa'id al-bahiyyah an 'al-ahadith al-nabawiyyah*, is the first book on hadith to have been written in Malay.[73]

72. Shagir Abdullah, *Penyebaran...*, vol. 6 (1999), p. 7.

73. Shagir Abdullah, *Penyebaran...*, vol. 5 (1999), p. 2.

Apart from his scientific contribution to the Islamic intellectual tradition, particularly in Aceh and the Indonesian-Malay archipelago in general, al-Raniri is renowned for having been an *'alim* who opposed *wujudiyyah* notions, especially those of Hamzah Fansuri and Shamsuddin al-Sumatra'i.[74] Al-Raniri who resided in Aceh from 1637 until 1644 was convinced that Hamzah Fansuri and Shamsuddin al-Sumatra'i' *wujudiyyah* notions were perverted. As an orthodox *'alim*, he issued a fatwa that the *wujudiyyah* doctrine was heterodox, digressed from Islamic theology and thus that those who did not repent and refused to relinquish these notions would be considered infidels and sentenced to death.[75]

Sultan Iskandar Thani fully supported al-Raniri's opinions and thus Hamzah al-Fansuri's followers were oppressed by royal officials. They were persecuted and forced to renounce their belief in the *wujudiyah* doctrine. The mystical works by Hamzah Fansuri were collected and burnt in front of the grand mosque in Banda Aceh, the *Baiturrahman*, because

74. Oman Fathurrahman, *Tanbih al-Mashi: Menyoal Wahdatul Wujud*, (Bandung-Jakarta: Mizan in cooperation with the EFEO, 1999), p. 36.

75. See Azra, *Jaringan Ulama...*, p. 182; this also mentioned in Fathurahman*Tanbih al-Mashi...*, pp. 36-37.



they were considered the sources of the digression from Islamic theology.[76]

Al-Raniri can be considered as an early, controversial *'ulama* in the Indonesian-Malay world but he was also a prolific *'alim*active for Islamic renewal through them any works he wrote. He was also an extremely orthodox *'alim,* at least when compared to his successor, Abdurrauf al-Jawi al-Fansuri. Surely, many variables and factors had shaped al-Raniri's attitudes, including the political interests of the Acehnese sultanate.

Thoughts Comprised by the *Hidayat al-Habib*

It must be underlined here that the only manuscript of the *Hidayat al-habib* is preserved in the collection of the National Library of Malaysia (MS 1042).[77]However, other copies of the text may perhaps be found, especially in Aceh, although the three major collections of the Museum Negeri Aceh, the Dayah Tanoh Abee, and the Yayasan Ali Hasjmy do not ownany copies of the text.

The problem in Aceh and also in other regions is that manuscripts are not only kept in formal institutions like museums or libraries, but also by individuals and non-formal groups in society. Consequently, we may assume that manuscript copies of the *Hidayat al-habib* may still be found in private collections. Tarmizi, one of the collectors of Acehnese manuscripts stated that among the dozen manuscripts he owns we may find the *Hidayat al-habib*, but he cannot say this with any certainty. Unfortunately, I did not check his collection when I wrote this essay.

Besides, it is also important that this text has only been printed one, by Mustafa al-Bab al-Halabi in Cairo in1346 A.H./1927 A.D. in the margin of another text entitled *Jam'al-fawa'id wa jawahir al-qala'id* written by Dawud al-Fatani. Besides this limited access, various redactional differences between the printed edition and the manuscript in the National Library of Malaysia also did not make foreasy access to its contents.

One of the most important differences between the manuscript and the printed edition is its title, *al-Fawa'id al-bahiyyah fi al-as'ilah al-nabawiyyah*, even though the translation of the title still refers to the original manuscript, namely "Haluan akan Nabi SAW pada menyatakan menggemari segala amal kebajikan dan menjauh dari segala amal kejahatan" (The prophetic guide on

76. Azra, *Jaringan Ulama...*, p. 182.
77. Shagir Abdullah, *Khazanah...*, II, p. 65.



the expression of fondness to all good deeds and dissociation of all evil ones).[78] Unfortunately, there is no information about what version was used for the published text and thus deeper studyis needed to divulge the reasons behind these differences. In philology and text editing, the title of a text should be based on the information in the text itself. In the case of this book by al-Raniri, it is obvious that the author was inspired by *Hidayat al-habib* for its title as stated on the first page.

Al-Raniri explained that the Hadiths he collected in his book were taken from various reliable sources. To show his 'scholarly responsibility', he created specific marks at the end of each Hadith he quoted. These marks were written in red ink. For example, the Arabic letter 'kha' for Bukhari'sbook , 'mim' for Muslim's work while he used'ta' for that of al-Tirmidhi, 'alif' for that of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 'dal' for Abu Dawud, and the combinations 'ḥa' and 'ba' for Ibn Hiban, 'qaf' and 'ṭa' for al-Daruquṭni, and 'jim' and 'ha' for Ibn Majah, etc.

At the end of the book, where he deals with the prerequisites for repentance, al-Raniri mentioned another of his books, the *Durrat al-fara'id bi sharh al-aqa'id*, which is a Malay translationof the Arabic *Sharh al-aqa'id* by Sa'd al-Din al-Taftazani (d. 791 A.H./1377/8 A.D.). Naquib al-Attas asserted that the text of this book was assumed to have been lost, as it had never been found.[79] However, it transpired that variouscopies are preserved in several depositories like the Yayasan Ali Hasjmy Aceh (two copies),[80] and the National Library of Indonesia (one copy).[81]

The *Hidayat al-habib* consists of 831 Hadiths about many kinds of good deeds people are recommended to perform and many bad deeds people should refrain front doing. Al-Raniri seems to have based this book on Hadith on reliable sources in the field of hadith, which were not only well-known but also the validity of which had been established by Hadith scholars and acknowledged by Muslim society in general.

78. See Dawud ibn Shaykh 'Abd Allah al-Fatani, *Jam' al-fawa'id wa jawhar al-qala'id* (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi wa awladuh, 1346), p. 3.

79. Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *The Oldest Known Malay Manuscript: A 16th Century Malay Translation of the Aqa'id of al-Nasafi* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 1988), p. 8.

80. Oman Fathurrahman & Munawar Holil, *Katalog...*, p. 53-54.

81. Ph.S.van Ronkel, *Catalogus der Maleische HSS in het Museum van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen* (Batavia, VBG LVII, 1909), p. 401; Sutaarga, *Katalogus Koleksi Naskah Melayu Museum Pusat* (Jakarta: PNRI, 1972), p. 78.

Therefore, in the beginning, al-Raniri specifically mentions the books on Hadith he referred to in composing his *Hidayat al-habib*, so that the reader would also know his references. Al-Raniri created special marks for each of his sources. The complete list of the referential sources is as follows:

1. Sahih al-Bukhari, marked with the letter 'kh';
2. Sahih Muslim, marked with the letter 'm';
3. Sunan al-Tirmidhi, marked with the letter 't';
4. Sunan Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, marked with the letter 'alif';
5. Sunan Abu Dawud, marked with the letter 'd';
6. Kitab Ibn Hiban, marked with the letter 'h and b';
7. Kitab al-Daruquṭni, marked with the letter 'q and ṭ';
8. Sunan Ibn Majah, marked with the letter 'j and h';
9. Kitab al-Quda'i, marked with the letter 'ayn and y';
10. Kitab Imam Hakim, marked with the letter 'k and m';
11. Kitab Ṭabrani, marked with the letter 'ṭ';
12. Kitab Imam Daylami, marked with the letter 'm and y';
13. Kitab Abū al-Qasam, marked with the letter 'ayn and m';
14. Kitab Imam al-Bayhaqi, marked with the letter 'q and y';
15. Kitab al-'Askari, marked with the letter 'r and y';
16. Kitab Abū Ya'la, marked with the letter 'y and ayn';
17. Kitab al-Nasa'i, marked with the letter 'n and s';
18. Kitab Ibn 'Adi, marked with the letter 'ayn and d';
19. Kitab al-Khaṭib, marked with the letter 'kh and ṭ';
20. Kitab al-Khuzaymah, marked with the letter 'm and h';
21. Kitab Ibn Abi al-Dunya, marked with the letter 'y and alif';
22. Kitab Abi Zar, marked with the letter 'b and alif'.

The Thematic Structure of the *Hidayat al-Habib*

As al-Raniri states, the *Hidayat al-habib* is devided into thematic chapters. The purpose was to helpthe readers and to offer them the most benefit. Al-Raniri said, *wa-ja'altuhu mubawwaban li-yu'imma al-naf'a li al-raghibi*, which in translation means:*and I arranged the chapters in order so that it could benefit those who were fond of it.* The thematic structure of the chapters is as follows:

I need the indonesian text to be able to check what follows.



A student offering the traditional greeting of respect to an Islamic scholar

Source: ***Pondok Pesantren Cipasung***

23. Chapter recommendation of intention.
24. Chapter recommendation of Islam, iman, ihsan dan sincere devotion.
25. Chapter recommendation fond of salat and prohibition to leave it.
26. Chapter recommendation fond of giving alms, charity, generosity, andprohibition to leave them.
27. Chapter recommendation fond of giving present.
28. Chapter recommendation fond of entertaining guests.
29. Chapter recommendation fond of fasting andprohibition to leave it.
30. Chapter recommendation fond of hajj and umrah and prohibition to leavethem.
31. Chapteron the virtue of mosques and the virtue of building mosques.
32. Chapter recommendation fond of reading the Qur'an and the related aspects, also prohibition to leavethem.
33. Chapter recommendation fond of dreaming to meet the Prophet Muhammad pbuh, visiting his tomb, sending prayer upon him, and prohibition to leavethem.
34. Chapter recommendation fond of knowledge, people of knowledge, seekers of knowledge, andprohibition to leavethem.
35. Chapter recommendation fond of being pious to Allah andprohibition to leave it.
36. Chapter recommendation fond of loving Allah, remembering Him and being closer to Him.
37. Chapter recommendation fond ofdestiny and fate.
38. Chapter recommendation fond of thanking God andprohibition to leave it.
39. Chapter recommendation fond of devotion to parents, connecting kinship, andprohibition ofinsubordination, disconnecting family relation, and the right of children to their parents.
40. Chapterrecommendation fond of being patience and contention to God.
41. Chapter recommendation fond of being wise, holding back emotion, and prohibition to leave them.
42. Chapter recommendation fond of trust to God.
43. Chapter prohibition of committingadultery and homosexuality.
44. Chapter prohibition of drinking alcohol.
45. Chapter prohibition ofpractice usury.
46. Chapter prohibition oftelling a lie and perjury.
47. Chapter prohibition ofstealing, being treacherous, hiding artifacts, not returning loan, and prohibition to take



orphan's property.
48. Chapter recommendation fond to fulfill a promise and the prohibition to leave it.
49. Chapter prohibition of being arrogant.
50. Chapter prohibition ofbeing a hypocrite.
51. Chapter prohibition offeeling envy, jealousy and revenge.
52. Chapter prohibition ofswearing and bringing people into conflict.
53. Chapter prohibition of doing injustice.
54. Chapter prohibition ofkilling a believer.
55. Chapter recommendation fond of performing royal occupations, being an 'amir or qadhi andprohibition to leavethem.
56. Chapter recommendation fond of the Prophetici traditions and prohibition of comitting heresy.
57. Chapter recommendation of not being envy to others and prohibition of being greedy and delusive.
58. Chapter recommendation fond of being ascetic and prohibition of loving wordly matters for the sake of the world.
59. Chapter recommendation fond of seeking lawful and prohibition of seeking unlawful.
60. Chapter recommendation fond of helping others among the believers, and prohibition to leave them.
61. Chapter recommendation fond of the nature faithful, being far from infidels and hypocrites.
62. Chapter recommendation fond of doing good and prohibition of being bad tempered.
63. Chapter recommendation fond of loving wife and prohibition to leaveher and to understand the couple's rights.
64. Chapter recommendation fond of being humble and prohibition to leave it.
65. Chapter recommendation fond of taking deliberation and performing prayer to ask divine guide, and prohibition to leavethem.
66. Chapter recommendation fond of being silent and prohibition of talking useless.
67. Chapter recommendation fond of being secluded (*uzlah*) and prohibition of being associated with creatures.
68. Chapterrecommendation fond of making friends with pious people and prohibition ofmaking friends with bad personages.
69. Chapter recommendation fond of weeping and prohibition of laughing too much.
70. Chapter recommendation fond of good deeds for life time and prohibition to leave it.
71. Chapter prohibition of going to a shaman.
72. Chapter recommendation fond



of participating a holy war and prohibition to leave it.

73. Chapter recommendation fond of commanding goodness and forbidding eviland prohibition to leave it.
74. Chapter recommendation fond of recollecting death, attending funeral, doing entombment, and prohibition of the death wish and offending deceased person.
75. Chapter recommendation fond of asking forgiveness, repentance, and prohibition to leavethem.

Concluding Remarks

In line with theme, this chapter is an effort to map the history of Islamic thought in Nusantara based on written texts produced by the authors and Muslim scholars since the beginning process of Islamization. Based on this boundary, then I do not intend to explicate the history of Islam in Nusantara comprehensively, but rather focus on the aspect of its 'thinking' based on the written texts. For both reasons I did not discuss, for example, Walisongo who are certainly parts of the history of Indonesian Islam, particularly in Java.

Given the data on the history of Islamic thought in Nusantara that is generally recorded in hundreds-year-old manuscripts, this chapter is very much dependent on studies conducted by scholars on the available primary sources in various local languages.

For some specific topics, such as the Sufi thought, this chapter may have soem detailed discussions, along with their dynamics and controversy. In fact, I have to bring Johns' 'new conclusion' related to Shamsuddin al-Sumatra'i's original thought on the mystical notion of five dignities, which is now believed to have predated the mystical idea of the seven dignity proposed the Indian Sufi Fadlullah al-Burhanpuri. This conclusion by Johns actually revises previous findings of his own and other scholars as well. Of course, such an alteration is very common in an academic world. As far as the new finding is being generated from reliable process of reviewing, the new conclusion should be meaningful for the next scholars.

Nevertheless, other topics in this chapter, such as the hadith thought, may seem to have been provided in a rushed and still shallow discussion. After all, it was resulted from the scarcely previous researches and primary sources on the topic.

Considering recent developments on the inventory and cataloging of the Nusantara manuscripts, especially

those carried out by philologists, we can certainly conclude that attempts to reconstruct the history of Islamic thought in Nusantara are far from being complete. A number of manuscript catalogs published for the past decade suggest that lots of Islamic texts had not been studied yet, either written in Arabic, Malay, Javanese, Sundanese or other local languages. We need to continue striving for the increase of attention to the primary sources to be studied by scholars, so that they could contribute in the related fields.


Nonetheless, based on studies having been discussed in this chapter, we can assure that the Islamic thoughts had contributed significantly to the overall history of Islamic scholarship. Islamic manuscripts resulted from the Muslims' interaction with teachers and colleagues at the Islamic world, especially Mecca and Medina, have also proven that the Islamic thought develop in the archipelago is part of the Islamic thoughts flourished in the Islamic world.

Therefore, scholars who have been studying history of Islamic thought in any regions had actually no reason for not considering 'Indonesian Islam' as their focus of comparisons, because this region has a very significant history of Islamic thought in accordance with the local contexts.

Finally, I myself must admit that this chapter is far from being complete. There are still many historical fragments of Islamic thought in the Archipelago, especially in Java, which I had not elaborated deeply. I am sure that in the future this chapter will be supplemented by scholarly findings of the related fields.




فاد و کسری سلطان
علاء الدین محمد اوزبک
شاه خوهن برد ولیه
ظل الله فی الطارم



Chapter Seven

Malay: From Lingua Franca to Indonesian National Language

Malay: From Lingua Franca to Indonesian National Language


Jajat Burhanudin

Though often associated with the 17th century Malay Kingdom in Sumatra, the Malay language has developed into one of the most important elements along with the historical development of the society and culture of the Nusantara World. The important role of the Malay language runs parallel with the spread of Islam and Malay became the lingua franca in the Malay-Indonesian world, not only for social interactions, political diplomacy and trade, but also for Islam. The Islamization process in various areas in Southeast Asia caused Malay to be used by people over a large geographic area and helped to unite them. The transformation of Malay into the Indonesian national language is proof of this. Malay has contributed greatly to unite the disparate communities into Indonesia as a nation-state.

This essay presents a discussion of the history of the Malay languageand its relation to the development of Islam in Indonesia. In this context, Malay is seen as an important element of Indonesian Islamic culture. The main focus of the present discussion is the process of the evolution, change, and development of Malay into the widely used language in Indonesia. This historical process, as will be explained later, cannot be seen in isolation of its function as the language of Islam as Malay became one of the media of the expression of Islam in Indonesia. The use of *Jawi* script (adapted Arabic script for Malay) in books in Malay emphasizes the importance of Islamic elements within the process of the development of the Malay language. Therefore, the process of Islamization at the same time meant the acceptance and use of Malay by Indonesian society.

The Kingdom of Samudera Pasai: The Early Basis of the Developmentof Malay

Archaeological evidence shows that the Malay language was already used as an official language in the region as early as the 7thcentury as witnessed by some inscriptions dating from that period. The inscriptions are written in Pallawa script in an ancient form of the Malay language. Some examples are the Kedukan Bukit inscription (605 Caka or 683 AD) that contains a charter of the establishment of the Kingdom of Sriwijaya;the Talang Tuwo inscription (606 Caka or 684 AD), that lists all the plants and fruits used for social welfare; and the Kota Kapur inscription in the island of Bangka (606 Caka) that contains the curses against those who do not submit as subject to the King of Sriwijaya.



The Kedukan Bukit inscription is proof that the Malay Language has been used as a formal language in the kingdoms in the archipelago since the 7th century.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Klasik masa Hindu-Buddha* (Historical Map of Classical Indonesia during the Hindu-Buddhist Era), 2010.

Specially related to Sriwijaya, the emergence of Malay was in line with the important role of the kingdom in the sea trade in Southeast Asia, particularly in the trade route between India and China. Because of this, Malay gradually grew into an intermediary trade language in the port cities along the coasts of the archipelago and the Malay Peninsula. This language became the only lingua franca between the population of the region and outside traders.[1] This is further strengthened by the record of a Chinese traveler, I-Tsing, who, at the end of the 7th century, lived for a number of years in Sriwijaya to learn Sanskrit and to translate Buddhist texts into Chinese. I-Tsing mentioned the term *Kw'un-Lun* as the name for the local language used to learn Sanskrit and Buddhism and which was the for erunner of Malay.[2]

The momentum in the development of Malay in the Kingdom of Samudera Pasai began in the 13th century. Samudera Pasai was the first Islamic kingdom in Indonesia. Historians accept the year 1297 as inscribed on Malik al-Saleh's tombstone as the time of the founding of Samudera Pasai as an Islamic kingdom. This is further strengthened by another local source, the *Hikayat Raja-raja Pasai* ---a classic Malay text about the kingdom--- that notes that Malik al-Saleh was the first Muslim king. Furthermore, the text mentions that Merah Silu --- Malik al-Saleh's name before he became a Muslim --- had built a palace in a certain area in Sumatra, i.e. Pasai. Shortly after he came to power, he had converted to Islam and adopted the title Sultan Malik al-Saleh.

An important thing to be underlined here is that the Kingdom of Samudera Pasai did not inherit Malay as the official language of the palace, unlike the Kingdom of Sriwijaya, but that it facilitated Malay to grow in both a geographic and linguistic sense. This is in line with the kingdom's position as an international trade hub, visited by many merchants from various countries who were engaged in economic transactions in the kingdom. In addition to traders from China and India, Samudera Pasai also welcomed the arrival of traders from the Muslim world in the Middle East, particularly Arabs and Persians. In these circumstances and especially when the contacts with traders from various countries intensified, Malay went through a process of enrichment as it accepted linguistic elements mostly

1. A. Teeuw, *Modern Indonesian Literature*, (The Hague: Matinus Nijhoff, 1979), p. 5.

2. T. Iskandar, *Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad* (Brunei: Universitas Brunei Darussalam, 1996), p. 3.

from Arabic and other languages from the Islamic world. The *ingress* of these foreign languages elements meant the introduction of new concepts in the Malay language, such as those related to religion, philosophy, and new social systems.[3]

The Munye Tujoh inscription in Pasai is an interesting illustration in this respect. It is an inscription on the tombstone of a princess dated Friday Dhu al-Hijjah 14, 1389 A.H. or 791 A.D.It reads as follows:

Hijrat nabi mungstapa yang prasaddha

Tujuh ratus asta puluh savarssa

Hajji catur dan dasa vara sukra

Raja iman (varda) rahmatallah

Gutra bha(ru)bha sa(ng) mpu hak kadah pase ma

Tarukk tasih tanah samuha

Ilahi ya rabbi tuhan samuha

Taruh dalam svargga tuhan tatuha

The translation of the *upajati* poetry is as follows:

The migration of the Chosen Prophet, who passed away

Seven hundred and eighty-one years

Dzulhijjah fourteen, Friday

The believer King (*varda*) God's grace

Barubha family possess the rights, Kedah and Pasai

Having a shoot.... all the world

O God the Lord, the Lord of all

Put in Paradise, our Lord.[4]

From this inscription it appears that Arab-Islamic words and expressionsdominate. The following terms clearly showArab-Islamic influence: "*Hijrah Nabi*" (the Prophet's migration), "*Dzulhijjah*" (the month of the pilgrimage), "*Rahmat Allah*" (Divine blessing), and "*Ilahi ya Rabbi*" (O God the Lord). Malay words of Sanskrit origin are also still used next toArabic expressions, though those Malay words are closer to the Malay language of the following centuries.[5] The text shows that the influence of Sanskrit had been declining and that it was being replaced by Arab-Islamic languages. This process

3. Chamamah-Soeratno, dkk, *Memahami Karya-Karya Nuruddin ar-Raniri*, (Jakarta: Depdikbud, 1982), pp. 66-8.

4. Imran T. Abdullah, "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, (Jakarta: Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve, 2012), Jilid III: Kedatangan dan Peradaban Islam, p. 236.

5. Imran T. Abdullah, "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., pp. 236-237.

continued to strengthen in line with the emergence of Islam in the socio-political and intellectual discourses in various regions of Indonesia.

The Munye Tujoh inscription differs from the Kedukan Bukit inscription of the Kingdom of Sriwijaya because the latter uses the Sanskrit language and Pallawa script. Similarly, unlike the Munye Tujoh inscription that belongs to the religious domain, the inscriptions of the Sriwijaya era generally record key events, such as the opening of new regencies or the establishment of new cities. In contrast to Islamic inscriptions that contain a Sufi dimension, the Sriwijaya inscriptions were greatly influenced by Hindu-Buddhist traditions in which the king was believed to be an incarnation of the gods. Here is a quote from the Kedukan Bukit inscription from the Sriwijaya period, which was written in Pallawa script and dated 605 Caka = 683 AD:

swasti sri warsatita 605 su

suklapaksa wulan waisakha dapunta hyang nayk di

samwan manalap siddhayatra di saptami suklapaksa

wulan jyesta dapunta hyang marlapas dari minanga

tamwan manawa yang wala dua laksa dangang-ko

dua ratus sapulu dua wanyaknya datang di mata ya

sukhan tita di pancami suklapaksa wulang...

laghu mudita dalam marwuat wanua...

sriwijaya siddhayatra shubuksa....

The translation is roughly as follows:

Peace be upon you! In 605 Saka day

Eleventh in the moonlit of Waishaka

His Majesty the King rides

in the boat to make earnings on the seventh day

In the light of the moon in the Jyesta month, He

Departed from the Estuary of...

Tamban bringing an army of twenty thousand

Men ... two hundred in numberswere employed in the boat

Men who came walkingwere one thousand three hundred and twelve in number

Came to greet the King with joy

The fifth day of the bright...



In a Muslim cemetery located in the village of Munyé Tujoh, Lhokseumawe, North Aceh, there is a grave whose tombstone was written in a combination of Ancient Javanese and Arabic scripts.

Source: *Atlas Sejarah Indonesia Masa Islam* (Historical Atlas of Indonesia's Islamic Period), 2011.

Then made the kingdom of...

Sriwijaya victorious, happy, and prosperous.[6]

In relation to archaeological evidence from the Samudera Pasai period, the older Trengganu inscription from 1303 is also note worthy. This inscription was written in Jawi script and it is the earliest evidence of the use of Jawi script and also shows the gradual decrease of the use of Sanskrit elements in Malaya it also contains elements of early Islam. The inscription consists of a rectangular stone written on all four sides here called A, B, C, and D for easy reference. Not the whole text is readable because some parts are broken and the text erased. Quoted from Iskandar[7] the text reads as follows:

A 1. *rasul allah dengan yang orang sahabat mereka salam*
2. *ada pada dewata mulia raya memeri hamba meneguhkan agama islam*
3. *dengan benar bicara darma meraksa bagi sekalian hamba dewata mulia raya*
4. *di banuaku ini & seagama rasul allah salla'llahu 'alaihi wasallam raja*
5. *mandalika yang benar bicara sudah dewata mulia raya di dalam*
6. *bhumi & semua itu fardhu pada sekalian raja manda*
7. *lika islam menurut setitah dewata mulia raya dengan benar*
8. *bicara berbayiki benua semua itu maka titah seri paduka*
9. *tuhan mendudukan tamra ini di benua terengganu adi pertama ada*
10. *jum'at di bulan rajab di tahun syaratan di sasanakala*
11. *baginda rasul allah telah lalu tujuh ratus dua*

B 1. *keluarga di benua jawa (. . . .)kan (. . . .) ul*
2. *datang berikan & keemp(at darma barang) orang berpihutang*
3. *jangan mengambil k(. . . a)mbil hilangkan emasnya*
4. *kelima darma barang orang (. . . .mer)deka*
5. *jangan mengambil tukul buat (. . . .)t emasnya*
6. *jika ia ambil hilangka emasnya & keenam darma barang*
7. *orang berbuat balacara laki-laki perempuan setitah*

6. Imran T. Abdullah. "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., p. 234.

7. T. Iskandar, *Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad*....., p. 109-110. See also, Imran T Abdullah. "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., pp. 236-237.

8. *dewata mulia raya jika merdeka bujan palu*
9. *seratus rautan & jika merdeka beristeri*
10. *atawa perempuan bersuami ditanam hinggan*
11. *pinggang dihembalang dengan batu matikan*
12. *jika inkar ba(. . . .) hembalang jika itu mandalika*

C 1. *bujan dandanya sepuluh tengah tiga jika ia*
2. *manteri bujan dandanya tujuh tahil sa(su. . .)*
3. *tengah tiga & jika tatua bujan dandanya lima tah(il . . . .)*
4. *tujuh tahil sepaha masuk bendara & jika o(rang)*
5. *merdeka & katujuh darma barang perempuan hendak*
6. *tida dapat bersuami jika ia berbuat balacara bujan ia*

D 1. *bila tida dandanya setahil sepaha & kesembilan*
2. *seri paduka tuhan siapa tida (. . . .) dandanya*
3. *jadikan anakkau atawa pemainkau atawa cucukau atawa keluargakau atawa anak*
4. *tamra ini segala isi tamra ini barang siapa tida menurut tamra ini la'nat*
dewata mulia raya
5. *dijadikan dewata mulia raya bagi yang langgar acara tamra ini &*

The translation of the text as follows:

A. 1. The messenger of God along with his friends greet
2. God the Most Noble bestows me to strengthen the religion of Islam
3. Properly speak for all honorable deeds to guide the Muslims
4. In my country the same religion with Divine Apostle peace be upon him. The King...
5. Mandalika had spoken correctly about God.
6. at home and all obligatory duties performed by King Manda-
7. lika are according to Islam, all of Divine instructions correctly
8. speak about the truth, then said His Royal Highness,
9. God seated him on the throne of Terengganu kingdom since the beginning
10. on Friday in the month of Rajab in the year that compared to a period of...
11. the Messenger of Allah had passed

for seven hundred two [years]

B.1. A family of the kingdom of Jawa ....

2. came to give goods and the fourth (Divine duty) thatone credits
3. Do not take (.....) take away and throw the gold
4. The fifth duty, whoever a freeman...
5. Do not take a hammer to make gold (....)
6. If he took it, the gold would diminish; and the sixth duty
7. Whoever commits adultery male or female is commanded
8. by God if a single or a widowed
9. a hundred lashes, and if a free married man
10. or a married woman, being buried up to
11. the waist [and being] thrown with stone till die
12. if [one] is refused to be stoned, if a Mandalika

C 1. a single being punished by ten mid three. If he ...

2. a minister who is single being punished by seven pieces ofgold coins and [ten]
3. mid three. If asingle leader, he were punished by five pieces of gold co(ins...)
4. seven pieces of gold coins is the same for the Treasurerand if o(ne)
5. who is free; and the seventh duty is a woman
6. cannot get married if she commits adultery, in which she is single.

D 1. If not, she will be fined to pay a gold coin or the equivalent. The ninth
2. His Royal Highness [said] whoever does not [...] the fine
3. [that] is made for yourchild or your grandchild, your player or your family
4. Theserulings must be obeyed, if not a Divine curse
5. will be entitledfor God's sake for those who disobey theserulings.

Like in the Munye Tujoh inscription, Arab-Islamic influence is also visible in the Trengganu inscription. In view of the fact that it is written in Jawi script, One can say that Arab-Islamic influence is far more powerful than any other



inscriptions with later dates. Specifically related to the Trengganu inscription, the following points are important. First, in the Trengganu inscription, God is called the "Dewata Mulia Raya", but the Prophet Muhammad is called "the Messenger of Allah" (*Rasul Allah*) and it still uses "the servants of Dewata Mulia Raya" rather than "the servants of Allah" (*hamba Allah*) to address the Muslim community. Second, the inscription already uses the names for days and months as they are known in the Arab-Muslim world. Third, Arabic words and expressions are used side by side with Sanskrit, while the Malay has become increasingly dominant. Fourth, a more complete set of affixes is used including *me-, ber-, di-, se, -kan, -nya,* and-*kau*. Fifth, there is a strong tendency to carry out the punishment for adulterers (Sanskrit: *balacara*); if single or widowed (*bujan, palu*) one hundred lashes, and if married to be buried to the waist and to be stoned.[8]

Samudera Pasai also witnessed the development of Malay into a medium for conveying religious messages. It should be noted that despite its diminishing role as a center of political power and trade anddespite the fact that its role was being replaced by Malacca in the early 14thcentury, Samudera Pasai's position as a center of Islamic learning survived. This had to do with the fact that the government highly respected and supported Islamic studies. Ibn Batutta's journal from the 14th century reflects a similar condition. According to him, Sultan Malik al-Zahir ---Samudra Pasai's second ruler --- observed the prayers in the palace mosque, and after he had finished his prayer he used to recite the Qur'an. He was also known as being very close and paying honors to scholars of Islamic law.

Therefore, entering the 15th century when Malacca was developing into a leading Islamic kingdom in the Archipelago, Samudera Pasai continued to be regarded as a center of Islamic studies. A story in the *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals), a classic Malay texts and the traditional source for information about Malacca --- proves Samudera Pasai's important position. It is told in the text that a scholar in the field of Sufism named Maulana Abu Ishak lived in Arabia. He had written a book entitled *Durr al-Manzum* and he intended to uses his book to teach in Malacca. Malacca's ruler, Sultan Mansur Shah, not only welcomed Maulana Abu Ishak's intention

8. Imran T. Abdullah. "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., p. 237.

but even himself became attracted to the study of Sufism. Consequently, he wanted Maulana Abu Ishak's book to be translated into Malay so that it could be a source for the study of Islam in Malacca.

For that purpose, Sultan Mansur Shah sent the book to Pasai to be translated. The ruler in Samudera Pasai ordered a cleric, Makhdum Patakan, to carry out the Sultan of Malacca's request and after he had acquitted himself of this task, the book was returned to Malacca. Sultan Mansur Shah was delighted when he received the translation of the book and he showed the translation to the book's author, Maulana Abu Ishak.


Other remarkable texts include various stories concerning the life of the Prophet Muhammad such as the *Hikayat Nur Muhammad* (containing a story of the prophet Muhammad since the early emanative process of the world'screation from his light), *Hikayat Bulan Berbelah* (contains the story ofthe Prophet Muhammad's miracle in splitting the moon), *Hikayat Nabi Bercukur* (tells the story of the shaving of the Prophet Muhammad's hair), *Hikayat Nabi Mi'raj* (a story on the Prophet Muhammad's ascension to heavens to receive the obligation of the five prayers)[9], and *Hikayat Nabi Wafat* (the story of the Prophet's death). All those stories are translations and adaptations of texts containing the same stories in Persian.[10] Along with the translations of these stories, other texts contain Islamic epics such as the *Hikayat Iskandar Zulkarnain*, *Hikayat Amir Hamzah*, and *Hikayat Muhammad Hanafiah*. These stories were also translated from Persian into Malay in Samudera Pasai.[11]

In addition to these stories, another text that has significance within the development of literature in Samudera Pasai is the literary history of the kingdom itself, the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* (the Story of the Pasai Kings). This text is the oldest historical work in the

9 See Th.C. van der Meij and N. Lamboril (edited and translated), The Malay *Hikayat Mi'raj Nabi Muhammad, The Prophet Muhammad's Nocturnal Journey to Heaven and Hell* (Leiden: Brill).

10 T. Iskandar *Kesusteraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad*, ..., pp. 119-123.

11 L.F. Brakel, *The Hikayat Muhammad Hanafiyyah* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) and L.F. Brakel, The Story of Muhammad Hanafiyyah (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1977). See also Iskandar, *Kesusteraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad*, ..., p. 127-152. See also Vladimir Braginsky *The Integration of traditional Malay literature* (Leiden, KITLV Press, 2004) pp. 150-153.



The book by Pocut Haslinda about Silsilah Raja-Raja Islam di Aceh Hubungannya Dengan Raja-Raja Islam Melayu Nusantara (The Geneology of Moslem Kings of Aceh and their Relationship with the Moslem Kings of Melayo-Nusantara)

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

Malay world and it was probably written in 1534. Based on the version in Latin script edited by A.H. Hill,[12] the content of *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* can be divided into three parts: (1) from the early establishment of Samudera Pasai until Sultan Ahmad ascended to the throne; (2) the reign of Sultan Ahmad and the story of his son, Tun Beraim Bapa; and (3) the story of Princess Gemerencang, a daughter of the King of Majapahit who fell in love with Tun Abdul Jalil, a son of Sultan Ahmad, and subsequently Majapahit's victory over Pasai.[13]

The important position of Samudera Pasai in Islamic studies can also be seen from a story from the *Sejarah Melayu*. It was told that people often turned to Samudera Pasai to addressing key issues and controversies in religious matters. One of these issues was related to the theological question about the nature of hell and heaven along with the contents of both realms: "What do the heavens consist of, are they forever therein; what are the contents of Hell, and are they eternal therein?" On this issue, Malacca's Sultan Mansur Shah sent Tun Bija Wangsa to Samudera Pasai to look for the answer. The ruler of Pasai ordered Makhdum Muda to prepare the answers to these questions and they took the answers to Malacca where Sultan Mansur Shah praised Makhdum Muda's answers.

This story is an illustration of Samudera Pasai's vital role in the Islamization process in the Malay-Indonesian world, and simultaneously of the development of the Malay language into a medium of religious expression, in addition to its use for diplomacy and trade. Thus, it is clear that in the 14th and 15th centuries Samudera Pasai was an important center of Malay culture and from where the development of Islam and the Malay language continued and reached many areas in Indonesia.[14]This development reached its peak in 16th and 17th centuries Aceh. However, before entering the discussion on the reign of the Kingdom of Aceh, some other important linguistic elements will be discussed first.

Pre-Classical Malay: the Development in the 15thCentury

12. A.H. Hill, (ed.), "Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai", *JMBRAS* 33, 1960, pp. 1-165.

13. T. Iskandar, *Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad*, ..., p. 153-157. See also, R.O. Winstedt, *A history of classical Malay literature*, (New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 105-106, andVladimir Braginsky, *The heritage of traditional Malay literature*, pp. 136-139.

14. T. Iskandar, *Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad*, ..., pp. 102-103.



As mentioned above, the transition process from ancient Malay dominated by Sanskrit to pre-classical Malay, also known as archaic Malay, became a key feature in Samudra Pasai in the 14th century. This transition was characterized mainly by the use of Jawi script (Arabic script adapted to the phonological system of Malay), as part of Arab-Islamic influence in the social-political and economic developments of the period. A similar process took place at the time of Malacca in the 15th century. The Pengkalan Kempas inscription, dated 1467 A.D., is important in this connection. The first part of the inscription is carved in Kawi script but subsequently continues in Jawi script. It is clear that a transition had started in the time of Samudera Pasai.

As during the time of Samudera Pasai, the15thcentury also spawned a number of Malay texts associated with the development of Islam and the Kingdom of Malacca. The following two prophetic stories, *Hikayat Nabi Yusuf* (Story of the Prophet Joseph) and *Hikayat Nabi Sulaiman* (Story of the Prophet Solomon), were both written in Malacca.[15]

15. T. Iskandar, *Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad*, ..., pp. 196-199.

Another text that is central to the history of Malacca is the *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals). The text isone of the oldest in the history of Malay literature and therefore, it isimportant for both history and language. Written in Jawi script, the *Sejarah Melayu* was composed by Tun Sri Lanang in 1613 and thus a century after the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in 1511. [16]Its contents starts with the story of the origins of the Malay rulers and continues with the establishment of the Kingdom of Malacca, where many foreign merchants, particularly Chinese and Tamils came and stayed. Many things about court life are narrated as well as Malacca's relation with Samudera Pasai. The story ends with the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese.[17]

Completing the picture on the advance of Malaccaas presented in the Malay Annals is the *Undang-Undang Malaka* (Laws of Malacca). The text contains a variety of governmental regulations related to many aspects of life ---social-

16. R.O. Winstedt, (ed.) "Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals", *JMBRAS* 16, 1938, pp.1-226, pp. 27-34. See also, Vladimir Braginsky, *The heritage of traditional Malay literature*, pp. 62-63.

17. T. Iskandar, *Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad*, ..., p. 208-209. See also, Vladimir Braginsky, *The heritage of traditional Malay literature*, pp. 139-151.

political, religious and commercial--- set during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Shah (1424-1444) and implemented more effectively by his successor, Sultan Muzaffar Shah (1445-1458).[18] In fact, during the rain of a later ruler, Sultan Mahmud Shah (1488-1511), special rules were also formulated for matters pertaining to marine trade, which was growing at that time.[19]

Back to the aspect of the Malay language, concerning pre-classical Malay, Abdullah[20] ---relying entirely on Iskandar[21]--- has done detailed research about some special features both in speech and in writing. These features are as follows:

First, the sound /h/ at the beginning or in the middle of a word was maintained: *harang* (*arang*, charcoal), *hurai* (*urai*, disclose) *hutak* (*otak,* brain); *tihang* (*tiang,* pillar), *tuha* (*tua,*old), *guha* (*gua,* cave), *samuha* (*semua,* all) etc.Sanskritloan words were written close to their original forms: *anugeraha* (Skt. *anugraha*, grace), *arta* (Skt. *artha*, wealth), *astamewa* (Skt. *astam eva*, special), *daruhaka* (Skt. *drohaka*, insubordinate), *gebala* (Skt. *gopala*, shepherd), *manusyia* (Skt. *manusyia*, mankind), *netiasa* (Skt. *nityasas*, constant), *periksya* (Skt. *pariksa*,check), *perkasya* (Skt.*perkasa,* brave), *sanggeraha* (Skt. *samgraha*, studio) etc.

Second, loan words that etymologically have two consonants kept only one usingan emphasis (*tashdid*), for instance / b. dd ./ *--budi* (Skt. *buddhi*, moral), / k. pp. l. / *--kapal* (Tamil: *kappal*, ship), / m . dd ./*--muda* (Skt. *mudha*, young), /s. dd. h. / *--sudah* (Skt. *suddha*, finished), /s. kk . a / *--suka* (Skt. *sukha*, like). For schwa/ĕ/the letter *alif* was used: *baralahan* (*beralahan*, alergic), *jamu* (*jemu*, bored),*sabau* (*sebau,*shoulder), *kakayaan* (*kekayaan*, wealth). A consonant after aschwa was doubled by using an emphasis: /b. dd . l/ *-bedil* (gun);not doubled /b. l . ddu/ *-beledu* (velvet), /b. rk. rr. t / *-berkerat*(slivery); /d . ngng . n/ *-dengan* (with); /m. m. rr ./ *-memeri*,(to give); /s. tt. y ./ *-setia*(loyal). Sounds /y/ and /w/ are doubled by using an emphasis or the same letter is written twice: /a yy ./ - *ia* (he/she/it), /d yy ./ -

18. Fang, Liaw Yock, *Undang-Undang Melaka: A Critical Edition*. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); pp. 32-38; T. Iskandar *Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad* ....., p. 204.

19. T. Iskandar, *Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad*,..... p. 207.

20. Imran T. Abdullah, "Bahasa Melayu' Lingua Franca Islam', in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., p. 236-239.

21. T. Iskandar, *Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad*, ... p. 114-118.



The Baiturrahman Mosqueis one of the remains of the Aceh Kingdom.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

dia (he or she), /bww . h/ *-buah*(fruit), / bww. ng / *-buang*(waste), /b. yy . k/ *-baik*(good), /d. lww. r/ *-di luar* (outside).

Third, in morphology some special things appear: when the prefix /me- / meta voiced consonant, the consonant will disappear and be replaced by its homorganic nasal: *balas–memalas* (to respond) rather than *membalas*, *belah–memelah* (to split), *bicara–memicara* (to speak), *buang-* memuang (to waste), *dengar–* menengar (to listen), *junjung–* menyunjung (to raise), *bunuh–memunuh* (to kill), *bilang–memilang* (to count), *binasa –meminasakan* (to destroy) etc.

Thus, pre-classical Malay is the language of texts composed in that period, and--after undergoing changes due to generations of readers' constantly changing needs --- it had become the language of the texts that were subsequently composed along with the development of the history of Islam in Indonesia. Two copies of the famous literary histories of the 15thcentury, *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* and *Sejarah Melayu* are evidence of the use of pre-classical Malay language. In addition to having been written in Jawi script, both texts also still used pre-classical or archaic Malay elements. For example, the word "*hilang*" (lit. lost) in the meaning of "to die" is still used, and it had not yet been replaced by the expression "*berpulang ke rahmatullah*" (lit. to return to the Divine blessed-[abode]) as the latter term was commonly used for exalted figures. So also the word "*ditanam*" (lit. planted) was also still used to mean "*dikuburkan*" (buried).[22]

In addition to these two texts, pre-Classical Malay is also employed as the language of narrative texts as evidenced bythe Shellabear's edition of the *Hikayat Seri Rama* (1917), Iskandar's edition of the *Hikayat Aceh* (1958), Brakel's edition of the *Hikayat Muhammad Hanafiah* (1975), and the *Hikayat Bayan Budiman*.[23]

Consolidating a Lingua Franca: Development in Malay in the 16th and 17th Centuries

Following the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in 1511, the central of Islam and the Malay language shifted to the Kingdom of Aceh. The center of commercial activities that was previously based in Malacca had also moved to

22. Imran T Abdullah. "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., p. 239.

23. Imran T Abdullah. "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (eds.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., p. 239.

Aceh, andencouraged the development of the region into a power house of commerce, politics and the development of Islam. Muslim traders migrated from Malacca to Aceh, and ---as is the case with Samudera Pasai and Malacca--- they contributed to turning Aceh into a leading trade center within the trading network of Asia. Mughayat Ali Shah (reigned 1514-1530) was the first king who laid the foundation for the development of Aceh into the most prominent kingdom in the 17th century archipelago.[24]

Aceh witnessed the most important stage in the development of Malay as it grew into the common language in the archipelago. Two explanations below offer strong evidence that Aceh, supported by stable political conditions and developed trade, contributed significantly to the development of Malay language and culture. At the same time, it should be noted here that the development of Islam is an inherent part of the development and establishment of the Malay language. In line with Aceh's position in the 16th and 17th centuries as the leading Islamic center in the archipelago, intellectual activities concerning language and texts were closely linked to efforts to contextualize and disseminate Islam in Aceh and in the Malay-Indonesian region in general.

> In the year nine hundred ninety after the Hijrah two priests came from Mecca. One was a man named Sheikh Abul-Khair bin Sheikh Ibn Hajar. He composed a book entitled *Saif al-Qati'* on the word *a'yan thabitah* and he taught Islamic law in the state of Aceh Darussalam. The second was Sheikh Muhammad Yamani, who was an expert in Islamic jurisprudence. Both Sheikhs discussed the problems of *a'yan thabitah*. At one point the discussion stopped as no one could judge the matter. Hence, both sheikhs sailed.
>
> Then came a ulama from Gujarat named Sheikh Muhammad Jilani ibn Hassan ibn Muhammad, Hamid was the name of his clan, the Qurayshwas his tribe, Ranir the name of his country, Shafi'i his School (mazhab). The sheikh taught logic, Arabic literature, Islamic jurisprudence and law in the state of Aceh Darussalam. And many students wanted to study Islamic mysticism. The sheikh complied and he came again at a

24. Denys Lombard, *Kerajaan Aceh: Zaman Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636)*, (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1986), p. 8-17. See also M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 62-69.

later time. Hence, the sheikh sailed to Mecca.

The quotation above, from the *Bustan as-Salatin* by Nuruddin al-Raniri,[25]is not only a testimony of Aceh's cosmopolitan nature---especially as seen from the religious side---but also that shows the use of Malay had been firmly established as the medium of expression in the religious intellectual discourse, in social life and for political diplomacy. The quote above does not only show the use of "original" Malay, where pre-classical archaic elements were less used, but also the emergence of a new genre in the writing tradition in the Malay world, the so-called "kitab" ---works that contain the substance of Islamic teaching of which the *Bustan as-Salatin* is one example.

Kitab Literature

It should be emphasized that the term 'kitab literature' was first used by Hooykaas[26] and then Brakel[27] and refers to a group of texts characterized by Islam or the results of adapting Arabic/ Persian works, unlike other fiction and historical works that developed in the Malay world. More specifically, it refers to literary works written in Aceh in the 16th and 17th centuries by leading religious scholars, namely Hamzah Fansuri, Syamsuddin as-Sumatrani, Nuruddin ar-Raniri, and Abdul Ra'uf as-Singkili that contain Islamic teachings ranging from Sufism, jurisprudence, theology, and Islamic history. In Aceh, these works are commonly called "Kitab Jawoe" (book written in Malay in Jawi script) or "Jawi books" in the Malay world generally. Kitab literature has special linguistic patterns and manifests it self into an Islamic *lingua franca* in the Archipelago.[28]

Hamzah Fansuri was the first scholar who needs to be explained. Based on the available resources, both local and foreign, several scholars argue that Hamzah Fansuri most probably lived in Aceh before and during the reign of Sultan Alauddin Ri'ayat Shah (1589-1602).[29] While Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani

25. T. Iskandar, (ed.), *Bustan's-Salatin: Bab II Fasal 13* [Nuruddin al-Raniri], (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1966), p. 33-4.

26. C. Hooykaas, *Perintis Sastra*, (Groningen-Jakarta: J.B. Wolters, 1951), p.144.

27. L.F. Brakel, "On the Origin of Malay Hikayat", *Review of Indonesian and Malaysan Affairs (RIMA)*, 13, 2, 1979, pp. 1-33, p. 6.

28. Imran T.Abdullah, "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ... p. 244.

29. However, in relation to Hamzah Fansuri, it is important to consider latest information from Guillot & Kalus (2000), which explains that on the basis of a finding in a tombstone in Mecca, it is probable that Hamzah Fansuri had already dead



is estimated to have lived during the reign of the next king, Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636). Both scholars held positions as "Sheikh al-Islam" and served as the king's advisers, especially in the field of religion. The most important thing to emphasize here is that Hamzah Fansuri and Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani were leading scholars, particularly in Aceh, in the late 16th and early 17th centuries.

Hamzah Fansuri wrote many books, but what have been found until now are three mystical treatises, respectively the *Sharab al-'Ashiqin* (Beverages of the Intimate People), *Asrar al-'Arifin* (Secrets of the Gnostics) and *al-Muntahi* (End Path). The *Sharabal-'Ashiqin* is regarded as his first Malay workand it is also the first mystical treatise in Malay. Another version is entitled *Zinat al-Muwahidin* (Jewelry of the Monotheists). While the findings on his mystical poems are only less than 32 threads. His poems are considered to be the first 'Malay poetry'. Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani (d. 1630 AD) mentioned these poems as *ruba'i*, namely a quatrain within two *misra'*.[30]

Although not in the form of poetry, Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani wrote many works, especially mystical treatises that belong to bookliterature. Among these arethe *Mir'at al-Mu'minin* (Mirror of the faithful), *Mir'at al-Iman* (Mirror of faith), *Zikarat al-Dairati qaba Qawsaini aw Adna* (Circle ofTwo Bows Lengthor Closer to God), *Mir'at al- Muhaqqiqin* (Mirror of the Self-Prosecutors), *Jawahir al-Haqa'iq* (Pearl of Realities), *Nur al-Daqa'iq* (Light of Subtleties), and *Kitab al-Haraqah* (Book of Gowns).

The next Muslim scholar who made important contributions to the development of book literature is Nuruddin ar-Raniri. His full name is Nur al-Din Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn Hasanji al-Hamid al-Shafi'i al-Ash'ari al- 'Aydarusi al-Raniri (d. 1068/1658). He was born in Ranir, or Randir, an old harbor city on the coast of Gujarat. Ar-Raniri came to Aceh around 1637, soon after Iskandar Muda and Shamsuddin had died. He was immediately granted the position of Sheikh al-Islam and in this strong position he launched a religious reform movement against the Sufi doctrine of

in around 1527. Of course, the finding of these two scholars has been the object of dispute. Braginsky (2001) for example, is still in doubt of the Kalus & Guillot'sinterpretation.

30. Abdul Hadi W.M., "Tradisi Sastra dan Kebahasaan", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (eds.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, (Jakarta: Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve, 2012), Vol.III: Kedatangan dan Peradaban Islam, p. 208-211, dan, Abdul Hadi W.M., *Tasawuf Yang Tertindas: Kajian Hermeneutik Terhadap Karya-Karya Hamzah Fansuri,* (Jakarta: Yayasan Paramadina, 2001), p. 198.



The tomb of Abdurrauf al-Singkilior Shah Kuala. Most of the literature on Indonesian Islam refers to works written by Acehnese ulamas like Abdurrauf al-Singkili.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

wahdah al-wujud (existential monism). During his stay in Aceh for about seven years, ar-Raniri produced many works in various fields such as theology, Qur'an exegesis, hadith, Islamic law, and history, and others. He was thus known to have beena highly productive scholar and around thirty works have attributed to him, although not all of them were written during his seven years stay in Aceh.

Based on the available sources, at least fifteen of ar-Raniri'sworks are related to theology and mysticism: (1) *Durrat al-Fara'id bi Sharh al-Aqa'id* (Precious Jewels on the Explanation of Theology), a Malay-language book on faith, which is an adaptation of the *Sharh al-Aqa'id Nasafiah* bySa'd al-Din al-Taftazani; (2) *Nubdhah fi Da'wah az-Zil ma'a Sahibihi* (Brief description of the Indictment theShadow with the Companions), which contains the perverted notions of the mystical doctrine of existential monism; (3) *Lata'if al-Asrar* (Subtlety of Secrets) that discusses mysticism; (4) *Asrar al-Ihsan fi Ma'rifah wa al-Ruh al-Rahman* (The Secret of Beauty to the Profound Knowledge and Divine Spirit); (5) *Tibyan Ma'rifah fi al-Adyan* (Explanation of the Profound Knowledge on Religions); (5) *Hill al-Zhill* (Deciphering the Shadow), which contains arguments against the heretical teachings of the Wujudiyyah; (6) *Hujjah al-Siddiq li daf'i al-zindiq* (Argument of the Righteous to Refute the Heretics); (7) *al-Fath al-Mubin 'ala al-Mulhidin* (The Real Victory over the Apostates); and several works that discuss various other issues.

Raniri's efforts to introduce a new pattern of Islamic mysticism in the Malay Archipelago was subsequently continued by Abdurrauf al-Singkili (1024-1105/1615-1693), whose full name is 'Abd al-Ra'uf bin 'Ali al-Jawi al -Fansuri as-Singkili. He was a prolific writer. The *Mir'at al-Tullab* is the first complete Islamic book in Malay Islamic literature. Al-Singkili most important work is the *Tarjuman al-Mustafid* an interpretation (tafsir) of the Qur'an in Malay. Al-Singkili was the first person in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago who wrote a complete interpretation of the Qur'an.

Abdurrauf al-Singkili'sother important works are *Idhah Tawhid al-Bayan fi Masa'il A'yani*, *'Umdat al-Fi Muhtajin Suluk Maslak al-Mufarradin*, *Ta'bir al-Bayan*, *Daqa`iq al-Huruf, Majmu' al-Masa'il*, *Sakrat al-Mawt*, *Tanbih al-Masyi*, and many others. The books were written in Malay. Except latter is written in Arabic the other books an in Malay. If Hamzah Fansuri was a follower of the Qadiriyah mystical order, Abdurrauf was



Pen and ink used to write manuscripts in the past.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

a follower of the Syattariyah Sufi order. As an expert in Sufism, Abdurrauf also wrote mystical poems, but they are not very well known. Among his poems is the *Syair Ma'rifa* (Gnostic Poetry). His works are largely classified as belonging to the book literature discussed here.

Linguistic Aspects of Book Literature

In terms of language, the book literature composed by the scholars discussed above and of a high intellectual level. Attempts not to use Arabic are vocabulary seem to have been strong, although Arabic influences remained, such as the use of: */adalah/*, */yakni/*, */dan/* to support words or phrases. Hamzah Fansuri seemed to stress this aspect. As a Sufi teacher, he wanted his students to come to exact understanding. Therefore, he deliberately wrote his works in Malay and not in Arabic or Persian, "so all the people who do not understand Arabic or Persian can comprehend it", he wrote in the opening of one of his works, the *Sharabu l-'Ashiqin*.[31]

31. Imran T. Abdullah. "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (eds.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., p. 244. See also, Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, *The Mysticism of Hamzah al-Fansuri*, (Kuala Lumpur: Universty of Malaya Press, 1970), p. 297.

The same statement is also valid for Shamsuddin as-Sumatrani's *Mir'at al-Mu'min*1601 M) in which he wrote "... because they do not know Arabic and Persian but only the Pasai language...."[32] Therefore, like Hamzah Fansuri, he wrote in Malay in an attempt to write a book in a language that his readers in Aceh and in the archipelago in general could understand.

The Malay language Hamzah Fansuri used is rated as pure Malay that it does not excessively use Arabic. Arabic is used more for religious terms that are difficult to translate into Malay. In addition, another important aspect of Hamzah Fansuri's contribution is his initiation in Malay Sufi literature, which indeed has been acknowledged by many observers. He is known to have used very creative language in his poetry. His use of Arabic words is prominent but he integrated them well into his poems' structure. Sufi terms as well as other religious terms do not only play their roles for the sake of rhyme and rhythm, but also made his poems solid. Arabic is also required in order to enable his readers to understand Sufism.[33]

32. Imran T. Abdullah. "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., p. 244.

33. Imran T. Abdullah. "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua

Linguistically, Ar-Raniri's works are not essentially different from those of Hamzah Fansuri. In his works, Ar-Raniri had the same ability as Hamzah Fansuri in terms of the use of Malay. The quotes from his work above, *Bustan as-Salatin*, are testimony to his ability. The Malay ar-Raniri used reveals not only a very high level of knowledge regarding Islamic doctrine and history, but also his choice of words is purely Malay, though he still uses Arabic words.

Another important thing about ar-Raniri's works is that he made a translation of each sentence in Arabic. His work is a refutation of Hamzah Fansuri's Wujudiyah mystical order and entitled *Hujjatus-Siddiq li daf'i l-zindiq* is almost an Arab-Malay paragraph to paragraph translation.

> *Fa 'allaftu wa tarajjamtu hadhihi l-risalata bi l-jawiyyati min kutubi l-shufiyyati wa ghayrihim.* So I composed and translated this treatise into the Jawi language from books on mysticism and others.
>
> *Wa sammaytuha hujjata l-siddiqi li daf'i l-zindiqi.* I named this treatise *hujjata l-siddiqi li daf'i l-zindiqi* meaning the arguments of all the wise to refute the theology of heretics. So I mentioned in this treatise the theology and the four schools of religious groups (*ta'ifah*), namely: the theologians (*mutakallimin*), the mystics (*Ahlu l-Shufi*), the jurists and philosophers (*Hukama Falasifah*) and the existentialists (*Wujudiyyah*) who were heretics for stating the existence of God to that of nature: are the two [existence] different or united as will be mentioned about the fact.[34]

It should be emphasized that only some book on literature that uses this kind of translation pattern. Other works use inter-linear translations, where the Malay translation is written directly under the Arabic sentences. This is the typical way of presentation in book literature of the period under discussion. Shamsuddin as-Sumatrani, who was a prolific writer ---although only someof his works have reached us--- also used inter-linear translations in his early works. He used Pasai-Malay as did Nuruddin ar-Raniri. In his *Mir'atu l-Muhaqqiqin*he copied sentences from the original Arabic and he put his inter-linear Malay translation

Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ... p. 245.

34. Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *Raniri and the Wujudiyah of the 17th Century Aceh*, (Singapore: Malaysian Branch of Royal Asiatic Society, 1966), p. 81-2; Imran T Abdullah, "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ... p. 248.

directly under the Arabic text. However, some standard Arabic mystical terms and expression remained in use which were never translated into Malay.[35]

Similarly, this way of presentation of the Malay translations also features in the work of Abdul Ra'uf Singkel, whose full name is Abdul-Ra'uf bin 'Ali al-Jawi al-Fansuri as-Singkili. This moderate figure composed a Qur'an commentary in Malay using interlinear translations and he also wrote a treatise entitled *Mir'at at-Tullab fi tasil l-Ma'rifat Ahkam ash-Syar'iyyah li l-Malik al-Wahhab* (Mirrors for Students in Reaching the Knowledge of Divine Shari'a Law). The treatise was written at the request of the Queen of Aceh at the time, Sultanah Tajul 'Alam Shafiyatuddin Shah. Abdul Ra'uf Singkel, with the help of his brother, wrote the treatise in Pasai-Malay because he was no longer very fluent in Malay after his long stay in Arabia.[36]

The works of the Muslim scholars described above clearly show that in the 16th and 17th century, Malay had evolved into an established language, not only in social life, political diplomacy and commerce, but also in the religious intellectual discourse. Book literature is evidence of the use of Malay in the latter. The Muslim scholars mentioned above needed to translate their works into Malay, so that they could be accessed more widely by Muslims in Aceh and in the archipelago in general. This confirms the conditions under which Malay turned into the *lingua franca* in the Malay-Indonesian world.

Of course, a number of Arabic words were still used in book literature. In view of the socio-political context of the time, this is not surprising. Composing Arabicized sentences and using Arabic loan words indicated the intellectual level of the authors and showed that they were scholars who were sufficiently qualified in the field of religion. Van Ronkel[37] called this pattern "Arabism" and it was much like the use of English now a days. Examples of Arabism are the titles of the books in this book literature that always use Arabic, even when they are translations in Malay. Like wise, a number of words that are standard in

35. Imran T Abdullah. "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., p. 249.

36. Imran T. Abdullah. "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., p. 249.

37. Ph. S. van Ronkel, *Mengenal Pengaruh Tatakalimat Arab terhadap Tatakaliat Melayu*, (Jakarta: Bharata, 1977), p. 11-13; Imran T Abdullah. "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., p. 250.

Arabic ---such as *ahlu l-shufi* (the mystic people), *mutakallimin* (theologians), *hukama'* (jurist), *Falasifah* (philosopher), *wujudiyyah* (the existentialism), and *mulhid* (the apostates) --- still appear here and there but are left without a translation in Malay.

However, it is important to note that the Arabic vocabulary was used to support certain scientific levels. The words were integrated into Malay and over time included in the Malay vocabulary. Arabism in this context is an expression of the growing public appetite for Arabic and oriented to enrich Malay with new terms to be used for the spread of Islamic sciences in the archipelago.

Translation works

In relation to translation, the following text deserves special attention. Dated 998 A.H./1590 A.D., the text is written in Arabic with inter-linear translation in Malay and entitled *'Aqa'id*, written by an-Nasafi. A manuscript of another text kept in Leiden University Library (Cod.Or. 1660) ---dated 990 A.H./1582 A.D., contains an Arabic grammar, and is written in Persian with inter-leartranslation in Malay--- *'Aqa'id* is the oldest manuscript from Aceh that has been preserved.[38] Al-Attas,[39] the first scholar to review the text, connects the year of the translation of the text to the visit of Sheikh Jilani ibn Hasan ibn Muhammad Hamid from Ranir, Nuruddin ar-Raniri's uncle, who for the second time came to to Aceh during the reign of Sultan 'Alau'd-Din Ri'ayat Shah (1588-1604).

In addition to the time of writing, another important thing to discuss are the linguistic aspects of the inter-linear translations. The following explanation refers in its entirety to Abdullah's research,[40] who in his turn refers to Asmar Omar's analysis.[41]The manuscript of the *'Aqa'id* shows the development of Malay in the 16th century as regards terms in the Jawi spelling, the morphophonemic system,

38 T. Iskandar, *Kesusteraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad*, p. 326.

39 Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *The Oldest Known Malay Manuscript: A 16th Century Malay Translation of the 'Aqa'id of al-Nasafi* (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of Royal Asiatic Society, 1988).

40 Imran T. Abdullah, "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam," in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., p. 240-241.

41 Asmah Hj. Omar, *Bahasa Melayu Abad ke-16: Satu Analisis Berdasarkan Teks Melayu 'Aqa'id an-Nasafi* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1991).



Tomb of Raja Ali Haji. Raja Ali Haji's thoughts, including those on linguistics, were attempts to restore Malay culture.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

morphology, grammar, and vocabulary. The characteristics of pre-classical Malay are still visible here, such as words like *'dipaccat'* (*dipecat*, fired) with /c/ emphasis, *'bertannung'* (bertenung, engaging in witchcraft), and *'lannyap'* (*lenyap*, disappear) with /n/ emphasis. Some Arabic loan words had been absorbed, but others also still retained their original form, such as *kubur* besides *'qubur'* (grave), '*tabi'at*', in addition to '*thabi'at*' (character).

The morphophonemic system is a jumble as some is still patterned with pre-classical Malay while others had already reached the classic stage. For example, the voiced consonant at the beginning of a word is omitted such as: *memicara*, *memeri* (sound /b/ is deleted), but we also find: *membenari*, *membahagi.* Likewise, there is a mixedsystem of the added nasal to the prefix *me-*. In some cases there is no nasal such as in *mehalalkan*, *mehadapi*, *mehendaki*, *mehabisi.* In other cased, the prefix*me-*is followed by a nasal like in*menghilangkan*, *menghasilkan*, *mengharuskan.* It is clear here that linguistic rules are inconsistently applied and this refers to language change.

In the *'Aqa'id*a more complete affixation system (*me-*, *me-kan*, *di-*, *di-kan*, *ke-*, *ke-an*, *ber-*, *ber-an*, *ber-kan*, *ber-i*, *pe-*, *pe-an*, *per-an*, *-an*, *-i*, *ter-*) is found but the prefix *per-* is less productive in this text. The more complete affixes are used in the translation, the richer are the nuances in meanings they indicate.

In the *'Aqa'id* there is no word *'untuk'*, instead only '*bagi'* is used. A similar situation exists in many stories such as the *Hikayat Hang Tuah*, *Hikayat Si Miskin*, and *Hikayat Raja Muda*. In the *Hikayat Pandawa Lima* the word '*untuk*' isfound only once: *".... sudahlah untuk kita dianugerahkan oleh dewata mulia raya akan kita."* The word *'untuk'* here means '*nasib'* (fate), and*'peruntungan*' (luck). The word '*bagi*' is probably a translation from Arabic: (*li*), (*la*), (*lahu -baginya*), (*laku - bagimu*). In additions, there are translated conjunctions which seemed odd like: *akan bahwa, karena bahwa, melainkan bahwa*, which are translations of the Arabic elements: *bi anna, li anna, illa wa an*, as seen in the following sentences: (1) ilmu *akan bahwa* kull (ya'ni perhimpunan) sesuatu yang terbesar dari sukunya; (2) tiada akan membahagiakan dan mencelakakan *karena bahwa* keduanya itu daripada sifat Allah Ta'ala juga; and (3) tiada ada ia *melainkan bahwa* ada ia sebenarnya dalam agamanya.

The word '*akan*' functions as a preposition rather than as an auxiliary verb, as shown in the following examples: (1) menyungguhkan yang bertannung *akan*yang diceritakan; (2) . . . dan *akan* dia beberapa peri yang asal; (3) syiksya kubur itu *akan* segala kafir dan *akan* setengah daripada yang isi segala mukmin; and (4) . . . memohonkan ampun itu thabit *akan* Rasul dan *akan* segala yang baik. The word *'akan'* in the these four sentences can subsequently be replaced with: *pada, tentang, untuk,* and *bagi.*

Thus, a linguistic analysis of the translation of the *'Aqa'id*, as Asmah Hj. Omar[42] and also Imran[43] conducted shows that in the 16thcentury the use of the Malay language had become increasingly well established and wide spread. This is proved by the more complete affixation system, in addition to the vocabularies that had also increasingly absorbed Arabic elements, especially those related to religious aspects, especially Sufism.

42. Asmah Hj. Omar, *Bahasa Melayu Abad ke-16: Satu Analisis Berdasarkan Teks Melayu 'Aqa'id an-Nasafi*, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1991)

43. Imran T.Abdullah, "Bahasa Melayu: Lingua Franca Islam", in Taufik Abdullah dan A.B. Lapian (ed.), *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, ..., p. 242.

Fiction and Historical Literature

In addition to book literature, in the 16th and 17th centuries, Aceh,Samudera Pasai and Malacca also produced other types of texts called fiction and historical literature. However, unlike in Samudera Pasai and Malacca, in Aceh, these two types of literature, as will be shown below, but more emphasize on Acehnese history and culture in addition to Islamic subjects. Here follow some texts from Aceh that are ranked among the categories of fiction and historical literature.

Taj as-Salatin

The*Taj as-Salatin* (Sultans' Crown) by Bukhari al-Jauhari is the first text to be explained. It was written most likely in 1602, during the reign of Sultan Alauddin Ri'ayat Shah Sayid al-Mukammil in Aceh. Various scholars have conducted studies on this text, including, for example, Valentijn (1726) Werndly (1736), and Roorda van Eysinga (1827) during the early days of Dutch scholarship about Indonesia. They generally praised the quality of the text of the *Taj as-Salatin*, especially the Malay language that it uses. They consider the book the best text in Malay literature.[44] More recent

44. T. Iskandar, *Kesusteraan Klasik Melayu*

scholars, such as van Ronkel and Winstedt (1938) proposed a slightly different view. Although they still praise the quality of the content and the expression of the Malay language of the text, but both found that it ismerely a translation of a Persian work.

However, regardless of these issues, it is undeniable that the text of the *Taj as-Salatin* played an important role in the development of the political discourse in the Malay world and in Indonesia in general.[45] One important point in this regard is that the *Taj as-Salatin* put Islamic political tradition ---to be precisely the Sunni school--- at the center of Malay political thinking. Political principles in Islam were formulated in the form of stories and admonitions. And the reigning monarch was expected to use the book as a reference to guide him in exercising his power and therefore it can be paralleled to the *Nasihat al-Muluk* by al-Ghazali (d. 1111).

Some issues dealt with in the book are the requirements a king needs, the duties of kings, his ministers and chief commanders; criteria for and the nature of a just king and those of ministers and commanders; physiognomy in selecting officials; rules and admonitions to govern a kingdom; and various other issues related to political power.

Bustan as-Salatin

The *Bustan as-Salatin fi Dhikr al-Awwalin wa 'l-Akhirin* (Sultans' Garden in Remembrance of the People of the Beginning and the End), is an extensive historical work written by Nuruddin ar-Raniri. He wrote it in 1637after he had receivedan order to do so from Sultan Iskandar Thani, who had become his patron in Aceh. It contains the history of the world, starting from the creation of the heavens and earth to the period of the Aceh Kingdom. The text consists of seven chapters: (1) the description the creation of the seven skies; (2) the description of all the prophets and kings; (3) the description of all the just kings and ingenious viziers; (4) all ascetic kings and pious saints; (5) authoritarian kings and despotic viziers; (6) generous and noble people; and (7) the description of reason and knowledge.[46]

Sepanjang Abad, ..., p. 380.

45. Taufik Abdullah, "The Formation of a Political Tradition in the Malay World", in, Anthony Reid (ed.) *The Making of Islamic Political Discourse in Southeast Asia*, (Monash: Monash papers on Southeast Asia, 1993), p. 35-58.

46. T. Iskandar,*Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad* (Brunei: Universitas Brunei Darussalam, 1996), p. 419-420.



The Walio stone is a heritage of the Buton Sultanate. Before a sultan or a king was inaugurated, this location was used to beat the drum.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

T. Iskandar (1966)[47] has made a transliteration into Latin script of chapter 2 article 13 and up to recently it was the most important source on the history of Aceh.

Adat Aceh

The author of this text has not been identified. Information about the text is based on T.J. New bold's study in the *Madras Journal of Literature and Science* (1836 III: 54-57 and 1836 IV: 117-120), as well as on his other works (1839: 225-226). Following New bold is Th. Braddle who conducted studies on the same text. The result of Braddle's study was published in the *Journal of the Indian Archipelago* (1850 IV: 589-603; 1851 V: 26-28). Detailed information and the latest research results were obtained from G.W.J. Drewes and P. Voorhoeve (1958). The *Adat Aceh* (Acehnese Tradition) consists of a number of important points: (1) the order of all kings; (2) the genealogy of the kings in Bandar Aceh; (3) the tradition of the Kings' assembly; and (4) other traditions.

Hikayat Aceh

This text contains the genealogy of the Acehnese kings, and more particularly that of Sultan Iskandar Muda whose descendants are described in detail. After that, the text continues with a detailed biography of Sultan Iskandar Muda, starting from his birth, childhood until his adult life when he was appointed as the ruler of Aceh. Therefore, although entitled *Hikayat Aceh* (Story of Aceh), this text is mostly dedicated to Sultan Iskandar Muda, Aceh's greatest ruler.[48]

Adat Perintah Raja-raja or *Mabain al-Salatin*

There is not much information about the *Adat Perintah Raja-raja* (Traditions of Kings' Commands). Iskandar[49] simply states that a manuscript entitled *Mabain al-Salatin* (the Sultans' Building) is also found in the Turkish court, and in some ways it reminds one of the *Taj as-Salatin*. It apparently aims to offer advice to the authorities on how to manage their kingdom, such as how to determine the requirements of an ideal king, his attitudes and behavior in relation to palace elites, and a number of rules for the inhabitants of a kingdom.

47. Iskandar, T. (ed.) *Bustan's-Salatin: Bab II Fasal 13* [Nuruddn al-Raniri], (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1966).

48. T. Iskandar, *Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad,....*, p. 404-405.

49. T. Iskandar, *Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad,....*, p.27-428.

Silsilah Raja-raja dalam Negeri Aceh Bandar Darussalam

This text contains the genealogy of the kings of Aceh, starting from its first king, Sultan Johan Shah, who is said"to have come from a wind ward in 601 A.H. There after Sultan Ahmad gained control and he was entitled Sultan Ri'ayat Shah in 632 A.H."This text further illustrates the continuously changing process of authority until the 34thking, Sultan Alauddin Muhammad Shah.[50]

Adat Majlis Raja-Raja

The *Adat Majlis Raja-raja* (Customs of Kings Assembly) contains the rules and protocols ---referred here as customs (*adat*)--- of various institutions (*majlis*) in the kingdom (i.e. the king's assembly and the army commanders), up to special institutions for social-religious affairs: the Majlis Tabal (Tabal Council) on the calculation of the day for performing the fast, the Majlis Junjung Duli (Ascent Council), the Majlis Berangkat Hari Jumat (Friday Departure Council), the Majlis Bandar [Aceh] Darussalam (Harbor of [Aceh] Darussalam Council), and various other assemblies in the environment of the Aceh kingdom.

50. T. Iskandar, *Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad,*....., p. 428-429.


Palembang and Riau: The 18th and 19th centuries Centers of Malay Language Development

Entering the 18th and 19th centuries, the center of the development of Malay moved to Palembang and subsequently to Riau. Palembang position in the development of Islam in the archipelago started in the 18th century and was marked by the emergence of a number of scholars who wrote works in various fields of Islamic knowledge. Supported by the authorities who encouraged religious-intellectual activities, Palembang replaced Aceh as the center of Islamic development as Aceh's role had gradually diminished due to internal conflicts, and then the war against the Dutch Colonial Government.[51]

Abdussamad al-Palimbani is the first scholar whose works needs to be discussed. Iskandar[52]a scribes nine works (books) to al-Palimbani, among which the most famous is the *Hidayat al-Salikin fi Suluk Maslak al-Muttaqin.* Written in Malay in Mecca (completed in 1788)it is an adaptation of al-Ghazali's*Bidayat al-Hidayah* Other works

51. Azyumardi Azra, *Jaringan Ulama Timur Tengah dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad XVII dan XVIII,* (Bandung: Mizan, 1994), p. 243-244.

52. T. Iskandar, *Kesustraan Klasik Melayu Sepanjang Abad,* ....., p. 450-452.




Organizing Board and participants in the second Youth Congress, 28 October 1928.

Source: *Perpustakaan Nasional* (The National Library of the Republic of Indonesia).

are the *Sair al-Salikin ila 'ibadati Rabb al-'alamin*which is also based on a work by al-Ghazaliand the *Lubab Ihya 'Ulum al-Din*also written in Malay and completed in the holy land of Mecca about ten years after his first book. Inheriting the neo-Sufi intellectual tradition, al-Palimbani's works tried to stress the need for a reconciliation between Sufism and the Shari'a for which he adopted many works by al-Ghazali, as he was the main figure behind this effort.

Another scholar from Palembang is Shihabuddin bin Abdullah Muhammad. His works include the *Sharh yang Latif atas Mukhtasar Jawharut Tauhid,*. in form of a Malay translation on a review of Jawhar al-Tawhid by Ibrahim al-Laqani. Another work is a treatise adopting the *Risalah fi al-Tawhid* . by Walli Raslan al-Dimasyqi. Mention also needs to be made here of Kemas Fachruddin, another Palembang scholar who contributed significantly to the use of Malay in religious works (book literature). He also translated and adapted a number of Arabic books into Malay: Zakariya al-Ansari's *Fath al-Rahman, Futuh al-Sham,*a translation of Abu Ismail al-Basri's *Mukhtasar Futuh al-Sham*, and the *Tuhfat al-Zaman*,translation of Ibn Shaddad al-Himyari's*Tuhfat al-Zaman fi Dharf al-Yaman*. In the list of works among ranked among 18th century book literature,one book should be included. It waswritten by the great scholar from Kalimantan, Muhammad Arsyad bin Abdullah al-Banjari. He wrote a very famous book, *Sabil al-Muhtadin li al-tafaqquh fi Amr al-Din*, \ about the intricacies of the study of Islam.

Thus, in the 18th century, Palembang played an important role in the development of Islam in the Indonesia archipelago. In this century, Palembang produced many leading scholars who wrote influential works that would in part determine the intellectual and social discourse of Islam in Indonesia. This is evident from the fact that the works authored by religious scholars from Palembang ---and also the works of the Banjar scholar in Kalimantan--- have been reprinted numerous times. Thus, these religious works became the sources of the Muslims' formation of knowledge and their religious attitude. These works were read not only by Malay-Indonesian Muslims, but also by non-Malay Muslims in other regions in Indonesia. Therefore, the works of these Palembang scholars strengthened the spread of the use of Malay more widely in Indonesia.



Organizing Board of the second Youth Congress chaired by Soegondo Djojopoespito, 28 October 1928.

Source: *Perpustakaan Nasional* (The National Library of the Republic of Indonesia).

Entering the 19th century, the development of Islam and the Malay language came to be centered in Riau, precisely in the island of Penyengat, the center of the Riau-Lingga Kingdom in the 19th century.[53]The most prominent figure who contributed to the development of the social-intellectual discourse and political Islam in Malayis Raja Ali Haji (1808-1873) who wrote many influential works, especially with regards to the development of Malay culture. Above all, Raja Ali Haji had a strong interest in linguistics. This is evident from his work, *Kitab Pengetahuan Bahasa* (Book of Language Knowledge). Although he did not finish the work---possibly because he died before having been able to do so— the *Kitab Pengetahuan Bahasa* is strong evidence of Raja Ali Haji's desire to promote the use of Malay. Raja Ali Haji declared that his work was wanted as a guide for those who intended to increase their knowledge of language, religion, and the right customs. Raja Ali Haji's interest in these areas can also be seen from the letters he wrote to officials in the colonial government, especially Roorda van Eysinga and A.F. von de Wall, two Dutch scholar who were very interested in language and culture. This work was lithographed in 1857 with the support of Von de Wall (1807-73) and his German companions who composed a Dutch-Malay dictionary, and for whom Raja Ali Haji played the role as informer and assistant.[54]

The discussion in the *Kitab Pengetahuan Bahasa* is divided into two main parts. The first consists of a discussion of seven words that start with an *alif*, i.e. Allah, Al-Nabi, Ashab, Akhbar, Al-Insan Al-Awali and Al-Akhirat. In this section, Raja Ali Haji offers a relatively detailed and systematic description of these religious concepts (and their history), so that the first part of the *Kitab Pengetahuan Bahasa* resembles a religious textmore than a book onthe Malay language. In the second part, though it has the same tendency as the first part, Raja Ali Haji presents discussions clearly meant as a dictionary. It is organized systematically and starts with words that start with *alif*, *'ba'*, *'ta'*, *'nya'*, *'jim'*, and *'ca'*. The book is

53. Virginia Matheson, "Pulau Penyengat: Nineteenth Century Islamic Centre of Riau", *Archipel* 37, 1989: 158-69, p. 153-72. See also Palawa Alimuddin Hassan, "The Penyengat School: A Review of the Intellectual Tradition in the Malay-Riau Kingdom", *Studia Islamika*, vol. 10, no. 3, 2003: 95-123, pp. 97-121.

54. Jan van der Putten and al-Azhar (1995) [annot and introd.], *Di Dalam Berkekalan Persahabatan: Letters from Raja Ali Haji*, Leiden: Department of Languages and Cultures of Southeast Asia and Oceania Leiden University, p. 5-113.

made up of eighty-seven chapters and contains 1,687 entries.[55]His *Kamus Logat Johor Pahang Riau Lingga* (Dictionary of Johor Pahang Riau Lingga Dialects),to be a basic tool in the reconstruction of words that had been miskaenly used became of the users could not refer to the original sources.[56]

It should be emphasized however that Raja Ali Haji'sthoughts about language revolved around the efforts of restoring Malay culture. He had witnessed the political and economic problems that had hit the kingdom and saw the fundamental changes that had been taken place in the Malay world. His *Buku Pengetahuan Bahasa* was meant to be used for Malay cultural revitalization. His other important works are the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (Precious Gift), *Thamarat al-Muhimmah* (Rewards of Important Duties), and *Intizam Wazaif al-Malik* (Systematic Regulation on the King's Duties). The third text is an important work especially with regards to the history and politics of the Malay kingdoms. In the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* he explained the history of the Malay kingdom of Johor at length, especially the political behavior of its Kings. For Raja Ali Haji, the greatness of Malay Johor in the past was an example to be emulated by the rulers of his time whom he judged to have deviated from the norms of Islam.

If the *Tuhfat* resembles Malay historiography, the *Thamarat* and *Intizam* contain the political principles the kings and the political elites of the realm should adopt as their guiding sources. In both works, Raja Ali Haji promoted the Malay kingdom's political way of thinking which he formulated based on the past experiences of the kingdom he had described in the *Tuhfat*. The *Thamarat* contains advice and instructions for the rulers so that in exercising their power they might learn from the stories of earlier Malay rulers.

At a closer inspection, one can see that see that Raja Ali Haji in his book trie to revive the kingdom's political system, which had already been well established in the Malay world. He thought that the imperial system was the ideal model for the political structure in the Malay world. In fact, this seems so strong that his political ideas, especially in the *Thamarat*, in some important respects lean on the political thoughts of the 17th

55.Hasan Junus, *Raja Ali Haji: Budayawan di Gerbang Abad XX*, (Riau Univ Press, 2002), p. 115-116

56 Hasan Junus, *Raja Ali Haji: Budayawan di Gerbang Abad XX*, p. 120



The royal palace of Buton. The Buton Sultanate in Southeast Sulawesi presents vital evidence of the development of the Malay language in the archipelago. The Malay language was the formal language of the kingdom, used for political and commercial diplomacy as well as for a number of socio-religious texts.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

century as found in classical Malay texts, especially the *Taj as-Salatin*.

Malay Language Development in the Archipelago

Malay was not only used in the kingdom of Aceh, the language had spread to almost all the regions in the Archipelago. In line with the increasingly intensive Islamization process and the involvement of the regions inthe archipelago in international trade, Malay had become more widely used in the archipelago. The Europeans (Dutch and British) also started to use Malay as their working language in administration and as a means of communication with the indigenous people throughout the British and Dutch colonial territories, particular in the Malay kingdoms.

The development of Malay led to an intensifying process of cultural interaction. The text of the *Taj as-Salatin*,can be taken as an example. Written by Bukhari al-Jauhari in 1603in Aceh, it was not only influential within the Malay world, especially in Aceh, but also in other kingdoms in the Archipelago. Peter Carey[57] noted that it was copied in the Palace of Yogyakarta in 1831 and used ---on the order of Sultan Hamengkubuwana I--- as aguide for the royal political elites of the palace. Moreover, the text of *Taj as-Salatin* has also inspired the writing of the text *Budi Istirahat Indra Bustanul Arifin* in Makassar, South Sulawesi, which had the same function as the *Taj as-Salatin* in Yogyakarta.[58]

The case of the Kingdom of Buton in Southeast Sulawesi presents important proof of the development process of the Malay language in the Archipelago. Malay was the official language in the kingdom and used for political diplomacy and trade, and for a variety of socio-religious texts. Buton's manuscript collections demonstrate this cultural phenomenon. Among the 301 manuscripts that have been collected, a large number, that is 102 manuscripts were written in Malay, much more than those written in Arabic (84 manuscripts) and the local Wolio language (75 manuscripts). The colophons in the manuscripts confirm that the Malay manuscripts are older than the Arabic and Wolio ones. Malay manuscripts were written in the 17th and 18th centuries, where as manuscripts written

57. Peter B.R. Carey (1975) "A Further Note on Professor Johns' "Gift Addressed to the Spirit of the Prophet", *BKI* 131, pp. 341-344, p.344.

58. C. Pelras, "Religion, Tradition, and the Dynamics of Islamization in South Sulawesi", *Indonesia*, 57, 1985, pp.133-154.

in Arabic and Wolio were produced in the 19th century.[59]

Still related to the kingdom of Buton, it is important to mention here the letters of the Sultan of Buton to the British and Dutch government officials. Based on his research in the Leiden University library, Suryadi [60] recorded that at least three letters that were written by the King of Buton to the Dutch government and one letter, on behalf of Sultan Dayyan Asraruddin, the 27th ruler of Buton (1799-1822) addressed to the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies in Batavia. Another letter is in the name of Sultan Kaimuddin I, the 29th ruler of Buton who was in power until 1851. The letters are parts of a collection of official letters the King of Buton sent to Dutch officials that are stored in Leiden University Library. The Bodleian Library in Oxford, England, preserves a collection of letters of a *kapitalao* (sea captain) from Buton written in the 17th century (around1667), during the reign of the 10th Sultan of Buton, Sultan Adilik Rahim (ata La Limpata or Oputa Musabuna) in 1664-1669.[61]

The important thing to note is that the letters were written in Malay, much like the bulk of the other manuscripts and documents in the kingdom. This finding shows that the Malay language had not only become wide spread in the Archipelago, but also that it connected the people, in this context, the society of the Kingdom of Buton, with other communities who used Malay language in the archipelago. The following excerpt is from a letter of the Sultan of Buton to the Dutch Governor General at Batavia, with the complexion of Malay that in principle has no difference from the Malay language that developed in the Archipelago.

> Bahwa warkat al-ikhlas serta tabe-tabe banyak-banyak akan tanda harap dan percaya yaitu daripada Paduka Anakanda Sri Sultan Raja Buton dengan segala wazir menteri-menterinya, melayangkan kertas sekeping, datang ke bawah Hadirat Paduka Ayahanda Kompeni, Tuan Her Gurnadur Jenderal dan Raden van Indie di Betawi, Insya Allah

59. La Niampe, "Bahasa Melayu di Kerajaan Buton", *Bahasa dan Seni*, vol. 40, no. 1, 2012, pp. 14-24, p. 19. See also, Ikram Achdiati, dkk. *Katalog Naskah Buton: Koleksi Abdul Mulku Zahari*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 2001).

60. Suryadi, "Surat-Surat Sultan Buton, Dayyan Kaimuddin dan Kaimuddin I, KoleksiUniversiteitsBibliotheek Leiden, Belanda", *Humaniora*, vol. 19, no. 3, 2007, 284-301, p. 286.

61. Suryadi, "Surat-Surat Sultan Buton, Dayyan Kaimuddin dan Kaimuddin I, Koleksi Universiteits Bibliotheek Leiden, Belanda", ..., p. 285-286.



Taala barang dilanjutkan usia umur zamannya, beroleh sehat dan walafiat dengan sejahtera jua adanya.[62]

The translation of the letter is as follows:

That sincere letter and tables often be a sign of hope and trust that the honorable son of Sri Sultan Raja Buton with the vizier ministers, waving the paper a piece, coming down the Presence of His Majesty the Father Company, Mr. Governor General and Raden van Indie in Batavia, Insha Allah will continue his age, health and good fortune in peace.

The presence of Malay in Buton is closely linked with the history of the kingdom, where the process of the establishment to become an empire involving the Malay Kingdoms of Johor and Sumatra who migrated there. However, the most important thing to say here is that Butonis a good example that Malay had been established well as a lingua franca in the archipelago. Thus, Buton in the eastern part of the archipelago was connected to the people living in the other parts of the archipelago.

The people of the archipelago were not only connected to one-another through languages, but also though religious thoughts recorded in books written in Malay in Jawi script in addition to books written in Arabic, which were also widespread and sources of religious knowledge. A note written by someone called Imam Ahmad ---an Imam for the Bacan islands in North Maluku who met Snouck Hurgronje in Mecca in 1884--- is important to record here. As Laffan showed,[62] Imam Ahmad gave Snouck a list of books the people read in the eastern part of the countries under the wind, the territory of Ternate, Tidore and Bacan. In addition to the books in Arabic that were widespread in *pesantren* as noted by van den Berg in the late 19th century,[63] Imam Ahmad recorded a number of titles of Jawi books composed by the *ulama* in the Archipelago from the Malay speaking regions, among them, the book composed by Abdurrauf Singkel, *Mir'at al-Tulab*, in form of a Malay adaptation of Ansari's book *Fath al-Wahab*. Another book is the *Dhur al-Thamim*, which, according to Snouck Hurgronje, was

62. Michael F. Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The* Umma *Below the Wind*, (London and New York: Routledge and Curzon, 2003), pp. 21-24.

63. L.W.C. van den Berg, "Het Mohammadensche Goddienst Onderwijs on Java en Madoera en daarbij Gebruikte Arabische Boeken", *TBG*, 31, 1886, pp. 518-555.

probably written by Muhammad Nafis al-Banjari.

Books composed by the Patani scholar, Daud al-Fatani (Daud bin Abdullah bin Idris al-Fatani) were also included in Imam Ahmad's list. Among them were two of his books on jurisprudence: the *Fara'id ghayat taqrib fi al-irth wa al-tansib* (Statutes of the Final Approximation in Inheritance and Consanguinity) on the laws about the division of an inheritance and the *Idah al-bab li murid al-nikah bi al-sawab* (Explanatory Chapter for Getting Married Correctly) about marriage. Another book in Jawi was the *Sabil al-Muhtadin li al-tafaqquh fi amr al-Din* (the Path of the Guided People for Mastering Religious Matters) regarding the procedure for studying religion written by Muhammad Arsyad bin Abdullah al-Banjari and the *Hidayat al-Salikin* (Manual for Searching Knowledge)--- a composition in Malay based on al-Ghazali's *Bidayat al-Hidayah*--- written by Abdussamad al-Palimbani.


Conclusion

The Malay language and Jawi books aren ot only important from a historical perspective ---that they have become a category in the study of Islamic culture in Indonesia--- but also in terms of the formation of ecumenical Islam in the archipelago. Through Malay, Muslim communities in various regions in the archipelago became connected to one another, and, strengthened through the use of Jawi books, these relationships remained within limits derived from the universal message of Islam. This gradual and long historical process has become the basis for the formation of what Anderson[64]called an "imagined community". If the colonial government might have inherited the Indonesian state, the Malay language has laid a solid foundation for the establishment of Indonesia as a nation the process when it adopted Malay as the national language of Indonesia.

64 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1991).







Chapter Eight
Reform Movements

Reform Movements

Muhammad Nizam

Introduction

In the West, the rise of rationalism gave birth to the Renaissance, the movement that aspired to liberate humanity from the shackles of mythology that had confined the people in Europe during the Middle Ages. Their theocentric mindset had confined them for so long that it was as if humans were incapable of doing anything. The revival of rationalism did away with this theocentric view and put man at the center of everything. Life was no longer centered on God, buton people. This anthropocentrism destroyed theocentric mythology and replaced it by humanist rationalism, in which man could do anything without God'sintervention (Kuntowijoyo, 1994: 160).

The Renaissance was the beginning of the rise of Europe towards modernism. It was characterized by the "deification" of human reason, in which man could progress only by way of appreciating reason, and by liberating himself from his dependence on God.. In about a century, the Renaissance successfully enabled the Western World to attain progress in science and culture. Later, new findings in science and technology also brought about the industrial revolution, where factories were built to produce goods in large quantities to meet human needs.

Scientific and technological advances also allowed the European nations to explore the world, i.e. the regions across the sea. Initially, the purpose of their explorations of the other parts of the world was to obtain commercial commodities and raw materials to develop their industries. In various ways, slowly but surely, colonization started as they changed their objective to the political subjugation of the regions across the sea. So, initially, they came to trade, then to monopolize, and finally to colonialize the world.

Entering the 17th century, European colonization spread everywhere, to Africa, America, South and Southeast Asia, up to the Pacific. European nations discovered that the population of the countries in North Africa, and South and Southeast Asia were Muslims. Their colonial reign lasted hundreds of years exploiting natural resources, enslaving the people and making them stupid, and humiliating their dignity. They built modernism by placing mankind at the center to appreciate reason and to discard mythological ways of thinking and thus, leaving behind the era of darkness, to enter one of enlightenment. At the same time, religions were being reformed, in which reason was positioned into its proper

place in understanding religion. The invention of printing technology also played a major role in accelerating the spread of Protestant reform under the leadership of Martin Luther and John Calvin. Therefore, Protestantism was born as a form of Christianity that was more critical to understanding dogmatic and mythical notions than old Roman Catholicism. The birth of Protestantism also led toinevitable religious conflicts as for about 30 years (1618-1648) Europe was plunged into "wars of religion".

Since Baghdad had been conquered in 1280 after Mongol attacks, Islamic civilization began to decline. What developed later was Sufism, an illuminative (*irfani*) paradigm of knowledge based on the essential wisdom of mystical gnosis to achieve a close relationship with God. Sufism is a spiritual science that uses the heart as its mechanism to achieve the highest dignity in human life. Sufism is the most logical way to cure the people who were depressed because of their "defeat". Within the development of Sufism, which is based in the heart, other Islamic sciences that are based on the sacred texts (*turath*) like Qur'anic interpretation, Islamic jurisprudence, and theology began to prosper while the sciences that developed through proof and experiments (*burhani*) and which had advanced in the past such as physics, biology, chemistry, astronomy, and medicine, all were in decline. Experts refer to this period as a time of setback. The dark ages of Islam lasted approximately 400 years. Ration-based sciences (*burhani*)stagnated, whereas explanatory (*bayani*) based knowledge also halted, because the gate of *ijtihad* had been closed.

In the midst of this stagnated era, away from its center in Arabia, Islam penetrated new territories in the Far East, namely the Indonesian archipelago. It can be assumed that the kind of Islam that entered the archipelago from around the 14thuntil the 16th century wasa Sufi-oriented one. According to some theories, in the early period, after the conversion of Hindus to Islam, until the mid-19th century, their religious orientation was likely to be Sufi. The Sufi orientation of the early period can be seen in the legacy of Islamic books on the mystic path (*suluk*) that portray an Islamic way of life colored by a heterodox Sufi orientation. Islam was based on the book of Allah, the Qur'an, mingled with magic that resembled the subjugation of the supernatural forces of the local culture. Among the books on mysticism

were the *Suluk Sunan Bonang, Suluk Sunan Kalijaga, Wasiyatjati Sunan Geseng, Suluk Sujinah, Suluk Ngabesi,* and others (Yunus, 1979: 220).

In the first phase, besides the peaceful process of Islamization, Islam was also accepted among the authorities without turmoil, radical change, or revolution. The acceptance of Islam was a process of accommodation of both the power structure and the culture in society. At the cultural level, acculturation occurred between Islam and the cultures of the archipelago, in which both identities were fused into the new identity of *Islam Nusantara* (Islam of the archipelago). Islamic law, up to the era of Indonesia's Independence and even in the reform era, adhered to what Hooker (2003) convincingly called "the Islamic schools of Indonesia". This indicates that acculturation ran continuously, resulting in a distinctive Indonesian Islam, which differs from Islam in the Arab world. The specialty of Indonesian Islam, among others, is that the stagnation period was marked by a mixture of the teachings of Islam and those of the local culture which were sometimes in opposition to Islam itself. This mixture is often identified as heterodox syncretism. This situation was exacerbated by the very weak socio-political colonial conditions, which not only put Muslims in a setting of foreign powers, but also made them foolish and exploited.

Being colonized and backward the Muslim community was led into real world of stupidity. However, colonization also incited the consciousness of emancipation. The teachings of Islam advocate changes (QS. 13: 11). The most likely change to influence social life, the economy, politics, and culture is a change in the way of thinking. So the first thing that had to be done was to change the way of thinking from blind imitation (*taqlid*) to freedom of thought. Of course, faith also guided this freedom. This is the essence of Islamic reform: Muslims should rise to explore and develop the intellectual property of Islam, educate themselves, and not to be ashamed to learn from Europeans who had modernized their lives already at an earlier stage.

What happened in Indonesia was different from what happened in Islamic countries in the Middle East. Colonialism that began in the 16thcentury with the arrival of the Portuguese, followed by the Dutch created aconsciousness of Islam as a symbol for the natives'fight against foreign and non-Muslim colonialism. This meant that Islam disseminated a sense

of "nationality" from the time before the ideology of reform had affected Indonesia, even though this "nationality" had not yet developed into modern nationalism. The awareness of modern nationalism grew along with the reform of Islam. Schools of Islamic reformism in Indonesia not only encouraged the growth of nationalism, but had also led to the birth of modern Islamic organizations in the early 20thcentury.

Modernism and Reform

Entering the final quarter of the 19th century, the condition of Muslims in the archipelago had changed only slightly. The changes were supported by two mutual forces. First was more intensive contact between Indonesian Muslims and the sources of Islam in the Middle East, as one of the consequences of the opening of the Suez Canalin 1870 and the invention of steamships. Shuttle ships between Europe and Indonesia increased in number and they were also faster than those of the days before. Muslims from Indonesia who went to Arab Countries to perform the *hajj* and the *umrah*or to study in the Haramain and Cairo also multiplied in number. At the same time, in the Middle East,blossoming Islamic thought had been influenced by modern Western civilization, which promoted the use of nationality. That is what is commonly called reformism, attempts to renew the understanding and the attitude towards religious doctrines which before had stagnated for a long time. Indonesian youths who studied in the Haramain and Cairo began to absorb this new way of thinking and when they returned to their homeland they brought notions of what Geertz (1985: 99) called the teachings of orthodoxy, and then passed on what they had found in the Middle East to the Muslim community in their homeland. In turn, the reform movement grew and developed in Indonesia. The result was an Indonesian version of Islamic reform. In this way these teachings of Islam, which were relatively closer to the origin of this religious civilization, started to influence Muslims in Indonesia.

Second is the change in colonial government, which adopted its ethic policy in the early 20thcentury. The implementation of this ethic policy was partly to offer an opportunity to the children of the country to get a broader education in Europe. Education for the natives was previously only to be had in boarding schools (*pesantren*) or in lower level schools exclusively devoted to the natives, but since the implementation of the ethic policy

the colonial government provideda European style of education: the *Hollandsch Inlandsch School* (HIS) for the primary level, *Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs* (MULO) for the junior intermediate level, and *Algemene Middelbare School* (AMS) for the senior secondary level. In the following period it also established the College of Engineering (*Technische Hogeschool*/THS) in Bandung, and the *Rechtshogeschool* (RHS) in Batavia. In addition, since the end of the 19th century, there had been a medical high school, the *School tot Opleiding voor InlandscheArtsen* (STOVIA), and the school of governmental science for the native civil servants, *Opleiding School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren* (OSVIA). Young Indonesian Muslim children gradually started to enter modern European schools, which slowly affected their modern way of thinking.

The children who entered modern public education were partly influenced by a Western secular way of thinking and some became anti-Islamic and behaved like Europeans, while others took advantage of rational thinking to comprehend their religion (i.e. Islam) better. Members of this group later became the forerunners of Islamic modernism and after Independence they joined the Masjumi. Among them, to mention some names, were H.O.S. Cokroaminoto, Agus Salim, Kasman Singodimejo, Mohammad Roem, and Mohammad Natsir.

It should be added that in Muslim societies in Western colonies a sort of secularization process had taken place under the influence of the Western educational system, both for those who were studying in their homeland and those who were sent to study in the West. The reformer group of Islam, as Western reformists, was open to accommodation and assimilation. It wanted to produce a new synthesis between Islam and modern science and technology. So, reformers tried to distance themselves from two orientations: old-fashioned and stagnant Islam, and from admiring Western secular civilization that only saw religion asan individual phenomenon (Esposito, 1999: 647).

The emergence of the reform movement in Indonesia was partly characterized by the establishment of modern organizations for structurally well-planned activities. These organizations are the Sarekat Islam (1911), the Muhammadiyah (1912), Al-Irsyad (1915), and also Persatuan Islam or Persis (1923).

According to the reformists, the religious format of imitation (*taqlid*) had to be replaced by *ijtihad* and renewal (*tajdid*). *Ijtihad* is none other than independently making intellectual efforts by utilizing the power of reason and thinking optimally to capture the essence of religion, to ensure that being religious is to understand the basic arguments and the foundation beneath all doctrines, commands and prohibitions, as well as to discover the methodological bases of the further development of religious knowledge. *Tajdid* is renewing a way of thinking to allow the discovery of the essence of the religious truth, so as to create a pattern of diversity that does not lag behind the progress of earthly life, but on the contrary, being religious causes progress on earth and in the here after.

According to reformists, the Muslims' backwardness and ignorance over the last several centuries was caused by a false understanding of religion. According to them, the closing of the door of *ijtihad* was a major mistake and the cause of stupidity. The closure of *ijtihad* had halted intellectual activities, while the Western nations had been enlightened after their encounter with Islam and they continued to progress. In the 19thcentury, most of the countries with Muslim majority populations were under Western occupation. This prompted the reformists to seek a new format and to find a new formula from within Islam itself. Their goal was that Muslims would get on the path of progress, as they also became politically freed from Western hegemony.

The hallmark of the reform was the confrontation with Islamic traditionalism. The reform tried to detach itself from the past and at the same time to orient itself to the future. 'More than a reactive stance, reformism is generally assertive, suggesting changes and developing strategic action-plans to achieve the ideological objectives.'(Abdullah and Sidique, 1988: 2)

The Proponents of Islamic Reform

Muslim scholars had in fact started to entertain thoughts of Islamic reformism for a long time. As-Syaukanie (2009) asserts that the roots of Islamic reformism can be delineated in the medieval period of Islam. During the middle ages, we find names like Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and Taqiuddin Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328). Both are often regarded as the early reformers in the medieval period. However, in the beginning, the reform was limited to the realm of ideas but

without any movement. Further reform that began in the 19th century was not limited to the realm of thought, but also incited movements. These movements were massive and radical. The reform in the 19thcentury was inspired by the condition of the Muslim people who were colonized and fell under the shadow of the spread of Western civilization, which was considered the locomotive of the new world order. As-Syaukanie (2009: 25-34) mentions the following Muslim scholars as thinkers of Islamic reformism in the 19th-20thcenturies.

The first is Rifa'a al-Tahtawi (1801-1873). Tahtawi was a pioneer reformer in the 19th century. In his magnum opus, *Takhlish al-Ibriz ila Bariz*, he expressed the need for Muslims to draw on and adopt modern political concepts such as nationalism, democracy, and equality because these concepts were useful for the progress of the Muslim community. Tahtawi's appreciation of modern sciences and his positive attitude towards the West were enthusiastically greeted by one of the next generation of Egyptian clerics, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). Abduh was a reformer who urged Muslims to conform to some aspects of modernity. He used to live in Paris at the invitation of his "mentor" Jamaluddin Al-Afgani and he also visited London and several other major European cities. From his encounters with European society, Abduh issued a statement which was very famous: "*wajadna al-Islam biduni al-muslimin fi aurubba, wa fi al-misr wajadna muslimin biduni al-Islam*" (In Europe we found Islam without Muslims, while in Egypt we found Muslims without Islam). Those words showMuhammad Abduh's high appreciation ofmodernEuropean rational civilization that produceda real Islamic ethos in everyday life. Abduh's rationality appears in his fatwas when he served as the Mufti of Egypt. Among his controversial fatwas are those about the lawful status of bank interest, the non-obligation for Muslim women to wear the *hijab*, and the permission for Muslims to eat meat slaughtered by non-Muslims (As-Syaukanie, 2009: 26).

In 19thcentury India another Islamic reformer was born. He was Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817-1898), whose position in India was similar to that of Tahtawi in Egypt. As Abduh, Sayyid Ahmed Khan was also a rationalist who did not hesitate to accept modern culture. He criticized orientalists who distorted the understanding of Islam, just as he criticized conservative Muslim scholars whom is understood Islam as well. In one of his works, Khan criticized

conservative clerics who blindly imitated others. He also yielded wide influence among the Muslim youth in India and one of his disciples, Chiragh Ali (1844-1895) followed in his footsteps as a reformer. He advocated the importance of reforming the *shari'a* (Islamic law). According to him, Islamic law was the product of jurists and therefore Islamic law should change its main target. The essential reform of Islamis the changes jurists made in Islamic law. According to Ali, the search for the truth in Islam would never end.

The greatest reformer in India was Muhammad Iqbal (1875-1938). His most influential workis *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* in which he referred to many Western philosophers such as George Berkeley, Immanuel Kant, William James, Alfred North Whitehead, and Bertrand Russell. Iqbal did not only authorize Muslims' use of Western knowledge even he recommended Muslims to learn and to take benefit from it. Iqbal's arguments about the necessity of convincing changes wouldinspire many scholars around the world. Of Iqbal'sfollowers, Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988) was even more radical about the issue of Islam and social change. Rahman was convinced that the most principal and foremost ideas in the Qur'an are its ethics. The Book of Allah reveals the moral guides for mankind. Many verses in the Qur'an relate to legal and political issues, but should be seen asethics' moral postulates. Laws should not be understood literally and punitive, as Muslims did in the past because that would make it seem as if Islamic law was only concerned with punishments and sanctions. The idea of the Islamic state of Pakistan, according to him, was the result of an obsessive desire to implement this kind of "punitive" Islam.

In short, these reformers' positive attitudes towards changes are based on their beliefs that change is part of the basic principles of Islam. Reformers consider *ijtihad* the most plausible argument for change. In Islamic jurisprudence, *ijtihad* is not about primary sources such as the Qur'an, the Prophetic tradition (*sunnah*), the Muslims' consensus (*ijma'*) and analogy (*qiyas*), but concerns the method of *istinbat* in order to produce law. *Ijtihad* is a rational way for Muslims to understand religious texts but it is not included in the texts themselves. Muhammad Arkoun defined *ijtihad* as *naqd al-'aql al-islami* or the critical logic of Islam. According to him, what is necessary for modern Muslims now is not a mere re-interpretation of

classical legal issues, especially Islamic law, but the radical deconstruction of the entire corpus of Islamic epistemology. Thus, *ijtihad* is the building block of modern Islamic reform.

Among the themes of reform and change in the modern Islamic discourse, political change occupies an important position. This is because the issue is directly related to the lives of the Muslims and touches upon the main doctrine of the unification of religion and the state, and the religious supremacy over the state. Many Muslims believe that the separation of state and religion is alien to Islam. Since Kemal Ataturk abolished the Caliphate and transformed Turkey into a secular state, secularizationhas become a controversial issue. If Rashid Rida assumed that the Caliphate was necessary, Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966) considered that it was just one out of a number of alternative systems of government. According to him, Muhammad was not sent by God as a political leader but as an apostle and that politics is not the objective of the prophetic mission. What concerns Islam is not the format of the state, whether it is a republic, kingdom, or caliphate, but whether and how a government is able to implement the universal values in Islam such as justice and welfare. Raziq's ideas do not only affect Ataturk'ssecularization of Turkey, but also of that of Soekarno in Indonesia. Raziq's major contribution is that he showed modern Muslims the way to find a theological basis for secularism.

Raziq did not recognize the concept of secularism but in his argumentation he referred to the Qur'an and the Sunnah and thought they explicitly agreed with the separation of religion and the state. Many intellectuals after Raziq discussed the concept of secularism and then approved it. To cite just some examples we may mention Mohammed Arkoun (Algeria), Asghar Ali Engineer (India), Abdul Karim Soroush (Iran) who saw secularism and equality as the basis for the implementation of democracy. These Islamic reformers' positive attitude towards secularism and other modern concepts such as democracy, pluralism, civil rights, and freedom signifies the height of their acceptance of changes. It is important to note here that the Muslim reformists' acceptance of secularism was not followed up by a negative attitude toward religion or, for instance, that "religion becomes irrelevant".

Islamic Reform and Challenges

Reform is a renewed attitude towards religion, where religious texts are no longer just being read as they are without thinking, but rather reflected upon within the structure of reality and local culture. If orthodoxy is concerned with the enactment of Islamic law in behavior and social order, reform requires the establishment of Islamic ethics and theology as the ideological and moral foundations of the modern world (Abdullah, 1986: 16). When reform began, orthodoxy split into two orientations in which those who wanted *ijtihad* were ready to face the modern world, where as the orthodoxcontinued to hold on tothe old traditions. The latter is often dubbed traditionalist.

The changes that occurred in Indonesia resemble the developments that took place in the other parts of the Islamic world. The main characteristic of reform in Indonesia was that it was a religious purification movement which started in the 18th century when three young men from West Sumatra returned from the *hajj*. They brought with them the puritan ideology of the Wahhabi along with its motto for a return to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. They began by cleansing Islamic practices from heresies and superstitions. Although they were severely challenged by the society, the influence of Wahhabi puritanism penetrated deep into Minangkabau society. In Java, reformism began with the founding of the Sarekat Islam, followed by the establishment of the Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad, and Persis. As in West Sumatra, reformism in Java was undertaken by compelling Muslims to submit to the ban on imitations, heresies and superstitions. Therefore, the main challenges of reform were what the Muhammadiyah called TBC, i.e. imitation (*taqlid*), heresy (*bid'ah*) and superstition (*churafat*). Muslims who were familiar with imitation were encouraged to break away from that bad habit and to start with a new one, namely free thinking and understanding religion independently without attaching themselves to any particular school. In West Sumatra, modernist Islamic schools emerged similar to those in Java, in addition to public schools with Islamic identities. Because of the Muhammadiyah's similar method of implementing modernism,West Sumatra has been one of the Muhammadiyah's strongest strongholds outside Java.

After the Sarekat Islam had rapidly grown into a mass movement at the national level, communism began

to emerge. Within the Sarekat Islam, where people from all Islamic orientations gathered, communism was also present and could grow along with the other members. It was not surprising that there even were communist pilgrims, like Haji Misbah in Solo. In Semarang, a communist-oriented group founded the Sarekat Rakyat, which later became the Communist Party. This may have come about under the influence of Sneevliet who had brought communism from the Netherlands and established the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging (ISDV).

Entering the first quarter of the 20thcentury, nationalism began to emerge and it led to Muslims to become divided into two groups: nationalists and Islamists. In 1924, 1930, and 1939-40, there were at least three debates between nationalists and Islamists. The nationalists were represented by Soekarno, where as the Islamists were represented by three Muslim reformist leaders, namely Agus Salim, A. Hasan and Mohammad Natsir. This shows that while in the Islamic world of the MiddleEastthe idea of Pan-Islamism spread, Islam in Indonesia was just the opposite. It was not attracted to the idea of Pan-Islamism, but rather to nationalism.

The most significant challenge to reform is modernism itself. The basic considerations of modernism had to be accepted, where as modern institutions in Islamic circles had to be created. The *pesantren* educational system that was devoid of any systematic method of learning, had no curriculum, no class, and no criticism was clearly incompatible with the modern mind-set. A European style school system needed to be adopted and adapted as it suited the modern mind-set much better. So a European school was founded, but the Islamic faith was an integral part of it because renewed faith was the soul of reform. The Adabiyah school in Padang was actually a *HIS met de Kor'an*. The School taught general subjects like any regularly HIS school, but added teaching of Islam. Later, the Muhammadiyah built *HIS met de Kor'an* in various other places and it also established Islamic based schools for teachers, the *Kweekschool*. As a reform organization, the Muhammadiyah not only worked to broadcast religious propaganda to spread the teachings of modernist Islam, but also established modern institutions, such as public schools, hospitals, scouting organizations and home care. The organization also published of journals and magazines.

Publication was a very important tool for disseminating the ideology of the reform movement. In the Middle East the spread of reformist ideas relied heavily on publications. The invention of the printing press greatly facilitated the spreadof Christianization to various parts of the colonized world. Printing and the press were very beneficial for the dissemination of ideas. The challenge of reformism was how to spread reformist ideas and it took advantage of the media. The reform ideas of Muhammad Abduh and other reformers in Egypt came to Indonesia in two ways. The first was through Indonesian students in Cairo and the Haramain and the second by others who performed the pilgrimage. Muslim scholars, also from Indonesia, studied the reformer's thoughts in the Haramain. Secondly it was through the press and other publications. In 1884, two reformers, Jamaluddin al-Afgani and Muhammad Abduh settled in Paris and they founded the Islamic association *al-'Urwat al-Wutsqa* and they published a magazine with the same name. Although the publication of the magazine lasted only for eight months its influence was very strong throughout the Islamic world. In Egypt, the British colonial government banned the magazine but it was still read in limited circles. In Egypt, Mohammad Abduh also publisheda magazine,*al-Manar*,with Muhammad Rashid Rida served as its edition. The colonial rulers of the Dutch East Indies banned these two magazines from entering Indonesia but they were smuggled in, sent by secret mail, and brought home by those who returned from the *hajj* or who had studied in the Middle East. In this way the magazines could be enjoyed and studied by the limited groups in Indonesia.
In Jakarta, the *Jam'iyyat al-Khair*, an organization of the Arab residents in Java established good relations with the Arab world and the Islamic power center in Istanbul it also played an important role in spreading the magazine. Therefore, it is not surprising that at the end of the 19th century, in addition to *al-'Urwat al-Wutsqa*, in Indonesia also several other magazines were circulated: *Al-Jawaib* (Istanbul); *Al-Insan* (Istanbul); *Al-Janna* (Beirut); *Lisan al-Hal* (Beirut); *Al-Watan* (Cairo); *Al-Ahram* (Alexandria); and *Al-Raudat al-Iskandariya* (Alexandria) (Noer, 1982: 67). Thus, scholars and the Indonesian community could absorb the idea of Islamic renewal in at both individual and group levels, and in mass organizations like the Muhammadiyah, Al-Irsyad, Persis and others.

Besides, the role of the mass media in Indonesia in particular and in Southeast

Asia in general had enabled the expanding influence of Islamic reform ideas. The most important example was *al-Imam* (1906-1908), a magazine published in Singapore. The magazine's editor was renowned Minangkabau scholar and cousin of Sheikh Ahmad Khatib al-Minangkabawi, i.e. Sheikh Tahir Djalaluddin who had studied in Mecca and then in Cairo for a long time. In Mecca, Sheikh Ahmad Khatib was a great Muslim scholar of Minangkabau origin and he was the most important teacher for those who sought knowledge coming from Indonesia and Southeast Asia at the Haram Mosque. Moreover, because of his famous piety, he was also appointed the Haram Mosque's Great Imam of the Shafi'i School. The writings in *al-Imam* were strongly influenced by Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida and the magazine could be seen as the mouthpiece *al-Manar*in Southeast Asia in general. The publication of this magazine was sponsored by the Arab community that had aspecial relationships with its colleagues in Indonesia (Shihab, 1998: 133).

Another challenge the reform movement had to face, especially in Java was Javanism, an ideology rooted in traditional Javanese beliefs partly mixed with Islam and Kebatinan (local Javanese mysticism). Most Javanism notions were contrary the both orthodox and reformist teachings of Islam although the advocates of Javanism were also Muslims. Because the reformers brought the stream of thoughts that conflicted with the notions of Javanism, leading Javanism figures did not hesitate to attack Islam through various means. At the time, Surakarta was the "center" of Javanism. For example, in early 1918, the newspaper Djawi Hisworo in Surakarta published an article written by Djojodikoro about the Kejawen notion of God. The manager of the newspaper, Martodharsono, was actually a prominent member of the Sarekat Islam. However, many Sarekat Islam activists, especially in the Central Sarekat Islam (CSI) leadership in Surabaya, condemned the editor because Djojodikoro's article contained elements of "SARA" [abbreviated form of *Suku* (ethnicity), *Agama* (religion), *Ras* (human race), and *Antar Golongan* (social groups) transl.] and insulted the Prophet Muhammad. The article said that the Prophet Muhammad received the revelations in an ecstatic state.

After it was spread in the newspaper of the Central Sarekat Islam, the *Oetoesan Hindia* (the Indian Envoy) published in Surabaya, Muslims reacted very harshly to the article. Apparently, the Sarekat Islam exploited this event to inspire

many local Sarekat Islam members who had started to be sluggish over the previous two years and it founded an organization with the provocative name, "Tentara Kangjeng Nabi Muhammad" (*Prophet Muhammad'd Army*) in Surabaya, which subsequently created branches in other cities. In Surakarta,the Kangjeng Prophet Muhammad's Army was declared in Tirnonadi attended by thousands of Sarekat Islam members, officials of the Dutch colonial government and the Palace, as well as the regional leaders of both the local Sarekat Islam and the Central Sarekat Islam. Although the organization was named an army, it was not clearly organized, and its inception had merely been inspired by the Sarekat Islam, to make it more spirited (Widyastuti, 2005). Although many people suggested that the editor and the author of the article should be brought to trial, in the end this did not happen. According to Kuntowijoyo (2000), Martodharsono had showed a letter of support from K.H. Ahmad Dahlan and a trial was considered unnecessary, because both parties, the editor and the author of the article, were Muslims so it could not be considered insulting other religions. This indicates that in facing Javanism, reformers showed a tolerant attitude as they did not oppose it frontally.

The superstitions of the Javanism followers believed, for example, that people can be blessed with fortune or relieved from total disaster by making certain offerings at specific sacred places. *Keramatan* (sanctification) itself is a belief of Javanism. They also believed that people could become rich by seeking the advice of a *pesugihan* (enrichment) shaman and by meeting all the requirements he recommended. The Muhammadiyah met this challenge by demonstrating that fortune was not the result of an enrichment fetish, but rather that it was determined by God's will and the result of one's obedience to Allah. In *Suara Muhammadiyah* (Voice of Muhammadiyah) no. 2, year 1, 1915, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan explained the merits of *salat sunnah* (not obligatory prayers). It said that "fortune"(Javanese: *begja*, *rahayu*) dependedsolely on God's will and performing preferable prayers was a way to obtain it. This means that one's fortune was not the result of begging at sacred tombs or keeping *tuyul*s." (Kuntowijoyo, 2000: xv)

Another challenge of reformism was traditionalism, which was irreconcilable with the teachings of reformed Islam.

There used to be the habit to venerate religious teachers (*'ulama*) and they were considered to possess spiritual merit so that their prayers were more often granted than those of ordinary Muslims. As a result, these *'ulama* became mediators between students and God and because of this they were highly respected in Muslim society. This kind of tradition prevailed within the Muslim community, especially in the *pesantren* milieu which was the only Islamic education institution at the beginning of the 20thcentury. At the time no teacher would go to visit his students as that would be seen as degrading his clerical status. Girls also did not get religious instruction except from their parents at home. At the time, no girls went to boarding schools to study religion.

Facing this condition, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan gave a *tabligh* (admonitory warning). At that time,*tabligh* were not used in Islamic propaganda. Ahmad Dahlan was an *'alim* who taught about Islam in his mosque and he delivered Friday sermons in the Grand Mosque of Yogyakarta and thus he occupied an exalted position in the Muslim community. Yet, he did not act out his role as a privileged figure. Even though he was an *'alim*, Ahmad Dahlan executed his *tabligh* to convey his teachings on Islam by visiting his students, something that was still taboo at the time. Doing so, he changed the public perception that Muslim clerics occupied high positions and that they possessed spiritual advantages unattainable to ordinary people and therefore they thought that visiting students was too much below them. Dahlan went to various places while he traded batik and to deliver his religious teachings. With his *tablighа* ctivity, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan went against the habits of the people who venerated Muslim clerics. He showed that clerics were just ordinary human being and the reform movement meant to abolish the clerical monopoly on religion. (Kuntowijoyo, 2000: xiv-xv). Thus, the challenges posed by traditionalism should be facedby prioritizing *amar ma'ruf* (commanding goodness) by offering good examples and not by *nahy munkar* (forbidding evil) that causes discord within community.

After Haji Agus Salim had joined the Sarekat Islam (SI), he always accompanied its chairman H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto wherever he went. Salim was amazed by the way the people cheered the chairman's arrival when ever he visited an area. Thousands of people greeted him by bowing and kissing his feet. "Seeing this, Salim told

Tjokroaminoto that allowing himself to be venerated like that might be dangerous. Responding to Salim's critical remark, Tjokroaminto did not get angry his relation with Salim became even more intimate. Its parked a deal between the two to help each other."(Tempo, August 12 to 18, 2013: 52)

The Indonesian Muslim community also remembered Agus Salim's conduct. At the time, the chairman of Jong Java, Samsul Rijal, proposed during a congress of the organization to make an Islamic course program for Javanese youth in Surakarta, but the congress rejected his proposal. When Samsul Rijal consulted Agus Salim, the latter suggested him to establish his own organization for Muslim youth. Rijal then founded the Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB- Young Islamic Association) and he appointed Agus Salim as advisor of this organization. During its first congress, Salim saw that a curtain (*hijab*)made of an unfolded fabricseparated the men from the women and he ordered the curtain to be pulled down.

The Implications of Modernization

It was mentioned that within the Muslim societies of the Western colonies a sort of secularization process took place because of the influence of Western education both for those who studied in their homeland and those who were sent overseas to study in Western countries. The reformer group of Islam, like the Western reformists, was open to accommodation and assimilation. They wanted to produce a new synthesis between Islam and modern sciences and technology. So, the reformers tried to distance themselves from two orientations: old-fashioned and stagnant Islam, and the admirers of Western civilization, which was secular and only saw religion as an individual phenomenon.

The reform movement led the Indonesian Muslim community to split into modernists and traditionalists. Modernists were those who supported the reform movement, characterized by thinking independently, being inclusive, and most crucially, they selectively accepted Western modernism. Traditionalists were those who accepted the teachings of orthodoxy, were closer to the source of Islam, the Haramain due to their intense relationship with the area since the beginning of the last century, and they were also close to local traditions. Both groups in fact shared an orientation to the teachings

of orthodoxy; however, the modernists were also selectively oriented to Western modernism, where as the traditionalists did not reject traditionalism. The modernist group organized it self in the Muhammadiyah, Persis, and al-Irsyad while the traditionalist group reacted by establishing the Nahdlatul Ulama. For several decades, from the 1930s until the 1960s, there were conflicts between the two groups which, in some regions, occasionally might incite violence. The conflicts generally centered on the dissimilarities in some subsidiary rituals of worship. The commonly prevailing characteristic of the Muhammadiyah is that the call for prayer (*azan*) for the Friday congregation (*jumatan*) is done only once, while the Nahdlatul Ulama usually does it twice. The Muhammadiyah used to practice the Tarawih prayer (at night during the month Ramadan) as much as 8 *raka'at* (lit. bows), plus 3 *raka'at* of Witir (the Vigil prayer). The Nahdlatul Ulamain its turn, runs 23 *raka'at*, which include the Witir. The modernists do not pronounce their intention before every ritual worship, while according to the NU the pronouncement (*talafuz*) of the intention has to be made. These differences are the sources of the conflicts and are used to tease each other.

Traditionalists used to perform various rituals associated with the events of a person's life cycle and they indulged in commemorations of the dead, which the modernists considered heretical. The modernists only performed life cycle rituals that accord with Islamic guidance like *akikah* (a feast 7th days after the birth of a baby), circumcision and wedding. Traditionalist also perform rituals on the 4th and 7thmonths of pregnancy, commemoration of the dead on the 3rd, 7th, 40th, 100th, and 1,000th days, as well as annual commemorations (*haul*). Modernists avoid excessive accolades to religious teachers, clerics and scholars, sheikhs of mystical orders, and*tawasul*, but traditionalists continue to do so. Similarly, Sufism and certain vocations of the mystical orders, which the modernists rejected, were all practiced by traditionalists.

The differences are not limited to religious rituals, but also in ways of dress and speaking, and educational orientation. If traditionalists chose boarding schools as ideal places to educate their children, modernists chose public schools, instead. Traditionalists chose agriculture as their livelihood, where as the modernists chose modern vocations as employees, employers, or traders. In the field of art, traditionalists

preferred to engage in *samroh*, *barzanji*, *rodad* and *salawatan* while modernists rather developed the art of orchestras, music bands, and drama.

Nevertheless, over time these differences gradually become in significant. Entering the 1970s, many traditionalist began to apply for enrolment in public schools. Boarding schools started to adopt school systems and turned into *madrasah*s, or even into public schools like SMP (Junior High School) and SMA (Senior High School) within the *pesantren*s. The fact that the Muslim younger generations massively entered modern education also gradually reduced the differences. Since the 1980s, the dichotomy between traditionalists and modernists had been fadingand the distinctive characteristics discussed above became lessuseful to differentiate between modernist and traditionalist groups. Entering the 3rdmillennium, the Muhammadiyah and the NU were no longer hostile towards each other, but started to collaborate. The leaders of both groups are closer to each other and work together to generate welfare for all the people.

This "unification" process was perhaps caused by the common challenges they, namely the Wahhabi Salafi group that had begun to blossom since the end of the 20th century and became much larger by the last decade. The Salafis were actually puritan like the Muhammadiyah, but they were also radical and confrontational in facing what they call heresies. Although puritan, the Muhammadiyah still accommodates to local culture. Moreover, there are some fundamental differences between the two in their views on heresy and the interpretation of certain Qur'anic verses. What the Muhammadiyah and the NU particularly can not accept is the Salafi ideology about the nature of God. The Salafis believe that the manifestation of God is really anthropomorphic (*tajsim*), and that He can be located in a specific place, namely on the Throne. The NU and the Muhammadiyah are strongly opposed to this anthropomorphic view. What the NU and the Muhammadiyah also share is their opposition against the attitude of the Salafis who feel that they are the most correct and that they categorize those who dissent as *ahlul bid'ah* (heretics), which also means infidels.

In the process of approaching each other to achieve the "unification" of modernists and traditionalists, the differences between their religious practices were no longer as striking as before. Mysticism, for example, which the modernists

originally opposed, is now beginning to be appreciated. Sufism has long suffered from marginalization the emerging modernist orientation which assumed Sufism was not original Islamic teaching. Modernists among the inhabitants of urban areas strongly objected to the practice of Sufism in the form of a long series of repetitive recitations (*wird*) following certain pronouncements and their unique invocation techniques (*dhikr*). One aspect of Sufism that has become the modernists' easiest target is *bai'at* (allegiance), which is the unreserved oath of allegiance to a Sufi teacher and obediently to carry out certain recitations. They are also against the excessive respect Sufis have for their teachers, either a *mursyid* (leader of a Sufi order) or the founder of certain Sufi mystical order (*tarekat*), and sheikhs, to and the tradition of the heretation of fatihah that was mediated by a sheikh (*tawasul*)to the founder of the *tarekat* who had been passed away. . According to the reformists, these practices are not rooted in the Qur'an or the hadith, heretical, and invalid innovations. This stereotyping had social implications, in which the modernists considered themselves puritan and pristine Muslims, where as the followers of Sufi orders as heterodox. According to some observations, this condition started to change in the 1980s. According to Julia D. Howell, the tendency to change had already begun in the 1970s (Howell, 2008: 375). Muslim scholars started to view Sufism and mystical orders in general as an alternate way and as amodern style of worship, which is said to had 'dried' spiritually and had become disconnected from the Muslim's deepest innermost self. The invocations of the mystical orders lead to a deep spiritual experience capable of fulfilling their yearning to become closer to God. The modernists' appreciation of mystical orders and Sufism in general has increased substantially. Many mystical congregation semerged in urban regions, where intellectuals, executives, and bureaucrats join these groups.

People who used to be critical of Sufism gradually appreciated these religious practices and some even joined a mystical brotherhood. In the last fifteen years, in the courtyard of the LIPI building on Jalan Gatot Subroto in Jakarta, every year a grand ritual is held. It is an annual commemoration (*haul*), organized by the Qadiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah mystical order. In the month of Sha'ban, the field usually uses for the ceremony is covered with giant tents that cover the

entire field, while there is also a stage within the fully carpeted tents. On a certain Sunday, whenthe offices are vacant, the annual commemoration is performed. The followers of Qadiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah mystical order from various regions in Indonesia, dressed in white uniforms, congregate together with the *mursyid* and the *'ulama* of the order to performinvocations (*dhikr*) and to make supplications (*doa*), being face to face with each other (*tawajjuh*), converse intimately (*munajat*), drawing closer to God and entreating forgiveness to gain salvation in this world and in the hereafter. This is an annual event in addition to the weekly rituals held by members who reside in Jakarta and surroundings and are usually held every Saturday, rotating between various places like mosques or members' houses. The Mosque of LIPI is one of the places used for this weekly congregation. This kind of *tawajjuh* is not only attended by ordinary Muslims but also by prominent society figures, bureaucrats, ministers, intellectuals, scientists, merchants, employees, entrepreneurs, and so on. Thus, the membership of the mystical congregations spans a wide range of social classes.

A grand invocation ritualas the one held in the courtyard of the LIPI office is similar to other rituals held by other Muslim communities in Jakarta and other major cities in Indonesia. Some television shows often broadcast similar rituals conducted by organized groups, such as the Majlis Adz-Dzikra led by Ustadz M. Arifin Ilham, Ustadz Abdullah Gymnastiar, and also Ustadz Haji Haryono. The invocation ritual performed by the latter is usually coupled with a healing ritual. People suffering from various illnesses, who usually have already visited a medical doctor but to no avail, assemble to recite the invocations and prayers led by Ustadz Haji Haryono. In addition to his life in Bekasi where he treats patients with his assistants with the invocation method, Ustadz Haji Haryonois also the leader of a *pesantren* in East Java.

K.H. Abdullah Gymnastiar founded and for a long time led Pesantren Darut Tauhid, a *pesantren* which is identical to spiritual training activities. Broadcasted by a radio station on the campus of Pesantren Darut Tauhid in Bandung his preaching attracted tens of thousands of people. Aa Gym (as Abdullah Gymnastiar was popularly called) also delivered his spiritually enlightening counsels in a heartrending way and by using of simple and touching language. Because of his popular style of spiritual

education, Aa Gym isalso called the "Manager of Qalbu".

Not only ordinary people performcongregated invocations and supplications led by a cleric or a religious scholar, but also the number one figure of the Republic of Indonesia, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). He is not a cleric or a religious scholar, but he set up a congregated invocation group like the ones mentioned above. In 2004, when he stated his intention to run for the presidency for the first direct presidential election in Indonesia, he founded an invocation group[1]with a number of clerics among his supporters and it was named the Majelis Dhikr SBY "Nurussalam" (Nurussalam Invocation Assembly of SBY).

The above mentioned invocation groups are just some examples. Many other invocation groups are located in Jakarta or in other major cities. Some can be mentioned here such as the Majelis Dzikir "Nurul Musthofa" and various other invocation assemblies under the guidance of descendants of the Prophet (*habib*) in Jakarta, like the "Majelis Rasulullah" (the Assembly of the Messenger of Allah) led by the late Habib Mundzir al-Musawa that had more than 10,000 members.

The most fundamental activity of the invocation assemblies is spiritual training by means of invocations and the remembrance of Allah as the Creator (*al-Khaliq*), the Omnipotent, the One, and all the other attributes of Allah by way of reciting a good utterance (*kalimah tayyiba*) such as *la ilaha illa Allah* meaning "no god but Allah", *Subhanallah walhamdulillah wa la ilaha illa Allah wallahu akbar* (Glory be to Allah, all praise be to Allah, there is no god but Allah, and He is the Almighty), as well as other good utterances. These fine utterances are recited uncountable times as a way to subjugate the soul and the innermost heart only to the meanings of these utterances, as well as by intimate conversations with God (*munajat*), exposing the soul to Allah, the One and Almighty, the Possessor of Power over everything, including the power to cure diseases, etc. The participants believe

that the practice of these invocation rituals is a means of bringing about a peaceful mind, controlling the self from disobedience, refraining from falling into the falsehood and the "illusion" of worldly splendor, which always tempt the people in urban societies.

Religious training and practices with particular emphases on this kind of spirituality seem to have become increasingly popular among urban communities, at least over the last fifteen years. Observers of religious life commonly call this phenomenon "urban Sufism". It is a form of spiritual discourse among several classes of followers but dominated by the upper middle classas it costs quite a lot of money. Sufism in urban society has its own functions and is both a form of social control as well as a place where those who perform mystical vocations can bring about a peaceful mind and have many other positive benefits. Sufism offers a wide range of forms of and methods for spiritual enlightenment amidst urban life that is overloaded with a large variety of psychic pathology.

Conclusion

From the above we may conclude that the modernization of Islam rests on two pillars, namely puritanism and rationalism. Reformists think that the cause of the stagnation of Muslims'moral and spiritual life during medieval times was their deviation from the norms set by the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The solution was to return to the purity of Islam by way of returning to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. They rejected everything that was not guided by the two main sources and regarded it as heretical; while anything that accords with these main sources is called *sunnah*. In accordance with a sound hadith, innovation is misguided, and the perverted are to be put in hell. They were very rigid with their slogan back to the Qur'an and Sunnah, so they considered innovations not only as distorted, and therefore hostile, but also ignored old innovative intellectual legacies. The religious purification movement through Wahhabism that emerged in the Arabian Peninsula was oriented to political power and managed to give birth to a new country called Saudi Arabia, but this kind of movement in other Islamic regions runs in accordance with local conditions and understanding expanded by Western rationalist traditions.

Indonesia is obviously different from Saudi Arabia. The reform movement in Egypt was also different from that of

in Saudi Arabia. If in Saudi Arabia the purification process was accompanied by the rejection of rational Western culture and the old innovative Islamic intellectual heritage, in Egypt, Muhammad Abduh accepted various views of modern Western civilization and he rejuvenated the old intellectual heritage of Islamic civilization. In Saudi Arabia,the Wahhabi movement was known as fundamentalist while in Egypt and Indonesia, supporters of pro-Western reform movements were called modernists. In Indonesia, reform took the form of religious purification while Western civilization was selectively accepted. In the field of Indonesia education, modernization was conducted by imitating the European schools system, such as *HIS met de Kor'an*, and by modernizing *pesantren*s by changing their system from only religious teachings, with no tier, no curriculum, and no general subjectsinto schools and *madrasahs* that imitate the Western classical system, with tiers, evaluation systems, and secular subjects such as English, mathematics, chemistry, physics and the like.

The old intellectual heritagehad been enriched by new ideas about Islam in the fields of social, political, legal, and educational matters that had developed by the so-called modernists.

In Indonesia, the modernist movement caused the development of political anti-theocracy and anti-monarchy thoughts and it tended to support a governmental system based on consensus (Q.S. As-Shura/42: 38). Indonesian reformers contended not only to develop modern thoughts, but at the same time also sought their country's liberation from colonialism. They formed modern organizations, utilized modern technology to distribute their ideas and ideology, the country's format, and the basic foundation of the independent state of Indonesia. In the process, inevitable dialogues and debates took place with those who wanted a different ideology and another basic foundation for an Independent Indonesia. They were often called religiously neutral nationalists. The result was a compromise for an independent Indonesia that was a democratic country, modern, but still relied on Islamic values. What is interesting in the ideological a political competition modernists and traditionalists unified to face rthe challenge of the eligiously neutral nationalists.





Chapter Nine

The Dynamic of Islamic Print Culture

The Dynamic of Islamic Print Culture

Islamic books are inherent parts of Islamic religious development. The evidence of this in Indonesia can be traced back to the early 20th century when printed media (magazines, newspapers, and Islamic books) were first introduced to the Muslims in Indonesia. Religious scholars traditionally acted as the sole holders of religious authority, but after the begining of the 21st century, ordinary Muslims had the opportunity to resort to printed media as sources of Islamic knowledge and guides to religious practices.

Facilitated by colonial printing technology at the reformist Muslims beginning of the 20th century used printed media as one of the most important components of their Islamic reform movement in addition to the reform of educational system and the ways of religious thinking this process not only created the appearance of a new expression of Islam, but also showed the changing outlook of religious scholars in *pesantren* and their use of *kitab kuning*.[1] Through the printed press, intellectual and political channels, modern educational institutions, the Islamic reformist movement had gradually turned into the dominating discourse in society. Intellectual changes in the Muslim communities in modern Indonesia had become unavoidable.[2]

Thaher Djalaluddin was the first Jawi-Makkah (Indonesian who had sojourned for a long time in Mecca) who became acquainted with the reform ideas of Muhammad Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida from Cairo. He was the first Indonesian who introduced Islamic reformism to Southeast Asia. His latter role was reflected in the publication of *al-Imam* in 1906 it was the first Islamic reform magazine in Southeast Asia. Together with other ulama who had been exposed to Cairo reformism, such as Sayid Sheikh al-Hadi (1862-1934),[3] his



The Grand Mosque of Ganting located in the area of the conflict between the KaumTua (the Old) and the Kaum Muda (the Youth) in Padang, West Sumatra.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

close friend from Singapore and Haji Abbas bin Mohamad Taha,[4] Djalaluddin triggered Islamic reformism in Singapore, the town that had begun to become a Southeast Asian metropolis.[5]

Al-Imam has a specific role in formatting political thinking and nurturing Islamic intellectuals in Southeast Asia.[6] Its role was mainly to provide close relations with reformists in Cairo and to become a model as well as a source of Islamic reformist thinking.[7] Like *al-Manar*, *al-Imam* underlined that its main concern was the reformist spirit. In its first edition,

of the ruling elite of the Riau-Lingga Kingdom. Consequently, he continued his education as a member of the royal family. Sayid al-Hadi witnessed the emergence of Pulau Penyengat into the center of revival of Malay culture at the end of the 19th century which gave him a chance to be close with the Islamic discourse of prominent ulama, especially those who were grouped into the Persekutuan Rusydiyyah in 1890. See also Virginia Matheson (1989), "Pulau Penyengat: Nineteenth Century Islamic Centre of Riau", *Archipel* 37, 153-172; Alimuddin Hassan Palawa, "The Penyengat School: A Review of the Intellectual Tradition in the Malay-Riau Kingdom", *Studia Islamika*, vol. 10, no. 3: 2003, 97-12. It has been noted that his relation with Islamic reform began when he visited Mecca and Cairo, together with Thaher Djalaluddin, as the guide of the royal family of Riau-Lingga kingdom who registered at the preparation school in Cairo. From there, he had not only become attracted to, but was also involved in the Islamic reform in Southeast Asia. For Sayid al-Hadi's title and carrier see William Roff, *The Origin of Malay Nationalism*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967), 62-3; Michael F. Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma below the Wind*, (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 19-30; Abu Bakar Hamzah, *Al-Imam: Its Role in Malay Society 1906-1908*, (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1991), 5.

4. Haji Abbas bin Muhammad Taha was born in Singapore in 1885, and was probably of Minangkabau descent. After studying in Mecca, he returned to Singapore in 1905 where he became a religious teacher and then in 1906 published his collection of homiletic quotes from works on Education in Egypt and Syria, the *Sempoerna Pelajaran* (1906). He was involved in *al-Imam* as an assistant editor and in 1908 as editor. After *al-Imam* stopped publishing in 1908, his carrier continued as in the same year he was appointed as *kadi* at the District of Tanjong Pagar in Singapore. Meanwhile, his reform concern also continued; in 1911 he published *Neratja* and then *Tunas Melayu* in 1913. In 1940 he was appointed as the Mufti of Pahang. See Roff, *The Origin of Malay...*, 63-64.

5. Another important figure behind the publication of *al-Imam* was Sheikh Muhammad Salim al-Kalili. He was born in Cirebon and a citizen of Singapore. His role in *al-Imam* was as a businessman who financially supported its publication rather than as a scholar or writer. There was also a person called Encik Abdullah bin Abdul Rahman of Muar but little known about him. See Roff, *The Origin of Malay...*, 32-9, 64; William Roff, *Bibliography of Malay and Arabic Periodicals Published in the Straits Settlements and Peninsular Malay States*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 75-89; Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood...*, 150; Hamzah, *Al-Imam: Its Role...*, 28-29.

6. Roff, *The Origin of Malay...*, 56-57; Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood...*, 148-60. See also A.C. Milner, *The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya: Contesting Nationalism and the Expansion of the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

7. Roff, *The Origin of Malay...*, 59.



***Al-Munir*, the reform magazine for youths in West Sumatra which continued the role and the spirit of *al-Imam*, which was published in Singapore in 1911.**

Source: *Perpustakaan Nasional* (The National Library of the Republic of Indonesia).

the editor of *al-Imam* wrote that the magazine attempted "to remind those who had forgotten; to wake up those who had fallen asleep; to show the right direction to those who had gone astray; to give a voice to those who speak wisely; to call for Muslims to live in accordance with the Divine command as much as possible; and to obtain the greatest happiness in the world and divine blessing in the hereafter."[8]

The influence of *Al-Manar*'s on *al-Imam* clear enough *al-Imam* reprined a number of articles that had been printed in *al-Manar*. On August 29, 1908, the editor of *al-Imam* announced that this magazine would start to publish the interpretations of the Qur'an. It provided a special section for that purpose, namely the Malay translation of the Quranic interpretations that had previously been published in *al-Manar*.

As mentioned in the previous edition of *al-Imam*, we promised our readers to publish the translation of Quranic interpretations which originate from Sheikh Muhammad Abduh's recent lectures at al-Azhar. To meet our promise, this edition will begin with a presentation of the introductory remarks [on Quranic explanation] Muhammad Abduh delivered in his lecture at al-Azhar in the month Muharram 1316 AH, as published in *al-Manar* vol. III, 4th edition.[9]

This quote is only one of many in which *al-Imam* states that it would republish the articles, or the kind of articles that had previously been published in *al-Manar*. The Quranic interpretations section confirms *al-Imam*'s primary mission to disseminate the reformist ideas from Cairo to Southeast Asia. Quranic interpretation is a major field of Islamic knowledge and provides the essential framework of the understanding of the core source of Islamic teachings, i.e. the Quran. By translating Quranic interpretations, *al-Imam* had laid down the main principle of Islamic reformism in Southeast Asia.

It is noteworthy that Abduh's Quranic interpretations, which were published in *al-Manar* by Rashid Rida, Abduh's disciple who completed his work on Quranic commentary, not only displayed a modernist tendency, but also rational approach to Quranic interpretation.[10]

8. See *al-Imam*, I, July 1906. For a discussion on the purpose and goal of *al-Imam* see also Roff (1967: 56), Hamzah (1991: 28-29).

9. See *al-Imam*, No. 4, vol. 3, 1908.

10. It must be noted here that 'Abduh wrote explanations on a number of Quranic verses. Rashid Rida, who was present and took notes of 'Abduh's lectures in al-Azhar, continued the work after 'Abduh died in 1905. The complete title is



Mepsi magazine No.3 issued on May 20, 1935. Mepsi (abbreviated from Madjlis Ekonomi PSII/the Economic Assembly of the PSII) was an internal magazine of the PSII that not only discussed the finances of the organization, but also economic problems in society.

Source: _Perpustakaan Nasional_ (The National Library of the Republic of Indonesia).

For Southeast Asian Muslims, as for Egyptian Muslims, Muhammad Abduh's Quranic commentary meant a radical transition in *tafsir* literature. It is certainly different from commonly practiced Quranic interpretations in traditional *pesantren*s, where mostly the *Tafsir al-Jalalain* by al-Suyuti and al-Mahalli was mostly used.[11] With Abduh's interpretations, *al-Imam* aimed at explaining the Quran practically to a wide audience of readers, wider than that which could be reached in the medieval period of *tafsir* the products of which were mostly discussed in *pesantren*s.

Besides *tafsir*, *al-Imam* also published articles on other subjects, for instance a translated version of a work titled "*Ilmu dan Ulama*" (lit. knowledge and the knowers) by the Egyptian cleric, Sheikh Muhammad bin Ibrahim al-Ahmadi. This article was published in *al-Imam*, July edition 1908. Similarly to Abduh's Quranic interpretation, *al-Imam* mentioned the source of the article as follow:

> This article (*Ilmu dan Ulama*) is a translation of the work by Sheikh Muhammad bin Ibrahim al-Ahmadi, a leading Egyptian cleric at al-Azhar. We publish this article in *al-Imam* in installments so that the readers of *al-Imam* may know the nature, position, and endeavors of this religious scholar.[12]

As appears from its title, "*Ilmu dan Ulama*'" discusses the essence of the *ulama*s as sources of religious authority in the Islamic tradition. Apart from illustrating the traditional roles of *ulama* in teaching religious subjects to Muslims, *al-Imam* also strongly encouraged *ulama* to involve themselves in all attempts to create the conditions the Muslims needed to advance in the contemporaneous world. For *al-Imam*, the clerical role that traditionally centered on Islamic education "must be expanded to include all efforts dealing with worldly affairs, in order that they may offer their benefits for wider society."[13]


As in the case of *tafsir*, through "*Ilmu dan Ulama*" *al-Imam* underlined that

Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-Hakīm al-Mushtahar bi Tafsīr al-Manār and it was first published in 1925. For a discussion on the origin of this Quran commentary see J.J.G. Jansen, *The Interpretation of the Koran in Modern Egypt* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), 20-21, 23-24. See also Charles Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), 273.

11. Martin Van Bruinessen, "Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in the Pesantren Milieu," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 146 (2/3), 253-254.

12. See *al-Imam*, vol. 2, No. 3, 1908.

13. See *al-Imam*, vol. 2, July, 1908.



***Capita Selecta*, two volumes, by Mohammad Natsir (the first part consists of articles he wrote before 1941 and the second part those he wrote between 1950 and 1955). The volumes were published in Bandung in 1954 and 1957 respectively.**

Source: National Archive of the Republic of Indonesia.

the transfer of religious knowledge was the main factor in supporting the advancement of the Muslims. Expanding knowledge was one of *al-Imam*'s main concerns. In the editorial of its first edition, *al-Imam* underlined the importance of knowledge, as "a weapon to attain victory in the battle field of life; it is the connecting factor that leads many people to their glorious goal and supremacy.[14] At the same time, *al-Imam* pointed out backwardness of the Muslims in Southeast Asia because of their laziness in acquiring knowledge. It was in this context that the publication of *al-Imam*'s "*Ilmu dan Ulama*" gained its socio-religious significance. It was one of *al-Imam*'s reform strategies in Southeast Asia, and, as in the case of its publications on *tafsir*, *al-Imam* took a scholar from Cairo as its source.

It should also be added that apart from the two articles discussed above, *al-Imam*'s edition of May 1907 published the Malay translation of an article of the Egyptian nationalist Mustafa Kamil, *al-shams al-mushriqa*,[15] entitled "*Matahari Memancar*" (lit. Shining Sun).[16] Also, in the special column on *fatwa* (question & answer) the editor of *al-Imam* cited many quotations from *al-Manar*. To mention just one example, *al-Imam* followed *al-Manar* in its response to a *fatwa* request (*istifta*) about the Sufi Naqsabandiyah brotherhood in which *al-Imam* asserted: "as explained by our colleague, *al-Manar* magazine in Egypt, the practices of a Muslim brotherhood must be based on the sharia." *Al-Imam* then underlined that "there is no doubt about *al-Manar*'s legal explanation in this matter."[17]

Introducing Printed Culture and Modernity

The examples presented above show that *al-Imam* played an important role in connecting Cairo reformism and Muslims in Southeast Asia. Thaher Djalaluddin was responsible for this connection. Moreover, *al-Imam* also initiated the emergence of a new kind of Islamic intellectual tradition by starting to use modern tools and facilities. The Jawi-

14. See *al-Imam*, vol. 1, July, 1906.

15. Mustafā Kāmil, *al-Shams al-Mushriqa* (Cairo: 1904).

16. For a discussion on this see Michael F. Laffan, "Watan and Negeri: Mustafā Kāmil's 'Rising sun' in the Malay World', *Indonesia Circle* 69, 1996, 156-175; Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood...*, 160-165. This indicates the rising influence of the Japanese Meiji restoration in the formation of Indonesian nationalism, as also on the case of Cairo. For the Tokyo-oriented voices in *al-Imam*, see Barbara Watson Andaya, "From Rūm to Tokyo: The Search for Anticolonial Allies by the Rulers of Riau, 1899-1944", *Indonesia* 24, 1977, 123-156.

17. See *al-Imam*, 5, October, 1908.

Makkah community in Cairo like Thaher had studied these tools and facilities together with Abduh and Rida's other reformist ideas. One of these modern aspects was the use of magazines and newspapers in the Islamic reformist movement. The printing press, which the Muslim community had initially rejected because it was seen as using a secular means to spread the sacred teachings of Islam, had become an inseparable part of the reform movement in the Muslim world. Just like for Muslims in South and Central Asia, printing machines had turned into one of the main elements in the growth of Islamic reformism.[18]

Al-Imam created the space for the growth of Islamic print culture in Southeast Asia. It initiated the emergence of a new face of Islam and of the Muslim "reformists" leaders and simultaneously also identified a new style of leadership different from that of the traditional *ulama*s in Javanese *pesantren*s and Malay *surau*s and in the use of their books. Because of the formation of a Southeast Asian modern social order, the traditional *ulama*s were no longer considered as the sole authorities in religious matters and who, up to then, had monopolized the formulation of Islamic thought. New Muslim leaders, the writers of magazine and newspaper articles, began to become increasingly involved in defining Southeast Asian Islam.


In additional to publications, educational reform was also becoming an important aspect of Islamic reformism. Muslim reformists would rather build modern educational institutions, schools, and *madrasah*s than founding *pesantren*s and *surau*s. Instead of generating *ulama*s, schools and *madrasah*s preferred to create a new kind Muslim leaders, called "educated Muslims" by Mukti Ali, a prominent figure of the reformist Muslim organization Muhammadiyah, as will be discussed later. They were to become Muslim leaders with a modern spirit and reformist ideas.[19] Different from *pesantren*s and *surau*s, which concentrated on teaching religious knowledge only, schools and *madrasah*s transferred knowledge in a wider sense including "secular subjects",

such as mathematics, English, Dutch, geography, and history. In addition, schools and *madrasah*s also introduced new educational methods adopted from Western educational institutions. Therefore, schools and *madrasah*s played important roles in elevating the Islamic reform movement and these new scholars rapidly became a religious authority that rivaled traditional *ulama*s.

Besides *al-Imam*, educational reform was the other concern of Thaher Djalaluddin. Soon after starting the publication of *al-Imam*, in 1907, he became a teacher in the newly established Madrasah al-Iqbal al-Islamiyya or the Iqbal School in Singapore. Headed by Uthman Affandi Raf'at from Egypt and financially supported by Raja Ali Haji from the Riau-Lingga Kingdom, the Iqbal School was the forerunner of modern Islamic schools in Southeast Asia.[20] To recruit teaching staff, Uthman Affandi Raf'at returned to Egypt in 1907 and this school became an effective tool in the dissemination of Islamic reformism in Southeast Asia. As reported by *al-Imam*, this school taught Islamic as well as the secular subjects.[21]

Through *al-Imam* and the Iqbal School, Thaher Djalaluddin manage to built a strong connection between Southeast Asian Islam and Islamic reformism in Cairo. He laid the foundations for the emergence of a new face of Islam different from traditional Islam that had been formed long ago under *ulama* power. Therefore, besides *kitab*, Southeast Asian Muslims began to learn from the products of the printed media and in addition to *pesantren*s and *surau*s; *madrasah*s emerged as new Muslim educational institutions. *Fatwa* requests started to be sent to magazines and newspaper editors and no longer only to *ulama*s. Islamic reformism no longer only gave rise to new ways of Islamic thinking, but also gave a new face to Southeast Asian Islam.

Supported by the modernization launched by the British and Dutch colonial governments, various regions in the Malay Peninsula and the Netherlands Indies emerged into fortresses for the growth of Islamic reformism that arrived from Singapore. This specifically took place in the urban area where modern infrastructure had been established.



The booth of the publisher Mizan in 2014 at the Indonesia International Book Fair. This event was first held in 2006 in Jakarta.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

Muslims in those areas started to participate in the reformist project by expressing the need for a formulation of Islamic doctrines in a modern spirit. They began to establish modern organizations, Western-style schools, ant they published magazines, newspapers, and books. In the Netherlands Indies, Padang in West Sumatra was the first region where the seeds of Islamic reformism were sown.[22] Muslim reformers in that area had become known as the Young Group (*kaum muda*) and they were the first group to voice their desire for Islamic reformism, primarily through their magazine *al-Munir*.

Al-Munir and West Sumatran Youths

Published from 1911 to 1918, *al-Munir* was established a magazine to continue the role and spirit of *al-Imam*, which had stopped publishing in 1908.[23] Hadji Abdullah Ahmad the founder and editor, *al-Munir*'s, actually "imitated the slogans and the format of *al-Imam*".[24] Abdullah Ahmad had a close relation with *al-Imam* and its representatives in Padang Panjang. His visit to Singapore in 1908 seemed to have given him the opportunity to become acquainted with the technical skills of magazine publication management.[25] He was the

22. Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), 30. Meanwhile at the Malay regions which are now Malaysia and Singapore, reformism also had a strong impact. In the field of publishing, this can be seen from the rise of magazines and newspapers after *al-Imam* had discontinued its publication. In 1911, Haji Abbas bin Toha, an al-Imam exponent, began to publish the reform magazine *Neratja*. In Penang, the reform magazines *al-Ikhwan* and *Saudara* were also published. These magazines, like other magazines and publications continued al-Imam's reform spirit. See Roff, *Bibliography of Malay...*, 11-4; Roff, *The Origin of Malay...*, 75-87.

23. Ahmat bin Adam, *The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian Consciousness (1855-1913)*, (Ithaca: Southeast Asian Program Cornell University, 1995), 140. It must be clarified here that *al-Munir* was the first magazine published in Indonesia after *al-Imam*. In Malaysia, *Neratja* emerged in 1911 and *Tunas Melayu* in 1913, both by H. Abbas, an ex editor of *al-Imam*. See Roff, *Bibliography of Malay...*, 7-8.

24. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim...*, 35. For a discussion on al-Munir's founding of, see also Hamka (Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah), *Ajahku: Riwajat hidup Dr. H. Abd. Karim Amrullah dan perdjuangan kaum agama di Sumatera*, (Djakarta: Widjaja, 1958); Alfian, *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism*, (Yogyakarta: UGM Press, 1989), 108; Tamar Djaja, *Pusaka Indonesia: Riwayat Hidup Orang-orang Besar Tanah Air*, Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1966), Vol. II, 700; Syamsuri Ali, "Al-Munir dan Wacana Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam 1911-1915", Padang: MA Thesis IAIN Imam Bonjol, 1997, 26.

25. Azyumardi Azra, "The Transmission of al-Manar's Reformism to the Malay-Indonesian World: the Cases of al-Imam and al-Munir", *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 6/3, 1999, 92.



One of the books published by Mizan in 2007.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

sole pioneer of *al-Munir* and his name has often been linked to this magazine and he was also called "Haji Abdullah al-Munir."[26]

Al-Munir shared similar concerns with *al-Imam*. It was designed to be "the lighthouse that illuminates [religious] life". Its editor explained the aims of the magazine as follows. First it was to lead Malay Muslims in Sumatra and to take them to the right belief and the proper religious practices; second, it was to maintain peace and harmony among mankind as well as to show its loyalty to the Dutch government; and third, it was to enlighten Muslims with knowledge and wisdom.[27]

In the 1913 edition, the editor reemphasized these goals in response to the increasing number of people who were against its publication, that was "to gain the essential religious knowledge and to constitute the true sharia of the Prophet Muhammad by way of supporting to revive the Prophet's tradition and to condemn heresy found within the practices of the Muslims' worship". *Al-Munir* explained that its goal was to ensure that Islamic worship would be performed on the basis of the main sources of Islamic teachings: the Quran, the Prophetic tradition, and the traditions of the Prophet's companions. These three were the basic foundations in solving religious disputes and discrepancies.[28]

Like *al-Imam*, *al-Munir* focused on the religious problems the Southeast Asian Muslims might face. The magazine also participated in portraying Islam in a way that suited modern society and supported progress. Consequently, traditional religious practices were considered to have polluted Islam because of their pre-Islamic local customs. *Al-Munir* stressed that religious beliefs and practices should be cleansed from impurities. For that reason that Muslims were urged to return to the Quran and Hadith and they had to resort to legal exercises in order to understand these holy sources rather than blindly replicate Islamic doctrines.[29]


Like *al-Imam*, references to *al-Manar* are also found in *al-Munir*. One of the best examples is the one about a *fatwa* on ways of dress. This legal decree is

26. Mahmud Yunus, *Sejarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Mutiara, 1979), 157.

27. See *al-Munir* 1, no. 1, 1911. See also Azra, "The Transmission of al-Manar's..., 94.

28. See *al-Munir* 3, no. 2, 1913.

29. For the contents of these two magazines see Roff, *The Origin of Malay...*, 56-59; Hamzah, *Al-Imam: Its Role in Malay Society...*, 21-22; Noer, *The Modernist Muslim...*, 39-40; Ali, "Al-Munir dan Wacana Pembaharuan"....



important because it proves that there was a transmission of *fatwa*s from *al-Manar* to *al-Munir*, but also because it indicates that a dialogue took place between the two magazines as long as there had been requests for *fatwa*s to *al-Manar*.[30]

In 1911 Al-Manar (14) published the questions posed by Abdullah Ahmad, the editor of *al-Munir*, who requested *fatwa*s on various disputed matters, two of which about Islamic ways of dress.[31] He asked whether it was legal for Muslims to wear European dress, like a hat and a tie, or whether they should be expelled from Islam when they did. He asked this because a local *alim* in West Sumatra had issued a legal opinion[32] saying that wearing European dress was forbidden based on the Prophetic hadith that says "whoever imitates a group of people, he or she would be part of them." Abdullah Ahmad inquired about the essential truth of this Prophetic saying and what was meant by "imitation" (*tasyabbuh*).

Abdullah Ahmad based his *fatwa* on a similar issue of apparel that had been discussed in *al-Munir* based on Rashid Rida's answer in *al-Manar*. In an edition of the same year (no. 17, 1911), *al-Munir* issued a *fatwa* with the same substance as that of *al-Manar*, stating that Islam does not prescribe specific ways of dress, except for *ihram* ritual during the *hajj* or the *umrah*. Moreover, even if they did not wear that particular attire during *ihram*, they would still not be


A book published by LP3ES entitled *Pergolakan Pemikiran Islam: Catatan Harian Ahmad Wahib* (Upheaval of Islamic Thinking: Notes from the Diary of Ahmad Wahib).

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

30. Jutta E. Bluhm, "A preliminary statement on the dialogue between the reform magazine al-Manar and the Malayo-Indonesian World", *Indonesia Circle* 32, 1983, 35-42.

31. N.J.G. Kaptein, "Southeast Asian Debates and Middle Eastern Inspiration: European Dress in Minangkabau at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century", in Eric Tagliacozzo (ed.) Proceedings Workshop Southeast Asia and the Middle East: Islam, Movement, and the Longue Durée, Asia Research Institute (ARI), Singapore, 17-18 August 2004. It needs to be clarified here that Muslims wearing European dress had started to become a controversy in 20th century Malay-Indonesia. The way of dress was included as part of Muslims' identity that differed from that of Europeans and Arabs. For a discussion on this matter see Kees van Dijk, "Sarongs, jubbahs, and trousers: Appearance as a means of distinction and discrimination", in Schulte Nordholt (ed.) *Outward Appearances: Dressing State and Society in Indonesia*, Leiden: KITLV, 1997, 39-84; and also a previous article by Kaptein on a similar issue that stressed the varieties of fatwas including those from al-Munir. N.J.G. Kaptein, "European Dress and Muslim Identity in the Netherlands East Indies", paper prepared for LISOR Congress, "Religious Change in Pluralistic Context", Leiden 28-30 August, 2003.

32. A local ulama referred to in the request was Chatib Ali, a traditionalist religious scholar from West Sumaera who opposed the reform movement. He banned the use of European dress and blamed the youth (the reform religious scholars) who had permitted the practice as appearing to be Christians. See Kaptein, "European Dress and Muslim Identity...", 6.



Booth of the publisher Amzah in 2014 at the Indonesia International Book Fair. This publisher is a special division of the Bumi Aksara publisher tasked to promote books on Islamic themes.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

considered unbelievers. In this example, *al-Munir*, like *al-Imam* adopted *al-Manar* in Cairo as the basis for its *fatwa*s on these disputed religious matters in West Sumatra. Abdullah Ahmad acknowledged that the *fatwa*s of "the Egyptian scholars [...] and their magazine" were the sources for the *fatwa*s in *al-Munir*.

Al-Munir's use of *al-Manar* is also evident in another *fatwa* on propelling some body parts as an indication on something that might happen in the future of one's life. This question was posed by Mahmud bin Sheikh Muhammad Idris from Tilatang, Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatera.[33] The answer was given in the next issue (*al-Munir* 3, No. 13, 1913), which quoted various statements published in *al-Manar*. The editor wrote, "*Al-Munir's* priority is to give the same answer as *al-Manar* had published on the same issue". Again, by following *al-Manar*, the magazine stated that there was no relation between triggering certain body parts and the character or nature of certain people as well as their future life. Therefore, like the dress issue, *al-Munir* referred to *al-Manar* as its source for issuing a *fatwa* and this clearly indicates its active participation in disseminating Islamic reformism into West Sumatra and the Netherlands Indies in general.

The evidence of the disseminating of Islam from *al-Manar* to *al-Munir* and *al-Imam* clearly indicates the crucial role of publications in transmitting Islamic reform in the regions mentioned above. These magazines provided effective channels for Cairo-based Islamic reformism which had important consequences for the Muslims of the then Netherlands Indies. These magazines also supported the growth of new Muslims, the reformists, and supplied a strong ideological basis for the Islamic reform movement and by so doing contributed to their increasing impacts within the Indonesian Muslim community in the early 20th century.[34] As a result, Islamic reform ideas started to become a main discourse in society.

Books as Reform Movement

With the appearance of *al-Imam* in Singapore (1905-1909), and *al-Munir* in Padang (1911-1916)[35] the Islamic reformist movement in Indonesia started to be increasingly active in publishing Islamic books, in addition

33. See *al-Munir*, 3, no. 12, 1913.

34. Azra, "The Transmission of al-Manar's...", 97.

35. The main source for the Islamic printed press in the beginning of the 20th century is based on research done by Jajat Burhanudin, "The Fragmentation of Religious Authority: Islamic Print Media in Early 20th Century Indonesia," published in *Studia Islamika*, Volume 11, No. 1 (2004), 38-53.

to journals and newspapers. The Muhammadiyah (founded in 1912) started to publish various magazines including *Bintang Islam* (1923), *Bendera Islam* (1924), *al-Kirom* (1928), *Adil* (1932), *Pantjaran Amal* (1936), *Ichtiyar* (1937), besides newspapers like *Al-Chair* (1926) in Surakarta, *Soengoenting Moehammadijah* (1927-1929) in Yogyakarta, and *Swara Islam* (1931-1933) in Semarang.[36]

Persatuan Islam (Persis) started to publish its own Islamic publications that contributed to the spread of their ideas in the magazine *Pembela Islam* (1929), *al- Fatwa* (1931), and *Sual-Djawab* (1930s).[37] So did Sarekat Islam which, after its establishment published its magazines *Hindia Serikat* (1913), *Al-Islam, Simpaj*, and *Sarotomo* (1916)[38] apart from several daily newspapers such as *Oetoesan Hindia, Pantjaran Warta, Sinar Djawa* (all in operation since 1913), *Neratja* (1916), *Sinar Hindia* (1924), and *Hindia Baroe* (1924).

The important roles these magazines and periodicals played were strengthened by the publications of Islamic books. The findings of a study by Ockeleon gives a clear picture: In the beginning of the 20th century were not many Islamic books were published but the most important thing was that they concentrated on all the Islamic disciplines found in the classical literature of the traditional Islamic institutions, especially *pesantren*. In Ockeleon's study, a number of Islamic books are classified in accordance with the scientific disciplines as found in classical books.[39]

The first were works on Arabic such as *Djalan ke Qoeran, Pengadjaran Bahasa Arab dan Nahwoenja* (lit. The path towards the Quran, the teaching of Arabic and its grammar by A.D. Haanie, 1936), *Pengadjaran bahasa Arab & Grammaticanja*, (The teaching of Arabic and its grammar by A.D. Haanie and Moehammad Farid Wadjdi, 1931), *Kitab akan beladjar membatja dan menoelis toelisan Arab diterangkan dengan*

bahasa Melajoe hoeroef Woelanda, (A book about learning how to read and to write Arabic script explained in Malay-Latin script by Achmad bin Abdullah Assagaff, 1918), *Kamoes Arab-Melajoe* (Dictonary of Arab Malay Fadloe'llah Moehammad and B. Th. Brongeest), and *Himpoenan Peribahasa Inggris, Belanda, Arab dan Minangkabau* (A collection of English, Dutch, Arab, and Minangkabau's Sayings and Expressions by Siradjuddin 'Abbas, 1934)[40]

Second, Islamic legal literature like *Kitab salat* (The book of prayers by Abu Dardari, 1926), *Zakatoel Fitri* (by Sayid Oemar bin Alaoei Alatas 1925); *Bab Djinajah* (Soeharti binti M. Ihsan), *Boekoe aosan solat kangge moerangkalih sareng anoe nembe beladjar salat* (in Sundanese) (Persatuan Islam, 1935), and several books written by A. Hassan like *Al-Boerhan* (1992), *Kitab Fiqh al-Boerhan* (1928), and *Pengadjaran salat* (1929).

The early 20th century also marked the flourishing of Quranic commentaries. In addition to the Quranic commentary by Muhammad Abduh, there were others written by Muslim scholars such as, *Al-Boerhan: Mentapsirkan doea poeloeh doea soerat dari pada al-Qoeran* (1930), *Boekoe tafsir soerat ichlas* (1928), and *Tafsir al-Foerqan* (1928), which was translated into Sundanese in 1930.[41]

Another flourishing category was the works on Islamic theology and Sufism. In addition to al-Ghazali's *Ihya Ulum al-Din* there were also works by H.A. Malik Karim Amroellah like *Arkanoe 'l-iman dengan djalan soal-djawab* (1933) and *Sendi Iman Tiang Selamat* (1930). Other were *Ilmoe Sedjati* (1910), *Pemboeka Pintoe Soerga* (1914), and *Titian kesoerga serta Kitab oetsoeloeddin* (1916). Meanwhile books directly concerned with Sufism included *Tasaoef dalam agama Islam* (Sjarafoe'ddin Maneri, 1916), and *Ilmoe Rohani* (Sjihaboeddin Effendi Idris, 1930).

In addition there were works concerning hadith, such as *Hadits Tardjamah Melajoe* (Abu Abdillah Muhammad bin Ismail al-Bukhari, 1936) and *Boekoe Ahadits al-Nabawiyah* (Abi Haiban, 1922), which was very well-known within the *pesantren* communities at the time.[42]

Ockeleon also lists other books on similar themes as those explicated in



The entrance gate of Perguruan Thawalib Padang Panjang, a male students' territory. It was established in 1911.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

magazines and newspapers proving the increasing role of publications in presenting Islam to Muslim audiences in Indonesian urban areas. They began to emerge as the principal sources of religious information for Indonesian urban Muslims much as classical religious literature had done in the generally traditional Muslim communities in *pesantren* and *surau*. These publications thus contributed to the creation of a new Muslim community with religious ideas and practices that differed from those of traditional Muslims in *pesantren*. Here, the Islamic reform movement was a stronghold for the urban Muslim community.

B.J. Boland made an effort to look at the publication of Islamic books in the post-independence period. In his eyes, between 1945 and 1955, Muslim leaders were mostly concerned with and spent their energy in politics; hence, most Islamic publications written in Indonesian at that period dealt with politics.

Boland offered several examples of books on religious politics, though regrettably, he did not give the name of their publishers for any of the books he presented. They included titles like *Tuntunan Perang Sabil*, written at the end of 1945 by Moh. Arsjad Thalib Lubis in Medan; *Islam dengan Politik*, written by Aziz Thaib and published in Bukit Tinggi (no date, but according to Boland published around the end of 1946); *Revolusi Agama*, written by Hamka in 1946 and published in Jakarta (reprinted in 1949); *Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam,* written by Muh. Isa Anshary in 1949 and published in Bandung; *Islam sebagai Ideologi*, written by Mohammad Natsir (no date, but according to Boland probably published in 1950); *Capita Selecta*, two volumes, also by Mohammad Natsir (the first part comprising of articles written before 1941 and the second part consisting of articles and speeches written between 1950-1955) published in Bandung in 1954 and 1957 respectively; *Undang-Undang Politik Islam*, a translation of a work by Muhammad Asad, published in 1954 in Jakarta; *Soal Agama dalam Negara Modern*, written by Abu Hanifah and published in Jakarta in 1949.

Besides, Boland's note reveals efforts that supported the formation of an Islamic state. This appeared in books like *Konsepsi Tatanegara Islam,* written by Zainal Abidin Ahmad and published 1949 in Jakarta; *Analyse: Mungkinkah Negara Indonesia Bersendikan Islam?,* written by M.Sj. Ibnu Amatillah and published 1950 in Semarang; and *Dasar-Dasar*



Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto substituted H. Samanhoedias the chairman of the SI.

Source: *Perpustakaan Nasional* (The National Library of the Republic of Indonesia).

Pemerintahan Islam, written by Muhd. Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy published 1950 in Medan.[43]

However, it should be noted that Indonesian mainstream Islam during the Sukarno is guided democracy period was a continuation of Islam as it was in the beginning of the 20th century. In this period, Islam in Indonesia was divided in two: traditional and reformist, which were represented by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, traditional), and Muhammadiyah and Persis (reformist) respectively. This division had become increasingly apparent and remained so up to the end of the 1960s. Because of this, Islamic books and other printed media partly consisted of reprints of works published before independence. Islamic books after independence mostly consisted of books published by reformist organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and Persis and written by their leaders. At that time, these Islamic organizations did not yet own their own publications departments.


The book *Sual-Djawab* by Persis figure Ahmad Hassan,[44] was first printed in 1931 and reprinted in 1957-1958 (Bangil: Persatuan Islam Bagian Pustaka). Another of his books, *At-Tauhid*, was reprinted in 1958 (Bangil: Persatuan Islam Bahagian Pustaka). Another Persis figure was Moenawar Chalil (1908-1961) who had been appointed the chairman of the Majelis Ulama Persis (Persis Ulama Council) and member of the Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah. He wrote a book on the concept of the people of traditions (*ahlus sunnah*) *Kembali Kepada Al-Quran dan as-Sunnah* (first published in 1956 and reprinted in 1991).[45]

An important member of the Muhammadiyah central board from 1953 to 1971 was Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (Hamka). He wrote *Peladjaran Agama Islam* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1956), *1001 Soal-Soal Hidup* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1961), and *Tafsir Al-Azhar* (Jakarta: Pembimbing Masa, 1967 reprinted 1992) (Jakarta: Pustaka

43. See B.J. Boland, *Pergumulan Islam di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1985), 79-88.

44. Ahmad Hassan (1887-1958) wrote no less than 80 treatises. He was acknowledged as one of the pioneers for the development of Islamic literature in early modern Indonesia. Several of his works in the field of theology include: *Kitab al-Tauhied* (first published in 1937), *al-Iman* (undated), *'Aqa'id* (undated), *Adakah Tuhan?* (1962, reprinted in Malaysia 1971), *Benarkah Muhammad itu Rasul?* (1931), and *an-Nubuwah* (1941). Hassan also wrote outside theological: *Pengadjaran Shalat* (1930, reprinted 1991), *Sual Djawab* (1931, reprinted 1957-1058), and *Islam dan Kebangsaan* (1941).

45. K.H. Moenawar Chalil, *Kembali Kepada Al-Quran dan as-Sunnah: Suatu Muqaddimah bagi Himpunan Hadis-hadis Pilihan* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1991).



TJAJA HINDIA

O. S. TJOKROAMINOTO

An article on Tjokroaminoto in *Tjaja Hindia*. This article states that Tjokroaminoto was a warrior who had fought for Indonesian Independence.

Source: ***Perpustakaan Nasional*** **(The National Library of the Republic of Indonesia).**

Panjimas).[46] Another prominent Muhammadiyah leader, K.H. Mas Mansoer (1896-1946) chaired the Muhammadiyah central board in 1937 and he wrote *Risalah Tauhid dan Sjirik* (1949) and *Himpunan Putusan Tardjih Muhammadijah*, which had initially been written in 1929. Djarnawi Hadikusumo, another important Muhammadiyah leader, wrote *Muhammadijah Ahlus Sunnah wal-Djama'ah?* (Nd) which was reprinted under the different title *Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama'ah: Bid'ah Khurafat* in 1996 (Yogyakarta: Persatuan).

It appears from the titles of the books mentioned above it appears that books published during the suided democracy period concerned theology by way of Quranic understanding and aimed to strengthen reformist ideas and ideology. They were mostly published by the organizations themselves or by other publishers that belonged to reformist organizations. As a result, up to the end of the 1960s a clear separation among the Muslim community between traditionalists and modernists (reformists), along with their organizations, the NU or the Muhammadiyah could clearly be seen.

46. Hamka (1908-1981) was also renowned as a poet and a prolific writer. Having been an editor of the magazine *Pedoman Masjarakat* (1936-Japanese occupation), he also wrote several famous books: *Ajahku* (Jakarta: Widjaya, 1956), *Tasawuf Modern* (first published in 1939, reprinted Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1990).

Book Publishing as a Religious Industry: Its Growth in Contemporary Indonesia

The rapid growth of Islamic book publications is evident from the significant increase in the number of publishers that produce Islamic books. If prior to 1980s there were only a few national-scale Islamic publishers like Al Maarif (established in Bandung in 1949), Bulan Bintang (established in Jakarta in 1951), and Media Dakwah (established in Jakarta at the end of 1970s), from 1981 to 1989, Ikatan Penerbit Indonesia (IKAPI/Association of Indonesian Publishers) stated that the total number of Islamic publishers was around six.[47] In practice, in the 1980s, Indonesia was overwhelmed by Islamic

47. IKAPI was established in Jakarta on May 17, 1950 through the consensus of several national publishers. Its membership initially counted only 13 publishers including IKAPI itself. See Philips J. Vermonte, "Penerbitan Islam di Indonesia: Menuju Sebuah Print Culture?," in Rizal Sukma dan Clara Juwono (ed), Gerakan dan Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Kontemporer, (Jakarta: CSIS, 2007), 257, "Ikapi Punya Peran Strategis dalam Pengembangan Budaya Unggul," in http://www.ikapi.or.id, http://www.ikapi.org, September 13, 2006 (accessed on May 4, 2008).



Wahid Hasjim accepted the position of the Vice Chairman of the Masjumito assist his father Kyai Hasjim Asj'ari, who was the Chairman.

Source: National Archive of the Republic of Indonesia.

publishers including Pustaka Salman (1980), Shalahuddin Press (1983), Mizan (1983), Gema Insani Press (1986), and Paramadina (1986).

Entering the 1990s, officially registered publishers included Pustaka Al Kautsar (early 1990s), LkiS (1993), Robbani Press (1993), Darul Falah (1993), Lentera (1996), Al-Qowam Group (1999), Khairul Bayan (early 2000s), Aqwam Group (2003), Kafayeh Cipta Media (2007), apart from various other formally registered and unregistered IKAPI members.[48] Thus, instead of going through a period of decline because of the economic crisis that hit Indonesia at the end of the 1990s, from year to year, the total number of Islamic publishers in Indonesia grew rapidly.

In the meantime, supported by the large number of Islamic publishers, Islamic Book Fairs (IBF, national exhibitions particularly organized for Islamic books) has been held annually in Jakarta since 2001 and recently also in areas outside Jakarta. In fact, in 2006, IKAPI held an International Islamic Book Fair (IIBF) in Jakarta, an exhibition of Islamic books at an international scale.[49] The result was that the total number of Islamic publishing houses did not decrease, but rather significantly increased annually.

IKAPI data show that between 2000 and 2003, it registered 20 more new Islamic publishers as IKAPI members and in 2002 there were in total 515 publishers affiliated with IKAPI. In 2005 the total number of affiliated publishers located in various regional branches in Indonesia stood at 681: 266 publishers in DKI Jakarta, 145 in West Java, 79 in Central Java, 47 in DI Yogyakarta, 86 in East Java, 16 in North Sumatra, 6 in West Sumatra, 1 in Aceh, 4 in Riau, 8 in South Sumatera, 6 in West Kalimantan, 8 in South Sulawesi, 7 in Bali, and 2 publishers in East Nusa Tenggara.[50]

The total number is still increasing;

in 2006 around 766 publishers were formally registered as IKAPI members and almost half of them were specialized in publishing books on Islam.[51] The most important thing to note here is that the total number does not include Islamic book publishers who are not IKAPI members and we can be assured that they are plentiful, particularly in remote regions. As a result, because of these publishing houses we witness a blooming phenomenon of Islamic book production on the Indonesian book market.

However, beyond the phenomenal growth of Islamic book publication we should acknowledge that up to recently there is no data on the total volume of Islamic books that has become available in the market. Studies conducted by Yayasan Masagung,[52] the Ministry of Religious Affairs,[53] and others have in fact not resulted in producing reliable data on the total number of titles of Islamic books produced up to recently. The Ministry of Religious Affairs cites a number as high as 7.728 titles, but these include merely the titles of Islamic books published in Indonesia up to 2003, which is only an estimate and not a reliable number.

Therefore, it is difficult to give a clear estimation of the total number of Islamic book titles circulating in Indonesia. However, the statistical data from several studies indicate that we may conclude that for the period between 1945 and 1970, Indonesian publishers annually produced at least 800 book titles. In spite of fluctuations, the total number of religious book titles kept growing, particularly from 1945 to 1970. From the total number of religious book titles the books mostly produced concerned Islamic themes.

A quite significant increase appears from the data provided by the Library and Documentation Division of *Tempo magazine* above. It reveals that between 1980 and 1987, from the 1.949 titles

of books on religious themes only 809 titles, concerned Islam.[54] It means that annually, on average more than 100 titles of books on Islam entered circulation. Data obtained from the DIAN/INTERFIDEI Institute[55] say that between 1981 and 1995 ca. 1200 titles of books on Islamic themes circulated in the market. And, when adding the number from *Tempo magazine* above, it means that up to the end of the 1990s an estimated 1500 to 2000 titles of books on Islam were published.[56]

An inventory done by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 2003 of 29 Indonesian publishers that produce books on Islam found that up to 2003 there were around 4.687 titles of Islamic books. Besides, still according to the data from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, from the ca. 110 Islamic publishers who joined the 2003 Islamic Book Fair in Senayan, ca. 3.041 titles of books comprising various fields of Islamic studies were published in Indonesia. So, from both studies it has become clear that up to 2003, 7.728 titles of Islamic books on various subjects entered the Indonesian book market.[57]

IKAPI, which attempts to determine the range of books on Islam published in Indonesia, assures us that the book publishing industry in Indonesia produces at least 10.000 book titles annually, and from that number 3.000 titles deal with Islamic themes.[58] This means that up to 2008, at least 20.000 to 22.000 titles of



The boarding school Madrasah Tarbiyah Islamiyah in Batang Kabung, Koto Tangah, Padang.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

books on Islam were published, a fact that should be considered.

This estimate may be correct when we have a look at the data on the publication of books on Islam from the 766 IKAPI members.[59] Up to mid-2008, Gema Insani Press published ca. 1000 titles of Islamic books,[60] Darul Haq ca. 124,[61] Penerbit Serambi 148,[62] penerbit Maghfirah Pustaka around 92,[63] Penerbit LkiS along with its affiliated branch, Pustaka Pesantren around 316,[64] and Pustaka Al-Kautsar more than 500 at the end of 2007,[65] Azam publisher around 79 titles at the end of 2006,[66] Remaja Rosdakarya around 137 books at the end of 2005,[67] and these are just some examples and do not include the total numbers of all the publishers that produce Islamic books be they IKAPI members or not.

59. The figure of 766 was a record in IKAPI membership up to 2006. As of now the number has certainly changed significantly.

60. Derived from the official website of LKIS publisher, 2008, http://www.gemainsani.co.id/ (accessed on July 14, 2008).

61. Catalogue of the Darul Haq publisher, April 2008 edition.

62. Taken from the official website of the Serambi publisher, 2008, http://www.serambi.co.id/ (accessed on July 14, 2008).

63. Catalogue of the Darul Haq publisher, June 2008 edition.

64. Taken from the official website of LKIS publisher, 2008, http://lkis.co.id/site/index (accessed on July 14, 2008).

65. Taken from the official website of Pustaka Al-Kautsar publisher, http://www.kautsar.co.id/ (accessed on July 14, 2008).


66. This publisher is part of the PT Bumi Aksara Group, which specifically published books with Islamic themes. The data were taken from the catalogue of Azaam publisher's 2006 edition, http://bumiaksara.co.id/amzah.php (accessed June 20, 2008).

67. Taken from the official website of Remaja Rosdakarya publisher, http://rosda.co.id/ (accessed on July 14, 2008).

Islamic Book Publishers: Some Socio-Intellectual Profiles

From what we have seen above we can underline that recently Islamic books have become an important category within the Indonesian publishing world; publishing books on Islamic themes has become an industry with serious repercussions on the characteristics of Indonesian Islam. It is very important to elucidate the profiles of Islamic book publishers and their roles in the development of Islamic book publishing. In addition to looking for profit, the publishers contributed invaluably to efforts in the promotion of the use of print culture.

Its Iso very important to note that Islamic book publishers have apparently adopted a clear outline of Islamic socio-



MEPSI

PENERIMAAN MEPSI

WANG MASOEK DAN KELOEAR.

Mepsi **(abbreviated from Madjlis Ekonomi PSII/the Economic Assembly of the PSII) was a magazine published by Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia.**

Source: *Perpustakaan Nasional* (The National Library of the Republic of Indonesia).

intellectual thought which they had turned into the ideological basis for their activities and the guide in selecting the books they wanted to publish. Here, we will be specifically concerned with three Islamic publishers for they represent —though not totally—Indonesian Muslims' sociological reality. They are Mizan, which represents moderate Muslims, Gema Insani Press (GIP) which represents scripturalist and fundamentalist Muslims, and LkiS (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial) that represents the Islamic left tendency and which is critical to both doctrines and the social institutions they represent.

In the early 1980s, Indonesian society was stunned by the founding of the Islamic publisher, Mizan and its two best-sellers *Dialog Sunnah-Syiah* by A. Syafaruddin al-Musawi and *Surat Menyurat Maryam Jamilah-Maududi*.[68] From the outset, Mizan, which was founded in 1983, stood for something innovative. In fact, Mizan was established to publish luxurious modern books and important works on contemporary Islamic thought written by young and international Muslim thinkers in order to offer a balance in the ideas on Islam (*mizan* literally means 'balancing scales').

Mizam was presumed to be a Shi'i publishing house because of its publication of *Dialog Sunnah-Syiah* and other works by Shi'i thinkers like Ali Shariati and Murtadha Muthahari.[69] However, Mizan occupied only a small space and it was surrounded by an Indonesian climate that generally ignored Shi'a. In fact, most books published by Mizan were books that belong to the Sunni branch of Islam and in the early years of its establishment it published books written by various popular al-Ikhwanul Muslimin figures, one of which is *Surat-Menyurat Maryam Jamilah-Maududi*.[70]

Mizan targets university students as its readership although most of them have become the enemies of the new ways of Islamic thinking about which Mizan also publishes books including the works written by Nurcholish Madjid. The majority of the readers of Mizan publications, according to Watson,

68. Both books were written in 1983, when Haidar Bagir founded Mizan. Various observers had the impression that, initially, Mizan more represented the development of Shi'i thought in Indonesia. This appeared, for instance, from the fact that 5 years after it founding, it published mostly works by Shi'a thinkers. From the 13 books it produced until 1988, 3 were written by Murthada Muthahari, and 1 by Ali Syariati. See Watson, *Islamic Books*, page 185, footnote14.

69. Vermonte, "Penerbitan Islam", 263.

70. Watson, "Islamic Books", 184-185.

belong to the older generations and are members of a group of people that supported the Islamic cultural movement in the 1970s.

Mizan's most important effect in the earlier stages of its development was to publish the work of young Muslim intellectual thinkers from middle class society who came to the forefront of Islamic discourses and debates in Indonesia, like Nurcholish Madjid, Kuntowijoyo, and Amien Rais—people whose fate had been fortunate under the New Order government. The government urged and supported them to do their doctoral studies abroad. In fact, they preferred Western universities to those of the Middle East. Mizan issued a series of publications named 'Seri Cendekiawan Muslim', ('Muslim Intellectuals Series'), which aimed at providing a platform for newly growing ideas.[71]

Mizan's success generated other publishers that adhered to similar ways of Islamic thinking, but they did not lasted long. One of the most important was Paramadina, the publishing section of the Paramadina Foundation. Paramadina stood under the leadership of Nurcholish Madjid and, as might have been assumed, Paramadina published most of Nurcholish Madjid's works next to those by other scholars like Syafii Anwar on new ways of Muslim intellectual thinking and those of Bahtiar Effendi on the relational patterns of Islam and the state in Indonesian history.

While Mizan continued its progress as a published of moderate books on Islam, another publisher came up with a sociological basis in *Tarbiyah*. It was a group of Muslims who might be considered on belonging to the scripturalists and fundamentalists. This publisher was Gema Insani Press (GIP), founded in Jakarta in 1986 by Umar Basharahil. Under the motto "Penerbit Buku Andalan" (Publisher of Reliable Books), GIP mostly publishes translations of books written in the Middle East on various Islamic themes such as Quranic commentaries, hadith, the history of the Prophet, Islamic theology, Islamic law and rituals, home and family, and Islamic politics. [72] These book were mainly the works of Ikhwanul Muslimin members and supporters like Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Qutb, and Muhammad al-Ghazali. In other words, GIP adopted a position at the opposite side of liberal Islamic thinking and practices and it supports literal and puritan Islamic teachings.[73]

GIP's position is not without reasoning. Initially, it was established and closely related to the translating of works written by the Middle Eastern scholars. As a result, the books GIP publishes focus on *harakah* or Islamic movements. Several examples include *Tujuan dan Sasaran Jihad* by Ali Bin Nafayyi' al-Alyani (1992), *Ujian, Cobaan, Fitnah dalam Dakwah* by M. Abd Qadir Abu Faris (1992), *Tarbiyah Rasulullah* by Najib Khalid Al-Ami (1994), *Dakwah Islam Dakwah Bijak* by Said bin Ali al-Qahthani (1995), *Ikhwanul Muslimin : Konsep Gerakan Terpadu* by Dr. Ali Abdul Halim Mahmud (1997), *Panduan Jihad: Untuk Aktifis Gerakan Islam* by Dr. Hilmy Bakar Almascaty, M.A (2001), *Pergerakan Muslimah Menyongsong Era Baru* by Amatullah Shafiyyah & Astriana (2002), *Jundullah: Mengenal Intelektulitas dan Akhlak Tentara Allah* by Said Hawwa (2002), *Prinsip-prinsip Pendidikan Rasulullah Saw* by Prof. Dr. Alawi al Maliki (2002), *Kebangkitan Islam di Andalusia* by Ahmad Mahmud Himayah, 2004, and *Tarbiyah Jaadah* by Muhammad ad-Duaisy (1998).[74]

Up to now, GIP has published thousands of titles of books (not including multi-volume and serial publications) on Islamic themes: theology, sharia, private law, women, Islamic politics, Islamic propagation (*dakwah*), and studies on Islamic movements.[75] It is one of the biggest Islamic publishers. Most books GIP publishes are in form of booklets of less than 100 pages and they are often translations from Arabic works.[76]

GIP's success also generated other publishing houses; particularly those with a similar ideological framework of religious thinking, for instance, Robbani Press. Most founders of this publisher and its administers are Indonesian Muslim scholars who have graduated from Middle Eastern universities or the ex-activists of campus propagation movements. Like GIP, Robbani Press also publishes thematic books on Islamic movements (*harakah*) including: *Menuju Kesatuan Fikrah Aktivis Islam*, and *Tarbiyah Hasan Al Banna dalam Jamaah Ikhwanul Muslimin* (both by Yusuf al-Qaradhawi), *100 Pelajaran dari para pemimpin Ikhwanul Muslimin* by Muhammad Abu Hamid, *Prinsip*

dan Penyimpangan Gerakan Islam by Musthafa Mashhur, *Menuju Jama'atul Muslimin, Telaah Sistem Jamaah dalam Gerakan Islam* by Sheikh Hussain bin Muh bin Ali Jabir.[77] In addition, Pustaka Al-Kautsar should also be included in this category. It was founded about 16 years later, and up to now has published books like *Aliran dan Paham Sesat di Indonesia*[78] and *Bahaya Pemikiran Gus Dur: Menyakiti Hati Umat*, both by Hartono Ahmad Jaiz.[79] The third book, still related to Gus Dur and the NU, is *Bila Kyai Dipertuhankan: Membedah Sikap Beragama NU*, written by Hartono and Abduh Zulfidar Akaha.[80] Another example is Hartono Ahmad Jaiz's *Menangkal Bahaya JIL & FLA (Fikih Lintas Agama)*.[81]

Still another publisher that belonging to category is Khairul Bayan. It is a small scale publisher that started operations in 2002. It is considered close to Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), a small Islamic-based party that inherited the ideology of the Masyumi, a former Islamic party that represented the "modernist" group of Muslims and that was disbanded in 1960s.[82] Oriented to its motto "Sumber Pemikiran Islam" (the source of Islamic thought), the books produced by this publisher support the implementation of the sharia. Among the books it has published are *Garis-Garis Besar Syariat Islam* by Mawardi Noor,[83] *Manajemen Strategis Perspektif Syariah* by Muhammad Ismail Yusanto and Muhammad Karebet Widjajakusumo,[84] and *Hukuman Bagi Konsumen Miras & Narkoba* by Fauzan Al-Anshari.[85] Khairul Bayan also published Islamic novels and short stories.

In 2005, soon after the death of Nurcholish Madjid (Cak Nur), one of the main supporters of moderate Islamic

thinking, Khairul Bayan published a controversial book written by Adian Husaini, in which he correlated Cak Nur death with his supposedly deviant and misguided ways of thinking.[86] The book clearly shows Khairul Bayan reaction to the ideas of Islamic reformism and its supporters.

Khairul Bayan also published Islamic magazines and journals, such as the weekly bulletin *Al-Insan*, and the magazines *Fikri*, *Keluarga Insani*, and *Alia*, a magazine for middle class Muslim women.[87] Khairul Bayan released a quarterly journal *Islamia*, which was first published in March 2004.[88] Looking at the first issue it appears that *Islamia* attacks the modernist-liberalist approach to Quranic commentary, like that introduced in their works by Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd and Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri which were mostly published by LkiS, as will be seen below.

Lkis was founded in Yogyakarta in 1993 by university students who mostly had a traditional *pesantren* educational background. LkiS began as a discussion group of students mostly at the State Islamic Institute or IAIN (now State Islamic University, UIN) Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta that talked about pluralism and inter-religious tolerance.[89]

LkiS publishes books about leftist and liberal-oriented Islam. The first book it published in 1993 was *Kiri Islam*, a translation of the English edition of *Between Modernity and Postmodernity: The Islamic Left and Dr Hassan Hanafi's Thought, A Critical Reading* written by Kazuo Shimogaki that was originally published in 1988. *Kiri Islam* was rapidly sold out as the early 1990s was an era of radical student groups that revived their demands for liberation from the New Order government that had restricted their reading. As a result, all books with a leftist title sold out in no time.

The rapid development of Islamic books in Indonesia is not only the result of Islamic publishing houses but also of that of general publishers like Erlangga, Bumi

Aksara, Raja Grafindo Persada, and the Kompas-Gramedia Group. These publishers initially did not produce books on Islam and only started to do so in the 1990s when they had become aware of the rising commercial importance of the publication of Islamic books.

In the 1980s, LP3ES, a general publisher established in 1971, marked its first success in catering for the Muslim community in 1981 with the publication of *Pergolakan Pemikiran Islam: Catatan Harian Ahmad Wahib*.[90] In the 1990s, many publishers followed and they also started to release Islamic works. PT Raja Grafindo Persada, through its publishing division Sri Gunting started to actively publish books on Islam since the early 1990s. In fact, some titles have been reprinted several times to cater for the market's interest, such as *Fundamentalisme Islam dan Modernitas*,[91] and *Tugas Cendekiaan Muslim*.[92]

Similarly, since the 1990s up to now, the Kompas-Gramedia group has also been publishing books on Islam starting with books in encyclopedic form covering discussions on Islamic biography, Islamic history, leaderships of Islamic dynasties, Islamic contemporary conditions, and other Islamic themes. Several Islamic books Gramedia published are *The Oxford Modern Islamic World* (4 Vols., published in 1995), *Concise History*

of Muslim World (3 Vols., published in 2001), *Encyclopedia of Muslim Biography* (5 Vols., published in 2001), *International encyclopedia of Islam Dynasty* (30 Vols., published in 2002), *Encyclopedia of The World Muslims* (4 Vols., published in 2002), *Dictionary of Islam* (2 Vols, published in 2004), *Encyclopedia of Islam & Muslim World* (2 Vols., published 2004), *Encyclopedia of Islam & Scientist* (4 Vols., published in 2005), *Biographical Encyclopedia of Islam* (4 Vols., published in 2006).

Erlangga did more or less the same. Mostly known as a publisher of school text books since 2002, it established a new publishing division for Islamic books. Up to 2003, it has released no less than 17 titles of books on Islamic subjects either about Islamic ways of thinking or easy-going stories. Up to 2002 its publication *Kisah Hikmah* had been reprinted five times.[93]

Bumi Aksara was established in 1990 and it initially focused on publishing general books on various themes such as the economy, law, social issues, electronics, automotive issues, education, and other themes. However, in 2000 it created a new specialized publishing division, i.e. Amzah publisher that specifically publishes books on Islamic themes. Up to 2006, Amzah has published 79 titles of Islamic books.[94]

Although general publishers published many Islamic books, seen from the marketing side they still lost against Islamic publishers who sometimes came up with best-selling works.[95]

We may conclude that the publication of Islamic books is a novel trend in the transmission of Islamic knowledge. The sources of Islamic knowledge and religious authority, which were initially held by *ulama*s and their *kitab kuning* as their primary sources of knowledge, started to become more varied because of the rise of printed media: Journals, newspapers, magazines, and books. The use of printed media also contributed to changes in the Islamic public sphere, where the *ulama*s no longer were the only people capable of speaking about Islam. The role of the *ulama*s as the sole creators of contemporary Islam

is slowly diminishing, and therefore a fragmentation of religious authority among the Muslim community has began. This situation justifies the opinion that the rise of public spaces is an inherent part of modernity.[96]

Therefore, the increase in numbers of publications on Islamic reformism creates the opportunity for the Muslims with different ideas and orientations to enter the debates about how Indonesian Islam is to be defined. The Muslim community has begun to participate in issues of Islam and the formation of Islamic opinions and they variously interpret Islam along the lines of groups with different educational backgrounds and ideologies. All polemics, debates, discussions, and opposition are principally manifestations and continuations of Islamic developments that started in the early period of the 20th century.[97]


This development can be understood from the fact that the printed media provides the Muslim community with easy access to Islamic teachings. The Muslim community begins to learn about Islam without having to go to or stay in *pesantren*s that used to be considered as the most authoritative centers of Islamic teachings. They can now easily find sources of Islamic knowledge in any bookstore, library, and many other places that never used to have any relations with Islamic studies.

Islam is now conveyed in a more natural way using daily language. The classical Islamic texts are no longer consecrated because of the availability of modern printed media. This process is accelerated by the arrival of translated editions of various classical texts of Islam the knowledge of which used to be restricted as they only used to be circulated among religious elites. Thus, reading hadiths and the practices of Islamic rituals is no longer only found in *pesantren*s and only to be known by being present before *ulamas*, but also in modern schools and in ordinary households.[98]

Through this development, Islamic reformism has contributed to the rise of new forms of Islamic religious thinking based on printed media. Especially for urban people, oral traditions as the basic means of the transmission of traditional Islamic knowledge is of no importance and its presence is threatened by the products of printing machines intended to

be read. Books, magazines, newspapers, and pamphlets contribute to produce religious meaning as all of them cause significant alterations in the formation of religious authority in Indonesian Muslim society. Here, Islamic reformism contributes to the construction of the fundament upon which religious plurality can be build, a basis where new voices of Islam can come to the surface.[99] Therefore, the publication of Islamic books has laid the foundation for the rise of "civil pluralism"[100] and —presumably— for the dissemination of "civilized society" in Indonesia.





Chapter Ten
Islamic Movements on Campus

Islamic Movements on Campus

Muhammad Wildan

Three crucial periods can be identified in the history of the youth movements. First, the establishment of Islamic study groups among the young educated people, such as *Jong Islamieten Bond* (JIB) and *Studenten Islam Studiesclub* (SIS). Second, the independent period when student movements emergedin nationalist and Islamic spirit, the *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (the Islamic Students Association, HMI); *Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia* (theIndonesian Islamic Students Movement, PMII); and *Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah* (the Muhammadiyah Students Bond, IMM) ---the latter two are student organizations under the NU and Muhammadiyah organizations respectively. Finally, the 1980s period up to the present time whenstudent movementshave developed into a high spirit of Islamism in the period establishment of *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* (the Campus Propagation Agency, LDK)and *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia* (the Indonesian Muslim-Students' Actions Union, KAMMI).

Islamic Student Movements:Some Explanatory Perspectives


Islamic movements (including campus Islamic movements) emerged as response to social realities. Islamic movementson campus wasa response to currents socio-religious and political situation. Socio-religious and political changes, require the involvement of groups of people who want to participate into the process of change.

Herbert Blummer defines social movements as collective efforts to create new rules of life within the community.[1] As a social movement, campus Islamic movement aims at changing social order. The Campus Islamic movement can be seen from several perspectives. The relative deprivation theory views social movements emerging from a group of people who are not satisfied with the ongoing social changes or because of their marginalized positions in politics or economy. Briefly, the relative deprivation theory explains that social deprivation is formed when there is a difference between expectations and realities. This relative deprivation, when collectively formed, potentially becomes a social movement.[2]

Another theory that may help to uncover the dynamics of campus Islamic movements is the rational choice theory.

1. Barry Mc Laughlin, *Studies in Social Movements: a Social Psychological Perspective.* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p.75.

2. Ted Roberr Gur, *Why Men Rebel.* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 24.



Campus dakwah activities in Salman Mosque at the Bandung Institute of Technology

Source: Documentation Salman Mosque ITB

Developed by James S. Coleman, the rational choice theory bears principles of people's involvement in an organization. One's action leads to a specific purpose and that purpose is determined by values or preferences. Followers of an organization rationally understand the goals of social movements and how to achieve their goals. A social movement can be distinguished by its primordial structure or its particular purpose.[3] In this theory the dynamics of a religious social movement could be exposed, not only how campus Islamic movement has emerged but also how it successfully triggers masses to reach the goal.

There were several factors that led to foundation of Islamic student movement. First,ideology is a very significant factor in shaping personalities and mass mobilization. In many universities, especially public universities, Islamic movement is a way to show students' Islamic identities. Many Islamic students are active in the movements at their campuses to spread their ideological orientation. Contestation with other movements, other religion based student organizations, and non-religious organizations are ideological factors that incite Islamic movements to emerge at campuses. *Jong Islamieten Bond* (JIB), as will be explained later, emerged as an antithesis to *Jong Java* that failed to accommodate the Muslim students' aspirations.[4]

Islam an identity to show along with the emergence of other ideological identities. The founding of *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI) and *Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (*PMII), several years after Indonesia's independence, was stimulated by the desire of Muslim students to be involved in shaping the characters and mentality of the Indonesian Muslim students. In contemporary era, the ideological factor is so intense to strive for the emergence of Islamic movements such as LDK and KAMMI. The rise of campus Islamic movements can be referred also as a "protest movement" against the existing Islamic movements within campuses perceived to bring into a different direction and ideology as well.

Second, the emerged of the student movements is also driven by political factors. This is especially true in the case of HMI and PMII. Within the



Dakwah Management Training in Salman Mosque at the Bandung Institute of Technology

Source: Documentation Salman Mosque ITB

plethora of nationalist movements, the Muslim students compelled to engage in coloring political attitudes, although these movements are not the substructuresof any Islamic political parties. However, in terms of Islam politics, the Islamic student movements cannot be classified as a movement of Islamism, since none of these movements support the struggle for the Jakarta Charter or bringing the issue of Islamic Sharia or Islamic caliphate.[5] Being the most conservative among other movements LDK and KAMMI are also not voicing the issues of Islamism.

Third, the globalization factor has also significantly influenced the emergence and development of the campus Islamic movements. The penetration of the wahhabist ideology in Indonesia became a major force in the LDK and KAMMI can not be separated from the process of globalization. The advancement in the field of information technology has made one easily move from and into a country and to get any information on a massive scale, so an ideology can rapidly grow and widely spread.

5. The only student organization voicing the Islamic caliphate is HizbutTahrir Indonesia (HTI). Due to minimum response of the students to HTI, this student movement will not be discussed specifically here, but will only be mentioned only in certain parts.

Fourth, the last factor that triggers the emergence of campus Islamic movements can be called political opportunity structure (POS). Sidney Tarrowstate that there are several variables that allow the emergence of social movements: (1) the open access to political institutions, (2) the unstable politics and the new political stability is still in the making process, and (3) the political elites is still in the conflict situation. Such situations give the general public an opportunity to become actively involved in the rebuilding of a national identity by setting of involved in the establishment of social movements, including religious movements at campuses.[6]

Almost all Islamic movements in on campus --- from the earliest, HMI, until the last, KAMMI--- emergedwith in the context of a political opportunity structure. The newly born Indonesian nation-state in 1945, political tensions and instability, and conflicting political elites were highly conducive for the emergence of the Islamic student movement such as HMI. Similarly, Indonesia during the 1950s were

6. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in movement: social movements and contentious Politics*, second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.15.

politically unstable, it provided an opportunity for Muslim students who were less accommodated in HMI to form other student organization such as PMII and IMM. The opening access of political opportunities allows the emergence of a social movement that not only reflects a political euphoria, but also express certain ideological demands.

These divergent factors separately or simultaneously have encouraged the rise of campus Islamic movements. Therefore, the phenomenon of the rise of campus Islamic movements cannot be separated from the complexity of surrounding social problems. In other words, a political situation, does not always lead to the emergence of a movement if it isnot accompanied by other driving factors.

Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB): A Profile of the Islamic YouthMovement during the Colonial Period

Founded during the Dutch colonial period, JIB was born when the identity of Indonesian nation-state had not been formated. JIB birth was a blessing in disguise on two reasons: to called ethical policy of the Dutch colonial government and the presence of Jong Java. After being criticized from various parties about the cultivation system that was highly profitable for the Dutch government, on September 17, 1901 Queen Wilhelmina finally declared ethical policy for the people of the Dutch East Indies as a form of reciprocation that covers three aspects: irrigation, emigration, and education. In the first two aspects, this policy was abused for gaining more profits for the Dutch-owned plantations, and the private-owned as well. It was recorded in history that the ethical politics had made multiple profits for the Dutch-owned plantations and mining sectors. In other words, the ethical policy provided more promises than evidences.[7]

In the education aspect, the Dutch government founded many schools in almost all regions. Starting from basic and intermediate levels such as *Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs* (MULO) and *Algemeen Middelbare School* (AMS) and special school such as *Opleidingscholen voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren* (Training School for Native Officers, OSVIA) and *School tot Opleiding van Indische Artsen* (School of Medical Education for the Indies, STOVIA). In line with irrigation and emigration, the aspect of

7. M.C.Ricklefs, *Sejarah Indonesia Modern 1200-2004.* (Jakarta: Serambi, 2007), p. 319.

education comprises much digression as the schools were expected to provide low cost manpower to support the Dutch colonial administration. However, it cannot be denied that the ethical policy had led to the emergence of the organizations of the more or less educated groups, who were modern organizations such as Budi Utomo (1908), SI (1911) later involved in some, Muhammadiyah (1912), and Jong Islamieten Bond (1925).[8]

From the Islamic perspective, as Nurcholish noted that ethical policy provided less impact on the group of ulama' because of their non-cooperative attitude. Finally, education within the framework of ethical policy caused a gap between traditional elite gentry and the people. The emergence of Islamic movements in the early 20th century was more a popular resistance of the Islamic ideology against the hegemony of the colonial as well as Chinese. Hence, the Muslims' resistance can also be said to be based on the ideology of socialist Islam.[9]

JIB was also born because of the disappointment of the Muslim youth to the Jong Java. The emergence of the educated classes in the Dutch East Indies at that time had inspired many young people to form youth organizations, such as Jong Java, Jong Sunda, Jong Celebes and others. Raden Syamsurizal (known as Raden Syam), saw the need for a course on Islam for the Muslim members of the Jong Java. After all the member of the Jong Java, who studied at the Dutch, school usually received lecture on Christianity, but how about the need of the students whose religion are Islam? Raden Syam brought the idea of the need of having Islamic lecture at the 7th. Jong Java Congress December 1924 in Yogyakarta, but the idea was rejected by more than a half of the whole members of the congress. This was a blessing in disguise, as finally RadenSyam and his Muslim friends in Jong Java were compelled to form a new organization which later was named Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB) on January 1, 1925. This idea was supported by approximately 200 youths and students at the time and Haji Agus Salim, became the advisor to JIB.[10]

In line with the goal to unite the Muslim youths and students as well as to be a learning medium, JIB provided courses on Islamic religion for its members.

To support the goal, JIB published a monthly magazine, named *Het Licht* (the Light), which played as a communication medium among the members of JIB and the rapid development of JIB in many major cities in the Dutch East Indies. Since this magazine published many articles on Islam and nationalism one can say that the JIB participatedin the process toward the maternity of the East Indie's youths and students.[11]

The decision to establish the JIB was a significant while the youth organizations at that time were based on divergent ethnic identities, as noted above, a number of youths were compelled to form an organization that used Islam as their unifying identity. Socio-historically should be understood that the establishment of an organization unifying many ethnic national identities was not easy, particularly on religious identity. Colonial government's control severely restricted the space for the Indonesian people. JIB had to face significant challenge in 1926 when it held the first congress in Batavia that was the time when all youth organizations were expected to join one youth organization that was based on nationalism. Wiwoho Purbohadijoyo the chairman, took a difficult decision by not joining it the JIB remained an Islamic-based organization. Because of this decision, many accused that JIB an anti-nationalist organization. However, JIB activities negated the allegations, as they remained close to other youth organizations.[12]

Although belonged to an Islamic identity, JIB played a significant role in the formation of Indonesian nationalism. This was supported by psychological condition of the Indonesian nation, in which the spirit of nationalism was growing and blossomingsuch us characterized by the emergence of various organizations or associations. There are some strong indications that support this assumption. *Het Licht* magazine published since March 1925 promoted articles on nationalism such as the article "Islam and the spirit of Nationalism", "Nationalism", and so on.[13]

In 1927, the JIB founded the scout organization by the name *National Indonesische Padvinderij* (the Indonesian National Scouting, NATIPIJ). Noer informed that it was M. Natsir who

named the JIB scouting using the word "Indonesia". This indicates that Natsir did not polarize Islam and the national identity.[14] It should be noted that the newly formed organization by JIB was the first organization in the Dutch East Indies using the name of Indonesia (*Indonesische*).[15] The spirit of nationalism seen in JIB involvement in the preparation committee of Youth Congress II in Jakarta, which gave birth to the Youth Pledge on October 28, 1928. Djohan Mohammad Tjaij is the JIB representative who signed the historic youth inscription. JIB had sought to promote Indonesian language by way of using the national language gradually in *Het Licht* magazine, since the Youth Pledge.[16]

In line with the spirit of Islam and nationalism, JIB was growing rapidly, especially under the leaderships of Wiwoho Purbohadijoyo (1926-1929) and Kasman Singodimedjo (1929-1935).

14. DeliarNoer, *Gerakan Moderen Islam di Indoesia 1900-1942*. (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1995), p. 287.

15. The name "Indonesia" was firstly used by Ki Haja rDewantara (atau Soewardi Soerjaningrat) in the Netherlands 1913 for the organization *Indonesisch Persbureu* and also Muhammad Hatta who changed the organization name for Indie students in the The Netherlands from *Indische Vereeniging* (formed in 1908) to be *Indonesische Vereeniging* (Perhimpoenan Indonesia) in 1922.

16. Saidi, *Islam dan Nasionalisme Indonesia,...* p.4-5.

During the Wiwoho period, JIB held many courses on Islam at its various branches and also expanded into smaller cities in Java and strengthening its identity as an Islamic organization. While during Kasman leadership period, JIB successfully established many branches in the West and North Sumatra. The youths and students' enthusiasm was also noted that until 1933 JIB had already had 55 branches and 4,000 members in Java and Sumatra. Some national figures who had been active in JIB were Kasman Singodimejo, M. Roem, Jusuf Wibisono (JIB Center), Sukarno (JIB Bandung), Cholid Rasyidi (JIB Betawi), Burhanuddin Harahap (JIB Yogyakarta). M. Roem confirmed that at that time being a member JIB was an honor. Something that adds to the pride of being members of JIB was that one could be close to national figures such as H. Agus Salim, M. Natsir, etc. In 1929, M. Natsir was recorded as a member of JIB Bandung who taught Islam to other members.[17]

Some of JIB figures had even close personal relationship with Ahmad Soorkati (the founder of Al-Irsyad) relationship that gave them an the opportunies to ask anything religions matters.[18] Another thing encouraging the growth of JIB was

17. Noer, *Gerakan Moderen Islam,...*p.100.

18. Saidi, *Islam dan Nasionalisme Indonesia,...*p.36.



Student discussion in the Salman Mosque at the Bandung Institute of Technology

Source: Documentation Salman Mosque ITB

the attitude of the Dutch government that considered JIB and other Islamic movements not as a threat, but they would rather in favor of the Netherlands because they were considered as a local resistance against the strongly growing communism.[19]

Since 1934, JIB had to face so many challenges that it began to setbacks. The, JIB members were not only high school students (MULO or AMS), was also widely followed by students from the upper levels or even youths at their age of 14 years old or above. Some of them saw that JIB was more active at the level of secondary school students, so they felt the need to establish a new organization. On this basis of this reason, M. Roem and Yusuf Wibisono founded *Studenten Islam Studieclub* (SIS) in 1934. Although this cannot be considered as a major friction in JIB, it was more than less reducing the influence of JIB as many activists were active in the SIS. Another challenge was the desire of some board of JIB like Kasman and Natsir to make JIB to be a religious social organization like Muhammadiyah and Persis that were able to establish schools and hospitals. This issue became a serious debate in the 6th and 7th congress. Although JIB did not change its statute in the end, these problems caused M. Roem and Yusuf Wibisono get out of JIB and set up a new organization of SIS. From then on, JIB tended to decrease until later it was disbanded by the Japanese on March 7, 1942.[20]

The role of JIB in carving the spirit of Islam and Indonesian nationalism cannot be considered minor. Along the course of the Indonesian movement periods, JIB was able to appear as a youth movement that brought together the ideals of Islam and Indonesian nationalism. JIB was the first Muslim youth and student organizations to deliver ideas to the next younger generations. The existence of JIB former members and activists on the national stage was an historical evidence JIB was not only able to appear as the first Muslim youth organization in Indonesia, it can also be considered a milestone of the emergence of young Indonesian Muslim intellectuals on the national stage. JIB cadres were not only good Muslims, they were also formidable Muslim statesmen and intellectuals.

HMI, PMII and IMM: Profiles of the 1950s Student Movements

Entering the Indonesian independence, the Islamic student movements were marked by the establishment ofthe

campus mass base organizations. Three organizations that were established, which not only continue to exist until now, but had also given influences in the development of Islam in Indonesia. The three organizations are Himpuan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Student Association - HMI), Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Islamic Student Movement in Indonesia - PMII) and Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Student Association - IMM), the latter two organizations are affiliated with the two largest social organizations in Indonesia, respectively NU and Muhammadiyah.

Historically, HMI was born in non-conducive social and political situations. As a newly established state, Indonesia had to experienced sevral external and internal challenges. Externally, the return of the Dutch and their allies after Indonesia's proclaimed its independence was a political challenge for the newly formed Indonesian government. This on the internal challenge, in which the Indonesian political elites were polarized about how the attitudes of the Indonesian government to face the Dutch aggression. Prime Minister Syahrir (Socialist Party) was more likely to prioritize diplomacy to gain recognition of Indonesian sovereignty from the Netherlands, while the opposition faction of Masjumi and the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) wanted to take military operations against the Netherlands.


HMI was born in the period known in history as the revolutionary period. However, the revolution that occurred at that time was not only the Indonesian government revolution along with all Indonesian people in facing the Dutch aggression, it was also a period known as the social revolution. Dutch colonization, which lasted for a very long period, had instilled a very strong repressive feudal system within the community. Moreover, the period 1945-1949 was also a period when Indonesia was looking for its new shape and identity. This period can also be seen as a time when social and political euphoria was going on. Various social and religious movements emerged as a the contribution of the society in shaping the identity of the Indonesian nation. HMI's birth in 1947 a type of a social revolution of the time.

HMI was born on February 5, 1947 in Yogyakarta, the the political centers of the

revolutionary period during the revolution period. Yogyakarta was very conducive to the establishment a student movement, not only because it was the capital city the Republic of Indonesia, but also because of the presence of several universities in that city. Actually, at the national level there had existed an Islamic youth movement, viz. GPII (founded in 1945), but this did not touch the educated group. Student movements that had already exist at the time, namely Persyarikatan Students Yogyakarta (PMY, founded in 1946) and Sarikat Mahasiswa Indonesia Solo (SMI, founded in 1946) were not only successful because both were local as well as secular movements. The educated circles' yearning for the Muslim student movement at the national level ---like JIB and SIS in the colonial period--- had encouraged the emergence of HMI and PII in 1947. Ridwan Saidi notes that HMI is ideologically the successor JIB's idealism, although it had been clearly denied by other writers, who said that HMI had nothing to do with JIB.[21]

Lafran Pane is often referred to as the initiator of the establishment of HMI. Lafran Pane is the younger brother of famous Indonesian litterateurs Sanusi Pane and Armijn Pane. At that time, Lafran Pane was registered as a student at Sekolah Tinggi Islam (the Islamic High College, STI; now UII). His strong religious background and his interaction with the STI lecturers ---like Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, HM. Rasjidi, Fathurrahman Kafrawi, Kasman Singodimedjo, and Prawoto Mangkusasmito--- who later inspired him to establish the Islamic student movement. Almost identical to the establishment of JIB, HMI was born for the purpose of teaching Islamic values to students. Preparations for the support of establishment had been done by Lafran Pane and friends since the end of 1946. Backed by 15 students at STI, HMI was finally established.[22]

Since the 1950s, HMI had begun to grow among the non-STI students such as Balai Perguruan Tinggi Gadjah Mada (the Higher Education Council of Gadjah Mada, UGM embryo) and Sekolah Tinggi Teknik (Technical High College).[23] Rahardjo notes that the growing of HMI into non-religious colleges was to realize



Campus dakwah activities in Salman Mosque at the Bandung Institute of Technology

Source: Documentation Salman Mosque ITB

the ideals of "clerical-intellectuals".[24] At that time HMI appeared as a kind of social revolution of the Muslim students. Along with the establishing process of the newly nation-state identity, some Muslims were also preoccupied with political parties and ideological issues surrounding the Jakarta Charter as the Muslims' attempt to color the nation's political life. HMI was a students effort to characterize the campus lives. At that time, secular student movements practically dominated campuses. Having been attached to the Islamic symbols HMI was clearly having trouble in getting new members. The Indonesian political situation that was still unstable also forced HMI to be involved in the fight against the retirn of Netherlands colonialism and also against uprising Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) in Madiun. In late 1950s HMI began to spread its wings outside Yogyakarta such as at the University ofIndonesia (UI), the Institute Technology of Bandung (ITB), and Padjadjaran University and others. In the 1960s, HMI had already had mass basis in various public universities. In 1965-1966 those members would become the motor of resistance against the PKI.[25] Of the various universities Dachlan Ranuwihardjo, M. Imaduddin Abdurrahim, Ismail Hasan Metareum, Sulastomo, Endang Saifuddin Ansari and others emerged as the leaders.

The development of HMI to becoming a major organization cannot be separated from the role of A. Dachlan Ranuwihardjo (Chairman of HMI 1950-1951), who brought HMI to Jakarta in 1950. The growth of HMI was also possible because Dachlan had also been close to Soekarno, who morally supported for HMI struggle. Soekarno's closeness with HMI is a factor that HMI had not been dissolved by the president despite the request of PKI.[26]

In the course of time, HMI had become a more mature organization and increasingly influential among the by students at either religious or secular universities. Dachlan asserted that HMI has three personal characteristics: 1) integrate with and within the national life of the nation, 2) to think, to act, and to move independently, and 3) to maintain Islamic brotherhood.[27]

Ideologically, HMI is often regarded as an *onderbouw* (substructure) of the Masjumi, as Victor Tanja said basing his assumption on the decision of the 1949 Congress that HMI and PII were only student organizations. Another thing that encouraged many people's assumption was the ideological proximity of HMI with that of Masjumi. At the 5th congress in Medan (1957), HMI demanded Islamic parties like Masjumi, NU, PSII, and the like to be able to fight for Islam as the state foundation of the Republic of Indonesia in the Constituent Assembly. Sitompul asserts that such claim was legal because the Constituent Assembly had the duty write a new constitution of the state.[28]

Sitompul also confirms that HMI and Masjumi shared similiar ideology basic but HMI remained an independent organization and it was not under the supervision of Masjumi. It had also been proved that HMI activists were not forced to choose Masjumi in the 1955 elections, but it was up to their conscience.[29]

As the oldest and the biggest student organizations HMI experienced a heyday in the 1970s. Intellectual dynamics among HMI activists developed, such as the presence of *Limited Group* by Djohan Effendi, M. Dawam Rahardjo and Ahmad Wahib in Yogyakarta. In addition to the figures above, some national figures were also born from the womb of HMI such as Nurcholish Madjid, M. Amien Rais, Fahmildris, Deliar Noer, Adi Sasono, and many others. [30]Rahardjo underlined that HMI has an important role in shaping Nurcholish Madjid's intellectuality.[31] The politicization policy of the Muslims that was carried out by the New Order government forced the HMI to take a cooperative political stance. In such political condition, Nurcholish Madjid issued a very famous slogan "Islam Yes, Politics No". This was an attempt to alter the pattern of Islamic struggle that had been more in politics to the cultural pattern of struggle.

Internal dynamics within HMI in the late 1960s shook HMI. Ahmad Wahib and Djohan Effendi were two HMI activists from Central Java, known for their critical and progressive thinking. Since the 1967's they did not feel "at home" in HMI as a student organization, because

28. Agussalim Sitompul, *Historiografi Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam tahun 1947-1993.* (Jakarta: Intermasa, 1995), p.60.

29. Agussalim Sitompul, *HMI dalam Pandangan Seorang Pendeta: Antara Impian dan Kenyataan,* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1984), p.62-63.

30. Latif, *Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa,...* p. 428.

31. Rahardjo, *Intelektual Intelegensia dan Perilaku ,.....* p.37.

it could accommodate their progressive thinking. Some activists even call HMI for being not the right habitus for Wahib and Effendi. Internal dynamics (not to mention the internal conflict) led to the witdrawal of Wahib and Effendi from HMI in September 1969.[32]

As student organization HMI had begun to decline in the 1980s. These years were in fact the culmination of the de-politicization policy of the New Order government. Various vertical conflicts occurred in there years such as the Jihad Command case (1980), the Usroh(1985-1986), and Tanjung Priok Incident (1984). At the session of the House of Representatives in August 1982, President Soeharto suggested the idea to reduce class and ideological fanaticism along with the regulation of the Single Principle, which finally set in terms of the Act No. 8 1985 on a Single Principle Pancasila. This law requires all social and political organizations to make Pancasila as the basic principle of their statutes. At the 15th HMI Congress in Medan 1983, it was not unanimously agreed that HMI should accept government's single principle policy. This undecisives situation had to be solved became the survival of the organization it self was at stake. In 1986 the HMI congress in Padang was an effort to save HMI from the danger of disbandment. However, there were a bunch of HMI members that retained the principle of Islam. They then set up Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi (the Organization Rescue Council, HMI-MPO). The HMI-MPO saw that adopting the single principle of Pancasila was a diversion of the HMI primary mission. Since it was known there were 2 kinds of HMI, the HMI Dipo that headquartered in Jl. Diponegoro and the HMI-MPO. HMI Dipo runs as a formal-legal organization, while the HMI MPO lived as an underground movement until 1998 reform, when the so called era of Reformasi began.

As a campus Islamic organization, HMI had contributed a lot. In accordance with its main purpose of establishment HMI provided the proper understanding of Islam to the students. The HMI it periodically conducted training for the cadres and students such as the Basic Training (Batra), Intermediate Training (Intra), and the Senior Course. In addition to provide the understanding of normative Islam, such trainings also gave insights for new students about organizational skills and communication, especially for campus life. Rusli Karim

criticized that so far HMI activities were more internal as it did not much get in touch with the general public.[33]

Although HMI is a socio-religious organization, it had a significant role in the country'spolitical sphere. It is not surprising if HMI is often referred to as the creator of political cadres. Compared to the other social organizations, there is no doubt that HMI had contributed most in the efforts to create cadres in politics. Figures such as Akbar Tanjung, AdiSasono, M. Amin Rais, and AM Fatwa are some of HMI alumni who are active at the political level.

The era of reformasi gives different nuances for HMI. The political opportunity structure that occurs in this era of political change provides an opportunity for HMI Dipo and HMI MPO to reunite. The process began when the 22nd congres was held in Jambi 1999. The HMI Dipo reassigned the Islamic principles in an attempt to restore the HMI identity as they were also hoping for the return of the HMI-MPO. Various attempts of reconciliation had been undertaken to unify the two HMIs, but until now they still fail to reunite. Though normatively both HMI's have been equally based on Islam, it is empirically known that HMI Dipo is more moderate, whereas HMI-MPO tends to be more conservative. Internal challenges have absorbed more energy so lately that HMI is less responsive to national issues. Reflecting to HMI's heyday in the 1970s, the future of HMI is expected to be more visionary and has more concrete contributions for the nation's life.

2) Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia-PMII (Indonesia Islamic Student Movement)

PMII was founded on April 17, 1960 in response to the trend of Islamic politics. Since the 1950s Masjumi had not longer been considered as the sole political party for the Muslims.[34] Political tensions in Masjumi began to appear by the withdrawal of the former Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Union Party, PSII) from Masjumi in 1947. Dissatisfaction of the ex-PSII figures was also felt by NahdlatulUlama (NU). This "traditionalist-oriented" Islamic association could no longer stand being oriented Masyumi leadership. In 1952 NU finally left Masjumi and transformed it self in the a new Islamic political party.

The political conditions were influential to the more educated members the

33. Karim, *HMI MPO dalam Kemelut*,.....p.103.

34. Sitompul, *HMI dalam Pandangan*,...p.62.

NU. In addition to the political aspect, sociological conditions also give the impetus to the growing numbers of the educated group of the NU. The first organization emerged within the educated group of NU is Ikatan Pelajar Nahdlatul Ulama (the Nahdlatul Ulama Students' Bond, IPNU) that was established in 1954 to accommodate both high school and the university students. Several attempts to establish university student organizations had been conducted such as by the establishment of Ikatan Mahasiswa Nahdlatul Ulama (the Nahdlatul Ulama University Students' Bond, IMANU) and Keluarga Mahasiswa Nahdlatul Ulama (The Nahdlatul Ulama Students Fellowship, KMNU) that was established in 1955. However, the extant student organizations received lack of support from the leadership of NU, because those organizations were feared to undermine the newly established IPNU. After the condition of IPNU was strong enough, the 1960 IPNU conference in Yogyakarta confirmed the need for student organizations. Furthermore, in April 1960 PMII was formally established in Surabaya with Mahbub Djunaidi as the chairman, Khalid M. Al-Mawardi as the vice chairman, and M. Said Budairy as the general secretary. Actually, at that time Mahbub was still an HMI activist. However, the establishment of PMII which is basically the act of desertion of the students affiliated to NU, by which PMII was then considered by HMI as "treason" against the decision of the 1949 Muslim Congress. Therefore, some PMII leaders such as Mahbub Djunaidi, were then expeled from HMI.[35]

Mahbub confirmed that the establishment of PMII was due to the fact that HMI could not accommodate the aspirations of the students leaning to the Islamic traditionalist group (*Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah*).[36] Although the establishment of PMII was a reflection of dissatisfaction felt by some parts of the HMI members, but the establisment of PMII cannot be separated from the endorsement of NU as the parent organization.

As its name implies, PMII was expected to become a dynamic and open organization. The name "movement" is expected to accommodate the dynamic aspirations of the young intellectuals. The organization deliberately abstained from using the name "NU" such as previously attached to some student

35. Latif, *Inteligensia Muslim danKuasa,...*p. 435.

36. Further see an interview with Mahbub in http://pmiigadjahmada.wordpress.com/ 2013/04/07/sejarah-pasang-surut-hubungan-pmii-dan-hmi/ (being accessed on April 18, 2014).



Dakwah Management Training in Salman Mosque at the Bandung Institute of Technology

Source: Documentation Salman Mosque ITB

organization under NU. It was an effort to make PMII as an open organization to all groups, especially to the people whose aspirations have not been channeled within HMI. The establishment of the progressive students organization was a way to shape the resilient character of the Muslim students so they would be able to contribute something positive to the nation.

Along with the growth of the educated groups in Indonesia, PMII managed to grow and develop rapidly. The massive participation of the traditionalist students to PMII helped to accelerates the growth of organization. In the late 1960s, PMII had reached thousands of members most of the were IAIN students.[37] In 1961 PMII Congress was attended by 13 branches, still being dominated by branches in Java and Sumatra, while the 2nd PMII Congress in Yogyakarta was attended by 31 branches including those of Kalimantan and Sulawesi.[38]

The national spirit of PMII was also evident in the organization's commitment to the state affairs. In addition to engaging into the political transformation process from the Old Order to the New Order by way of joining into the 1966 Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia dan Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia (the Indonesian Student Action Union and the Indonesian Youths-Student Action Union, KAMI-KAPPI), PMII was also actively involved in expelling PKI from of the Indonesian soil. However their dependence on NU made PMII become less independent as they could not join the Cipayung Group[39] that consisted of HMI, GMNI, GMKI, and PMKRI. The dependency of PMII was not only in terms of the organizational matter, but also in

37. Latif, *Inteligensia Muslim danKuasa,*...p. 434.

38. http://misbahulmanaf.blogspot.com/2012/09/lahirnya-pmii.html (being accessed on March 8, 2014).

39. The Cipayung group is a communication forum for extra-university student organizations that are independent and free from any kinds of cooptation of political parties. The initiators of this group are Akbar Tanjung (at that time the chairman of HMI), Kris Siner Key Timu (at that time Chief Presidium PMKRI) and BinsarSianipar (at that time chairman of GMKI). Cipayung group has high loyalty to the Indonesian state-nation. Now it develops Cipayung Group Plus comprises HMI, GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia), PMKRI (Persatuan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia), PMII, IMM (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah), KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia), GMKI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia), Hikmahbudhi (Himpunan Mahasiswa Buddhis Indonesia, KMHDI (Kesatuan Mahasiswa Hindu Dharma Indonesia). Up to now, Cipayung group is still active in meeting and issuing statements for the democratization process for better Indonesia. See http://www.tribunnews.com/ nasional/2014/01/16/kelompok-cipayung-plus-desak-seepeserta-pemilu-buat-pakta-integritas (being accessed on March 8, 2014).

politics. At that time NU had become part of PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/ United Development Party). In 1972 PMII formally declared its independence in the Murnajati Declaration, since in 1974 PMII could join the Cipayung Group. The entry of PMII into the Cipayung Group confirmed the status of PMII as a student organization, with a high commitment to the nation's affairs.

In the New Order era, PMII was also affected by de-politicization process. As a socio-religious organization PMII was affected by the government policy of making Pancasila as the single principle. like other youth and student organizations PMII had to take sole principle as a necessity. Acceptance of Pancasila as the sole principle not only meant their submission to the government as an organization, it also a political strategy. In line with NU, PMII decided to return to the 1926 basic principle (*khittah*) as their tactical struggle by abstaining from practical politics. As a consequence, PMII put more focus on the internal affairs, namely the development of intellectual capacity and to empowering civil society. The-politicization policy of the New Order government was a blessing in disguise for PMII, because it confirms the moment of PMII as an organization that wanted to put high commitment to other aspects of Islam, such as the transformative nature of Islam, democracy, and religious pluralism.[40]

In line with HMI, the alumni of PMII have increasingly put their contribution at the national level. Some of the former chairmen of the PMII Executive Board (PB PMII) pursued their political career through PPP, PKB, as members of parliament or other national institutions. In national politics people like Suryadharma Ali, Muhaimin Iskandar, Slamet Effendi Yusuf, Maftuh Basuni, Arifin Junaidi, Andi Muarli Sunrawa, Otong Abdurrahman, Ali Masykur Musa, and other had joined the political arena. Another interesting thing was that almost all members Central Executive Board of the National Awakening Party (DPP PKB) are the former PMII activists, either at the national level or at the lower regional levels. Thus, PMII was not only a mass base organization for PKB, but also a reservoir of highly loyal politicians.

3) Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (IMM)

IMM was the last Muslim student organization established during the Old Order era. A few years after the

40. http://rayonsyahadat.wordpress.com/2012/01/11/kepmiian/ (being accessed on March 8, 2014).

NU affiliated students had sparated from HMI, the Muhammadiyah affiliated students also made a breakaway. IMM was founded in Yogyakarta on March 14, 1964. There were several factors behind the establishment of IMM. Ideologically considered the establishment of IMM was due to the dissatisfaction of a younger generation of Muhammadiyah against HMI, the organization which had been considered to be less consistent with their Islamic modernist ideology. The modernist concept of renewal had always been an important principle for the Muhammadiyah students being an autonomous organization of the Muhammadiyah. Sociologically, the establishment of IMM was also stipulated by the emergence of many Muhammadiyah universities. The dissatisfaction of the young generation of Muhammadiyah to the ideology of HMI had led to the birth of IMM.[41]

Another sociological factor is that the establishment of IMM was to complete the organizational structure of the young generations of Muhammadiyah that had established Nasyi'atul Aisyiyah (founded in 1931), Pemuda Muhammadiyah (founded in 1932), and Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah High School Student Organization, IPM) that was established in 1961, and in 2008 it named itself Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah or the Muhammadiyah Bond, IRM). Some of the well-known figures behind the establishment IMM are Mohammad Djazman, M. AmienRais, and A. Rosyad Sholeh.

Unlike PMII, the establishment of IMM did not lead to either conflicts or frictions with HMI. This can be sociologically understandable since the founding of IMM was not followed by the release of activists who belonged to the modernist ideology of HMI. IMM was established in 1964 because Muhammadiyah was still attached to a moral burden on the 1949 Muslim pledge, which agreed that HMI was the only student organization for the Muslims. However, the establishment of PMII was a "good precedent" for Muhammadiyah students to establish their own organizations too. The existence of IMM would rather be an alternate organization for students belong to the modernist ideology. On the other hand, IMM that is dominant in universities and colleges of the Muhammadiyah cannot be a threat to the existence of HMI. Politically, the establishment of IMM is in conjunction with HMI confrontation with the PKI;

41. Latif, *Inteligensia Muslim danKuasa,*...p. 436.



Muhammadiyyah Student Association (IMM)

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

moreover, HMI was even in danger of being dissolved by Soekarno regime.[42]

IMM grows and developed rapidly within the milieu of Muhammadiyah colleges because of it was structurally supported by Muhammadiyah as the parent organization. Despite being the youngest autonomous organizations within Muhammadiyah, IMM moved freely to spread the modernist ideology of Muhammadiyah among the academics of the higher level educational institution of to Muhammadiyah. The IMM is clearly stated in the rule of the Muhammadiyah colleges (Perguruan Tinggi Muhammadiyah, PTM). The 2006 PTM Rule chapter XIV article 78 states that "Student organizations established in PTM are: a) the Muhammadiyah Students Bond; b) Other organizations permitted by the Chairman of PTM ". In practice, only IMM is the formal institution of Islamic propagation in various campuses of the Muhammadiyah universities. This means that IMM is regarded as an extra-campus organization within higher educational institutions of the belonged to Muhammadiyah, which is thus it similar to the existence of IMM in other public universities.

IMM emerged at the night time, when Indonesia ghad been under the ideological threat of the PKI. This a condition was also supported by Soekarno's authoritarian Guided Democracy. History can record that in the period of the 1960 Soekarno tended to learn towards socialism-communism. The Nasakom (Nasionalism, Religion, Communism) proclaimed by Sukarno at that time was the concrete evidence of this trend. Involvement of some Masjumi leaders in the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, PRRI) in 1958 was culminated by the dissolution Masjumi in 1960. Being considered as an *onderbouw* (substructure) of Masjumi, HMI almost got swept too by the dissolution of Masjumi. On the other hand, the existence of PKI was also a very significant force in this period. Moreover, PKI had also supporters within the level of student organization, i.e. Concentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia (the Concentration of the Indonesian Student Movement, CGMI). Since the HMI strongly rejected the ideology of PKI, this party and CGMI urged the government to dissolve HMI. They accused the HMI was

42. AjibPurnawan, *Ikatan Mahasiswa MuhammadiyahBeraksi Di Tengah Badai: Catatan Kritis Sejarah Kelahiran IMM Melawan Komunisme*, (Yogyakarta: Panji, 2007), p.6-7.

an accomplice of the DI/TII. At this point IMM emerged as an HMI supporter so organization would not be dissolved by Soekarno.[43]

The early period of the New Order was not only a difficult time for the Islamic political organizations, but also for the Muslim student movements. The New Order's de-politicization program since the early 1970s has shrunk the space for Muslims not only in their political realm, but also in their social life. The IMM also faced a difficult time in facing the principle of Pancasila as being the only ideology allowed, such as comprised by the Law of Social Organizations (UU Keormasan). In line with its parent organization that had accepted Pancasila, The IMM followed the decision of the 41stMuhammadiyah Congress 1985 as the Muhammadiyah strategy in their Islamic propagation. This period was optimally benefited by IMM to develop their organization. As a result, by the 1990s IMM had been growing in almost all Indonesian regions, especially within the milieu of Muhammadiyah higher education levels.

As a social organization at the university level, IMM was also concerned with socio-political and humanitarian issues. The New Order period generally muted various socio-religious and political movements. However, when the political opportunity was opened, IMM along with other student associations as well as intellectual groups demanded for the resignation of Suharto in 1997. Being an autonomous organization under Muhammadiyah, IMM supported political movements of Muhammadiyah, especially in the realm of practical politics as well other social aspects. However, not many alumni of IMM who were involved in the national level so far except some figures like M. Amien Rais, M. Din Syamsuddin, and M. Djazman Al-Kindi.

43. Purnawan, *Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah,...*p.7.

LDK and KAMMI: A Portrait of Islam in Muslim Student Movements

Entering the era of Reformation, Indonesia witnessed the emergence of the Islamic student movements, that were ideologically different from the three student movements described above. Inspired by the Middle East movement, especially the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, this new movement imitated the Islamist movement, which promoted a full implementation of Islamic teachings in socio-religious life as well as the

state-politics. Starting from an education (*tarbiyah*) movement, small study-groups at public university campuses in Indonesia since the 1980s, along with the world of openness of the reform period, the movement had been transformed into two organizations that would be explained below: Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (the Campus Propagation Institute, LDK) and Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (the Indonesian Muslims' Student Action Union, KAMMI).

1) Campus Propagation Agency (LDK)

Campus Propagation Agency (LDK) is an intra-campus student organization founded in every university in Indonesia. At each campus, names of the LDK may vary, such as the Islamic Spiritual Section, the Forum of Islamic Studies, Campus Propagation Agency, Board of Islamic Spirituality, and so forth.[44] According to their line of action (*khittah*), LDK is a student organization engaging in the propagation of Islam on campuses to enforce the word of God by way of "commanding the good and forbidding the evil" (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*). Such a movement focuses their activities in a small community called the campus community, in which students are the most important element.

As the name implies, Lembaga Dakwah Kampus is an institution engaging in Islamic propagation by making the campus as its core strength. All members of the academic community are the subject as well as the object of their messages. The differing objective circumstance of each campus leads LDK in each campus to develop their own names and patterns of propagation in accordance to circumstances they have to face. LDK on the UGM campus, for instance, is named Jamaah Shalahuddin (JS) in ITB, its called, Jama'ah Salman in ITB, Forum Remaja Masjid (the Mosque Youths Forum) in UI Jakarta, Unit Kegiatan Mahasiswa Kerohanian Islam (the Islamic Spiritual Student Activity Unit, UKMKI) in Airlangga University Surabaya, and Mahasiswa Pecinta Masjid (Mosque Lover Students, MPM) in UNHAS Makassar. Moreover, LDK also develops recently in faculty levels with so many different names.

LDK is founded at different periods along with their different historical situations. Among the existing LDK, the Jamaah Salman at ITB is the earliest LDK formed. It was established on May

30, 1964. Other LDK, such as Jamaah Sholahuddin at UGM was founded in 1976, whereas UKMKI Airlangga was established on March 30, 1984. The period from 1970 to 1980 was the most difficult period for the Indonesian Muslim students due to the heavy handed policy of the New Order government. The students' attitude of establishing an Islamic propagation agency on campuses was a good decision and strategy in order to keep preaching, while they do not have to interact with the government. Other LDKs were founded at the end of the New Order period, when the political situation was also improving, were even founded after the refer a of reformation.

Normatively, speaking the main purposes of Islamic propagation on campuses were state wellprepared young Islamic cadres to optimize the role of campuses in an effort to transform the society into an ideal Islamic society. To achieve their goals, LDK has multiple functions as explained below.[45] First, LDK is the medium for community building. This is the primary role of LDK that has been been carried out for the time being. Considering range in performing activities to the academic community widely as well as general populace around the campuses the LDK has indeed a strategic position. Second, LDK as an articulator. It means that LDK serves to contrive people's aspirations, in calling for goodness and eradicating evils. In practice, such an articulation of LDK (either oral, writing, or action) for the sake of credibility, impetus, and the given effect, is delivered by way of cooperating with other propagation exponents, especially the Islamic press.

Third, LDK as a mediator. Along with its owned access, LDK plays its role as a mediator between people on one hand, and the decision makers on the other hand. Sometimes aspirations of the people come to a standstill as those do not arrive to the competent authorities; while there are unpopular government policies among people because of their lack of understanding on people's aspirations. In this context, the role of mediation (of cultural and political brokers) becomes important. Fourth, LDK as a facilitator. All ideas, accesses, and facilities owned by LDK can play their roles as facilitators in various

activities to achieve public aspirations, in the activities of articulation, mediation, or action.

The growth of LDKs in various universities as well as cities are unified by a coordinating forum. However, their bustle in performing internal propagation activities make them less optimal in performing broader propagating agendas. Consequently, Forum Silaturahhim Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (An Interconnection Forum of the Campus Islamic Propagation Agencies (FSLDK) was established. This forum has a coordinating function of propagation, as a means to boost synergy of varieties of propagation movements towards a unifying community (*ummatan wahidah*). At its early stage, FSLDK was named Sarasehan LDK (the LDKs' Assemblage). This event was organized at first by Jamaah Salahuddin UGM on May 24-25, 1986, which was attended by 13 LDKs, first workshop manage to produce several decisions, namely:[46]

1. The need ti improve Islamic brotherhood amongst the Campus Islamic Propagation Agencies, at least among the functionaries of the LDKs' leaderships.
2. The communication and coordination amongst LDKs should be conducted in several zonings: a) the western region was coordinated by Karisma Salman ITB, b) the central region was coordinated by Jamaah Salahuddin UGM, c) the eastern region was coordinated by UKKI Airlangga University.

The first meeting was then followed by several other meetings subsequently held at ITB Bandung January 2-4, 1987; at the Airlangga University Surabaya September 13-16, 1987; at UNS Solo on September 3-6, 1988; and at the IKIP Malang September 15-19, 1989. At the 5th gathering at IKIP Malang FSLDK made an important stage because the assemblage was attended by LDKs outside Java such as Sumatra, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, and Bali. Another important step was the agreement on the formulation of LDK's lines of action (*khittah*). These lines of action comprised direction, goals, and objectives of the campus propagation movements. This *khittah* was aimed at strengthening mutual understanding on the direction of Islamic teaching on campuses as well as with the FSLDK as an integral part of the global strategy



Office of the Central Board of the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII)

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

of Islamic propagation in Indonesia. Recently, the forum is more popular with an addendum in its name Forum Silaturrahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus Indonesia (the Interconnecting Forum of Campus Propagation Agencies in Indonesia, FSLDKI).

In contrast to other campus base Islamic organizations, LDK is considered as the formal organization of a university. Despite the name differences the, LDK is regarded as the most authoritative propagation agency on campuses. At the same time, other organizations are commonly considered as extra-campus student organizations. As an official organization of the university, an LDK usually receives facilities to use the campus mosque as its center of activities. Although as an official campus Islamic organization, LDK has different colors in each university. The only similiar line is that those LDKs are Islamic propagation agencies, that are different from either HMI or PMII the two organization that may not be fitted to be regarded as propagation agencies.

2) KesatuanAksiMahasiswa Indonesian (KAMMI)

The faucet like 1998 reform opens up all channels of bureaucracy and politics. In social theory, this moment is called the political opportunity structure. In this condition nodes of all political stalemate are opened, thereby allowing all segments of society to express their social and political aspirations. This period was then characterized by the emergence of various political parties, including the Islamic parties. Various social movements have also emerged, including within the segment of Muslim students by forming FSLDK in Malang on March 29, 1998. The forum eventually form an alternative institution for the students named KesatuanAksiMahasiswa Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Muslim Students' Action Union, KAMMI). The decision is then poured into an act of establishment called the Malang Declaration.[47]

Some factors behind the establishment of KAMMI by the campus activists are: 1) they saw here were some indications of eliminating the nation's potencies; 2) the urgent demand for a reform; 3) the Muslims' interests to act immediately; 4) the mushrooming demonstration and the inclination of free speeches; 5) the Muslim Student as a social elements; 6)

47. The FSLDK that successfully formed KAMMI was presented by 59 LDKs affiliated from 63 campuses in Indonesia. The total attendants were 200 people. Further see "Profil KAMMI" in http://kammi.org/ke-kammi-an/sejarah.html(being accessed on March 8, 2014).

the neglected Muslims' voice; 7) campus de-politicization that has sterilized students' roles.

The selection of the name Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, then is shortened KAMMI, for the movement meant that as it has some consequences, namely:

3. KAMMI is an organized force that unified various elements of students.
4. Either as an individual or as an institutions the Muslims have agreed to work together KAMMI.
5. KAMMI is a movement on oriented to a real and systematic action based mature ideas on reform and the formation of civilized Islamic society.
6. The core strength of KAMMI is students various strata committing to the clear and correct struggle of Islam and nationalities.
7. The vision of KAMMI's movement is based on an understanding of reality of the Indonesian nation with so many diversities, so that KAMMI will cooperate for the goodness and the progress of the Indonesian people, nation, and homeland.[48]

Different from the appearance of several other Islamic student organizations, KAMMI's presence seemed to represent a spirit of "new Islam" that reflects the "totality", in all the purpose, struggle, and the social political behavior. In other words, KAMMI really wanted to reflect a portrait of the ideal youths of Islam, as a pious generation, upholding Islamic morality in various aspects of life (*kaffah*).

At the relatively young age, KAMMI was very popular. In fact, along with the attached strong Islamic spirit the organization has attracted students of major campuses like UI, ITB, UGM, and Unair. In fact, in Islamic labeled campuses such as UIN or IAIN, KAMMI also well develops, especially at the faculties of science such as natural sciences, chemistry, physics, mathematics. This seems to correspond with KAMMI's statute as an extra-campus organization that united all Indonesian Muslim students regardless of ethnicities, races, and classes. KAMMI unified Indonesian Muslim students who willing to cooperate in building the Indonesian nation-state. It is not surprising that in its struggle, KAMMI embraces all elements of students from various campuses, both in the western and eastern parts of Indonesia.[49]

48. "KilasBalikSejarah KAMMI" in http://kammi.org/ke-kammi-an/sejarah.html(being accessed on March 8, 2014).

49. "Profil KAMMI" in http://kammi.org/ke-kammi-an/sejarah.html(being accessed on March 8, 2014).

KAMMI's vision of struggle was to be a forum that would give birth to strong cadres of future leaders in the efforts to achieve an Islamic community in Indonesia. To manifest this vision, there are some agendas that had to be done. Firstly, fostering Islamic values, faith, and devotion of the Indonesian Muslim students; second, to explore, develop, and strengthen the students' intellectual social and politic all potentials; third, to brighten and to improve the quality of Indonesian society to become the devoted to God (*rabbani*) and the civilized (*madani*) society; Fourth, to promote and to maintain communication, solidarity, and cooperation of Indonesian students in solving social and state problems; and fifth, to cooperate with elements of society in the spirit of bringing kindness, spreading benefits, and forbidding evil (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*).[50]

In addition to these ideas, KAMMI serve as a forum and partner for Indonesian students who want to maintain justice and righteousness through healthy and responsible national development. KAMMI also took part as a partner to the community in efforts to build civil society, to strengthen the process of democratization, and to promote Muslim brotherhood and the nation by constructively critical to the state policy that had marginalized communities. In relation to there ideas, there are some referred principles of KAMMI's movement, namely: the victory of Islam as the soul of struggle; sleaze as an eternal enemy; Islamic solution as an offer of the struggle; improvement as the tradition of struggle; the Muslim leadership as the strategy of struggle; and brotherhood as the nature of KAMMI's intercommunication.[51]

Almost similar to LDK, KAMMI is also known as an education (*tarbiyah*) agency. Strict and tiered regeneration system of this campus Islamic organization is different from the other Islamic student organizations such as HMI, PMII or IMM. KAMMI's propagation pattern is considered as a breakthrough on the old propagation patterns like sermon and classical patterns as conducted by HMI or PMII. The education (*tarbiyah*) system produces cadres not only belonging to a strong religious commitment but also a strong solidarity among members.

Lastly, nationalism and political

50. "Profil KAMMI" in http://kammi.org/ke-kammian/sejarah.html(being accessed on March 8, 2014).

51. AndiRahmat and Muhammad Najib.*Gerakan Perlawanan dari Masjid Kampus*. (Surakarta: Purimedia, 2001), p.189-193.



Lafran Pane, founder of the Islamic Students Association (HMI)

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

activism of KAMMI also deserve to be discussed here. Although it has never been confronted with events testing their nationalism as was the case of HMI, PMII, and IMM, concerning their acceptance of the sole principle of Pancasila, it does not mean that KAMMI does not coattach it self to idea of nationalism. As an organization founded at the end of the New Order era, the emergence of KAMMI implies the commitment of the founders interest of to the state. In addition, KAMMI also comprehends democracy as the proper political mechanism. Such implies their strong commitment of this organization to the Indonesian nation.

Campus Islamic Movements in Comparative Perspectives

The following chart discusses both groups of the Islamic student movement in a comparative perspective. Therefore, the following issues are taken as bases of comparison, ranging from religious thought to the movement strategies and the member recruitment.

1) Religious Thought and Movement

In general, campus Islamic movements can be categorized into two, namely the Indonesian "origin" and the trans-national Islamic influence. The student movements such as HMI, PMII, and IMM are Islamic movements strongly rooted within the Indonesian history. While the campus Islamic movements like LDK and KAMMI in many ways are founded as an influence of Islamic movements in the Middle East, especially the Muslims' brotherhood (*al-ikhwan al-muslimin*) in Egypt. Such a difference significantly formulates their religious thoughts and ideologies.

The first two Islamic movements, HMI and IMM, inherited the modernist Islam movement, while PMII is clearly affiliated with the traditionalist group of NU. However, the campus atmosphere in urban areas has often made the relationship of the three student movements to be relatively fluid, and therefore the author suggests that the Indonesian Islamic identity is dominant in the three movements compared to the campus Islamic movements like LDK and KAMMI, that are greatly influenced by Islamic trans-national movements and ideologies.

Since the beginning of the New Order, the Middle East style of Islam called Salafism had a powerful influence in Indonesia. The Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII) under the

leadership of M. Natsir had brought the ideology of Wahhabi Salafism into Indonesia since 1967.[52] Many Indonesian students were sent by DDII to study in the Middle East as well as Indonesian students studying at the representative of the University of Imam Ibn Sa'ud in Indonesia, namely Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences, LIPIA). The influence of Wahhabism is not only for the general public but also at the university, which takes form of the campus Islamic movements. Alumni of Middle East universities as well as LIPIA began to emerge and give influences on campuses since the 1980s. Some of them also carry the influence of the Islamic movement in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, the books of the Muslim Brotherhood figures such as Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb had flooded Indonesia during the 1980s and eventually influenced the campus Islamic movements.[53] The education (*tarbiyah*) regeneration methods like that of the Muslim Brotherhood has the most significant effect on the regeneration system of campus propagation agencies from the 1980s to early 1990s.

In connection with the development of Salafism in Indonesia, it should be emphasized that there are several patterns of the thought of Salafism in Indonesia, such as the Wahhabi Salafi, the IkhwaniSalafi, and the Purist Salafi. The Wahhabi Salafi has the understanding that is based on the thought of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab of Saudi Arabia, while the Ikhwani Salafi is a movement rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. The Purist Salafi category is an understanding originates from Yemen's Salafist, which is less political in their aspects of attention.

In general, Islamic religious understanding of the LDK and KAMMI is almost the same that Islam is a religion that regulates all aspects of life. Such an ideology brings the understanding of the first two movements on the political aspect, by which they are also often referred to as Islamist movements. In contrast to the Purist Salafi movement that does not want to get involved in the political sphere, the other two contemporary Islamic movements considers politics as part of the struggle

method of Islam. Although LDK movement so far has no affiliation with any Islamic parties, they still see political parties as a significant sphere to fight for Islam. KAMMI has from the beginning affiliated with the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and it is even as a supplier of the Islamist party activists.

(c) Socio-Religious Behavior

In addition to religious thought, the diversity of campus movement can also be seen from the patterns of their appearances. In terms of clothing, for example, HMI, IMM and PMII activists are more accommodative Indonesian style of Islamic clothing, while the LDK and KAMMI tend to accommodate Middle Eastern-style Islamic clothing. Many HMI and PMII women activists during the 1960s and 1970s had not used hijab as widely used by HMI and PMII activists today. Changes in understanding Islam within the HMI and PMII members have also undergone significant development along with the rise of global Islamic influences in Indonesia.

Another important thing to be discussed is how these activists understand and apply the concept of hijab in everyday life. This clearly distinguishes LDK and KAMMI with other Islamic organizations like HMI, PMII, and IMM. Hijab as the identity of Muslim women are equally used by all women activists, but the style of hijab used by LDK and KAMMI activists are wider than the commonly used veils by HMI, PMII, or IMM activists. Another phenomenon that distinguishes women activists of LDK and KAMMI is that they almost never wear trousers or jeans, but they wear long skirts, instead.

Still related to the physical appearance, LDK and KAMMI male activists believe that the beard is part of the prophetic traditions and also as part of the Muslim identity. In fact, it is less evident in other Islamist activists. In the case of *isbal* (trousers cut above the ankles), campus Islamic activists have different opinion from the Salafis. The majority of campus Islamic activists wear trousers covering the ankles in everyday life, but they keep *isbal* by not lengthening pants only at time of praying.

Lastly, the socio-religious behavior of the campus Islamic activists can also be seen on their social solidarity. Being students who pay attentions to humanitarian issues, almost all campus Islamic movements implement social programs. These student movements are often engaged in social work within the

community. The regeneration department of LDK and KAMMI perform a lot of preaching activities and social work in particular villages called the coaching villages. Based on observations in Yogyakarta region, LDK and KAMMI are quite active in various activities to help the earthquake affected people of Bantul in 2006 and also the Merapi eruption in 2010. In such cases, it seems that HMI, PMII, and IMM are some what different. Although they cannot be said to have been passive, they are less active as well as less responsive in social activities within the community.

3. Membership and Strategies of the Movement

Membership of the campus Islamic movements varies, depending on each campus; at public universities LDK and KAMMI are more dominant, whereas at UIN campuses HMI and PMII are more dominant; at the same time IMM is more dominant at Muhammadiyah campuses. However, many LDK and KAMMI activists have Muhammadiyah and NU backgrounds. Some "conflicts" between Muhammadiyah and PKS in some regions prove the assumption that Muhammadiyah's cadres had been stolen because they were more active in KAMMI or PKS.

Membership of an Islamic movement is strongly influenced by the propagation strategies or methods of the member recruitment. On the basis of a survey in Yogyakarta, the majority of members are interested in Islamic movements for their ideology and social activities. The majority of LDK and KAMMI activists felt that regeneration system of these student organizations is quite effective, particularly the methods of Islamic propagation and the vision of the organization. Both LDK and KAMMI use *tarbiyah* method as a regeneration system to recruit new members. The *tarbiyah* system is a regeneration system routinely held once a week with limited participants and it is also classified in tiers. The regeneration system of HMI, PMII, and IMM are held once or twice a year with specific names: the Basic Training for HMI, the Basic Leadership Training for PMII, and the Baitul Arqom for IMM. The difference between those recruitment systems is that the Baitul Arqom and *tarbiyah* put more emphasis on introducing Islamic education, while the Basic Training and the Basic Leadership Training put more emphasis on capacity building. All regeneration efforts of the student movements use the momentum of the beginning of new academic enrolments to recruit new



members among the new students registered for a university. In additions, another momentum attracts to involve a lot of new members is the commonly held Ramadan on Campus (Ramadan di Kampus, RDC).

To maintain consistent propaganda as well as to raise members, some campus Islamic movements use varieties of media. Most organizations hold activities such as study clubs, publishing weekly bulletins, or using information media and technologies such as SMS or Facebook for member gathering. In additions, some of the movements use also internet blogs and websites as the propagation media and the interconnecting forum among the members.

It should be emphasized that the member recruitment and the movement strategy are closely related to how the Islamic movement could gain victory over the "wars" against varieties of opinion voiced by other Islamic movements. In social movements, the process is known to be *framing*. The framing process can be done in varieties of media, both in the discussion rooms, pamphlets, tabloids, or in informal forums.[54]

54. Abdul Wahib Situmorang, *Gerakan Sosial: studi kasus beberapa perlawanan*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2007), p.12-13.

Social problems closely related to students such as social injustice, corruption, law enforcement, and human rights abuse are significant issues in the propagation strategy. Campus Islamic movements that are belonged to a pragmatic idealism as well as to provide an alternative solution to the social problems will be more attractive to students.

Besides, normative-cognitive aspects are also significant in the member recruitment. Based on surveys in some campus Islamic movements, students are more interested in getting involved into the Islamic movements not only to deepen their religious knowledge, but also for capacity building as for the formation of their character, discover their-own potential, as well as the process of maturity. The above aspects are carefully discerned by various campus Islamic movements, so that they become an alternative organization for students.

4) Central Issues of Struggle

Campus Islamic movements cannot be released from any contemporary issues when Islam confronts modernity. Among the issues to be discussed in this subchapter are the Sharia, Islamic caliphate, democracy, and pluralism.



Consecutive chairmen of the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII)

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

Although the Sharia has been much discussed since the era of Reformation, but the concept was apparently not understood well by students, including campus activist movements. LDK and KAMMI generally support the concept of Sharia, but they do not know exactly how the application of Sharia in everyday life. So far the campus Islamic movement activists would rather understand the Sharia as taken for granted, because from the beginning they understood Islam as a complete religion. For them, Sharia means the formalization of Islamic law. Some movements want to spread Sharia within campuses, although they do not explain what they mean by the concept.

In line with the Sharia, the concept of Islamic caliphate is also not clearly understood by some campus Islamic movements. Although some LDK and KAMMI activists support this idea, they do not quite have a clear idea of the concept of how the roadmap towards the Islamic caliphate would be achieved. They understand that this concept is good only because of their normative understanding of Islam.

The concept of democracy and pluralism is actually not much different from the concept of Sharia and the Islamic caliphate. Although this concept is a Western product of thought, the students are often listened to this concept, the resistance to this concept is not strong enough. The majority of LDK and KAMMI activists on several campuses in Yogyakarta do not frontally reject the concept of democracy, but they tend to say that it is okay as far as it does not contrary to Islam. Several other activists believe that through democracy the Sharia and Islamic caliphate can still be realized.

The HMI activists, PMII, and IMM are very diverse in understanding the various concepts above. Although some activists expressed support for the concept of Sharia and Islamic caliphate, in general theyareless agreed with the concepts that they think are still unclear and not applicable. In line with other movement activists, activists of HMI, PMII, and IMM generally do not reject Western concepts such as democracy and pluralism. So far, students tend to see democracy and pluralism as political and social concepts that are neutral and less ideological or opposing the Islamic ideology.

5) A Campus Base Movement

The Islamic movement is rampant as this develops not only by the general public

but also among the campus students. Islam had spread widely in Indonesia since the 13th century or even earlier. Islam had already experienced a pattern of acculturation, which is called the ideologically moderate Indonesian Islam. The development of Islam in Indonesia escalated since the Wahhabi intensifies their propaganda in Southeast Asia to repress Shi'ite influences. The latter Islam has different pattern of Islam that can be called the Middle East style of Islam, in which the latter is ideologically relatively conservative. Various patterns of diversity also affect campus Islamic movements. In general campus Islamic movement emerged in the two periods, i.e. the early period Indonesian independence and the middle period of the New Order.

The spirit of nationalism becomes a significant issue that led to the emergence of campus Islamic movements in the early period of Indonesian independence. Campus Islamic movements that appeared before and after the independence due to social and political situations are JIB, HMI, PMII, and IMM. Although JIB has no longer existed, some analysts suggest that the Islamic spirit of JIB is inherited by HMI in both ideology and politics. The manifold political background then forms the nature of campus Islamic movements as dense as their political nuances.

The second period of the rise of campus Islamic propagation movements is in the middle New Order period. The conservative style of Wahhabist Islam brought by the Middle East alumni sent by DDII began to emerge in the early 1980s, along with the repressive politics of Soeharto regime against the growing Muslims campus Islamic movements. This phase is characterized by the emergence of a new generation of Muslim students who makes the campus' mosque as their base of Islamic propagation. They are known as *tarbiyah* groups taking much inspiration from the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In this period actually began to appear also a student movement affiliated to the Hizbut Tahrir. But this latter student movement is less significantly developed at campuses.

In addition to local factors, the rise of Islamic movements, especially in the last two decades has been influenced by global factors. No denial that the emergence of Islamic movements in the reform era is a global phenomenon that also appears in various countries. The

dominant course of globalization has accelerated the spread of the trans-national Islamic ideology.

Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, DDII) plays significant role in bringing the ideology of Salafism-Wahhabism into Indonesia. To develop the Wahhabi influence and also to repress the influence of Shia in Indonesia, various Islamic organizations in the Middle East provide massive funding to develop the propagation of Islam. Among the DDII missionary activity was to establish mosques, publishing magazines, and the most significant one was to provide scholarships for Indonesian students studying in the Middle East. A few years later, the Middle East alumni had a significant influence on the spread of Wahhabism in Indonesia, including on campuses. For DDII, the significant lines of Islamic propagation in Indonesia are three: boarding schools, campuses, and mosques. This idea is the vision of M. Natsir, the founder of DDII, as he said "if we used to propagating Islam in politics, now we play politics by the path of Islamic propagation."[55]

55. Lukman Hakiem and Tamsil Linrung, *Menunaikan Panggilan Risalah: Dokumentasi Perjalanan 30 Tahun Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* (Jakarta:DDII, 1997), p.3.


Lastly, the development of Islamic movements in several campuses in Indonesia cannot be separated from the students' psychological condition, which is full of idealism or favoring a belief to be true thing. Students are often persistent in fighting for his beliefs. In general, students do not like the establishment of status quo, because it is synonymous with setbacks, which does not correspond to the progressive encouragement of his youthful spirit. Various campus Islamic movements that are the object of this study can be categorized into two movements: the campus Islamic movement and the Campus Islamic propagation Movement. First, the campus Islamic movements are any movements founded during the Old Order era and the early period of the New Order to include HMI, PMII, and IMM. In contrast to other campus movements, student movements were founded due to political factors and the spirit of nationalism. Similarly, in contrast to other Islamic movements, these movements have some characteristics such as: politically moderate, more focused on capacity building activities for the students, having a fewer propagation activity, being more internal, and relatively fewer activities within the community.


Second, the campus student movements emerging at the middle New Order period and beginning of the era of Reformation like LDK and KAMMI would rather be called the campus Islamic propagation movement. Although comprising political aspects in their process of establishment, these student movements are more influenced by the high spirit of Islam resulted from the Middle East influences. The LDK and KAMMI movements belong to the following characteristics: having a conservative ideology, more focused on Islamic propagation activities, or the capacity building activities leading to Islamic propaganda, and conducting activities in either for the campus community and or the general populace.

In spite of the relatively different ideology and idealism the campus Islamic movements in many ways belong to some shared similarities, especially as it is noticeable in the spirit of nationalism. Generally, all of the referred student movements push for democratization of Indonesia, and also want to disseminate modern values such as pluralism and multiculturalism. Issues around Islamism like the Islamic Sharia, Islamic caliphate or Islamic states are very rarely heard on campus except by small-scale movements of the HTI.

Lastly, the Islamic movements in public or secular universities tend to be more Islamic than those movements found in Islamic universities. This phenomenon is clearly visible not only in terms of clothing, but also on their selection of Islamic movements. In public universities, the LDK and KAMMI movements are morepreferableby students compared to the student movements of HMI, PMII, and IMM. On the contrary, HMI and PMII dominate Islamic universities such as UIN and IAIN, except in the Muhammadiyah Universities where IMM is more dominant.







Chapter Eleven
Islamic Political Movements

Islamic Political Movements

Yon Machmudi

Since the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century Islamic politics in Indonesia have developed significantly. The political struggle of the Muslim in Indonesia has gone through a long and complicated transformation following the development of democracy in Indonesia. Muslims have become the most important part of the Indonesian population in strengthening the process of democratic consolidation. Therefore, it is not surprising if Indonesia is now regarded as an important model for democracy in the world. However, Indonesia's success in this process has not come about without challenges. To what extent did Muslim communities, especially Islamic politics parties, played their political role and contributed to this democratic consolidation? There is need for an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of Muslim politics in Indonesia from the beginning of Independence up to the present.

It is crucial to have a good look at the development of their new political role, one of which is the new strategies adopted by the Muslims in response to the repressive New Order regime. These strategies tended to be more cooperative, which differed from the more confrontational former strategies that were adopted in relation to Islam and the state . They engendered a new approach to politics that could stimulate Islam into becoming more accommodative and more widely accepted by the ruling regime.[1] In general, one may say that Indonesian Muslims had begun to focus on another, more substantive role of Islam rather than merely on its legal formality, which they could easily adapt to the course of the developing democracy. However, behind the Muslims' success in delivering this new strategy, it still engendered the emergence of small numbers of hardliner groups of Islamists who rejected the model of the Islamic struggle from within the system and stressed the application of more substantive Islamic principles in politics. They insisted on the implementation of the Shari'a and on a change in the system of enforced legislation.[2]

There are currently two types of Islamic political parties in Indonesia: mass-based and ideologically-based that differ in terms of the principles they adhere to but they are similar in their defence of Muslim aspirations and in their support for democracy. Parties categorized as Islamic are the Prosperous Justice

1. Bahtiar Effendy, *Teologi Baru Politik Islam.* (Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2001).

2. Syarifuddin Jurdi, *Pemikiran Politik Islam Indonesia: Pertautan Negara, Khilafah, Masyarakat Madani dan Demokrasi* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2008), pp. 181-192.



Office of the Central Board of Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party), Pasar Minggu, Jakarta. PAN is an open political party, but it has a special relation with the Muhammadiyah.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) and the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB), in addition to the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN). The latter two parties are categorized as Muslim-based parties, although they also declare to be open to non Muslims. Although significant, in general these differences are not very evident as the working programs of Islamic, nationalist, and secular parties in Indonesia are almost the same. Such is due to the large number of Muslim activists in both nationalist and secular parties.

Political Movement before Independence

Before the time of independence, Muslims had formed a number of socio-political movements that aimed at the independence of Indonesia. Initially, these organizations focused their activities on Islamic propagation, education, and social development. They had realized that the propagation of Islam could no longer simply rely on traditional models but had to be carried outby more modern and well-structured organizations only by these new methods the Dutch domination and Christian penetration could be be resisted.[3] Changes had to be made through reforms in religion, education, as well as in politics.

Sheikh Nawawi al-Bantani (d.1897), Sheikh Ahmad Khatib (d. 1915) and Sheikh Mahfuz at-Turmusi (d. 1920) were three great scholars of Indonesian origin who taught at the Haram Mosque. They had a major influence on the adventof social, religious and political movements. These three sheikhs, according to Martin van Bruinessen,[4] were among the highest ranking Indonesian *'ulama* in the Haram and after them no other Indonesians ever succeeded tothem. Nawawi Banten was a very prolific author. In addition to writing a Qur'anic commentary, he also wrote several books on various disciplines of Islamic scholarships. He gave a full explanation of some brief treatises that were taught in Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) and he also equipped and corrected their contents.[5] It is not surprising if traditional religious clerics and scholars in

3. Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Moderen Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942*. (Jakarta:LP3ES, 1982), p. 37.

4. Martin Van Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat*, (Yogyakarta: Gading Publishing, 2012), p. 106.

5. Van Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning* ..., p. 107.

pesantren in Indonesia regarded him as their most famous teacher. The reformist *'alim,* Ahmad Khatib, also acknowledged Nawawi Banten as his teacher. More than 22 of the latter's works are studied in *pesantrens*, 11 of which are the most widely circulated books among the almost 100 books used in the *pesantren* (Bruinessen, 1990).

Sheikh Ahmad Khatib was born in Bukittinggi in Minangkabau in West Sumatra in 1855. He was a religious leader and a very influential teacher for the next generation of Islamic reformers in Sumatra, Java, and other regions. After having completed his primary education in 1876, Ahmad Khatib went to Mecca and settled there. In the Holy Land he managed to acquire a honorable position in the Haram Mosque as an *imam* of the Shafi'i School. It was the highest position ever awarded to an Indonesian in Mecca. Ahmad Khatib had an intimate relationship with Indonesians who were performing the pilgrimage and who studied in the Holy Land. Through these students he was able to establish a close relationship with Indonesian Muslims in their homeland, because most of his students would be teaching religious subjects in various regions of Indonesia after returning from the Holy Land. Among Ahmad Khatib's disciples were Sheikh Muhammad Djamil Djambek, Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah, Haji Abdullah Ahmad, Haji Ahmad Dahlan, Sheikh Sulaiman Al-Rasuli and Kyai Haji Hasjim Asj'ari.

In addition to teaching the jurisprudence of the Shafi'i School of Islamic law, Sheikh Ahmad Khatib gave his students the chance to read the articles of Muhammad Abduh from Egypt that were published in *al-Urwah al-Wusqa* and *Tafsir al-Manar.*[6] His influence in politics developed further from his study of these articles. The establishment of modern Islamic movements in Indonesia was initiated by Ahmad Khatib's students in Minangkabau and many other regions in Indonesia.

Sheikh Mahfuz Termas is the third Indonesian *'alim* who attained an important position in Mecca. Javanese *'ulama* respected him even more than Kyai Nawawi.[7] He successfully completed his Islamic education under the guidance of foremost scholars in Mecca and by then he had become an expert in *qira'ah* (the Qur'anic recitation). He wrote a four-volume book which is still used in *pesantren.* He was the first Indonesian scholar who taught the hadiths of the

Sahih of al-Bukhari to Hashim Asj'ari, his favorite pupil, who later founded the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).

Before the time of Independence, most Indonesian Muslims were united in their position to the Dutch. However they were practically divided into two ideological orientation, what kind of independent Indonesia they wanted to have. *Santri* wanted to establish an Indonesian state that was based on the Shari'a, where as the *abangan* preferred a national state in which no religious distinction would be made and would cover the entire Indonesian population.[8] *Santri* generally joined Islamic parties, where as the *abangan* supported political parties that might be based on nationalist, communist, or even Christian ideologies.

It was the Dutch ethical regulation of 1901 that provided for educational opportunities for Indonesians while the Decentralization Act of 1903 entitled local residents of Indonesia, the country that was then still called the Netherlands Indies to establish a Representative Council which stimulated the growth of organizations and political parties. Amir explained in 2003 that after the issuance of these policies three kinds of parties emerged in Indonesia[9]: (1) parties of people of Dutch descent, (2) parties of people of Chinese descent, and (3) Indonesian parties. The Indonesians parties can be grouped into Islamic-based and nationalist. Benda classified the parties into two categories comprising of almost the same groups: Islamic-nationalist and secular-nationalists.[10] This division was based on the fact that these groups had equally been fighting for the same national ideology, the only difference being where religion should be located. The first group adopted Islam as the basis of its struggle to construct the ideals of the Indonesian state, while the second group was religiously neutral.

The Muslims' struggle can be distinguished on the basis of the strategies they adopted against colonization. Some opposed the Dutch and Japanese occupations in a revolutionary way, while others took a more cooperative strategy.[11] However, both groups shared the same ideals

to fight for Indonesian Independence. The cooperative group was represented by modernists or reformists, where as the resistant group was represented by traditionalists. The Modernists had mostly received their education in schools established by the Dutch colonial government as a result of the ethical policy, while those who rekindled the spirit of resistance usually originated from *pesantren*. Most of Nawawi Banten and Mahfuhz Termas's students developed traditional organizations, while Ahmad Khatib's students tended to practice reformed Islam. In addition to the traditionalist *'ulama*, non-cooperative Muslim groups were also represented by revolutionary young Muslims who were influenced by socialist ideology.[12]

In general, Islamic movements did not promote these differences because they had the same goal of making Indonesia independent as the result of Muslim struggle. They envisioned the creation of an Islamic-based state. They came together to realize this Islamic ideals. Some of their well-known leaders include Achmad Dahlan, Hasjim Asj'ari, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, and Agus Salim. Islamic political groups dealt with the nationalist and socialist groups' differences in political ideology and ideals to realize the Indonesian state. Some nationalists are Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta and Mohammad Yamin and socialists include Tan Malaka, Muso and Semaun. Indonesian national movements divided into three major groups in terms of their ideologies, viz. Islamist, nationalist, and socialists.[13]

According to Noer,[14] the spread of the Islamic reform movement that gave birth to Muslim political movements in Indonesia started in Minangkabau and originated from Sheikh Ahmad Khatib's teaching of Islamic reformthat spread to other regions in Indonesia. while the reform movement originally developed in Minangkabau, Islamic political organizations started to appear in Java. The Thawalib School, for example, shows the change of its orientation in 1923 as it focussed on political affairs after a teacher named Datuk Batuah had arrived from Java bringing communist influences that reflected a more radical stance against the government than simply materialism itself. However, the political transition among the teachers

and the students of the Thawalib School in Padang Panjang was slow and came by through reading newspapers and magazines that discussed political issues, including those around the Sarekat Islam (SI). The vice-president of the Sarekat Islam, Abdul Muis, often visited his homeland to take care of public interests. The Communist influence Datuk Batuah brought had caused polemics betweenMuslim scholars in Minangkabau and finally, in 1924, the Union of Islamic Religious Teachers agreed to reject Communism as it was declared antagonistic to the teachings of Islam.[15]

Muslim political activities in Indonesia are generally seen to have been spearheaded by the Islamist Union (Sarekat Islam, SI) which was founded in Solo on November 11, 1912 as the successor of the Islamist Trade Union (Sarekat Dagang Islam, SDI). The SDI was founded on October 16, 1905 by Haji Samanhoedi and aimed at promotingthe Muslims' economy that had been facing stiff competition from Chinese traders. It initially attracted local *batik* traders in Solo who felt the Chinese humiliated them as they considered themselves as higher because they occupied the position second only to the Dutch. At first, local traders and Chinese merchants were barely involved in conflicts, but after the 1911 Chinese Revolution they began to limit themselves. Besides, the SDI was also founded to protect its members from the pressure of upper-class elites, who could not meet the public rights of thepeople who were often discriminated. For example, common people were not allowed to wear particular *batik* patterns. In some regions they were not allowed to travel by train and were victimized by various other humiliating forms of treatment. Hence, the SDI turned into a bastion of struggle for indigenous traders to help them raise their rank in front of Chinese traders and upper-class aristocrats.

When the SDI started not to limit its scope to unifying merchants, but began to be interested in politics, it transformed into the SI. SDI founder H. Samanhoedi, who also became the SI's first chairman, started to shape the organization by improving its leadership, formulating the basic organizational statutes, as well as the arrangement of the relationship between thecentral organization and its local branches. The basic organizational statutes were formulated on November 11, 1911 by Raden Mas Tirtoadisurjo,

one of the SI leaders who had finished higher education. The statutes stated that Muslims had to contribute to their own progress by the establishment of an association called Sarekat Islam. The SI urged its members to get along like brothers, to maintain harmonious relations, to organize mutual help and to enhance the people's dignity to attain prosperity, well-being and the greatness of the country.[16]

The SI was widely accepted and it rapidly set up branch offices in many regions. The Dutch Resident of Surakarta was weary of the SI because of some of its uncontrolled activities and therefore he banned the organization. As a result, quarrels with Chinese groups became more frequent and plantation workers started to go on strike and the SI was accused of being behind the ferments in the regions. However, the suspension imposed by the Resident of Surakarta was later repealed under the condition that the SI had to change its basic statutes and the organization was allowed to exist only in the Residency of Surakarta.

The SI activities started to progress after Samanhoedi had convinced Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto to lead the organization in order to strengthenthe Sarekat Islam. Unlike Samanhoedi, Tjokroaminoto was an authoritative figure who had finished higher education. Disregarding the decree of the Resident of Surakarta, Tjokroaminoto began to establish SI branches in several localities. He then filed for government recognition and demanded the abolishment of the preventive and repressive administrative supervision. Hence, under Tjokroaminoto's national leadership the SI had so changed that was marked in its first congress in Surabaya in January 1913 attended by delegates from several regions in and outside Java. There were three regions: East Java (Sulawesi, Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa and islands in the eastern part of Indonesia), Central Java (also covering Kalimantan) and West Java (covering West Java and Sumatra). To meet the East Indies Government's order that the organization had to be regional and was not allowed to operate at the national level, SI sought to keep its coordination and cooperation with its regional organizations. Finally, in a special meeting held in Yogyakarta on February 18, 1914, the SI established a centralized management by electing H. Samanhoedi as honorary chairman; Tjokroaminoto as chairman, and Gunawan as vice-chairman. Tjokroaminoto officially ran the

organizatioin's daily management. On March 18, 1916 the Dutch East Indies Government sanctioned the SI Central Board.

Tjokroaminoto was often regarded as the organization's only leader as he remained on his post until his death in 1934. Under Tjokroaminoto's leadership, the SI developed rapidly. His attitude towards the Dutch, however, was ambiguous. On the one hand he showed his loyalty to the government, but on the other, he had a strong sense of nationalism, demanded human rights and the improvement of the prosperity of all Indonesians. He rejected the notion that the SI was a political party that wanted to bring about a revolution. His attitude was understandable because, at that time, the Dutch East Indies Government's regulations disallowed the formation of political parties.[17] In any case, in his political struggle, he cooperated with the Government in a proper way.

The political activities of the Sarekat Islam increased considerably after its congresses started to be held at the national level. These activities showed that the SI was a national organization, which had branches in many regions and that its leaders were able to evoke the spirit of nationalism along with Islam as its basic teaching. Tjokroaminoto used the term "national"to express his efforts to struggle for an autonomous government, or at least to gain the rights to speak in political terms. The SI's political dimension was clearly defined in its principles and working program that were proposed at the second national congress in 1917. The SI demanded the establishment of regional councils and the expansion of the rights of the People's Council (*Volksraad*) in the hope to turn the council into a representative institution that truly represented the people in general. It also demanded that political rights could be exercised openly forced labor and travel permits. Actually, there was a difference of opinion among SI members between those who supported joining the Volksraad and those who rejected it. Tjokroaminoto, Abdul Moeis, and Agus Salim tended to accept the Volksraad while Semaun, the SI chairman of the Semarang branch, rejected it because he thought that the Dutch Government did not really mean it to function. In 1918 Tjokroaminoto and Moeis were appointed as the members of the Volksraad.

The debate about the Volksraad flared up again when the council rejected the motion of some parties to reduce the



Emblem of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, Nation Awakening Party), which was founded on July 23, 1998 at Gus Dur's house in Ciganjur, South Jakarta.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

area used for sugar cane plantations by 25%. To endorse the motion, which was considered to safeguard the people's interests, some SI leaders who initially supported the Volksraad began to dispute it and they asked Tjokroaminoto and Moeis to resign from the Council. As a result, the SI started to change its strategy of cooperation with the Dutch Government into a non-cooperative one. This was especially the Dutch had jailed Tjokroaminoto in 1921 and the demand to restore the SI leadership in the Volksraad was also not granted. This policy of non-cooperation became known as the *hijrah* (lit. migration). Kartosuwiryo took this political migration a step further by establishing theradical institution of the *Suffah* as the party's cadre agency. Because the SI found that Kartosuwirjo ran the organization individualistically and not in the interests of the SI, he was dismissed in 1939 and branch offices in several regions were prohibited to entertain relationships with him. Kartosuwiryo subsequently established Darul Islam, which had its strong base in West Java.

Indeed, before the issuance of the "migration" (*hijrah)* policy, the SI had submitted several motions to the Council as a means to fight for the people's voice. The motions were meant to expand learning opportunities for the indigenous people so that they could become equal to Europeans.[18] These motions were put forward so that the people did not have to resort to radical ways to vent their outrage with the Dutch Government. Given the influence of Semaun, who wished the struggle to be more radical and non-compromising, this incited divisions between SI members. However, the SI ultimately pursued its non-cooperative policies after the Volksraad was no longer able to meet its interests. During the congress in Madiun on February 17-20, 1923, the SI formally institutionalized its political objectives by changing its name to Partai Sarekat Islam (Islamic United Party, PSI).[19]

The Communist group tried to influence other organizations, including the SI, to support the people's movements led by the Communist party. Abdul Moeis thought that the Dutch had installed Communist group to break the people's movement. Disputes with Semaun increased when the Communist group showed its distrust of Tjokroaminoto's leadership. The party leaders who rejected the Communist Party of Indonesia's influence within the SI felt they needed to make efforts to eliminate

18. Noer. *Gerakan Moderen*...,p. 133.
19. Zainal Abidin Amir. *Peta Islam Politik*...,p. 29.



Office of the Central Board of the PKB, in Raden Saleh Street, Central Jakarta.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

the communists' influence and the 1921 congress in Surabaya supported the motion to expell the Communists group from the SI.

The advance of the Communist group in the SI had led to the weakening of the organization as it had split into pro and the contra-communist factions. This split was also caused by conflicting opinions within the SI, especially with regards to Kejawen beliefs and radical nationalism. However, the SI's success in warding off the influence of Communists and other currents that were not entirely based on the fact Islam had strengthened the Muslim reformists groups within the SI structure. The SI subsequently established a solid relationship with the Muhammadiyah which was marked by the founding of the Islamic youth organization, *Jong Islamieten Bond* (JIB) in 1925. The JIB later produced many prominent figures who would actively support the Masjumi.

However, this cooperation only lasted until the Dutch Government, on the advice of Snouck Hurgronje, imposed an Islamic policy in which the government encouraged Muslims' religious and social doings but closely monitored their political activities. As a result, by adopting a non-cooperative policy, the SI was at odds with the Muhammadiyah that tended to cooperate with the government because various Muhammadiyah's activities relied on government subsidies. The Muhammadiyah's refusal to follow the SI's policies resulted abadonement of the dual-membership pattern that had been maintained by the SI and the Muhammadiyah. In 1927 the SI expelled the Muhammadiyah.

The departure of the Muhammadiyah had weakened the position of the SI that had in the meantime been involved in a dispute with Persis on several disciplinary subjects (*furu'*) in Islamic law. Furthermore,the SI saw a new rival when in 1926 the traditionalist group founded the Nahdlatul Ulama. The establishment of several Islamic organizations had increasingly added tothe polarization of the Muslims and dissociated the SI from other Islamic organizations. In 1927 Soekarno founded the Indonesian Nationalist Party (*Partai Nasionalis Indonesia*, PNI), which became a rival for the SI as well as forIslamic leadership within the Indonesian independence movement. Soekarno himself had been Tjokroaminoto's disciple. Hence, PNI's advent divided the political movement in Indonesia into two groups: Islamic and religiously-neutral nationalist. This condition continued up to Independence.

The establishment of the Indonesian Islamic Party (Partai Islam Indonesia, PII) in 1937 had weakened SI's position further within the Indonesian nationalist movement. In 1938, the SI merged with other Islamic organizations into the *Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic High Assembly, MIAI), which became the forerunner of the establishment of the *Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia* (Indonesian Muslims Consultative Assembly, Masjumi).

The Partai Muslimin Indonesia (the Indonesian Muslims' Party) abbreviated Permi was established in Minangkabau in 1930 by Hadji Iljas Jakub. Shortly after its establishment, Haji Muchtar Lutfi joined the party to strengthen it. Iljas received his religious education in Mecca and further pursued his studies at a university in Egypt. He gained much political experience by his interaction with Hizb al-Wathan, a political party in Egypt founded by Mustafa Kamil and he was often present in the party's discussions and meetings. Indonesian and Malay students in Egypt highly respected him because he was the deputy chairman of the Jami'at al-Khairiyah. Haji Muchtar Lutfi was the son of a respected *'alim* from Bukittinggi, Haji Abdul Latif. In the mid-1920s, the colonial government suspected people who were involved in politics and Muchtar went abroad to circumventarrest. After settling in Malaya (present day Malaysia) he decided to continue his trip and to go to Egypt. Lack of funds brought a halt to his education in Egypt and he decided to join Hizb al-Wathan's activities. Here he got political experiences and strengthened his desire to contribute further to the national struggle in Indonesia.[20]

The return of Jakub and Muchtar to Minangkabau coincided with the decline of the Thawalib School because of disagreements between its teachers after it had become influenced by communism. The Thawalib School saw a revival after communist activities in Minangkabau had been suppressed. The two politically experienced young men who both had just returned from Egypt re-energized the political spirit in Sumatra. Permi was established based on their observations of how the SI developed in Java, which had become polarized between Islamists and nationalist factions. Therefore, Permi tried to combine both ideologies that, in a Muslim individual, are inseparable.[21]

In general, Permi adopted a non-

cooperative attitude in order to achieve the ideals of Islamic nobility teaching and Indonesian independence. The party was strongly against capitalism and imperialism as they had caused the suffering of the Indonesian people. Therefore, the only way to elevate the dignity of the Indonesian people was to attain Indonesian Independence. Permi members were convinced of the ideals of independence and they continued to fight for Independence through their political activities. However Permi continued its activities in education by establishing an Islamic College in Padang in 1931. The party was also engaged in economic activities in order to meet its members' needs based on the *swadeshi* principle by way of emphasizing business efforts. Permi opened branches in Central Sumatra, Bengkulu, Tapanuli, East Kalimantan and Aceh and the people in Sumatra saw it as an alternative when the Sarekat Islam went through periods of decline.

Given Permi's non-cooperative program and its critical attitude towards the colonial government, the Dutch closely monitored many Permi leaders. Several female members like Fatimah Hatta, Ratna Sari, Rasuna Said and Rasimah Ismail were detained for ten days in Semarang because of their radical speeches. Some teachers affiliated to Permi were not permitted to teach. Conditions were getting worse when Permi leading figures such as Muchtar Lutfi, Iljas Jakub and Djalaludin Thaib were exiled to Digul in Papua. Prior to the Japanese occupation, the Dutch government moved them to Australia but after Independence they returned to Indonesia. Muchtar Lutfi settled in Makassar, while Iljas Jakub and Djalaluddin Thaib returned to the Minangkabau.[22]

The *Partai Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic Party, PII) was founded because Muslim activists had been disappointed with the internal conflicts within Partai Sarekat Islam. In 1930, Partai Sarekat Islam changed its name into Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Union Party, PSII). The SI had been split into several smaller factions such as the Awareness Group and the Truth Committee of the PSII. Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim, who had replaced Moeis, had health problems and therefore were no longer active. In 1933, changes had been made to the party's structure and its foundation and the central leadership was divided into



The emblem of the Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Crescent Star Party).

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

two: First, the Party Board which served as the board of supervisors (*Majelis Tahkim*, or Arbitration Assembly) and second *Lajnah Tanfidziyah* (Executive Committee) in charge of the party's daily activities. The daily affairs had been handed over to young leaders, while the Arbitration Assembly consisted of senior leaders insupervisory roles. However, this regeneration of the leadership was not done properly and marked by conflicts within the party leadership. Consequently, Sukiman and Surjopranoto who were considered potential rivals to the leadership were forced to agree to their dismissal. Agus Salim himself, who held an important position in the party, did not automatically replace Tjokroaminoto who died in 1934, because Tjokroaminoto was replaced by his brother, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso.

Sukiman's dismissal in 1933 had led to criticism from various circles. The boards of branches in various regions asked the party leadership to review the dismissal, or at least they asked for a referendum to measure the validity of the party's policies. Those who disagreed with the dismissal established a new group called "Persatuan Islam Indonesia" that center edits activities on Islam, nationalism and self-reliance. In the mid-1930s, the leaders of Parti, namely Sukiman, Wali Alfatah and a number of Muhammadiyah leaders under the leadership of Kyai Haji Mas Mansur sent a proposal to the PSI asking for changes in the hijrah politics that were considered too restrictive under major obstacle for the party to achieve its goals. These leaders proposed that the PSII deal only with political issues and refrain from religious, social, and educational affairs for they were handled by other Islamic organizations. The central leaders PSII had also ignored the request to take disciplinary action against the Muhammadiyah.

Because these proposals were rejected, some Partii members began to think of creating a new political party. They found a proper channel in Yogyakarta, i.e. the Islam Study Club led by Ahmad Kasmat and they joined it. On December 4, 1938 they finally agreed to establish the Partai Islam Indonesia (Islamic Party of Indonesia, PII) by appointing Raden Wiwoho, the former chairman of the JIB who was also a member of the Volksraad as the chairman of the PII. Many Muhammadiyah figures joined the PII's central leadership, while Persis figures dominated the leadership in the Priangan region, and Permi figures did the same in Sumatra. The Muhammadiyah itself highlighted the involvement of these figures in the PII which underlined its



Office of the Central Board of Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Crescent Star Party) in Pasar Minggu, South Jakarta. The founding of the PBB was declared on July 26, 1998 in the Grand Al-Azhar Mosque in Jakarta. The building of the central board was inaugurated in 2001.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

neutral position vis-à-vis the existing parties; nonetheless, according to other members, their support for political involvement was personal and did not represent the Muhammadiyah as an organization.[23]Support from other regions was also sufficiently strong so that the PII briefly established branches outside Java such as Kalimantan, and Sulawesi.

In general, the PII adopted a cooperative strategy and it supported and encouraged its members to take positions in existing representative institutions. It also wanted a democratic state, the extension of political rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press while it also decided to join the MIAI in the struggle for Indonesian independence. Shortly before Japan's arrival in Indonesia, the Dutch apprehended PII leaders Ahmad Kasmat, Faried Ma'ruf and Haji Abdul Kahar Muzakkiron the accusation of sympathizing with Japan.

The Muslim political struggle went through major changes after the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, that was the time when the Japanese military authorities granted Muslims the freedom to establish political organizations. If under Dutch colonial rule Muslims who engaged in politics were always supervised, the Japanese government had different policies. The Japanese colonial government embraced Muslim leaders to fill political leadership positions in Indonesia. The Dutch were wary of Muslims who adhered to Islamic political doctrines of local agitation and the spirit of Pan-Islamismand saw them as enemies while Japan actually provided for open political channels for Muslims in Indonesia.[24]

Of course, Japan's accommodative position towards Islamic political movements in Indonesia and Muslim leaders' enthusiasm for cooperation with Japan had many dimensions. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to measure the seriousness of the intention of the Muslims to support Japan, as is the measure of Japanese favor in view of Muslim figures, but they certainly cannot be ignored. Islamic collaboration with Japan was one of the Japanese efforts to sever the linkages the former bureaucracy had with the Dutch in the hope that Muslims groups would become the new elites and replace the old ones. The reason was that Muslims were very antipathic towards the West and they constituted a formidable power, and so

23. Noer. *Gerakan Modern* ...,p. 177.

24. Benda. *Bulan Sabit* ...,p. 44.

they could serve as Japan's allies. Since the beginning of its arrival in Indonesia, Japan tried to convey its intention to honor and respect Islam by stressing the importance of collaboration by way of making Islam a major power.[25] Japan seemed even to be cautious in the way it addressed the problems of Islam in order not to offend Muslims. Religious scholars and clerics were expected to be propagandists and to further Japanese interests in Indonesia. Nevertheless, the generally cooperative attitude of the Muslims with the Japanese was based on attempts to make Indonesia independent and liberated from all forms of colonialism.

Uniquely, in its efforts to place Islam at the forefront of political affairs in Indonesia, the Japanese colonial government purposely did not include MIAI officials in its apparently supportive program for Islamists. In November 1943, the three Indonesian national figures. Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (the Muhammadiyah chairman) went to Japan to accept meritorious awards from the Emperor. No MIAI board members were invited to attend. In addition to activities to include Muslims in the Japanese administration, another important effort was to make Muslim leaders take up the most important posts in the military forces in Indonesia. Muslims were not only given administrative education but they received also military training.[26]

The Japanese reluctance to include the MIAI because the organization was founded on the initiative and due to the awareness of Muslims in Indonesia. Japanese military authorities saw the MIAI as an independent organization that should be monitored carefully despite the fact that it was a lenient Muslim association. In October 1943, the Japanese military government dissolved the MIAI. In its judgement the MIAI had maintained an anti-colonial spirit for it had refused to cooperate with the Dutch. The Japanese feared that the organizations'embedded anti-colonial attitude would extand into an overal xenophobic stance, which would also, indirectly, be anti-Japanese.[27]

As a substitute, Japan later enabled the establishment of a new political organization called the Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslims Consultative Assembly, Masjumi) on

December 1, 1943. If the MIAI was a religious association unifying Islamic organizations and conducting religious activities, the Masjumi was more political aiming at strengthening the unity of Islamic organizations to help Dai Nippon for the benefit of the Great East Asia.[28]The Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama which had never joined the MIAI, went over to the Masjumi which comprised of two types of memberships, organizational and individual.

It seems as if the Muslims perceived that they could get benefit from the Japanese replacement of the Dutch. First, the Japanese met the Muslims' needs in the government by founding the Office for Islamic Affairs. Leading this office was the highest position the Japanese government gave to Indonesians. Since October 1, 1944 the office was headed by Hoesein Djajadiningrat who was later succeeded by the charismatic *'alim* from East Java, Kyai Hasjim Asj'ari who was simultaneously the chairman of the Masjumi. The daily leadership of the office for religious affairs was mostly done by his son, Wahid Hasjim, because Asj'ari had to spend more time in his *pesantren* in Jombang rather than in Jakarta. Since April 1, 1944 an office for religious affairs was also installed in each residency. In cooperation with both Wahid Hasyim and Kahar Muzakkir, a Ministry of Religious Affairs was set up which also had branches in the regions. Later, in 1950, Wahid Hasjim was appointed as the minister of religious affairs in the first cabinet of the Republic of United States of Indonesia.[29]

The second benefit of the Japanese presence was the founding of the Masjumi. As the organization that embodied several Islamic organizations and many individuals it was expected to be of great assistance for the Japanese propaganda in Indonesia. It was a political vehicle the Muslims in Indonesia saw as a means to achieve independence, whereas for Japan the focus was to gain the Muslim's acceptance of the Japanese occupation. The leadership in the Masjumi was split evenly between NU and Muhammadiyah factions. Kyai Hasjim Asj'ari was the first chairman and his son Wahid Hasyim acted as one of his vice-chairmen.

The third benefit of the presence of the Japanese was the establishment of a military organization called Hizbullah for which the Masjumi appointed Zainul Arifin, a NU delegate, as chairman.

Other leaders who occupied important positions in Hezbollah were Mohammad Roem, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, Jusuf Wibisono, and Prawoto Mangkusasmito. They represented the Muhammadiyah and the PSII, while they were also members of the Masjumi leadership. Hezbollah was important for the development of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) and it helped *santris* in their military career.[30]

According to Benda,[31] during the Japanese occupation, Muslim elites got to occupyspecial positions, while the Javanese aristocrats suffered from declining prestige. This happened not only at the national level but also in many areas where the gentry was disappointed with Japan because of the drastic decline in their political and social status. Surely the shift from hereditary aristocracy to Muslim leadership, which especially occurred in mid-1944, also meant a decline in the influence of the nationalists, who were largely supported by the gentry.

It is also necessary to analyse whether this fundamental change was also influential in terms of the participation of religious groups in the dynamic formation of the new Indonesian state? An important political development for the Muslims in Indonesia was the moments of the drafting of the basic foundation Constitution?? of the state and the preparation of the proclamation of Indonesia's independence in 1945. The drafting led to fierce debates in the BPUPKI (see below). The choice was whether to make Indonesia a state based on Islam or a state based on a nationalist ideology. The debates showed the socialist's tendency to cooperate with the nationalist as they opposed the Islamist group.

Japan promised independence to the Indonesian people by establishing an Investigating Committee for Preparatory Works for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) on December 7, 1944 and the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) in August 1945. When looked at up close, it was clear that the Muslim groups were not proportionally represented. The BPUPKI whose members were appointed directly by the Japanese government only included 15 Muslim leaders, while the rest came from nationalist groups. In fact, the BPUPKI had 60 members. In the PPKI, Muslims groups were represented only by the Muhammadiyah and the NU, by Wahid Hasyim and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo.[32]

The Muslim representatives in the BPUPKI were obviously orientated towards avital position for Islam within the formation of the independent state of Indonesia. They were Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (PSII), K.H. Ahmad Sanusi (PUI Sukabumi), K.H. Abdul Halim (PUI Majalengka), Ki BagusHadikusumo (Muhammadiyah), K.H.Masykur (NU), K.H. Mas Mansyur (Muhammadiyah), Abdul Kahar Muzakkir (Muhammadiyah), Raden Rooslan Wongsokoesoemo (Masjumi), Haji Agus Salim (Penyadar of PSII), Raden Syamsudin (PUI), Sukiman (PII), K.H. Wahid Hasyim (NU), Mrs. Sunarjo Mangunpuspito (Aisyiyah), Abdul Rahman Baswedan (PAI), and Abdul Rahim Pratalykrama (Regent of Kediri, *santri*). When the BPUPKI membership was expanded by adding 28 more members, only two represented the Islamic group, i.e. Pangeran Mohammad Noor (Masjumi) and Haji Abdul Fatah Hassan(.[33] Most Muslim representatives came from the old generation of charismatic figures, but they lacked political experience in organizations. Their political thoughts in general were practical, not theoretical, whereas the BPUPKI's tasks were more about the philosophical basis and the ideology of the independent state of Indonesia. Therefore, in this forum, Islamic leaders had to face two major dominant groups, namely the religiously neutral nationalist group and the group representing Javanese culture.

It is clear that the representation of secular nationalist group within the two forums was much larger. It is not an exaggeration to say that at the end of the Japanese occupation, the Japanese government was more inclined to prioritize the national leadership of Indonesia to be in the hands of the nationalist group rather than in those of the Islamist group. This was evident in the next developments in which the national politics in the independent period were more dominated by the nationalist group than by the group of Muslim students (*santri*).

Beside these benefits, two other important aspects should be highlighted in relation to the political developments in Indonesia at the time. First was a new way of thinking within the Muslim groups that political parties were important vehicles that could be used to convey their interests. Second, the government agenda to use the military as its dominating force rather thanthe



The building of the Central Board of the United Development Party (PPP)

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

civil authorities. It was for this reason that generally only parties whose policies accorded with those of the government were allowed to flourish and they were given the task to mobilize the masses in support of the Japanese government.[34]

It could be said that before independence in almost all regions, Muslim leadership was not as large as the leadership of the religiously neutral nationalist group or those who disliked religion as a political force. The MIAI was replaced by the Masjumi as the representative forum for Muslim leaders but it didnot play the expected important role yet. The Muslim leaders' readiness to cooperate with the Japanese colonial government did lead to an improved position before the nationalist leaders just before Indonesia's Independence.

Nevertheless, the Muslim leaders had a limited representation, but in certain circumstances, especially during the critical time when the basis of the Indonesian State was being formulated, their position strengthened and they continued to strive for important roles for Islam in politics. The position and opinions of these Islamic leaders became particularly evident during the debates in the BPUPKI or in PPKI meetings. These debates took place mainly between Soekarno representing the nationalists group and Abdul Kahar Muzakkir from the Islamic side. Ki Bagus, Wahid Hasyim, and Ahmad Sanusi were among the Muslim figures who strongly defended the Islamic ideology and who rejected nationalist arguments. It can be ascertained that it was a very important moment, in which the debate illustrated the openness of the initiated forum involving Islamists and nationalists groups.[35] When agreement on the basic foundation of the Indonesian state could not be reached, a smaller forum was created that consisted of nine people. It included four Muslims and four nationalist groups in a balancing number plus one more person who was a Christian. The Muslim group was represented by Agus Salim, Wahid Hasjim, Abikusno and Abdoel Kahar Muzakkir, and the nationalists by Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, Achmad Subarjo and Muhammad Yamin. A.A.Maramis represented the Christians.

Political Movement after Independence

After Independence huge differences began to emerge betweenthe

34. Zainal Abidin Amir. *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Soeharto* (Jakarta: LP3S, 2003), p. 33.

35. Noer. *Partai-Partai Islam* ..., p. 35.

Muslim, traditionalist, modernist, and fundamentalist groups.[36] The majority of Muslims in Indonesia were traditionalists and they were represented by the NU, Mathlaul Anwar, and Jamiat Khair. Modernist Muslims, also known as reformists, were represented by religious organizations such as the Muhammadiyah, Persis and Al-Irsyad. The fundamentalist Muslim group was a minority but it had always been a public concern because of its actions, which were often at odds with mainstream Islamic groups. It did not struggle through political parties but took a military approach and resorted to violence in order to achieve its purpose of the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia. This group was represented by Darul Islam or the Islamic State of Indonesia. This group came later to be associated with radical movements like Jemaah Islam. In terms of political aspirations the groups were divided into different political currents such as the Masjumi Party and the Nahdlatul Ulama Party while the fundamentalists chose to continue their struggle through extra-parliamentary activities and they refused to be part of the Indonesian political system.

The Indonesian people greeted the proclamation of Indonesian Independence with great joy, most notably the Muslims. The Muslim leaders no longer saw the need to continue the hostilities and heated debates as they had before the proclamation. They seemed to have forgotten all their differences and they jointly sought to build the new born Indonesian Republic. Some nationalist elites, especially among the socialist group, were skeptical towards Indonesian Independence because they assumed that it should have been enforced with a stronger emphasis on anti-fascism so that the world would be convinced that the Japanese had no say in the formation of the Indonesian state. However, the strong nationalist spirit and the over whelming support of the Indonesian people made all factions support the proclamation of Indonesian Independence by Soekarno and Hatta.

For Muslims it was clear that Indonesia's Independence was the manifestation of the ideals they had for a long time. No wonder if they greeted the proclamation with enthusiasm because they thought that independent Indonesia would automatically implement the ideals of

Islam. To prepare Muslims for their participation in building the new Republic of Indonesia, some Muslim leaders like Abdoel Kahar Muzakkir, Wahid Hasyim and Mohammad Roem met to formulate future strategies. In September 1945 they decided to revive the Masjumi that was passive at the time and to turn it into an influencial political force.[37]

At the beginning of independence there was an attempt to make the Indonesian National Party (PNI) the only political party in Indonesia. Although not directly an extension of the previous PNI during the periods ahead of Independence, Soekarno and Hatta's support for the party had made it grow rapidly. However, with the issuance in October 1945 of the government policies on the multi party system, the PNI was no longer the only growing party in Indonesia. Political polarization swiftly developed and nationalist groups began to face the rivalry of the Islamic Masjumi party.

Nationalist groups benefitted from the establishment of the Central Indonesia National Committee (KNIP), a representative institution established by the government before the formation of parliament. Among its 136 members, President Soekarno only put 15 members represented the Muslims. Only two of them were official representatives of the Islamic party, Sjafrudin Prawiranegara and Wahid Hasyim, while the others were the former representatives ofthe Islamic circles, i.e. Abikusno Tjokroaminoto, Kasman Singodimedjo, Jusuf Wibisono, Dahlan Abdullah, Mohammad Roem, AR Baswedan, A. Bajasut, Harsono Tjokroaminoto, and Mrs. Sunarjo Mangunpuspito. To channel the aspirations of Muslims in the midst of government policies that opened up greater opportunities to form political parties, the Muslims held a conference in Yogyakarta on November 7-8, 1945. Almost all the representatives of the Muslims attended and they agreed to set up a Central Consultative Assembly (Masjumi) for Muslims to be only Muslim political party in Indonesia.[38] In 1945, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo was appointed its leader and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso his deputy. Sukiman served as the Masjumi chairman until 1951 and since 1949 Natsir acted as vice-chairman. In 1951, Natsir was promoted chairman, and Sukiman was appointed vice-chairman. In 1959 Natsir was replaced by Prowoto Mangkusasmito, while Sukiman remained vice-chairman.

The Masjumi had two different memberships: individual and organizational. The organizations' presence in the Masjumi was important so that they could offer advice and their considerations on the policies the party decided. At first, only four organizations belonged to the party, i.e. the Muhammadiyah, NU, Perikatan Umat Islam (the Muslim Union), and Persatuan Umat Islam (Muslim Association). In 1948, the Islamic organization Persatuan Islam (Islamic Unity, Persis) joined, followed by other organizations such as the Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (The Association of the Muslim Scholars of Aceh, PUSA) in 1949 and Al-Irsyadin 1950, while Al-Jam'iyatul Wasliyah and Al-Ittihadiyah joined in the following year. The good relationship between the Masjumi and these Islamic organizations deteriorated especially after a split had taken place between the Masjumi and Soekarno. Soekarno who accused the Masjumi of having sympathized with the rebellion of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in 1958. The party's leadership and some privileged members held a consultation on September 8, 1959 to end the relation so that the organizations would no longer meet any obstacles in their activities. In 1960 Soekarno dissolved the Masjumi.[39] Meanwhile, the NU had left Masjumi in 1952 and founded its own party, namely the NU Party.

Perti was part of the socio-religious organization Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Association of Islamic Education) based in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. It was a traditional Islamic organization founded by Sheikh Abbas, Sheikh Sulaimanar-Rasuli, and Sheikh Muhammad Djamil Djaho on May 20, 1930. Perti belonged to a traditional mass base and spread to regions where it had boarding schools existed in Jambi, Tapanuli, Bengkulu, Aceh, West Kalimantan and South Sulawesi. Before Independence, Perti persisted to focus on education, but then suffered a set back in its development. In 1944 it decided to join the organization Islamic High Council (Majelis Islam Tinggi, MIT) led by Sheikh Muhammad Djamil Djambek. MIT itself was an association of organizations for the whole of Sumatra. When MIT transmuted into a political party, Perti decided to turnits own organization into a political party as well and it declared itself as such on November 22, 1945.[40]

Perti's decision to form its own political party, to withdraw from MIT and to turn into the Masjumi's Sumatra Branch was partly due to its uneasiness with the dominating modernists within Masjumi. Perti wanted to develop its own political party to fight for the aspirations and interest of the traditionalists in Sumatra. This step was made so that the teachings of traditionalist Islam could be maintained and further develop. As a result, there were heated conflict between the modernists and the traditionalists in Sumatra at the time that affected the political choices of the Muslims.

In terms of political thought, Perti was a fairly flexible Islamic party and it cooperated with nationalist and Communist factions. Unlike the Javanese traditionalists, who kept their distance from the Communists and who tended to be hostile towards them, Perti displayed a different political behavior. During the period of Guided Democracy, Perti was ready to cooperate in activities initiated by the PKI and the communists in China and the Soviet Union. Only Pertisent emissaries to the World Peace Conference for Asia and the Pacific in Beijing in October 1952. One well known Perti leader who continued to serve until 1955 was its sole representative in parliament, Haji Siradjuddin Abbas.[41]

The Indonesian Islamic Union Party (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, PSII) is actually the oldest party in Indonesia, because it was a conversion of the SI that was established as early as 1911. As discussed above, before independence the SI had experienced ups and downs resulting in a decrease in its activities, including a declining role of the PSII. After independence, the PSII revived its political activities. The PSII's presence in national politics after Independence is interesting especially because Muslim leaders had agreed that the Masjumi was to be the single political vehicle for Muslim aspirations. As Noer indicated,[42] the emergence of the SI was motivated by the solicitation of Amir Syarifuddin who had been appointed by the President to form a new cabinet in 1947. Amir Syarifuddin wanted to include Islamists in his cabinet, but the Masjumi rejected his offer. The PSII represented the Islamic group as a political party and later joined Amir Syarifuddin's cabinet.



The building of the Central Board of PKS (the Prosperous Justice Party)

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

Another reason for the PSII departure from the Masjumi and to re-establish itself as a party was because the PSII leaders, especially Wondoamiseno and Arudji Kartawinata did not get important positions in the Masjumi while they had been prominent figures the periode before Independence. In the MIAI, Wondoamiseno had even held the position as the head of the secretariat. In addition, PSII figures generally disagreed with the Masjumi's unstable attitude in the negotions with the Dutch in the Sjahrir Cabinet. Before Independence, the PSII had been non-cooperative with the Dutch colonial government and of course, it condemned the Masjumi's lenient attitude towards the Dutch demands in the negotiations. The PSII had seen in Minangkabau that there was much disagreement among high-ranking regional Masjumi members because of the strong domination of the modernist group, especially Permi and the Muhammadiyah. Considering that PSII leaders were not proportionally included in the Masjumi leadership, most PSII branches encouraged the PSII central leadership to launch its own political party. The desire to establish a political party was formalized on July 13, 1947 in a resolution of the party's national conference in Banjarnegara, West Java which was attended by 20 branches.

However, after leaving the Masjumi in 1947, the PSII central leadership clarified to Muslims that it did not have any conflict with the Masjumi and that their connection with the Sjahrir Cabinet was solely the party's responsibility to the state. It remained committed to ensuring the sustainability of the Indonesian state and the unity of, especially Indonesian, Muslims. It was disbanded in 1960 due to an acute disagreement among its leaders. During the formation of the Sastroamidjojo Cabinet in 1953, the party sacked Abikusno and replaced him with Arudji Kartawinata - Anwar Tjokroaminoto. However, Abikusno resisted and established a counter PSII that was widely supported by PSII's South Sumatra branch. The reason for his dismissal was that Abikusno had not consulted the party leadership when he became involved in the Sastroamidjojo Cabinet. The dual leadership of Abikusno and Arudji-Anwar could not be reconciled and brought about the party's decline, despite the fact that the PSII had strong bases in Java, South Sumatra, Lampung, North Sulawesi and Aceh. In the time to come, the PSII

was always plagued by internal discord which resulted in the party's even further decline.[43]

Initially, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), established in 1926, was an organization engaged in social affairs. Fatwa issued by Hasjim Asj'ari contained the obligation for every Indonesian Muslim to keep up the Indonesia's independence which, at the time, was better known as its Jihad resolution. In the Revolution Era, the NU took a more frontal stance against the Dutch, so contrary that it tended to be lenient during the Renville and Linggarjati negotiations. In this era the NU and the Masjumi still maintained harmonious relationships and it recognized that the Masjumi was the only Muslim party and that it should respect it.

However after Revolution Era, the NU began to feel disappointed with the political trends of the Masjumi. It saw the Masjumi had changed strategic Consultative Assembly into an institution that only served as an advisory board. The NU saw this shift as an attempt to turn the Masjumi into a political organization that would pay less attention to religious problems after all that Masjumi offered no important positions to religious scholars. Because it was extremely dissatisfied with the structural changes that had taken place within it, the NU finally left the Masjumi and established its own independent party.

As a major organization in Indonesia, the NU saw that it was not sufficiently represented in the Masjumi-supported cabinet. The Masjumi undeniably derived its greatest support from the Muhammadiyah and the NU, but in all cabinet formations, the Muhammadiyah had always been represented by at least two persons where as the NU had never been represented by more than one. Therefore, during the formation of the Wilopo cabinet, Kyai Wahab Hasbullah demanded that the post for the Minister of Religious Affairs should be given to the NU. Kyai Wahab also threatened that if this demand was not met, the NU would continue the struggle on its own. However, most of the Masjumi's leaders saw the demand as a threat and for that reason could not be met. Who would become the Minister of Religious Affairs would be decided by vote involving all the party leaders and they finally agreed to propose Kyai Haji Faqih Usman of the Muhammadiyah to Wilopo as their candidate for the Minister of Religious

Affairs. Wilopo agreed and Fakih Usman was appointed. Responding to this unfavorable decision, on April 5, 1952 in a meeting of the NU Central Board in Surabaya, the NU declared to leave the Masjumi.[44]

This split with in the Masjumi illustrates the disharmony prevalent among the parties within the organization. The traditionalists' and the modernists' backgrounds were also influential and exacerbated the conflicts between them. There was a sense among the traditionalists that the modernists no longer honored the *'ulama* who belonged to the traditionalist faction. Members with a Dutch educational background adopted an attitude of superiority towards those who were educated at religious schools. This disharmony continued to increase and found momentum when cabinets ministers were appointed. So it is reasonable enough that the NU broke away from the Masjumi after all most Masjumi ministerial posts were occupied by Muhammadiyah members.

The heated debates between Islamists, nationalists, and socialists made the relationship between the national elites in Indonesia increasingly tenuous and politics became increasingly polarized. In the early formation of the nation, each group was involved in its own struggle for power and influence. The Islamists group itself were split between modernists, traditionalists, and fundamentalists. After the fundamentalists, under the influence of the Darul Islam, had failed to achieve their goals and were successfully destroyed by central government, both traditionalist and modernist Muslim groups continued to fortify their parliamentary roles.

At the beginning of his presidency at the *eculy* months of the revolution, Soekarno opened up the possibility for the people to establish political parties. Muslims were represented by the Masjumi, PSII, and Perti. In 1952, the NU left the Masjumi and formed its own party. Even though Muslim groups formed the majority however, in politics this was not always the case.The representation of Muslim leaders in KNIP or in government cabinets were quite limited compared to that of the nationalist group. Under Soekarno, in the first presidential system, the Islamic groups were only represented by two ministers, namely Abikusno Tjokroaminoto and Wahid Hasyim. Although the Masjumi that politically



Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta.

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

represented Muslims was aware of this unfair treatment, it never demanded changes. It tried to achieve justice while it still emphasized the importance of maintaining national unity in Indonesia. It rejected the parliamentary system and favored the presidential system in order to ensure the political stability and the unity of the Indonesian Republic. Sutan Sjahrir (socialist) proposed KNIP and President Soekarno to adopt the parliamentary system, which was approved and anew cabinet under Sjahrir was declared in November 14, 1945. Initially, in this cabinet there was only one representative of Islam, namely H.M. Rasyidi but later, on January 3, 1946 Mohammad Natsir was appointed as Minister of Information.[45]

Through Natsir, the Masjumi continued to ventits disapproval of the change into the parliamentary system since it meant the Constitution. According to him, the presidential governmental system was guarantee to ensure political stability. He also refused to believe that the reason that the change was made to eliminate the influence of those who had cooperated with the Japanese government. Natsir argued that the Sjahrir Cabinet continued to be dominated by elites who had collaborated with both the Japanese and the Dutch colonial governments. For him, any changes inthe Constitution and the cabinet could only be done after general elections had been held.

In regard to the Sjahrir Cabinet, the Masjumi demanded a reshuffle that was based on a coalition of several parties. Other KNIP members accepted this proposal and the parties supported it. Soekarno responded by dissolving the Sjahrir Cabinet and he ordered a new cabinet be formed and Sjahrir was reappointed as the so called cabinet formatter. On March 12, 1946 he announced Cabinet Sjahrir II and he announced the names of the four ministers who came from the Masjumi, namely M. Natsir, Arudji Kartawinata, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and H.M. Rasyidi. However, this Muslim representation was considered insufficient to represent the Masjumi because it was merely a national cabinet and not a coalition cabinet. Dissatisfaction was also voiced by other parties that had joined the Persatuan Perjuangan (the Struggle Union) led by Tan Malaka. The members of the PP came from Pesindo, Barisan Pemberontak (), Badan Kongres Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth Congress

Agency), and Partai Bangsa Indonesia (Party of the Indonesian Nation).

The Masjumi along with Persatuan Perjuangan continued to criticize Sjahrir's cabinet and demanded changes. A dispute between the government and Persatuan Perjuangan arose because of their disagreement over the position the government had taken in the negotiations with the Netherlands. Sjahrir, who came from the Socialist Group turned out to be lenient towards the Netherlands. Soekarno acted strongly by arresting the Persatuan Perjuangan's leaders, including two Masjumi leaders. This action wrecked the Barisan Perjuangan and resulted in the formation of a new board on May 5, 1946 called the National Concentration in which a representative of the Masjumi acted as vice chairman. The demand for the formation of a coalition cabinet was made in an effort to ensure the installment of a stable government.[46]

The unstable situation and the poor relations between the government and the opposition to leaders led to an emergency situation that Soekarno forced to disperse the Sjahrir Cabinet. Soekarno attempted to restore security by taking action against the elements that had been involved in the efforts to seize power. According to a government statement, there was a group that would force the downfall of the cabinet and to replace its members through a coup. When the situation had returned normal on October 2, 1946, Soekarno mandated Sjahrir to draw up a new cabinet. In this cabinet six Masjumi members were appointed as ministers, namely Mohamad Roem, Jusuf Wibisono, M. Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Fathurahman, and Wahid Hasjim. However the Masjumi announced that those who sat in the cabinet did not institutionally represent the Masjumi.

When Sjahrir managed to hold the negotiation with the Dutch in Linggarjati on November 15, 1946,many parties rejected the negotiations' results. The Masjumi also expressed its rejection which led to heated relations between the Masjumi ministers and Masjumi leaders. A conference was held between the Masjumi and the GPII in Solo on December 4-5, 1946, and the Masjumi ministers were told to leave the cabinet. However, they refused by saying that they sat in a national cabinet, not a coalition cabinet, and that the parties were not entitled to regulate their members who sat in a national cabinet. The extant of the political parties' rejection, including the Masjumi, ofthe results of the Linggarjati

agreement led Sjahrir to hand over his mandate to Soekarno on June 27, 1947.

A new cabinet was formed under the leadership of the socialist Amir Syarifuddin by inviting the participation of the existing parties. The Masjumi demanded the position of Prime Minister and those of the Ministers of Defense, the Interior and Foreign Affairs. There was disagreement between Amir Syarifuddin and the Masjumi and on July 2, 1947, Amir Syarifuddin was chosen as Prime Minister and the cabinet was drawn up without the participation of the Masjumi. To give the Islamic groups' some representation in the cabinet, Arudji Kartawinata and Wondoamiseno were asked to revive the PSII which had been reestablished and then they formed a coalition with Amir Syarifuddin's cabinet. They occupied ministerial positions. The Masjumi firmly rejected Amir Syarifuddin because he had converted from Islam to Christianity before Independence. He had also cooperated with the Dutch when the Japanese had occupied Indonesia.[47]

When there was a reshuffle in Amir Syarifuddin's cabinet on November 13, 1947, the Masjumi was willing to join the coalition cabinet by appointing Samsudin, M. Roem, K.H. Masjkur, and Kasman Singodimejo to sit in the cabinet. However, on January 16, 1948, the Masjumi with drew its cadres in protest to the outcome of the Renville negotiations that too much favored the Dutch. The PNI and the Sjahrir group also rejected Amir Syarifuddin's policy causing the cabinet to be dissolved. On January 29, 1948, a new cabinet was formed headed by Mohammad Hatta. Hatta invited the Masjumi and the PNI to form a strong coalition cabinet. Hatta's cabinet turned out to survive relatively long in the Revolution Era (1949). Hatta's cabinet had to deal with various local uprisings such as the PKI revolt in Madiun in 1948 and the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java. The Masjumi played active roles in negotiations to quell these uprisings. After the Dutch military aggression of December 19, 1948, the Dutch controlled all important cities in Java and Sumatra. Soekarno, Hatta and Natsir were arrested. The Indonesian people who had previously been involved in the political conflicts were reunited. Under these precarious conditions, the Masjumi leader, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, took the initiative to set up an emergency government center in the interior of West Sumatra, complete with ministries. Throughthis center the continuation

Tabel 1

Names of Party	Vote Results
PNI	22,3%
Masjumi	20,9%
NU	18,4%
PKI	16,4%
PSII	2,9%
Perti	1,3%

Tabel 1 the 1955 General Election

of the Republic of Indonesia could be maintained. After Soekarno and Hatta had returned to Yogyakarta, Sjafruddin immediately returned the mandate to the central government. In the Roem-van Royen negotiations, the Masjumi had also shown its outstanding contribution by preventing Indonesia from being harassed by the Dutch.

The period from 1950 to 1957 was marked by the rise and fall of cabinets because no party was able to rule as the majority. The dominant parties were the PNI, Masjumi and the PKI. When the NU left the Masjumi in 1952, the Masjumi began to weaken even further although in the 1955 election it still ranked as the second largest party. Masjumi continued to support cabinets after 1950 which was marked by its joining the Hatta cabinet (1950-1951). In 1951-1952 the cabinet was chaired by Natsir who was later replaced by Sukiman. The next cabinet was held by the PNI under Wilopo's leadership (1952-1953) and continued by Sastroamidjojo also of the PNI (1953-1955). To see the configurative strength of the Islamic parties compared with the nationalist parties it would be good to have a look at the vote results of the 1955 general election the first and the most democratic election Indonesia ever had. The PNI was temporarily the largest political force, while the Masjumi and the NU were the second and third largest respectively. The fourth place was occupied by the PKI (Boland, 1985: 56). The PSII and Perti were only minor parties. The overall vote result of the Islamic parties was about 43.5%.

Due to the parliamentary system's ineffectiveness and ongoing regional insurgencies after Ali Sastroamidjojo handed over his mandate, Soekarno issued Martial Law which provided much power for the military and became the initial step towards Guided Democracy in 1957. The debates in the Constituent Assembly in 1959 to decide the foundation of the Indonesian state reached a deadlock and Soekarno took over the discourse by issuing a presidential decree in 1959 which dissolved the Constituent Assembly and issued the Presidential decree that ordered thereturn to the 1945 Constitution. Adopting Guided Democracy, Soekarno formed the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong (the Mutual Cooperation – People's Representative Council, DPR GR), in which the members were directly appointed. He also launced the concept of "Nasakom" (Nationalist, Religious, and Communists) in his administration. The Islamic faction was represented

by the NU and PSII, while the Masjumi refused to join. In 1960, the Masjumi was declared banned, a number of the party leaders were arrested and imprisoned.[48]

The involvement of communists in the government made the military and Islamist groups less comfortable with Soekarno. September 1965 was a defining moment when the chaotic, radical, and corrupt democracy ended. A planned coup alledged by the Communist Party of Indonesia, supported by Gerwani (Communist Women Movement) and Pemuda Rakyat (the People's Youth) kidnapped some high-ranking army officials and murdered them. The coup attempt was averted by Major General Soeharto, the chief of the Army's Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) aided by Islamic organizations. The Coup plot which was later known as the September 30 Movement (G30S) stimulated horizontal conflicts that cause hundreds of thousands of casualties from both Muslim and the communist parties. To restore security and stability in the country, Soeharto, fully supported by the army took over power.[49]

In order to strengthen his position, Soeharto began his political consolidation by implementing a repressive policy towards Islamic political groups but collabrated with Muslim groups that did not have political aspirations. Groups with political Islamic orientation were feared to disrupt the country's stability and to causesecurity threats had they successfully imposed their influence on society in general.[50] They were also suspected of trying to impose the establishment of Islamic state and to implement the *shari'a* (Pauker, 1981: 240). Soeharto did not hesitate to rid himself of his political rivals from both Islamic and Nasionalist. Therefore, to circumvent Soeharto's repressive policy, Islamic groups began to implement a pragmatic political strategy to avert politics and to focus more on social and religious activities. However, the Islamic Political groups did hope that the new regime would accommodate their political and economic interest because of the services they had provided during the alleged communist insurgency. In August 1968, thousands of Muslims gathered inthe Al-Azhar Mosque to welcome

Tabel 2

Parties	Voters	%	Seats
Golkar	34.348.673	82,80	336
NU	10.213.650	18.67	58
PNI	3.793.650	6,94	20
Parmusi	2.930.746	5,36	24
PSII	1.308.237	2,39	10
Parkindo	733.359	1,34	7
PartaiKatolik	603,740	1,10	3
Perti	381.309	0,70	2
IPKI	338.403	0,62	-
Murba	48.126	0,09	-
Jumlah	54.699.509	100	460

Table 2 The 1971 Election Results

the former Masjumi figures who had been released from prison. They were Hamka, Isa Anshary, and Burhanuddin Harahap. Some former Masjumi leaders like M. Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, M. Roem, and Kasman Singodimejo were also present and they made speeches during a grand sermon. They demanded the government's immediate rehabilitation of the Masjumi.

Apparently the Masjumi activists hoped to get back into politics and that their party would be allowed to revive. Although they had so meritoriously joined the military to save the country from the suspected communist coup, the New Order regime did not meet their expectations. The military-backed regime's position was very clear. The government would never allow any group that had been involved in "illegal activities and rebellion" to return to politics. In 1967, former Masjumi activists prepared for the establishment of a new political party, Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslims Party, Parmusi). Due to the former Masjumi leaders' persistence to that the Parmusi's chairman should come from the Masjumi, the government forbade the establishment of the new political party. Approval was only given after the Parmusi had replaced its chairman by a government appointed person. Although the party establishment's proposal was approved, the government did not permit former Masjumi activists to become involved in the party's new leadership Soeharto's close ally Mintaredja was appointed to head Parmusi.

Of course, these conditions were a great disappointment for the former Masjumi leaders and Parmusi's supporters. In the 1971 general election, the Parmusi only gained 5.36% of the votes while the NU gained as many as 18.67%. In general, since the 1971 general election, Islamic parties'vote results had been declining. The 1971 election's results are shown in Table 2:[51]

In order to be able to monopolize political discourse, the New Order regime reduced the political parties into two major groups: Islamic, nationalist, and secular. Islamic parties joined the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the nationalist party joined Golongan Karya (the Functional Groups, Golkar), and the socialist-leaning and Christians parties melted into the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI).

51. Syamsuddin. *Islam dan Politik* ..., p.51.

Tabel 3

Parties	Voters	%
PPP	18.743.491	29,3
Golkar	39.750.096	62,1
PDI	5.504.751	8,6
Total	63.998.338	100

Tabel 4

Parties	Voters	%
PPP	20.871.880	27,8
Golkar	48.334.724	64,3
PDI	5.919.702	7,9
Total	75.519.702	100

Table 3 The 1977 Election Results

Source: The General Elections Commission (www.kpu.or.id)

Table 4 1982 Election Results

Source: The General Elections Commission (www.kpu.or.id)

However the New Order regime had its own political aim, the Golongan Karya (Golkar) as the functional group, which was directly under the control of the President himself. Moreover, this fusion policy was followed by the obligation that the all parties should be on the Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation. Many saw this policy as an attempt to de-Islamize Islamic parties.

The results of the 1977 general election (Table 3) illustrates the segmentation of the Indonesian political parties because of the simplification of the party system. The number of votes for the Islamic parties that had joined the PPP decreased substantially while the Golkar, the New Order's ruling party, won the election with an extraordinarily large number of votes.

In order to strengthen his position, Soeharto planned to restrict the influence of Islam in politics. Although they had been grouped together into a single party, the PPP, in the 1982 general election the Mulsim vote result had increased. That is to say, in terms of percentage the result had decreased but the numbers of voters had increased. Of course, these developments were not in accordance with Soeharto's design, which was to ensure control over Islamic parties progress. The 1982 election results can be seen in Table 4.
The government designed and implemented the policy that required all institutions, communities, and youth organizations, including socio-political organizations to adopt the Pancasila as their sole foundation. Of course, this policy was opposed by the Islamic political party. Nevertheless, the regime was so strong that in the end Islamic organizations had no other option but to adopt this principle. Although some clashes between Islamic organization and the military had caused casualties, in general the government managed to control the situation and it forced all citizens to adhere to the Pancasila's principles.

The Priok incident in 1984 was the most tragic event during which the military forces massacred countless Muslims who opposed government policy. Their resistance was led by Amir Biki, the imam of a mosque Imam in Priok. Other acts of resistance and physical violence also colored the implementation of the uniformity principle. Since 1985, the government had formally succeeded to unify the ideology of parties and organizations in Indonesia. Pancasila was their only principle. The Golkar also managed to solicit the Muslim organizations' support for the policy

Tabel 5

Parties	Voters	%
PPP	13.701.428	18,8
Golkar	62.783.680	74,8
PDI	9.324.708	8,7
Total	85.809.816	100

Table 5 1987 Election Results

Source: The General Elections Commission (www.kpu.or.id)

which was the reason that, in 1987, the NU called on its members not vote for the PPP. The 1987 election results showed a dramatic drop in the PPP's vote result after it replaced its former principle of Islam with the Pancasila.

The Masjumi's disappointment with the Soeharto regime in general and the pressure it felt made Natsir to abandon politics and shifted his struggle into the field of *dakwah*, Islamic religion propagation. In order to maintain the spirit and the political struggle of Islam, the former Masjumi activists set up the *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* (the Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesian, DDII) on May 9, 1967, M. Natsir and Anwar Haryono actively developed the organization. The DDII activists continuously vented their unrelenting criticism from mosque's pulpits.The result was that the New Order regime became increasingly repressive against the Islamic groups. According to Hefner in his *Civil Islam,* the target of the New Order regime's repressive policy was political Islam and Islam that was institutionalized through political power, while the regime continued to embrace culture-based Islam.[52]After its establishment and especially in the 1970s and 1980s, the DDII continued to criticize the government while it was busy setting up propagation bases in society. This DDII's missionary movement in turn affected the development of Islamic propaganda on several campuses since the mid-1980s. Imaduddin Abdurahim, a young DDII activist who was also the head of *da'wah* on the central board of the HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic Students Association), set up Islamic propagation on campus and established the Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Campus Propagation Agency, LDK). From then on, Islamic propagation mushroomed on university campuses.

Soeharto's experience as military commander in combatting insurgencies in Indonesia made him very careful in dealing with Islamic groups in politics. In the early days of his tenure, Soeharto took repressive measures against political Islamic groups. The antagonistic relationship between the state and Islam in the early Soeharto era led a new generation of political Islam to change their strategy in order to realize Muslims' aspirations.

In addition to the Muslims' disappointment with the co-opted

52. Robert W. Hefner. *Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp.175-180.

PPP, younger generation of the Islamic activities tried to formulate a new transformation strategy. Din Syamsuddin[53] called the move undertaken by PPP leaders and by a Muslim intellectual, Nurcholish Madjid, to be an accommodative step. Mintaredja explained that the relationship between Islam and the Pancasila was understandable because during the time of the Prophet Muhammad there had never ever been the term "Islamic state". The Muslims' responsibility was to struggle for and create a true Islamic society, and that was not quite the same as to struggle to establish an Islamic state. An Islamic society can be realized without leading to the disintegration of the nation. According to Mintaredja, because politics is a worldly affair, apolitical approach to Islam cannot be but something secular. Mintaredja's view was in line with that of Nurcholish Madjid who coined the slogan, "Islam yes, Islamic party no." Muslim leaders severely criticized this renewal concept because italienate Muslims from Islamic political parties.

In response to the New Order regime's repressive policy against Islamic groups, new generations of Muslims came up with a new strategy of what Bahtiar Effendy[54] described as a breakthrough to reconcile Islam and the state with a new theology of political Islam. They were the young generation of political Islamic groups who tried to propose a new approach in negotiating with power. Although the new strategies of political Islam under the New Order regime are regarded as co-opted Islam, this new approach had enabled the establishment of better relationships between Islam and the state. The Islamic parties had suffered a setback, but political power and bureaucracy could widely accept Islam's aspirations.[55] The founding of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*, ICMI) in 1990 was an important milestone for the acceptance of Islam groups at the government level without going through the channels of political parties based on Islamic principles. Since then, Islam was an important attraction for anyone who wanted to pursue a career within the system of power.[56]

Tabel 6

Parties	1992	%	1997	%
PPP	16.624.647	17,00	25.340.028	22,43
Golkar	66.599.331	68,10	84.187.907	74,51
PDI	14.565.556	14,89	3.463.225	3,06
Total	97.789.534	100	112.991.150	100

Table 6 Results of the 1992 and 1997 Elections

Source: The General Elections Commission (www.kpu.or.id)

Uniquely in an era where Islamic political parties saw a decline, especially in the 1990s, the process of Islamization of Indonesia had run smoothly. At the grassroot and community levels, Islamization was carried out by Islamic activists who focused on the propagation of Islam, while at the political level Islamization occured not only in the civil services, but also in political parties that were previously considered secular.[57]This process of Islamization occurred in the body of the ruling party (Golkar) and also in the opposition party (PDI). A satisfying development of the role of Islam in the political arena was the enactment of several laws that favored Muslims' interests. One was the Law on National Education that required all levels at all schools to offer religious education in accordance with the professed religion of their pupils (1988). Others are the Law on Islamic Legislation Courts, the Law on the Compilation of Islamic Law (1991), the administrative arrangements of alms giving (*zakat*) through BAZIS (Badan Amil Zakat Infak dan Sedekah, Charity Board) (1991), the lifting of the ban on wearing head scarves in public schools (1991) and other government policies adapted to Muslim aspirations.

In the 1992 general elections, support for Golkar began to wane as popular discontent against Soeharto increased. Opposition within society increased and the PDI accomplishments also increased sharply. Interestingly, in the 1997 general election, the Golkar and PPP grew, while the PDI slumped. The decline of the number of votes for the PDI was triggered by dissatisfaction withthe PDI's new leadership, which was considered to be government-inspired. More details about these changes can be seen in the following table.

Political Movements in the Era of *Reformasi*

Muslims enthusiastically greeted Soeharto's fall in 1998 and they reacted in a spirit of establishing Islamic parties. Islam's re-birth as an ideological force was marked by the founding of Islamic parties and cultural forces that manifested themselves within secular parties. Two parties came to represent Muslim groups because they adopted Islam as their foundation, the Prosperous

Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Masa Order Baru (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), pp.235-240.

57. Taufik Abdullah."The Formation of a New Paradigm: a Sketch on Contemporary Islamic Discourse," in Mark R. Woodward, ed. *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought*. Arizona: Arizona State University, 1996, p.47-64.



The building of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI).

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

Justice Party (PKS) and the United Development Party (PPP). Muslim-based but more pluralist parties are the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National Awakening Party (PKB). PAN is a representation of modernist Islam, while PKB while PKB belong to the traditionalist Muslims.

Muslims' awareness of their struggle to contribute to the nation through existing political parties reflected their readiness to support the implementation of democracy in Indonesia. Several Islamic parties that came up in the Reform Era are the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the Awakening Society Party (Partai Nahdlatul Ummah, PNU), the Awakening People Party (Partai Kebangkitan Umat, PKU), the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) and the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB). Other parties that may be categorized as Muslim-based parties but that remained based on the Pancasila are the National Awakening Party (PKB), National Mandate Party (PAN), and the People Sovereign Party (Partai Daulat Umat, PDU).

Although declaring themselves Islamic parties, both the PKS and the PPP no longer focused on Islamic ideology and the formalization of the *shari'a*, but rather strengthened their agenda of meeting the people's aspirations in general. This enabled them to unite and depite the fact that they originated from different parties, their commitment to the Islamic aspirations was very strong. This was so because many Islamic activists had become administers and leaders in non-Islamic parties.

For a very long time after the 1980s, Golkar's prominent leadership was filled with former Islamic activists. The chairman of Golkar, for example was a former chairman of HMI (Akbar Tanjung). Since its establishment, most Golkar officials had come from the ICMI. The Islamic groups' success within Golkar was characterized by B.J. Habibie, ICMI's first chairman was Soeharto's vice-president (1997) and subsequently replaced him as President (1998).

Today we find Islam is not just the monopoly of Islamic political parties, it is also on nationalist parties' agendas. The development of political Islam in Indonesia is ultimately compatible with democracy itself. Islam has become one of the important supports for the establishment of democracy in Indonesia.

The National Mandate Party (PAN) was founded on August 23, 1998 in Senayan, Jakarta largely by Islamic activists of the Muhammadiyah. Its existence cannot understood without reference to a phenomenal figure in the Reform era, Amin Rais. who since the New Order era has been known as very critical of president Soeharto. At first, Amin Rais wanted to appoint Shafi'i Maarif as the party's chairman because the new party required a figure who could widely be acknowledged as a symbol of the nation's morality as well as acceptable to all circles. Muhammadiyah members also would undoubtedly support Maarifin his struggle through the party. But Maarif declined and instead pushed Amien foreward as the party's general chairman.[58]

The establishment of PAN was intimately linked with Amien Rais, who was the chairman of the Muhammadiyah. The support of Muhammadiyah for this party is clear, because it was based on the mandate of the Muhammadiyah's *Tanwir* (lit. enlightenment) issued on July 5-7, 1998 in Yogyakarta. The meeting was held to formulate recommendations for the Muhammadiyah's Central Board in connection with the implementation of political *ijtihad* (lit. effort) for the people's benefit within the framework of the Islamic concept of "enjoining good and forbidding evil".[59] Amien Rais understood the Muhammadiyah's *Tanwir* meeting's decision that the Muhammadiyah would never become a political party but would allow its members the discretion to establish a framework of political parties in the spirit of enjoining good and forbidding evil. Therefore, the political *ijtihad* of Amien Rais, the general chairman of the Muhammadiyah could be understood as an effort to respond to Muhammadiyah members' wishes to own their own party.


Before deciding to lead PAN, Amien Rais also received several bids from senior Muslim figures to lead the parties they would establish. Anwar Harjono, the chairman of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII) had once asked Amien to lead a party initiated by the Star and Crescent family. But Amien turned the request down due to their differences of opinion with respect to an Islamic political platform. Likewise, senior leaders of the United Development Party (PPP) also proposed Amien to lead the PPP because the party needed a figure acceptable to Muslims in order to

revive the only Islamic party during the New Order era. But again he declined since he considered himself not the right person to lead the PPP as it was rife with intra-factional conflicts.

The PAN is an inclusive party with an Indonesian face. The most important party decisions are made in a National Congress, an Extraordinary Congress, or in National Working Sessions (Rakernas). Although the Muhamadiyyah supported PAN's inception it cannot be said that PAN was the Muhammadiyah's only party. Considering that Muhammadiyah members had already been involved in political parties such as the PPP or Golkar, PAN was expected to be able to expand its social basis outside the Muhammadiyah but still to offer the widest possibility for Muhammadiyah members to join. PAN bases spread throughout Indonesia, but its main bases are in West Sumatra and in West and Central Java. In the 1999 election, PAN got 7.12% of the votes, and in the following general elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014 respectively got 6.44%, 6.01%, and 7.5%.

National Awakening Party (PKB)

The National Awakening Party (PKB) is the party of the Nahdliyin (lit. awakening people) group established in the Reformasi era. After the NU had distanced itself from practical politics for decades following the decision of the 1926 *khittah* (guiding principle), it finally saw the need to own its own party in order to voice the aspirations of Muslims who embrace the notion of the *Ahlus Sunna walJamaah*(the people of the Prophetic tradition and congregation), that follows the Shafi'i School. Not long after Soeharto resigned as the President of the Republic of Indonesia, the NU, which had gone through a long period of political cooptation by the Soeharto regime, greeted the overthrow enthusiastically. The NU Central Board (*PBNU*) suggested to create a political forum for NU members. Not only did almost all regional boards support the *PBNU* to assist the establishment of a political party, some NU activists even had already taken a further step by holding a series of meetings to prepare for the establishment of a political party. Having received so many proposals from the regions, the PBNU finally managed to capture the aspirations that seemed to be unstoppable. Various NU elements had even proposed no less than 39 names for the party. Of course, the NU tried to accommodate these aspirations but in such a way as not to violate the



established NU guideline principles. In the meeting of the NU consultative and executive boards on June 3, 1998, it installed a Team of Five in charge to realize NU's aspirations composed of K.H. Ma'ruf Amin (chairman), K.H. Dawam Anwar, Dr. K.H. Said Agil Siradj, H.M. Rozy Munir and H. Ahmad Bagdja. With the full of PBNU support, the Team of Five was assisted by Arifin Junaidi (chairman), H. Muhyidin Aburusman, H.M. Fachri Taha, H.M. Nashihin Hasan, H. Andi Muarly Sunrawa, H. Abdul Aziz MA, H. Lukman H. Saifuddin, Drs. Amin Said Husni, and Muhaimin Iskandar. The teams continued to work until it was finally able to complete its task in a recommendation to form the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB). On July 23, 1998 at Gus Dur's house in Ciganjur, South Jakarta, a party that was born from the womb of the NU was declared.

Although the NU had created the PKB, this did not mean that there were no other NU mass-based parties. Not long after PKB's declaration, several other parties were also declared that also claimed to represent the awakening groups' aspirations. These parties were the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (PNU), established by K.H.Syukron Ma'mun, the Awakening People Party (PKU) established by K.H. Yusuf Hasjim, and the Indonesian Union of National Solidarity Party (Partai Solidaritas Nasional Uni Indonesia, Partai Suni), founded by Abu Hasan. In the end, although a number of parties emerged on behalf of NU, only the PKB still exists at present.

Along the course of its career the PKB had to face many internal conflicts that had led to either the disband mentor the establishment of new parties because of disharmonious relations between the supporters of Abdurahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and his opponents. These conflicts could not be resolved because of Gus Dur's very strong position as chairman of the consultative council at that time while the highest decision-making mechanism also did not work well. Consequently, the PKB went through ups and downs in terms of vote results. In the 1999 election it collected 12.61% of the total votes, but in the 2004 and 2009 elections (10.57% and 4.94%) respectively. But in the 2014 elections it saw an increase to approximately 10%. In general, the PKB bases remained in East and Central Java, Banten, and South Kalimantan. Since its establishment, its chairmen have been Matori Abdul Jalil and Muhaimin Iskandar.

During Abdurrahman Wahid's administration, a shift took place within the MUI. The clearest changes were related to its financial system and the relations between the MUI and the government experienced.

Source: *Ensiklopedia Nahdlatul Ulama: Sejarah, Tokoh dan Khasanah Pesantren* (Encyclopedia of the NU: History, Figures, and its Treasury of Pesantrens).

The Crescent Star Party (PBB) has a historical relationship with the Masjumi. It was founded by activists who tried to keep up the Masjumi's glorious symbols. The founding of this party was initiated by meetings held by members of the Islamic Brotherhood Forum (Forum Ukhuwwah Islamiyah, FUI) which was initiated by M. Natsir, K.H. Masykur, K.H. Rusli Abdul Wahid, and H.M. Rasyidi, and was motivated by the incessant Christianization that hit the Muslims in the early period of the New Order era. The FUI itself was officially formed on August 1, 1989.

The FUI received was heavily supported by many Muslim leaders, especially those of the star-crescent family. Its existence was re-confirmed by the large support it got from various Islamic propagation and national Islamic mass-organizations, because of its crucial role to reunite Muslims and to preserve the Indonesian Muslim's faith. On December 11, 1993, the FUI was expanded by involving several Muslim leaders, such as Dr. Anwar Harjono, K.H. Latif Muchtar, H.M. C.H. Ibrahim, K.H. Sholeh Iskandar, K.H. Nur Ali, Drs. Nurulhuda, Rajab Ranggasoli, Prof. Ismail Sunny, K.H. Dadun Abdulqahar and H. Nurdin Lubis. FUI primary activities were to forge friendship ties with its supporters, holding discussions among its supporters and trying to build mutual understanding in order to resolve the problems of the Muslims. The FUI was led by a presidium that rotated every six months among supporting Islamic organizations. The session results were usually delivered to the concerned factions and those considered having the power to determine national policies.

Soeharto's unexpected fall had rapidly accelerated Muslim politics' dynamics. To anticipate changes in national politics and to ensure a role for Muslims in the post-Soeharto's leadership, the FUI responded by offering ideas for Muslim political roles. They held a meeting on May 12, 1998 at Anwar Harjono's house which resulted in the decision to found the Muslims Coordination Agency (Badan Kordinasi Umat Islam, BKUI) intended to absorb Muslim aspirations through existing Islamic mass-organizations in order to set up an Islamic party. Mass-organizations that joined the BKUI included the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Da'wah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII), Cooperation Agency of Boarding Schools in Indonesia (Badan

Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren Indonesia, BKSPPI), the Islamic Brotherhood Forum (FUI), The Islamic Association (Persis), Islamic Union (SI), the Union of Indonesian Muslims (PUI), the Union of Islamic Education (Perti), Al-Irsyad, and the Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, KISDI). BKUI's membership was more focused on organizations rather than on individuals.

The BKUI began to play a role in the dynamics of Indonesian politics after Soeharto's fall by inviting Muslim youth organizations to join. There was a great spirit among them to turn the BKUI into something like the MIAI which contained Islamic organizations and was a unifying vehicle for Muslims in Indonesia. The BKUI was expected to play a more important role, especially by mobilizing cooperation and inviting brotherhood among the Muslim organizations and by representing the Muslims in their struggle for a role in politics, the economy, law, socio-cultural affairs, and in Islamic propagation. Apparently, the desire to establish an Islamic party had become irreversible when the BKUI held its National Congress I on June 1, 1998 where a proposal was made make the BKUI the forerunner of an Islamic party. However, ICMI representatives opposed the proposal and they threatened to walk out of the BKUI if the agency would change into a political party.[60]

Prior to establishing an Islamic party, Anwar Harjono had approached the PPP to create a single party that could cover the entire Muslim community, but the PPP did not accept his proposal. Had the BKUI wanted to join the PPP, it would have had to go through the membership mechanism defined by the organization's Basic Articles. Aware of the difficulties, activists representing the BKUI began to think of setting up a separate Islamic party that could really animate the spirit of the Crescent Star Families.

Finally, a party named the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB) was declared on July 26, 1998 in the Grand Al-Azhar Mosque in Jakarta. Prof. Dr. Yusril Ihza Mahendra was appointed chairman instead of Amien Rais who had declined the offer. The PBB also participated in the 1999 election, but did not gain encouraging support. In the 1999 election, the party only managed to get 1.4% of the votes and it was absent in subsequent elections after not having passed the electoral and parliamentary thresholds. The party participated again in the 2014 elections but also

received less than two percent of the total votes. In fact, efforts to rebuild the Masjumi's greatness through the PBB all failed because the Muslim's political dynamics in the reform era showed that each group of Muslims tried to establish its own party in accordance with the organizations currents. Various Islamic leaders with a historical relationship with the Masjumi also established their own parties rather than join the PBB, such as the Indonesian Muslims Party (PUI) chaired by Deliar Noer, the Masjumi Indonesian Islamic Party (Partai Islam Indonesia Masjumi) under the leadership of Abdullah Hehamahua, and the New Masjumi Party led by Ridwan Saidi. All these Islamic parties were previously affiliated to the Masjumi and did not get Muslim support as evidenced by the small number of votes they got in the 1999 election (1.94%).

United Development Party (PPP)

The only Islamic party founded in the Reform era is the United Development Party (PPP) and it is thus the oldest Islamic party that is still in existence. It was founded in 1973 in the early days of the New Order and it was a fusion of the NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti. In the Reform era it got the opportunity to develop after having existed for about 25 years in an unsupportive political atmosphere. Golkar's domination during the New Order era had caused the PPP to decline from one election to the next. However, in addition to improved opportunities and political freedom in the era of *Reformasi,* the PPP also found itself in a difficult position. As a party that could no longer claim to be the only Islamic party the PPP now had to develop new strategies to ensureits future existence.

Because it was originally a fusion of four Islamic parties, the PPP inherited many internal conflicts involving the parties' various and unreconcilable interests. One by one the PPP leaders who were critical of the government were removed. The PPP increasingly grew into a party that was co-opted by the interests of the New Order regime. At the beginning of the PPP's formation, NU's Idham Chalid was its chairman while Parmusi's H.M.S. Mintaredja who was a close associate of Soeharto's, was appointed vice chairman. In accordance with an agreement between the signatories of the party's declaration, H.M.S. Mintaredja was appointed PPP chairman for the period 1973-1978. In the next period the leadership was handed over to H.J. Naro without going through a party meeting. From then on, the PPP was strongly

controlled by the Parmusi elements, also called Muslimin Indonesia (MI), which tended to be close to the New Order ruler. H.J. Naro held the leadership until 1989, after which he was replaced by Ismail Hasan Metareum, also from the MI.

In the era of *Reformasi*, the PPP faced internal challenges asits cadres' demanded that an internal reform was carried out. They were joined by the members of the Reform Committee - United Development Party (KR-PPP) to hold an immediate national meeting demanding Ismail Hasan Metareum to step down since he was responsible for the PPP support for Soeharto at the General Session of the MPR in 1998. The KR-PPP group occupied the PPP's central leadership office but Buya Ismail's supporters took it back. Responding to this heated internal unrest a national meeting was held in June 1998 and it decided to accelerate the organization of a national conference to resolve the issues surrounding the party's leadership. From November 29 to December 2, 1998, the PPP successfully held its Muktamar IV in which Hamzah Haz of the NU was elected the party's chairman. From then on, NU figures led the PPP. The congress also decided to change the party's logo from the old star to the Ka'ba. The PPP was revived and once again based on Islamic principles after having been forced to adhere to the single principle of the Pancasila during the Soeharto era. Later, Suryadarma Ali, also from the NU replaced Hamzah Haz.

In the first election after the era of *Reformasi* in 1999, the PPP gained 10.71% of the votes. In the 2004 election it tumbled to 8.15% and continued to decline in the 2009 election with only 5.32% of the votes while in the 2014 general election the percentage slightly increased to 6.5%. Like other Islamic parties, the PPP's bases were in West and Central Java and Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.

Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)

The Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*) was originally named the Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan*). Because it had failed to meet the electoral threshold in the 1999 election, for the 2004 election PK changed its name to be PKS. Among the existing parties, the PKS was included into agroup of new parties that had no traditional mass basis. Most PKS supporters were Muslim activists nurtured in study groups on campuses known as *Tarbiyah* (lit. education). It is not surprising that the members of

this educated group did not have any emotional and historical ties with old Islamic mass-organizations, because most of them were from new generations of Muslims who were not bound by the dichotomy between traditionalist and modernist Muslims. Although their families might have been rooted in major Islamic mass-organizations, such as the Muhammadiyah, NU, Persis and other mass-organizations, the tussle of Islamic propagation on campuses had turned them away from existing Islamic organizations. The reason was that public campuses in the New Order era had deliberately been kept away from the influences of youth organizations affiliated with Islamic political parties and mass-organizations. Through the policy of the normalization of campus life, the regime restricted the organizational activities ofthe students of many major universities. Syafi'i Anwar[61] referred to these Muslim groups that had no emotional and ideological ties as neo-*santris*. These religious groups were represented by a generation of Muslims whose political ideology was Islam-oriented, but they had lost confidence in both existing Islamic political parties and the younger generation of Muslims who preferred socialist and secularist ideologies. Kuntowijoyo[62] called them 'Muslims without mosques'.

There are three factors behind the emergence of the new *santris* in the 1980s.[63] First, the strong repression of political Islamic groups and the failure of Islamic parties during the New Order era had made the younger generations of Muslims in Indonesia to try to find political channels that differed from those of their parents. Second, religious education in public universities tended to introduce universal Islam and tried to avoid contravening issues that often caused conflicts among the adherents of either traditionalists or modernists Islam. Third, international influences affected the spirit of revolution and the Islamic awakening attracted the young Muslim generation who had been disappointed with the co-opted Muslim organizations and their leaders. The *Tarbiyah* group that became the PKS basis drew inspiration from figures of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and they adopted Hassan al-Banna's political thought as the basis of their Islamic political thinking.



The LDK Salman ITB. The Congregation of Salman ITB was the first LDK that was established, namely on May 30, 1964.

Source: Documentary of the Salman ITB.

Through the Islamic propagation network on campuses, these educational movements coalesced in the Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Campus Propagation Agency, LDK), which began to flourish in the mid-1980s. Through this network they later founded the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia*, KAMMI) established in Malang on March 29, 1998. Along with other student elements, KAMMI demanded Soeharto to resign as president. After Soeharto's fall, the educational movement, backed by FSLDK and KAMMI transformed into a political party called the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK). On July 28, 1998, the PK was officially declared in the Al-Azhar Mosque in Jakarta and Nurmahmudi Ismail was elected president.

The PK participated in the 1999 election but because it was a newcomer in politics it got only 1.4% of the votes. In 2000, Nurmahmudi was replaced by Hidayat Nur Wahid. On April 20, 2003, under the leadership of Al-Muzammil Yusuf the PKS was founded in an effort to anticipate the situation that the PK could not participate in the 2004 elections as it did not meet the electoral threshold. In July 2003, the PK formally merged with the PKS and Hidayat Nur Wahid became the party's president.

After Hidayat Nur Wahid, the leadership was taken up by Tifatul Sembiring, Luhfi Hasan Ishaq, and, currently, by Anis Matta. In the 2004 election, with 7.3%, the PKS managed to gain enough votes. In the 2009 election, the party managed to gain 7.8% of the overall votes, but was less succesful in the 2014 election with 6.9% of the votes.

Political Movement and Democratic Consolidation

Marcus Mietzner[64] has analysed the post-Soeharto conditions in Indonesia and how Muslims played a role in creating the democratic consolidation in the country. He divided the reform era into two periods: democratic transition (1998-2004) and democratic consolidation (2004-present). This is not an ideal description to understand the actual condition inIndonesian politics, but the analysis may help to look at the role of Islam in both periods.

First. The era of democratic transition (1998-2004) began on May 21, 1998 when Soeharto officially resigned as president and B.J. Habibie, the vice president and chairman of ICMI, became

the president of Indonesia until an election was held. Although he served not too long as president, Habibie is considered to have greatly contributed to saving Indonesia in the transition period until the democratic elections in 1999.

The transition era towards democracy was a difficult time and full of challenges. The freedom of political engagement and opinion was successfully attained and led not only to encourage wider public participation but also had unavoidable negative consequences. The freedom euphoria that was not balanced with political stability and law enforcement had invited a wide range of legal issues, conflicts, and disintegration. In this transition period, Indonesia not only experienced an economic downturn, but also had to face problems with security, social conflicts, a variety of socio-political disturbances, including the conflicts in Ambon, Poso, Aceh, and a number of terrorist actions.

Although overshadowed by horizontal conflicts and sectarian violence, Muslims managed to confirm their identity by creating peace in Indonesia. The concsciousness of the Muslims either in political parties or religious organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) greatly contributed to help the Indonesian nation to get through the difficult times in the transitional phase towards democratic consolidation.

One of the political achievements of the Indonesian Muslims is the success of Abdurahman Wahid (former NU chairman) as a representative of the Muslims' strength by occupying the highest position as the president of the Republic of Indonesia in 1999. Similarly, the election of Amin Rais (former chairman of the Muhammadiyah) as the chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (1999-2004) and Akbar Tanjung (former chairman of the PB HMI) as chairman of the House of Representatives (1999-2004)had all given out strong signals that Islam had become an integral part of Indonesian political life.

Second. The 2004 election was a milestone in the process of democratic consolidation in Indonesia. The strengthening role of civil society backed by Islamic groups marked the consolidation of Indonesian democracy. The horizontal conflicts that had arisen in the transition period had gradually began to become settled. Interestingly, Islamic parties started to progress into open parties while moving to the center

and they began to have a national consciousness within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). In the 2004 election, the role of Islam in politics was also very important. Hidayat Nur Wahid, the former president of the PKS was elected to replace Amien Rais as chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly.

In the 2009 election, eight parties had met the parliamentary threshold and they were able to deliver their representatives in Senayan. These parties were the Democratic Party, Golkar Party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, Prosperous Justice Party, National Mandate Party, United Development Party, Great Indonesia's Movement Party (Gerindra) and People's Conscious Party (Hanura). Two parties were based on Islamic principle (PKS and PPP) and two other Muslim-based parties (PKB and PAN) entered into coalition with the Democratic Party had successfully supported Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) to become President and Boediono as Vice President for the 2009-2014 period. SBY was elected president for the second time with the support of Islamic parties and the Muslim-based parties like the PKS, PAN, PPP and PKB.

The main challenge for Indonesian Muslims in the present political conditions is no longer about ideology and nationalism, but much more on the ability of Islamic parties to establish a propertrack record.[65] Corruption, for example,is a chronic problem in Indonesia and infects almost all political parties, including Islamic parties. Unfortunately, also Muslim activists were caught in corruption cases because of the high cost of politics in Indonesia. The cases that hit several members from Islamic groups of the House of Representatives had set a bad precedent and created the negative image in society that also Muslim activists were not free from corruption. In general, Muslims in Indonesia who struggled through political channels in both Islamic political and nationalist parties and those who did so in Islamic mass-organizations had always been a stabilizing force in the nation existence. Their contribution to push for democratization in Indonesia had made Indonesia experience a remarkable progress in democracy. The plurality of Muslims and the Indonesian

people in general did not cause disunity but rather constituted a major force in establishing democracy in Indonesia.

Conclusion

The political role of the Muslims in Indonesia from pre-Independence period until the contemporary period has experienced ups and downs as well as a varietyof dynamics. During the Dutch colonial period, the political movements of Muslims were divided into two groups: those willing to cooperate with the Dutch government and had joined the People's Council, and groups that refused to join because they thought the People's Council was ineffective in the struggle for the fate of the Indonesian nation. The SI's initial high hopes because of its presence in the People's Council turned to disappointment when the motions it addressed to the Dutch government were rejected. This disappointment deepened when the Dutch detained Tjokroaminoto, which indirectly prevented him to remain in the People's Council. Since the SI expressed its dissatisfaction with the Dutch government's policies and had taken more radical political measures by adopting a non-cooperative stance. In the course of SI's political adventures, it started to decline because of internal conflicts. In general, the Dutch policies had severely restricted Muslims political activities.

During the Japanese occupation there was a shift in Indonesian Muslims' political movements. Japan tried to approach the leaders of Islam in order to rekindle their anti-Dutch spirit and it tried to strengthen its position in Indonesia by opening political channels to Muslims. Various political institutions and organizations for Muslims were formed and they received a positive response from the leaders of Islam at that time. Muslims were accommodated in institutions formed by the Japanese government, viz. the Office of Religious Affairs, Masjumi, and Hizbullah. In this era, there was a shift in the elites' political role in Indonesia from the aristocratic gentry (*priyayi*) to *santri*. Consequently, nationalist groups experienced a marginalization of their political role.

The politics of Muslims in Indonesia continued to experience ups and downs. In the preparation era before Indonesian Independence, Muslim's political roles suffered. Both the BPUPKI and PPKI, institutions established to prepare Indonesian Independence, accommodated the political currents of Islamic, nationalist, and socialist

groups. Apparently, the Muslims' political representation shortly before Independence was verysmall compared to that of the dominating nationalist groups. Fierce tussles and debates about the kind of foundation and the format of the new state of Indonesia had sprung up especially about the option to make Indonesia an Islamic state based on Islamic ideology. In the end, the Islamic leaders showed that they wanted to compromise and they adopted an accommodating stance in order not to stand in the way of the formation of the independent state of Indonesia.

In both the Old and New Order periods, the Muslims' political struggle also experienced different dynamics. Debates between the Islamic and nationalist groups continued under Soekarno. However, the debates during Soekarno's era could be ended by forcing the Islamists groups to accept the government's decision to restore the 1945 Constitution through the 1959 presidential decree. Under Soekarno, Guided Democracy was in force and the Masjumi was disbanded, hence the only Islamic party to survive was the NU party.

The New Order regime pursued an almost similar policy towards Muslim political movements. Under conditions of political consolidation and accelerating economic development, Soeharto implemented his policy by way of restricting political parties. A simplification of political parties was enforced so that the existing parties had to be united in three political streams only, the functionalist group (Golkar), Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and United Development Party (PPP). Soeharto then applied the single principle policy that forced all organizations and political parties to adhere to the principle of the Pancasila. Although Islamic circles had opposed it, in the end this policy was successfully implemented and came to be accepted by the social and political organizations in Indonesia.

In the Soeharto's era when the regime's policies tended to restrict Muslim politics, Muslim's young leaders managed to circumvented them by formulating a new political strategy.


A political transformation took place in order to temper the hostile relationships between Islam and the state. By not turning Islamic parties into the sole objective of the Muslims' struggle, they began to pay attention to other, neglected social and intellectual fields. From then on, Muslim activists began to

enter the bureaucracy and joined Golkar. While some considered this approach as part of the regime's cooptation, their success in entering the bureaucracy had a significant impact on the process of Islamization within the bureaucracy.


The contributions of Muslims became more and more forceful in this process of democratic consolidation. Muslims who struggled through parties consistently supported the democratization process in Indonesia by bringing forward the national spirit, while those who contended through mass-organizations like the Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Persis, Matlaul Anwar, and other mass-organizations continuously encouraged and strengthened civil society in order to create a more democratic Indonesia. In this era, horizontal conflicts also decreased. Terrorism still emerged, but in general, the government could properly solve them in cooperation with the Islamic mass-organizations, including the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI).

Islamic parties play an important role in safe guarding democracy in Indonesia. Indonesian Islam shows two approaches at the same time; political and cultural. Islam in Indonesia does not support the establishment of an Islamic state, but also rejects secularization. Although most Islamic parties are not the dominating forces in parliament, their roles in the fight for the Muslims' interests in Indonesia are quite substantial. The reason is that the Muslims' aspirations are not only advocated by the Islamic parties, but also accommodated by other, nationalist parties that adopted Islam as one of their most important constituing elements. In practice, the Islamic forces in Islamic parties can easily cooperate with nationalist parties within the framework of nationality. This is moderate Islam in Indonesia as embodied in both political and cultural movements.

Muslims in Indonesia have become an important force in ensuring the implementation of democratic consolidation. Muslims' political maturity substantially contributes to the realization of a democratic Indonesia. It is not surprising that Indonesia is cited as one of the most democratic countries in the Muslim world.







Chapter Twelve
The Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Council of Indonesian Ulama

The Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Council of Indonesian Ulama

Didi Ahmadi

The Ministry of Religious Affairs was officially founded in 1946 but it has its roots in Dutch colonial times and the Japanese occupation. In the Dutch colonial period, adherents to religions were classified into two major groups: Christians and non-Christians and religious affairs were coordinated by several agencies.[1] Problems concerning the general worship of the Christian population were, for instance, coordinated by the *Departement van Onderwijs en Eeredienst* (Department of Education and Worship). Problems related to the religions of the natives, marriages, mosques, the hajj and such more were regulated by the *Departement van Binnenlandsch Bestuur* (Ministry of Interior Affairs). The Mahkamah Islam Tinggi (Islamic High Court) and the *Hoofd voor Islamitische Zaken*(Head of Islamic Affairs) fell under the authority of the *Departement van Justitie* (Ministry of Justice).

Outside theseDutch institutions, the *Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken* (Office for Native Affairs) was another institution that was most influential in the formulation of Dutch colonial policies on Islam. Its primary task was to advice the governor general on indigenous affairs, mainly pertaining to Muslims and Arabs. Its role as an advisory officedirectly responsible to the governor general, made the office far more strategic than any other office concerned with religious affairs. This advisory agency went through many changes. The Dutch colonial government no longer based its policies on indigenous affairs on fear and suspicion and hence they no longer wanted much intervention. Advised by the brain behind the operational mechanisms of the advisory office and an expert in Islam, C. Snouck Hurgronje, the Dutch colonial government actively managed and governed indigenous Muslims' life in many fields including Islamic organizations, Islamic education, religious courts, the pilgrimage, up to the construction of mosques and inheritance matters.[2]

During the Japanese occupation, the way the colonial government had handled indigenous and religious affairs remained essentially unchanged. Fearing potential resistance from the Indonesian Muslim community, Japan needed to domesticate it through making systematic arrangements for those religious fields that might incite

1. Kementerian Agama 2014, "Profil Kementerian Agama", being accessed on February 22, 2014 from http://www.kemenag.go.id.

2. Suminto 1985, *Politik Islam*, pp. 111-114.



Consecutive chairmen of the Indonesian Scholars

Source: Directorate of History and Cultural Values, Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia.

resistance, while concurrently act as a unifying movement for the natives. Interests in Islam itself had been on the rise in Japan since the mid-1930s along with its desire to conquer the Asia Pacific region.[3] Therefore, the Japanese colonial government had formed the *Shumubu*, a military administrative office for religious affairs established to implement Japanese colonial policies related to religious issues, especially in Java.[4]

This office was almost the same as the *Kantoor voor Islamitische Zaken* of the Dutch period. However, if during the Dutch period the office was designed on the principle of "neutrality" toward religion, in the Japanese era the office of religious affairs from the beginning had been designed to garner Muslim leaders'support for the Japanese military authorities.[5] To reap more massive Muslim public support offices werealso opened in the provinces under the name *Shumuka* which were authorized to supervise local religious life at regencyand lower levels. In order to ensure the Indonesian Muslims' sympathy and support for the Pan-Asian commonwealth ideals under Dai Nippon's leadership, Japan appointed the leaders of Islamic movements as the heads of these offices.

3. Benda 1955, "Indonesian Islam", p. 353.

4. Benda 1985, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*; Benda 1955, "Indonesian Islam", p. 354.

5. Benda 1955, "Indonesian Islam", p. 354.

Ministry of Religious Affairs

As part of the government of the newly independent Republic of Indonesia, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was authorized to deal with religious issues. Much like the colonial and occupational governments, the Indonesian government also considered it very important that Muslims occupied positionsinside the state structure. Therefore, a ministry in charge and to take care of Muslim problems was absolutely necessary.

However, it should be noted that the establishment of the ministry of religion affair's had its own political objective – it was a concession of the power that-be to Islamic political process. It needs to be reiterated here that at the time there were concerns about the voice and the power of Islam which forced the Indonesian government first under Soekarno and subsequently under Soeharto to work hard to weaken and "domesticate" the Muslim's powerful voice.[6] In fact, the establishmentof

6. Bahtiar Effendy 2009, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Gagasan dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia,* the expanded 2nd edition, (Jakarta:

the Ministry of Religious Affairs in post-independent Indonesia is often seen as the ruling regime's success in constitutionally, physically, and bureaucratically thwarting Islamic forces.[7]

Nevertheless, the position of the Indonesian regimes towards Islamic groups has changed, especially during the New Order period. These changes have had a number of consequences. One was that Muslims occupy increasingly more important positions in the government structure while the roles and functions of the Ministry of Religious Affairs within the context of national development also became more and more prominent. This can be seen in the New Order government's great affection for Islam since the 1980s.[8] At the time, Indonesia witnessed the endorsement of pro-Muslim governmental policies as well as the government's accommodation of Islamic groups through the establishment of Muslim-based strategic organizations.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs' crucial position is reflected, for instance, in its duties and functions in the wider framework of nation building. Its main task in the government is to buildup religious life of the Indonesian nation, maintaining harmonious inter-religious relations, and to play an active role in social welfare.[9] To do this, it carries out general supervision and guidance and it offersservicesfor religious life. It does not involve itself in theological matters orin the internal affairs of religions and their adherents. The Ministry of Religious Affairs only has the authority to regulate believers' relations with the state and religious life on Indonesian soil.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs manages all issues pertaining to religious life in Indonesia. Islamic affairs fall under the Directorate-General of Islamic Education, Directorate General of Hajj and Umrah, and the Directorate General of Islamic Guidance; the affairs of religions other than Islam are managedby the Directorate Generals of Guidance for Christians, Catholics, Hindus, and Buddhists.

Religious Harmony

Christianization took place during the

Dutch colonial period and it has been a hot issue in post-independent Indonesia. The Dutch government was not neutral towards the religions of its colonies, as it had promised, but rather, it was in favor of the groups who adhered to religions the Dutch adhered to.[10]

Christianization took place in many areas and the Dutch colonial government facilitated it financially and politically. During the reign of Governor-General Idenburg (1909-1916) for example the government gave massive subsidies to the construction of zending (missionary) hospitals and the opening of missionaries territories in Solo.[11] Although the *Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken* under C. Snouck Hurgronje's leadership published a decree strictly prohibiting proselytization in Islamic areas, such as Aceh, Christianization quickly penetrated into other areas.[12]

Although in a different intensity and with other activities, Christianization remained even though the Dutch had to pull out of the archipelago in 1949. The 1960s and the 1970s are recorded as periods when Christianization was intensively conducted which incited discord and suspicion between Muslims and Christians that led to religious polemics. This was clearly a serious problem for maintaining inter-religious harmony. Therefore, creating and maintaining religious harmony became one of the Ministry of Religious Affairs' main functions.

Following the polemics on the state's basic foundation during the early years of independence, which were more or less related to the issue of inter-religious relations, Islam-Christianity relations were increasingly tense and sometimes even led to conflicts. Therefore, the government made efforts to ease and solve the problems. In 1967, two years after the issuance of the 1965 PNPS law, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, under the leadership of K.H. Muhammad Dahlan took the initiative to hold inter-religious dialogues. However, the program did not have a clear concept and was still held on avery limited scope. The Ministry of Religious Affairs reformulated its concept for inter-religious dialogues under Minister Mukti Ali (1971-1978). Because in this period a variety of programs including dialogues, seminars, research, and

publications were executed in order to develop and maintain harmonious life among adherents of various religions, itis considered a milestone in the construction of a model for religious harmony. Mukti Ali was a pioneer in inter-religious dialogue in Indonesia.[13] From then on, inter-religious dialogue was one of the main programs of the ministry and it has been conducted uninterrupted under subsequent Ministers of Religious Affairs.

Mukti Ali launched his major dialogue project with a program called "Coaching Project for Inter-Religious Harmony". As a professor of comparative religion, Mukti Ali was convinced that the Islamic-Christian polemic could not end in the absence of constructive concept of living together to ensure the sustainable rights of both. So in an effort to create a harmoniousrelationship between religious adherents and to streamline the overall development agenda, Mukti Ali proposed the concepts of inter-religious coexistence, mutual tolerance, and respect. In his view, these attitudes would prosper when adherents of each religion would still be allowed to emphasize that their religion was the best, but at the same time admit that many similarities exist between religions rather than only look at the differences. This religious attitude is called "to agree in disagreement".[14]

The keyword for religious harmony is dialogue. By having dialogues an attitude of mutual respect between religious communities would be awaken. The reason is that dialogue is a bridge to meet the human need for mutual recognition, trust, and respect. According to Mukti Ali, within the context of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, inter-religious dialogue meant that the government had to present a *modus vivendi* to enable the various religious communities to build mutual respect and understanding and to realize that they were living together under the umbrella of "nationality".[15] Mukti Ali used the term "nationality" in order to promote the pluralism of the nation that apparently had been disrupted. He did not encourage constructing plurality based on religions or on particular ethnic achievements. In his view, the concept of

13 Fuad Zaenal 2007, *Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: Muslim-Christian Discourse*, PhD dissertation at the University of Hamburg Germany

14 Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam (ed.) 1998, *Menteri-Menteri Agama RI: Biografi Sosial Politik*, Jakarta: INIS, Badan Litbang Agama RI in cooperation with the PPIM-IAIN Jakarta)

15 Azra and Umam (ed.) 1998, *Menteri-Menteri Agama RI*

nationality as stated in the Pancasila was neutral to specific sectarian interests.

Mukti Ali believed in the creation of harmony in line with the Islamic thoughts that were simultaneously developing outside the state's bureaucracy, for instance, Nurcholish Madjid (Cak Nur)'s ideas about secularization and religious pluralism. Cak Nur's ideas of the renewal of Islamic theology were directly or indirectly institutionalized by Mukti Ali's policies, whereas Mukti Ali'sconcept of a nation-based religious dialogue were theologically and culturally supported by the dissemination of Cak Nur's ideas on the introduction of new meanings in Islamic doctrine.

Mukti Ali was very serious about inter-religious dialogue and from 1972 to 1977 he organized his program in 21 cities. Since the beginning of the New Order period up to the present,inter-religious dialogue programshave continued and even been put on the national agenda. Moreover, various non-governmental organizations also actively organize dialoguesfor which they invite officially recognized religious councils such as the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), Indonesian Churches Communion (Persatuan Gereja Indonesia,PGI), Bishops' Conference of Indonesia (Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia, KWI), the Parisada Hindu Dharma, and the Indonesian Buddhists Trustee (Perwalian Umat Budha Indonesia, WALUBI). In the 1980s, these activities were organized by the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP) headed by Johan Efendi, who was one of Mukti Ali's junior colleagues when he studied in Yogyakarta.

Apart from institutional dialogues, other models were undertaken in the Islamic world, including Indonesia, such as parliamentary and theological dialogues, dialogues of life, and spiritual dialogues.[16]Parliamentary dialogues generally tookplace atthe international level such as in the World's Parliament of Religions and during a World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP). Theological dialogues are usually organized by intellectual organizations such as Interfidei, Paramadina, LKiS, LP3M, and MADIA. Dialogues of life are organized bystudy groups and NGOs and held to formulate the handling of practical and actual matters. Finally, spiritual dialogues tend to deepen the spiritual practices of religious communities.

16. Azyumardi Azra 1999, *Konteks Berteologi di Indonesia*, Pengalaman Islam, Jakarta: Paramadina, pp. 63-64.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs'coaching program for religious harmony rested essentially on Presidential Decree no. 1/1965 on the prevention of abuse and/ or blasphemy, which later became known as Law no. 1/PNPS/1965 after having been promoted to law in 1969. Other, similar policies were issued to regulate religious adherents'coexistence. Some policies, including the Joint Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of the Interior number 01/BER/ mdn-mag/1969 on the implementation of government officials' tasks to assure the orderly and smooth implementation of the right of the religion adherents to perform their religion ceremonies and rituals. The Joint Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of the Interior no. 1/1979 on procedures for religious propagation and foreign assistance to religious institutes; the Instruction of the Minister of Religious Affairs no. 4/1978 on policies regarding local belief systems; and the Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs no. 35/1980 on consultative councils for religious adherents.

Broadly speaking, the program of religious harmony as stated in the Basic Guidelines on Religious Life for the year 1985/1986 the government sought 1) to instill the importance of community life in supporting religious harmony; 2) to promote an environment for and circumstances capable of supporting attitudes and behavior leading to religious harmony; 3) to foster and develop attitudes and behavior that manifest religious harmony. These things mean that the religious community is responsible for development, particularly in the context of building religious harmony.

The technical implementation of the government's more institutionalized attempts to foster religious harmony is the official task of the Center for Religious Harmony (Pusat Kerukunan Umat Beragama, PKUB), an institution under the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In 2000, this institution had a sizable share in the process of the recognition of Confucianism as one of the official religions in Indonesia. Managing religious harmony is also organized in regional inter-faith forums called the Forum for Religious Harmony (FKUB) which are strategic partners of the government in linking the interests of the government and of societyin the context of religious harmony. The role of this forum was strengthened by the issuance of the Joint Ministerial Regulation (Peraturan Bersama Menteri, PBM) of the Minister of Religious Affairs

and the Minister of the Interior no. 8 and 9, 2006 on the Guidelines for the Duties of the Regional and Deputy Regional Heads in maintaining religious harmony, the empowerment of the FKUB, and the establishment of houses of worship.[17]

The FKUB's strategic role and the issuance of PBM, among others, were to increase the forum's position as the government's principal tool to organize dialogues. Its role was also to get to know the aspirations of religious figures, religious organizations and society in general in order to be able to offer recommendations to the heads of the regional authorities to promote policies related to religious harmony, and to make written recommendations on requests for the establishment of houses of worship. The FKUB also has a more practical and tactical role crucial to the formation of religious harmony in Indonesia. For example, the FKUB has the cleartasks 1) to detect and map cases of religious disharmony; 2) to reduce and to find solutions for potential disruptions; and 3) to identify and revitalize local wisdom that supports religious harmony.[18]

However, some circles added some critical notes as they concluded that the inter-religious dialogue program was insufficiently entrenched and played a less significant role at the community level. These critical notes were made in reaction to events that occurred in regions like Situbondo, Tasikmalaya, Ketapang, Kupang, Ambon, Poso and the Moluccas, where religious violence occurred in the 2000s, especially between Muslims and Christians. These events showed that inter-religious dialogue still met with practical difficulties.[19] Some obstacles were that the dialogues tended to be discursive and elitist and frivolous in the ways they addressed thegaps between religious elites and mediators in the field, negative prejudices among inter-religious adherents, existing socio-economic disparities, and the lowlevel of justice for the whole of society. A former Minister of Religious Affairs Thalchah Hasan saw that the strengthening of religious

harmony tended to be structural and politically oriented.[20]

So far, the FKUB has been unable to detect, dampen, or find solutions for disrupting unrest or sectarian conflicts with religious backgrounds. The violence radical Islamic groups perpetrate against minority communities such as the Jamaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) in West Java, Lombok and Banten, the Shiites in Madura, and other conflicts and violent actions instigated by disputesover the establishment of houses of worship such as in Bogor, Bekasi, and many other areas are proof that the FKBU does not function well in those regions.[21]

In some cases, it is unfair to blame or discredit only the FKUB. As a matter of fact, in the Ahmadiyah case it was clear that the perpetrators of violence, arsonists, and murderers justified their actions based on the 2005 MUI fatwa and the Joint Decree (SKB) of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of the Interior and the Attorney General which ordered the cessation of the activities of the Ahmadiyah group to expand its unwanted influences (2008). In their actions against potential violations of the rules, they claimed to have preceded the legal authorities. That security forces sometimes did not take any anticipatory action and preferred to keep silent, despite knowing of the violence would only made the matters worse.[22]

Various pro-democracy groups and pro-human rights NGOs, intellectuals, religious figures, and lawyers pointed out that the Joint Decree on the Ahmadiyah, and thus the Ministry of Religious Affairs, had been interfering in the internal and external affairs of a religious community. In fact, the Ministry of Religious Affairs explained clearly that its concern with religious harmony was limited only to external affairs and did not include religious communities'internal affairs.[23]

With regard to the rising problem of violence and vigilantism caused by

20. Thalchah Hasan 1999, "Reaktualisasi Pembinaan Kerukunan Umat Beragama", unpublished article.

21. See the 2011 annual reports of the Wahid Institute, *Lampu merah kebebasan beragama*, (Jakarta: Wahid Institute Annual Report 2011); see also Zainal Abidin Bagir et.al. 2011, *Laporan Tahunan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia 2010*, (Yogyakarta: CRCS UGM); Rizal Panggabean and Ihsan Ali-Fauzi 2014, *Pemolisian Konflik Keagamaan di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: PUSAD Paramadina, MPRK UGM and The Asia Foundation).

22. Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi 2014, *Pemolisian Konflik*

23. See Mudzhar 2013, "Lingkungan dan Peran Strategis FKUB" and also Taher 1997, *Aspiring for the Middle Path*.

government policies, it is important to underline that the final part of Law no. 1 PNPS 1965 ---the main point of reference for government policies related to religious harmony and for the Joint Decree--- states "warn and instruct citizens in general to preserve and maintain religious harmony and peace as well as the order of social life by not committing actions against the law against followers and members of the JAI board." However, vandalism and physical violence against religious minorities persists. The problem increasingly worsened when the MUI and the Ministry of Religious Affairs blamed the JAI itself for having become the victims of these crimes. According to a report written by Bagir and others on the basis of the PNPS law and the SKB, Minister of Religious Affairs Suryadharma Ali declared that he could not allow the Ahmadiyah case to drag on because it would be tantamount to continuing the problem.[24] According to him, disbanding the Ahmadiyah was indeed risky, but to condone it would be an equally great risk. In August 2010 the Minister of Religious Affairs insisted that the government should dissolve JAI.

The violence on the basis of the law thus got a fresh breeze from the government (Ministry of Religious Affairs) and the MUI but they had gone too far in their efforts to bring Indonesia back to Islamic orthodoxy. Because of this, some circles were of the opinion that,as it is the basis for policies on religious harmony, the PNPS law should be considered problematic andin violation of the 1945 Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as well as detrimental to religious minority groups. Therefore, in 2009, seven NGOs and some individuals applied for a judicial review of the PNPS law to the Constitutional Court (MK). The MK then invited a debate among community organizations, religious leaders, and Muslims and human rights activists. Unfortunately, after the trial and hearing the opinion of experts held from February 4 to 24 March 2010 the attempt to a judicial review failed, because the Constitutional Court overruled it.[25]

The Constitutional Court had three options: first, to declare the law constitutional and therefore it is

24. Bagir et al. 2011, *Laporan Tahunan*, p. 47.

25. See Mudzhar 2010, "Pengaturan Kebebasan Beragama dan Penodaan Agama di Indonesia dan Berbagai Negara", a paper on the study of the Constitution Council decreeno. 140 dated April 19, 2010 on the judicial review of the law no 1/PNPS/1965, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. See also Bagir etal. 2011, *Laporan Tahunan*.

needed to be upheld; second, the law is constitutional but needs to be revised; and third, the law considered unconstitutional and had to be canceled and revoked (Mudzhar 2010). However, the experts focused on two opposing opinions. The pro-judicial review group argued that freedom of religion should be implemented and guaranteed as the state cannot interfere in religious matters. The contra-judicial review group argued that without the PNPS law, religious desecration would happen more freely and that this wouldcause more serious disharmony between religious groups and therefore, Indonesia as a non-secular state had to protect religions.[26]

The Ministry of Religious Affairs ---as seen in the case of religious-based sectarian conflicts---was impressed not to dampen or to find solutions for disrupted religious harmony, but rather to back the perpetrators. However, some positive achievements should also be noted, especially this ministry's contributions to efforts to establish and maintain religious harmony. Another positive note is its decision about Confucianism. Since the issuance of the Presidential Instruction no. 14/1967, Confucians experienced limitations in the way the adherents of this religion could live their faith. They ranged from not being able to state their faith on their identity cards and problems in the organization of religious worship, up to their way of living. As the consequence of this government policy, for more than 30 years, Confucians had to merge into other religious communities. The good news for them came with Abdurrahman Wahid's Presidential Decree no. 6/2000 which repealed the prohibitions imposed on Confucians, and subsequentlyPresidential Decree no. 19/2002 which proclaimed Chinese New Year (Imlek)a National Day, and the Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs no. 331/2002, which proclaimed Chinese New Year a National Holiday.

Finally, Confucianism was recognized as one of the official religions in Indonesia and its festive day also had become a national holiday through the government's new policy. However, it actually did not mean freedom for all of its adherents in Indonesia. All the Confucians'religious and civil rights were finally met after the Minister of Religious Affairs sent a letter numbered 12/MA/2006 dated 24 January 2006 to the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of National Education on the clarification of the marital status according to

26 Bagir et al. 2011, Laporan Tahunan ...

Confucianism and religious education for the adherents of Confucianism. Through this letter marriages of Confucians were declared valid before the registry office, and religious education for its adherents was facilitated by the government.[27]

Education, Justice, and the Hajj

In addition to religious harmony, the Ministry of Religious Affairs also has the task to deal with Islamic education, the organization of religious courts, the performance of the hajj and various other related religious matters. Educational affairs, justice, and the pilgrimage had been serious concerns since the era of the Islamic kingdoms in the archipelago and the Dutch colonial administration. The Dutch colonial administration supervisedIslamic education in the Dutch East Indies throughthe Regulation on Islamic Education of 1905, which contains detailed and strict rules about licensing and religious teachers.[28] Therefore, even though Islam was the religion of the indigenous population, Islamic education was always put in a marginal position in contrast to Christian education which the Dutch East Indies Government supported.[29] Policies taken by the independent Indonesian government up until the 1960s had failed to change Islamic education's marginal position, let alone to make it a central issue. This was, as noted earlier, because of the government's impartiality towards Islamist groups.

In the 1970s, when Mukti Ali was the Minister of Religious Affairs, the government policies for Islamic education began to show some changes. The release of the Joint Decree of Three Ministers (the Ministers of Religious Affairs, Education and Culture, and the Interior) no. 6/1975 was a turning point in Islamic education.[30] It required that the pillars of Islamic education, called *madrasah*, were made equal to the education levels in public schools. As a result, the *madrasah's* curriculum was converted into 70 percent general subjects and 30 percent religious instruction. This meant the beginning of the modernization of Islamic education, which was more strongly affirmed by

27. Azyumardi Azra (2010), "Pendaturan Kebebasan Beragama".

28. Noer (1973), *Gerakan Modern Islam*, p. 194.

29. Azra and Jamhari 2006, "Pendidikan Islam Indonesia dan Tantangan Globalisasi Perspektif Sosio-Historis," in Jajat Burhanuddin and Dina Afrianty, *Mencatak Muslim Modern, Peta Pengkajian Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta RajaGrafindo Persada), p. 2.

30. Azra and Jamhari 2006, "Pendidikan Islam Indonesia", p. 3.



Consultation meeting of Indonesian Islamic scholars in Pondok Pesantren Cipasung, Tasikmalaya, West Java

Source: *Pondok Pesantren Cipasung*

the issuance of the Law on the National Education System (*UU Sisdiknas*) in 1989. In this Law, the educational levels of public schools and *madrasah*s were equalized.[31] This equality became even cleared by the statement that *madrasah*s are an essential part of "public education" characterized by Islam. After this period, modern Islamic education spread to many regions in Indonesia. Thus, the issuance of the 2003 National Education Law was no more than the affirmation of the new position Islamic education had acquiredin the context of overall human development in Indonesia.

The Religious Courts are also rooted in the long history of the nation ever since the time of competing Islamic sultanates and during the colonial era. After the Dutch had conquered the Islamic sultanates, religious courts were regulated by the issuance of *Staatsblad* no. 152/1882 on Religious Courts and Islamic law.[32] From then on, the government's intervention in religious matters became manifest. The next step was to place judges and religious courts under the authority of the *Hoofd voor Islamitische Zaken* (Head for Islamic Affairs) and supervised by an advisory board in the name of the governor-general, as Snouck Hurgronje had arranged.[33] Despite the colonial administration's recognition, the religious courts' judicial authority remained constrained. Its function highly dependedon the policies the advisory board recommended to the governor general.

The firmness of the Indonesian government about the position of religious courts became apparent in the New Order era by the issuance of Law no. 14/1970 that divided judicial authority into General Courts, Religious Courts, Military Courts, and Administrative Courts. To position of religious courts was further strengthened byLaw no. 1/1974 on Marriage, followed by several implementing regulations. In 1989, with the promulgation of Law no. 7 which was several times amended up to 2009 to give religious courts a clearer legal status and authority. Besides, the issuance of Law no. 3/2006 which regulates religious courts'judicial technical coaching, organization, administration and finance, the significance of religious courts' within the legal frame of Indonesia became even more clear. Hence, they became the primary venues for Indonesian

31. Azra and Jamhari 2006, "Pendidikan Islam Indonesia", p. 5.

32. Suminto 1985, *Politik Islam*, pp. 29-30.

33. Suminto 1985, *Politik Islam*.

Muslims to formally and legally resolve Islamic legal cases, but they werenot to issue normative Islamic regulations.[34]

The demand for legal reform that had started in 1998 finally affected the religious courts. In 1999, the government passed Law no. 35, which is a correction to Law no. 14/1970 on the Distribution of Judicial Authority. The 1999 Law is the fundament for the mediation of the unification process of all judiciary institutions under the Supreme Court, both as seen from the technical side as well as from its administration, up to financial matters. The third amendment of the 1945 constitution was followed by the issuance of Law no. 4/2004 which further confirmed the unification of judicial authority. The law states that "judicial power is conducted by the Supreme Court and all judicial bodies that fall under its jurisdiction, i.e. the general courts, religious courts, military courts, and state administration courts, and the constitutional court". Therefore, judicial institutions in Indonesia are now under the Supreme Court, with no exception for religious courts, which were originally under the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

The unification of the religious courts into judicial bodies under the Supreme Court had some consequences. Firstly, it was clear that it was aimed at the explicit separation of executive and judicative power, which previously at some points had looked blurred. With this clear separation, state institutions were expected to become increasingly conducive more democratic and transparent structure. Secondly, it aimed to further consolidate the position of the judiciary, especially regarding the strengthening of formal, legal and technical proceedings. Thirdly, as defined by article 2 of Law no. 3/2006, this separation turned religious courts into one of the judicial authorities for Muslims who seek justice in specific 'Islamic' cases. Hence, the religious courts' authority changed as it has become more extensive and include tribunal disputes on alms giving, charities, and the Shari'a economy.[35]

Meanwhile, the centrality of the haj administration had since the Dutch colonial time been seriously felt. In the colonial era, the pilgrimage was

34. Muhammad Daud Ali (1991), Hukum Islam: Peradilan dan Masalahnya, in Tipo Sutiyono (ed.), *Hukum Islam in Indonesia: Pemikiran dan Praktek* (Bandung: Remaja Kosdakarya), p. 75.

35. Jaenal Aqlan (2008), *Peradilan Agama dalam Simpul Reformasi Hukum di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Pernada Media), pp. 14-15.

even seen to be politically related to the spread of the idea of Pan-Islamism that was feared to arouse Muslim resistance to the Dutch East Indies.[36] For this reason, the colonial government even planned to prohibit Muslims from performing the hajj because it might only turn the natives into fanatics. Thus, the Dutch colonial authorities strictly supervised there religious activities and installed a special superintendent in the Dutch consulates in Jeddah and Cairo.[37]

After independence, the administration of the pilgrimage was given in the hands of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, although in 1950 the private sector was also allowed to be involved through the issuance of the Letter of the Minister of Religious Affairs of the United States of the Republic of Indonesia no. 3170. In practice, not the Ministry of Religious Affairs handled the hajj directly but rather the Hajj Committee. In 1964, finding solutions to the problem of pilgrim transportation was the background for the issuance of Presidential Decree no. 122/1964and the establishment of PT. Arafat in the same year to provide shipping for the pilgrims. In 1979, PT. Arafat was declared bankrupt, so the government obviated the pilgrimage by ship. The Government again became the pilgrimage's direct organizer. The 1980s led to the implementation of exclusive pilgrimage packages known as the ONH Plus program. However, the problem of organizing the pilgrimage persisted hence the reissuance of the law on hajj organization by the government as Law no. 17/1999, which was complemented by a revision that resulted in Law no. 13/2008, which reaffirmed the principles and the organizers of the implementation of the hajj.

The Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI)

As mentioned earlier, in the early days of the New Order, the regime was not in favor of Islamic political power. The disbandment of the biggest Islamic political party, Indonesian Muslims Consultative Assembly (*Masjumi*) under Soekarno, did not necessarily mean that the power of political Islam had been tamed, at least not in the eyes of the New Order government. So ahead of 1971 election, Soeharto ordered Ali Murtopo, Amir Mahmud, and the chief commander of the Kopkamtib to ensure that Golkar would win the election.[38] Murtopo was

asked to interfere in the election of the PNI leadership. Meanwhile, the leadership of Parmusi, one of the Islamic parties, should be put in the hands of a person Soeharto could trust. The Kopkamtib sorted out the candidates of the political parties and disqualified 20 percent they considered the rulers could not trust. In some regions Muslim leaders were intimidated to vote for the Golkar, a situation that had also occurred before the general election.[39] The 1971 election was thus like a war between Islamists and the government's secular factions. The Golkar emerged as the victor of the election by gaining 62.8 percent of the total votes (65.6 percent of the total number of parliamentary seats), while the representatives of Islam only the NU Party, could collect, 18.7 percent of the votes.[40]

The distrust of the regime' to Islamic politics became stronger after the New Order government issued its policy to merge political parties in January 1973.[41]

Thus, to control national politics, only three participants, namely Golkar, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI, which was an merger of the nationalist and Christian parties), and the United Development Party (PPP, a fusion of the Islamic parties, especially Parmusi and the NU) would compete in the next general election. At the same time, the intimidationof Muslims leaders in the regions persisted. The regime seemed to think that in the race for state political leadership Islamic power was its main rival. Soeharto himself actually did not dismiss the potential of the *ulama*sand the great powerthey had in the community. Therefore, he called on some Muslim elites to back him and to support his policies.

Soeharto took the initiative to form an institution where religious scholars could meet. It was proposed for the first time during a national conference in 1970 of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Center (Pusat Dakwah Islam Indonesia, PDII) an organization founded by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The proposal not only garner positive responses, but also led to Indonesian Muslims to wonder if the regime's intent was nothing just another strategy to destroy Islamic political

power in Indonesia once and for all.[42] However, the regime was adamant. The government reaffirmed its idea during the next PDII conference in 1974 and a year later, Soeharto proclaimed to support the establishment of the council before the Indonesian Mosque Council (DMI). To realize the President's proposal, in the same year the Interior Minister ordered all of the heads of the provinces and residence/cityregions to establish a clergymen council.[43]From 21 to 27 July 1975, the Ministry of Religious Affairs held a national 'ulama conference. On 26 July, the conference that was attended by religious scholars, Muslim intellectuals, and representatives of the Islamic spirituality sections under the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) reached an agreement, established the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and appointed Prof. Dr. Hamka or better known as Buya Hamka as its first chairman.[44]

As stated in its official website, the Indonesian Ulama Council is a social organization that serves as a vehicle for Muslim scholars (*'ulama*), Muslim leaders (*zu'ama'*), and Indonesian Muslim intellectuals to unite their efforts to realize their shared goals. The MUI's Basic Guidelines state that its fundamental objective is to participate in the realization of a just, prosperous, safe, and peaceful society (article 2). On its website the MUI also states that its role is to offer advice and guidance andto issue fatwas for the government and the community on religious and social issues to increase activities for the realization of an Islamic brotherhood and harmony between religious communities. Its duties also include tobolster national unity, to form a bridge between scholars and the government, to mediate between the people and the government to foster national development, and to improve relations and cooperation between organizations, Islamic institutions, and Muslim.[45]

The MUI is an *Ulama* (scholars on Islamic doctrine) organization and its members originate from social Islamic organizations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Al-Irsyad, al-Washliyah, Persatuan Islam (Persis), Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (PERTI), and many others. Figures who have served as MUI chairmen include Prof. Dr. Hamka, K.H. Shukri Ghozali, K.H. Hasan

42. Ichwan 2005. "Ulama, State and Politics", p. 47.
43. Ichwan 2005. "Ulama, State and Politics", p. 48.
44. Ichwan 2005. "Ulama, State and Politics", p. 48.
45. Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) 2013, being accessed on February 20, 2013 from http://www.mui.or.id

Basri, Prof. K.H. Ali Yafie, K.H. M. Sahal Mahfudh, and Prof. Dr. Din Syamsuddin. As it states on its website, the MUI has 12 commissions: 1) *fatwa*, 2) Islamic brotherhood, 3) Islamic propagation and community development, 4) education and regeneration, 5) Muslim economic empowerment, 6) information and communication, 7) women, youth, and families, 8) law and legislation, 9) research and study, 10) inter-religious harmony, 11) Islamic art and culture, and 12) foreign relations and international cooperation. The MUI also has councils and institutions such as the National Shari'a Council (*Dewan Syariah Nasional*, DSN) that concentrates on Islamic-labeled economic activities, Research Institute for Food, Drugs and Cosmetics (*Lembaga Pengkajian Pangan Obat-obatan dan Kosmetika*, LP-POM) that produces halal certificates, the Center for the Environment and Natural Resources (PLH-SDA), and others.

In general, the MUI's most fundamental function is to act as *mufti* (*fatwa* maker). Fatwas may be issued by the MUI's *fatwa* commission but also by the DSN while other *fatwas* can be the results of Muslim scholar's consensus and MUI national deliberations. Besides *fatwas*, the MUI also issues other kinds of legal decisions such as recommendations (*tausiyyah*), warnings (*tadhkirah*), instructions or mandates (*amanah*), statements, appeals, and offers new ideas.

The MUI in the New Order era

The MUI is a product of the New Order government. In his opening speech at the MUI first National Conference, President Soeharto declared that the MUI had the roles to act as: 1) translator of concepts and activities of community development at the national and local levels; 2) advisory body for the government related to religious issues; 3) mediator bridging the government and religious scholars; and 4) consultation forum for 'ulama to discuss their duties and responsibilities as religious scholars.[46] The regime's support was not limited to facilitating its programs. New Order regime had always funded the despite the fact the MUI had failed to give the maximum services in recent years.

The above conditions, coupled with the *fatwas* it produced and the personal and institutional closeness of MUI figures and government leaders, many people concluded that the MUI could not be fully independent or free from the ruling regime's interests. According to them, the MUI was an organization created to

46. Ichwan 2005, "Ulama, State and Politics", p. 48.

neutralize Islamic political forces, which often were at odds with Soeharto's regime. It was created to break as well as to neutralize Islam as one of the biggest political forces in Indonesia, to regulate public life and to convince the people to vote for the Golkar in the general elections.[47] Moreover, it was seen to be no more than the most palpable embodiment of the bureaucratization of Islam[48] and only meant to support the state's interests,[49] although in the end it did not perform this role optimally.

In any case, the MUI is not a state agency whose formation is founded on a specific legal source. It remains a non-governmental organization whose leadership is elected by its members on a regular basis. Although the government had a very large share in its formation process, the MUI has not always been in favor of the government interests or its decisions. Several prominent MUI members remain independent and put more priority on the people's demands rather than on government interests.[50] The MUI does not always support the government. In his research, Atho Mudzhar proved that from the 22 *fatwa* the MUI issued from 1975 to 1988, only eight can be classified as supporting government policies, three actually contravened the government, while the remaining 11 were neutral.[51] The three *fatwas* that contravened the government included a *fatwa* related to the prohibition of abortion, the unlawfulness of the use of vasectomy and in vitro fertilazation in family planning programs, and the *fatwa* on the prohibition for Muslims to congratulate Christians at Christmas and to attend Christmas celebrations.

The fatwa that banned Muslims to participate in Christmas celebrations was the first controversial *fatwa* issued by MUI. It was issued on 7 March 1981. The MUI bases its fatwa on Islamic teachings derived from the Koran and the Prophetic Hadith. First of all it underlined that relationships between Muslims and

47. Donald J. Porter 2002, *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia*, (London: RoutledgeCurzon), p. 76.

48. M.B. Hooker 2003, *Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press), p. 60.

49. Martin van Bruinessen 1990, "Indonesia's ulama and politics: caught between legitimising the status quo and searching for alternatives", *Prisma – The Indonesian Indicator*, No. 49.

50. See Muhlim Sirry 2013, "Fatwas and Their Controversy: The Case of the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI)", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 44, no. 1. See also Ichwan 2005, "Ulama, State and Politics".

51. Ichwan 2005, "Ulama, State and Politics", p. 51; Sirry 2013, "Fatwas and Their Controversy", p. 102.

Christians are only allowed with respect to worldly affairs[52]for which it cited three verses of the Koran (QS 49: 13; 31:15; and 60: 8).

Furthermore, the MUI declared that a Muslim should not blur his own worship and theological beliefs with those of other religions. For this it used QS al-Kafirun/106: 1-6 and al-Baqarah/2: 42. To deny the Christian concept of God, it quoted various Qur'anic verses about Jesus and Mary to finally declare that Christmas celebrations cannot be seen in isolation of Jesus' divine status, which is contrary to the Qur'an. Thus, the participation of Muslimsin Christmas celebrations could lead to a syncretic attitude and thus may pollute the Muslim's monotheistic beliefs.

Finally, the MUI quoted a Prophetic Hadith that suggests avoiding something unclear (*shubhat*) to justify that the participation of Muslimsin Christmas celebrations should be seen as meddling with unclear matter. The *fatwa* was reinforced with the rules of Islamic law "to escape from a danger is preferred to trying to take advantage." The MUI thus finally concluded that it is unlawful and therefor forbidden for Muslims to participate in Christmas celebrations. During the authoritarian New Order regime, the MUI also tended to issue *fatwas* related to Islamic jurisprudence and social issues. It appears that it hardly ever issued *fatwas* with a political content or on the state's practices as it would do at a later stage. Initially, on these issues the MUI tended to remain quiet.[53]

This reticence of the MUI showed its weakness and that of the Indonesian Muslims before the New Order regime. Some examples that can be put forward in this context are that the MUI remained silent in the case of the government sponsored football tournaments lottery (*Porkas*) and the tragedy of the killings in Tanjung Priok in 1984 in which the state apparatus was involved. In the first case, the MUI did not whole heartedly welcome the Muslim majority's protest against the lawful status of the *Porkas* lottery as voiced by the NU and the Muhammadiyah.[54] Instead, the chairman of the fatwa commission at that time, Ibrahim Hosen, argued that the kind of gambling that has a negative impact and which Islam disallows differed from the Porkas lottery, which helped the government to execute beneficial

52 Siroj 2013, "Fatwas and Their Controversy" pp. 104-105.

53 Ichwan 2005, "Ulama, State and Politics", p. 51.

54 Bruinessen 1990, "Indonesia's ulama and politics".

activities in the form of sports and youth programs. Hence, Porkas was allowed. In this case, it was clear that MUI opted to comply with the authoritarian government rather than to pay heed to the people's conscience.

In addition to MUI fatwas' legal and social propensity, during the New Order the MUI founded several agencies that later turned out to be its largest sources of income. The MUI formed two institutions: LP-POM in 1989, which grants halal certifications for all food products, drugs, and cosmetics that circulate in Indonesia, and the first Islamic bank, the *Bank Muamalat Indonesia* (BMI) in 1991. It started to organize the rejuvenation of the 'ulama in 1990 by offering courses in Islamic law for prospective religious scholars from various regions. National development has also consistently been one of the MUI's core projects.

The BMI is one the MUI's products in banking. However, its banking-related activities did not halt there. Since the early 1990s, one very important concentration of the MUI was its conceptualization of the Shari'a Banking system and to ensure that all banks would offer Shari'a products. An institution under the MUI's authority that fully participated to this end is the Shari'a Advisory Council (*Dewan Pertimbangan Syari'ah*, DPS). In 1992, the government issued Law no. 7 on the banking system. A derivative regulation of this Law is Government Regulation no. 72/1992. Paragraph 5 states that any bank that applies for the basic principle of profit sharing ---which is claimed as the basic principle of Islamic banking to avoid the forbidden usury---,is required to have or raise a DPS.[55]

A more detailed explanation on the DPS emerged in 1999 in Government Regulation no. 30/1999. It states that a DPS should be independent from the bank's management and it must have the authority to determine whether banking products, services, and activities are in accordance with the Shari'a. The institution most apt to this task is the MUI. Hence, a bank that offers Shari'a products should be supervised by someone from the MUI who sits on its Shari'a Advisory Council. This was of course a big project and it generated large funds because of the MUI people's strategic positions in the banking world. Before the 1990s, this had never been done by this "clergy" institution.

55 Tim Lindsey 2012. "Monopolising Islam: The Indonesian Ulama Council and State Regulation of the Islamic Economy." *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, vol. 48, No. 2, 253

In the 1990s, the government recognized the development of Islamic banking by the issuance of Law no. 10/1998. Wider recognition came in the Reform era after the House approved and passed Law no. 21/2008 on Shari'a Banking.[56] From then on, Shari'a banks enjoyed the same status as conventional banks and all Shari'a banking products were allowed. Nevertheless, frequent disputes arose and overlap occurred between the Central Bank of Indonesia (*Bank Indonesia*, BI) as the highest banking authority and the MUI as the institution that safeguarded and "produced" DPS. On some key issues regarding Islamic banking, BI sometimes decided its own policies, although most still depend to a large extent on the MUI DPS that claims to the most authoritative institution to settle these issues.[57]

The 1995 MUI national conference shows the programs of the MUI in the New Order era most clearly. It appeared that the programs of the MUI were divided into functional and institutional groups.[58] The first are the MUI's traditional tasks as advisor of the government and the community, strengthening Islamic brotherhood, education, and the supervision of Islamic propagation activities, Islamic economy, and Islamic identity. The second included more practical activities such as the propagation ofparticipation in efforts tobuild society, the establishment of Islamic financial forums including Islamic banks and extending enrichmentmodels and trainings for Muslim scholars.

The MUI in the of Reformation Era

The fall of the New Order regime in 1998 brought about changes in the concepts of Indonesian nationality and the governmental system, including Islamic movements and politics. The period of democratic transition meant a return of radical groups and Islamic political parties' demands for the implementation of the Jakarta Charter, which they consider the symbol of the inclusion of the Shari'a in the Indonesian Constitution.[59] The radical-fundamental Islamic movement was

56 Lindsey 2012, "Menjadikan Islam", p. 264.
57 Lindsey 2012, "Monopolising Islam", p. 265.
58 Mawan 2005, "Ulama, State and Politics", pp. 49-50.
59 Saiful Mujani 2007, *Muslim Demokrat: Islam, Budaya Demokrasi, dan Partisipasi Politik di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru*, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama). See also Nurdin Nasir 2007, *Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: PSAP Muhammadiyah) and B. Platzdasch 2011, "Religious freedom in Indonesia: the case of the Ahmadiyah" *ISEAS Working Paper, Politics and Security Series*, no. 2: 1-38.

represented by organizations such as the Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI, 1998), *Laskar Jihad* (LJ, 1999), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*, MMI, 2000), the Muslims Community Forum (*Front Umat Islam*, FUI), the *Jama'ah Islamiyah* (JI), and the Liberation Party of Indonesia (*Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia*, HTI) which had become more and more consolidated despite having itsroots in the period before the Reform era started.[60]

The strengthening of Islamic fundamentalism also extended to the political arena with the founding of the Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan*, PK, 1998) that later became the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS), the Crescent Star Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang*, PBB), in addition to the United Development Party (PPP) that tuned its principles back to Islam. In addition to supporting the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia, some organizations were concerned or even directly involved in religious violence. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, some of them had been involved in the mobilization of the "Islamic forces" that had been deployed in conflict areas. Others had been involved in acts of violence against ethnic and minority groups, as well as in vigilantism against individuals or groups they considered to contravene or offend the Islamic beliefs of the majority. Last but not least, the PKS is a political channel for young Muslim campus activists and it has become the political vehicle for supporters of Islamic revivalists.

However, at the other end of the spectrum, the strengthening Islamic exclusivism in Indonesia produced a response in the emergence of inclusive and even liberal Islamist groups.[61]The Liberal Islam Network (*Jaringan Islam Liberal*, JIL) was formed in 2001 and, according to one of its founders was formed in response to the radical Islamic movementsthat vehementlybrandishedthe flag of *jihad*.[62] In addition to JIL, adherents to

60 Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni 2004 *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo Persada).

61 Komaruddin Hidayat 2005 "Contemporary Liberal Islam in Indonesia: Pluralism and the Secular State", in Chaider S. Bamualim (ed.) *A Portrait of Contemporary Indonesian Islam* (Jakarta: Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya UIN Jakarta and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung).

62 Luthfi Assyaukanie 2007 "Fatwa and Violence in Indonesia" *Journal of Religion and Society*, vol. 11, p. 121. See also Muhamad Ali 2005 "The Rise of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia" *Arena: an Journal of Islamic Socie*

inclusive Islam include the Paramadina Foundation, the Wahid Institute, the Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual Network, and many pro-democracy and human rights groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

In era reformation the MUI has in many ways changed in -- ranging from it's the membership structure up to its activities and the trends in the *fatwas* it issued. Along with the rise of conservative-radical Islamic organizations, the post-1998 membership of the MUI became more dominated by representatives of Islamist groups.[63] The MUI's visions had also changed, especially in the context of the objectives of its fatwas and its relation with the state. The 2000 MUI National Conference, for example, produced the formulation of the organization's new vision. It stated that the MUI was: 1) the successors of the Prophet to spread Islamic teachings and to improve the life of the Muslim community, 2) to issue *fatwas* based both on issues requested by Muslims and unsolicited ones, 3) a counselor and a public servant, 4) an agent of the reform movements (*al-islah wa al-tajdid*), and 5) the upholder of the Qur'anic doctrine of "calling for goodness and eliminating evil". The MUI also firmly positioned itself as the powerful bearer of the moral movement to save guard the propriety of social life. This vision, according Ichwan (2005), showed that the MUI's had changed significantly in two respects: first, the MUI is now less close to the government and more attuned to the changing aspirations of the Muslims. Second, using the strategy of the Islamic Reformists, the MUI led the organization and Indonesian Muslims to adopt a more orthodox ways of living.[64] Changes became more apparent with the publication of the *fatwas* of the MUI from this era which revealed that they had started to enter the realm of politicsandtended to be intolerant and insensitive to Human Rights.

Unlike the *fatwas* the MUI issued during the New Order regime, in the early period of the Reformation, precisely under B.J. Habibie's presidency, the MUI's political position began to emerge. The tendency among some political elite to doubt the legitimacy of Habibie's presidency after he replaced Soeharto, for example, had moved the MUI to gather all its members' support for Habibie. The MUI issued a political

63 Ichwan 2005: "Ulama, State and Politics" p. 51

64 Ichwan 2005: "Ulama, State and Politics" p. 50

statement calling for the acceptance of President Habibie's mandate.

To justify its recommendation, the MUI started its argument by citing the Qur'an. It used QS 3: 104 on "commanding the good and prohibiting evil, QS 4: 59 on the obligation to believe in God, the Prophet and those in authority (viz. the government), and QS 8: 46 on the prohibition to prolong a useless debate. In essence, the MUI urged the president and pro-reform groups to take productive stepsin relation to the importance of a return to religious and moral teachings, to meetthe people's basic, especially economic needs andto continue political reform through cooperation with the Government and the House of Representatives. It also stated that the MUI fully supportedPresident Habibie's leadership.[65]

Ahead of the June 1999general elections, the MUI issued three related recommendations on the importance of taking part in the elections and onthe selection of future leaders. However, the recommendations had different objectives. In April, the first MUI recommendation entitled "the MUI's appeal to make the 1999 elections a success" urged the public to vote. It simply urged the people to give their vote, because it was a way to determine the character of the nation and the society it was also important to elect the trusted political party – the party that would be able to lead the nation into the world of place and prosperity. The first recommendation was very general and did not have the explicit objective to solicit support for or against any particular political party.

The second recommendation was released in May 1999 and entitled "the recommendation of the MUI leadership for the 1999 election". The contents had become more specific. The MUI urged the people to use their right to vote and to choose the leaders who would defend the aspirations of all the citizens. Then the MUI invited Muslims to favor the Islamic brotherhood and Islamic political parties in order to compete for goodness (*fastabiq al-khairat*). Lastly, the recommendation warned Muslims to be vigilant against the latent danger of communism and the Communist Party of Indonesia. This recommendation began to reveal the MUI's intention to invite Indonesian Muslims to vote for Islam-based political parties and invited Islamic parties not to fight one another. In the meantime the MUI called on the Muslims to be wary of certain groups,

65. Ichwan 2005, "Ulama, State and Politics", p. 63.

perhaps also certain political parties, which it considered might harm Islam in Indonesia.

The third recommendation was issued in June, just a few days ahead of the election. From its title, "Instructions to Muslims for the 1999 elections", the MUI seemed to be firm in its advice. By quoting QS 3: 28 on the prohibition for the faithful to make friends with or to ask for help from those who do not believe, this recommendation in essence 1) urged Muslims to choose a political party that would fight for the interests of the people, the nation and the state. 2) invited Muslims to choose a political party that seriously nominated Muslim candidates. 3) opposed a return of communism, authoritarianism, and a secular government and it aimed at discouraging the choice of a political party that had demonstrated that it hated Islam. The last call clearly shows the MUI's call on Muslims to choose a political party ready to fight for the aspirations of the people and the nation and it instructed Muslims not to vote for a non-Muslim leader or political party dominated by non-Muslim candidates.

The tendency the PDIP, under the leadership of Megawati Sukarnoputri, might win the election. The MUI saw this political party was dominated by the non-Muslim candidates.[66] In the end, the MUI's advice did not significantly boost the vote for Islamic parties. The only Islamic party that gained more than 5 percent of the total vote in the 1999 election was the PPP (10.7 percent).[67] Two other parties affiliated with the Islamic masses despite their acceptation of the Pancasila as their principal basis were the PKB (affiliated with the NU, 12.6 percent) and PAN loosely (affiliated with the Muhammadiyah, 7.1 percent). The winner of the 1999 elections, as predicted, was the secular party PDIP (33.7 percent), followed by the Golkar (22.4 percent). The Golkar, which had almost been destroyed as it was identified with Soeharto's authoritarian regime, seems to have benefitted most from the MUI's recommendation. This may be because of the majority of its candidates were Muslims. After all Golkar was the oldest party, while the Islamic parties were the new – comers.

During the administration of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), the MUI also underwent changes especially in its financial administration and in MUI-government relations. In addition to the

66 Ichwan 2005, "Ulama, State and Politics", p. 56.

67 Ricklefs 2008, *Sejarah Indonesia Modern*, p. 710.

consequences of reform, these changes seem to have been inter-related and to have reinforced each other. The MUI distanced itself from the government because Abdurrahman Wahid's administration had terminated state funding. Gus Dur's proposal to cancel the decision to prohibit communism and the ban of the PKI in force since 1966 and to state that it violated Human Rights and his proposal to open diplomatic and economic relations with Israel strengthened the MUI's distancing from the government.

Rejecting Gus Dur's proposal to abrogate the ban on communism and the PKI, the MUI issued two recommendations, which in essence contained a warning to the Indonesian people that Communist/ Marxist-Leninist thoughts were anti-God and anti-religion ideologies aimed to destroy the ethical and religious principles contained in the Pancasila. It rejected all attempts to abort MPR Decree no. 15/1996, and it invited the members of the DPR/MPR to act wisely and not to forget the country's miserablepast. In its second advice, the MUI declared that if the PKI rebellion in 1965had succeeded, life in the country, especially for religious communities,would have been very hard. So it was important for Indonesians to be aware of communisms'latent danger and it suggested the people unite to dispel this threat at all cost.

The MUI's distancing from the government and the growing influx of clerical institutions into the state-political discourse emerged from a *fatwa* presented to the government in 2002 against bribery, corruption, and gratifications. The MUI had actually never issued a fatwa on this issue. As stated above, initially, the MUI tended to be silent and even legitimized government's policies. In the era Reformation, it reversed this reticent attitude. In the case of the *fatwa* on corruption, the MUI felt the urge to present itself as an organization that took part in the passionate changes that were taking place by responding to the people's demands to end massive corruption, bribery and gratifications within the government.[68]

Quoting some Qur'anic verses in addition to the opinions of various influential Muslim scholars, the MUI declared that both giving and receiving bribes and committing corruption were unlawful. Whether offering gratifications to government officials is unlawful or not depended on the context and its

possible consequences (MUI 2002). The issuance of this *fatwa* did not seem to have any significant consequences on both society and the governmentsince widespread corruption remained ever-present. Moreover, the *fatwa* failed to attract public attention and was barely discussed in the mass media or in the anti-corruption movement.

After the 2001 World Trade Center bombing in the United States, rampant acts of terrorism committed by radical Islamic groups that targeted the Western-Pagan symbols in Indonesia drew much public attention, both nationally and internationally. In those years, tourist destinations, cafes, hotels and foreign embassies were among the targets of suicide bombings ranging from the bombings in Kuta and Legian, Bali, to the bomb attacks on the Australian embassy and the J.W. Marriot Hotel in Jakarta. The MUI responded to these incidents fairly slowly and only issued a *fatwa* in 2004. The *fatwa* on terrorism essentially aimed at distinguishing terrorism from holy war (*jihad*) and to the public the MUI underlined its decision that terrorism was forbidden, especially the suicide bombings that occurred in Muslim majority countries like Indonesia.

Like the *fatwa* on corruption, the one on terrorism also did not receive much public or mass media attention. The reason was that the people probably realized that the *fatwa* on terrorism had not been issued whole heartedly, not only because of the MUI's incredibly slow response, but also because the MUI's membership was dominated by Islamist groups that adhered to fundamentalist ideologies which in some cases even overlapped with those of radical Islamist groups. Moreover, the MUI itself did not have a program on its agenda to follow-up the fatwa.

In 2010, the MUI was invited to cooperate with the National Counter Terrorism Agency (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme*, BNPT) as a follow up of the MUI's 2004 *fatwa* to make a series of discourse programs (*halaqah*) on counter-terrorism in a number of cities in the country.[69] Some Islamic fundamentalist organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) were against the program since it was thought to be an attempt to distort and manipulate Islam by way of utilizing Muslim scholars.[70]

HTI objected to the conclusion of many

[69] Tempo, 3 – 9 May 2011, Cadangan Terbaru, p. 23.
[70] Tempo, 3 – 9 May 2011, Cadangan Terbaru, p. 23.



Kyai Haji Syamsudin (center) founder of the Pondok Pesantren Duri Sawo, Ponorogo, East Java

Source: Documentation *Pondok Pesantren Duri Sawo*

people who equalized terrorism with the Islamists' vision on the establishment of the Shari'a and the Caliphate in Indonesia. Nevertheless, the chaotic relations between HTI and the MUI did not last long but were the cause of a series of heated debates. Both seemed to have understood each other, and even started to resume their cooperation to release decisions in line with the interests of Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia, as later will be seen in MUI *fatwas* related to the religiously awkward status of the Ahmadiyah, the unlawfulness of secularism, liberalism and pluralism, etc.

Although the MUI seemed to be more welcoming and sensitive to political issues in this period, the council also paid attention topurely legal and common social issues. A clear example of this are several *fatwas* on cases such as lawful food, and the provision of *halal* certificates for food and cosmetic products. The most famous case and one that received much public attention was the MUI's *fatwa* on Ajinomoto, the food seasoning product from Japan. After having had a *halal* certificate from LP POM MUI from June 1999 until November 2000, Ajinomoto had started to use *bacto soytone* containing pig enzymes to replace *poly-peptone* *enzymes* derived from nuts as one of the ingredients used in its food seasonings product.[71]As a result of this finding, on 16 December 2000,the MUI issued a fatwa declaring that Ajinomoto products were declared "unlawful" (*haram*) and that the Muslim community in Indonesia was not allowed to consume it.

Gus Dur as the President of Indonesia at the time responded to the MUI's declaration on the unlawfulness of Ajinomoto products. According to him, the MUI had been mistaken to issue a *fatwa* on this food seasoning productandthe Muslim community could safely consume the Ajinomoto product.[72] However, his criticism had no effect on the fatwa. On the contrary, Gus Dur's opinion was considered more politically-inspired than having been made for purely religious reasons. Therefore, Islamic political parties along with the other parties in the House of Representatives generally supported the MUI's *fatwa*. The disputes between the legislative council and Gus Dur at that time were worsening by the day.

The Ajinomoto case had set the precedent for the MUI's monopoly over what Tim Lindsey called "Islamic

71 Ichwan 2005 "Islamic State and Politics" p. 69
72 Ichwan 2005 "Islamic State and Politics" p. 70

economy regulation" in the field of halal certification and it obtained the same position as in the case of Islamic banking.[73] LP-POM is the only institution authorized to inspect and identify whether food is *halal* or not. The MUI's *halal fatwa* is not a religious recommendation like *fatwas* on other issueswhere it has a binding effect on the public. In the case of halal certification for industries, the same as in the banking sector, the MUI *halal fatwa* is a ruling instrument with the power to enforce much likestate rules.[74] Furthermore, this monopoly has turnedinto the MUI's primary means of fundraising after Gus Dur's administration had discontinued itssubsidy.

Halal certification is the process of *halal* labeling for a product manufactured or sold in Indonesia, so the cleanliness and the suitability of the product for consumption is guaranteed with the standard rulings contained in Islamic doctrines. The only agency authorized to produce halal certificates is LP-POM MUI,based onLaw no. 7/1996, in which paragraph 30 (2) (e) states that "any person producing or importing food packages to Indonesia for commercial purposes must add amark to the product or on the package stating that the product or package is lawful". Hence, food or goods must first pass a test by the accredited inspection institution which in this case is LP-POM MUI. A *halal* certificate is valid for two years and can be extended. The inspection institution can conduct random tests on certified products at any time and the outcome may influence the decision on the issuance or extension of the certificate.[75]

Fatwa, Religious Violence, and the Development of Islamic Thought

The ascendancy of conservative groups within era of Reformation MUI can no longer be denied. MUI's shift toward conservatism has become more apparent by the issuance of several fatwas that tended to affirm the struggle of conservative groups. So, it is not surprising that the presumption emerged that the MUI and conservatives groups had entered into a relationship beneficial to both, and that it even strengthened their respective positions. Conservatives-fundamentalists are convinced to have secured their existence because the *fatwas* of the MUI tend to be in favor of their line of struggle. While the MUI also feels that public recognition proves its

73 Lindsey 2012 "Monopolising Islam" p. 266.
74 Lindsey 2012 "Monopolising Islam" p. 268.
75 Lindsey 2012 "Monopolising Islam" p. 267.

alignment with the Muslim community. It strengthens its position by defining public opinion through the affirmation of fundamental-conservative groups who always claim themselves to be the representatives of the Muslim-majority in Indonesia.

The climax came in the seventh MUI National Congress in 2005, when it issued no less than 11 *fatwas*. Two of them caused a prolonged and fierce controversy, i.e. the *fatwa* that proclaimed that the Ahmadiyah was heretical and the *fatwa* on the prohibition of secularism, pluralism and liberalism. The 2005 MUI fatwa on the Ahmadiyah was actually not new. The MUI had issued a similar fatwa in 1980 followed by the instruction to the group of Ahmadis in 1984. However, since the New Order regime used to treat the discussion on the religiously sensitive issues as something unwanted MUI's fatwa and instruction gave no social effects. The Ahmadiyah adherents could still continue to live and practice their faith as they had done since 1925.[76]

However, 2005 seemed to tell another story. The radical Islamic groups' intensive rhetoric and strong lobbying had forced the MUI to re-issue its fatwa in stronger language on this group of Islam that was originally rooted in India. The 2005 fatwa combines the 1980 MUI *fatwa* and the 1984 instruction and affirmed that 1) the Ahmadiyah doctrine deviates from Islam, 2), Ahmadiyah followers must return to true Islam based on the Qur'an and the Hadith, and 3) the government has to prohibit the adherence to Ahmadiyah principles and to ban the Ahmadiyyah from Indonesia. Ultimately, the 2005 MUI *fatwa* justified radical Islamic groups such as the FUI and FPI's intimidating actions, physical violence, persecution, arson andthe closing of Ahmadiyah offices and places of worship.

From 2005 to 2008 the violence radical Islamic groups perpetrated against the Ahmadiyah congregation was intense. In 2008, one radical group even urged the government to issue a Joint Decree (SKB) by the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Attorney General and the Minister of the Interior on the Ahmadiyah's deviant status and the cessation of all activities to spread itsdoctrine in Indonesia (Joint Decree of three ministers, 2008). In those years, the Ahmadiyah congregation was forced to return to the true teachings of

76. [illegible]

Islam.[77] In fact, as voiced by a senior FPI official, Shabri Lubis, the Ahmadiyah congregation had to be combatted. In public, FPI leaders called on Muslims to brandish the flag of war against the Ahmadiyyah and to declare that they had polluted the Islamic faith, on the basis of which spilling their blood was lawful.[78] Some organizations noted that the period from 2005 to 2011 had seen houses, mosques, offices, and schools that belonged to the Ahmadiyah in West Java, Lombok, and Banten destroyed and set on fire, and at least two Ahmadis had been murdered.[79]

Another manifestation of the MUI's increasing favor with the growing current of post-reform Islamic conservatism is the MUI fatwa on the unlawfulness of pluralism, liberalism and secularism. In its *fatwa*, the MUI firstly explained the definitions of the three issues at hand. The MUI divided pluralism into religious pluralism and the plurality of religions. The first term, which the MUI rejected and which became the concern of the fatwa was the understanding that all religions are equal and each religious truth is relative. The second term, which the MUI finds acceptable, is the reality of the presence of different religions and that their adherents live alongside each another. The MUI understood religious liberalism as understanding religious texts or giving them meaning by the use of reason and the only accepted religious doctrine are those that accordwith rationality. It defined secularism as the separation of worldly and religious affairs, in which religion is only seen as a personal relationship with God, while human relations are governed by social contracts. Furthermore, to conclude the *fatwa*, the MUI stated that pluralism, liberalism and secularism had abused Islam and, therefore, Muslims were not allowed to follow these ideologies.[80]

The *fatwa* on the unlawfulness of pluralism, liberalism, and secularism inevitably incited responses and criticism from various factions as well as from the religious communities. The proponents of the *fatwa* were Islamic radical groups, who used it to legitimate theirthreats and acts of violence, as may be seen in the raid on JIL's office

in Utan Kayu, East Jakarta, only a few days after the *fatwa* had been issued.[81] Criticism was also voiced by inclusive and liberal circles and Dawam Rahardjo pointed out that the *fatwa* had obviously upset and violated the freedom of thought, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of religion, as well as the freedom of belief, all of which are the most basic human rights.[82] He also pointed out that the definitions of the three key concepts in the fatwa were very problematic and misguiding. Azyumardi Azra, a Muslim intellectual and the Rector of the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta at the time, had the same critique arguing that the MUI could not prohibit or discourage people to think, while pluralism, liberalism, and secularism are not ideologies but ways of thinking.[83] Azra thought that the MUI's problematic definitions of the three key terms in the *fatwa* was caused by the MUI membership which was dominated by groups that understand the Qur'an and the Hadith literally withoutusing reason or logic.

A representative of the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia had the same critique. Hasyim Muzadi, the general chairman of the NU at that time, asserted that the *fatwa* of the MUI was a step backwards in the context of inter-religious relations in Indonesia. While Masdar Mas'udi, another NU leader, explicitly demanded that the MUI revoke its fatwa because it might trigger increasing violence in the name of religion. Criticism was also voiced by Christian circles. Franz Magnis-Suseno said that pluralism is actually a very clear and very positive concept in the reality of diversity. He thoughtthat the MUI's definition of the term pluralism was one typically given by hardliner groups and that it would lead to the instigation of the persecution of pluralists among Islamic groups.[84]

These *fatwas*, especially those issued by the post-reform MUI leadership appear to be more concerned with politics, as can be seen in the case of elections and related *fatwas* on the rights of certain groups. The *fatwas* of the MUI often stimulate the issuance of new policies by the Ministry of Religious Affairs that have

81. Assyaukanie 2009, "Fatwa and Violence in Indonesia", p. 14. See also Sirry 2013, "Fatwas and Their Controversy", p. 116.

82. Dawam Rahardjo 2005, "Kala MUI Mengharamkan Pluralisme", *Koran Tempo*, August 1, 2005.

83. Sirry 2013, "Fatwas and Their Controversy", p. 113.

84. Sirry 2013, "Fatwas and Their Controversy", p. 113.

more formal legal force and are hence binding. The collaboration between both has led to the strengthening of conservatism and radicalism. This can be seen, for example, in the emergence of religious leaders and Islamic organizations that openly or covertly support or condone acts that restrict and violate the principles of religious freedom.[85] This group seems to display an ambivalent attitude about the disruption of religious harmony in Indonesia.It condemned terrorism but did not have a similar attitude against religion-based violence related to sectarian conflicts and to disputes concerning houses of worship.[86]

On the other side, the collaborative policies of the Ministry of Religion and the MUI have caused extended and profound discussions about Islamic thinking,[87] as seen in the debate between Dawam Raharjo versus Ma'ruf Amin and Budhy Munawwar Rachman's verbal attack against Adian Husaini in his book on the freedom of religion and belief, particularly when he addressed the Ahmadiyah case. For this reason, some peoplethink that the policies of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the MUI also have a bearing on the development of the discourse on Islamic thinking in Indonesia.

Conclusion

The Ministry of Religious Affairs and the MUI are two institutions intimately associated with religious issues in Indonesia. The Ministry of Religious Affairs is a formal institution that takes care of religious affairs and issues policies related toreligion for all faiths in Indonesia. The operational costs of the ministry are born by the state's budget. The MUI is a social organization of religious scholars, Muslim leaders, and Indonesian Muslims intellectuals meant to offer explanationsand legal decisions on religious issues that arise within the Indonesian Muslim community. In the early phase of its establishment, the MUI budget came from the state but since Gus Dur's administration, the state no longer does so.

The two institutions have several things in common. One is that both have the task to ensure that harmonious inter-religious relations are maintained to

85. Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), 2013. *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the Conservative Turn*. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).

86. Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi 2014. *Pemuliaan Komik*, p. 4.

87. Sirry 2013. "Fatwas and their Controversy", p. 115.

strengthen national unity. Fostering religious harmony has thus been one of the main reasons behind the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. While the MUI is a non-government community channel it is also the government's advisor on religious affairs. Unfortunately, in some cases, both institutions donot guard harmony but rather trigger inter-religious problems. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, for example, was unable to meet human rights activists'view that PNPS Law was an aperture for the rise of intolerance against religious minorities. In its turn, the MUI has become one of the vehicles for radical-fundamental Islamist groups and is thus seen to condone their beliefs that often conflict with the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In the case of the Ahmadiyah, to be more specific, the MUI fatwas and the joined decree signed by among others the Ministry of Religious Affairs do not solve religious harmony issues but rather instigate intolerance, acts of vigilantism, and even murder committed by religious majority groups and thus are clearly contrary to efforts for the development of religious harmony.



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